Senate Bill 68
By: Senators Kennedy of the 18th, Gooch of the 51st, Robertson of the 29th, Anavitarte of
the 31st, Walker III of the 20th and others
AS PASSED
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT
To amend Titles 9, 40, and 51 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to civil
practice, motor vehicles, and torts, respectively, so as to provide for substantive and
comprehensive revision of provisions regarding civil practice, evidentiary matters, damages,
and liability in tort actions; to provide limitations relative to evidence of noneconomic
damages; to provide for timing of answers and discovery; to provide for dismissals of civil
actions; to provide for attorney's fees, court costs, and litigation expenses; to provide for
admissibility of evidence related to seat safety belts; to provide for trial procedures; to
provide for a negligent security cause of action; to provide for exclusive remedies for
negligent security actions subject to exceptions; to provide for apportionment of damages in
negligent security actions; to provide for the recovery of special damages for medical and
healthcare expenses in personal injury and wrongful death cases; to provide for construction;
to provide for definitions; to provide for related matters; to provide for an effective date and
applicability; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA:
SECTION 1.
Title 9 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to civil practice, is amended by
revising Code Section 9-10-184, relating to value of pain and suffering may be argued, as
follows:
"9-10-184.
(a) As used in this Code section, the term:
(1) 'Economic damages' means pecuniary damages recoverable in tort for bodily injury
or wrongful death, including, but not limited to, damages for past and future medical
expenses; costs of rehabilitation; costs of therapy; loss of wages; loss of income; loss of
earning capacity; loss of services performed by the injured or deceased person as a result
of the injury or death, including domestic and other necessary services performed without
compensation; and funeral or burial expenses.
(2) 'Noneconomic damages' means all damages recoverable in tort for bodily injury or
wrongful death other than economic damages, including, but not limited to, damages for
physical or emotional pain, discomfort, anxiety, hardship, distress, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment
of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, and
in wrongful death cases, the nonpecuniary elements of the full value of life.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, in the trial of any
action to recover damages for bodily injury or wrongful death, counsel shall not argue the
worth or monetary value of noneconomic damages, and counsel shall not, in the hearing
of the jury or any prospective juror, elicit any testimony regarding, or make any reference
to, any specific amount or range of amounts of noneconomic damages, the measure of such
damages being the enlightened conscience of an impartial jury.
(c)(1) In the trial of any action to recover damages for bodily injury or wrongful death,
counsel for any party shall be allowed to argue the worth or monetary value of
noneconomic damages only after the close of evidence and at the time of such party's
first opportunity to argue the issue of damages, provided that such argument shall be
rationally related to the evidence of noneconomic damages and shall not make reference
to objects or values having no rational connection to the facts proved by the evidence.
(2) If counsel is entitled to the opening and concluding arguments, then counsel shall not
be allowed to argue the worth or monetary value of noneconomic damages during such
counsel's concluding argument unless counsel has argued the worth or monetary value
of noneconomic damages during such counsel's opening argument, and such counsel shall
not argue a different worth or monetary value of noneconomic damages in concluding
arguments than was argued in such counsel's opening argument.
(d) If counsel elicits any testimony, or makes any argument or reference, prohibited by this
Code section in the hearing of the jury or one or more prospective jurors, the court shall
take remedial measures as provided in Code Section 9-10-185 or shall, with respect to
prospective jurors, excuse the prospective jurors.
(e) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to prohibit counsel from asking
prospective jurors during voir dire whether they could return a verdict that does not award
any damages or a verdict in excess of some unspecified amount, provided that such
question is supported by the evidence. In the trial of a civil action for personal injuries,
counsel shall be allowed to argue the worth or monetary value of pain and suffering to the
jury; provided, however, that any such argument shall conform to the evidence or
reasonable deductions from the evidence in the case."
SECTION 2.
Said title is further amended in Code Section 9-11-12, relating to answer, defenses, and
objections, when and how presented and heard, when defenses waived, and stay of discovery,
by revising subsections (a), (e), and (j) as follows:
"(a) When answer presented.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a A defendant shall serve his
an answer within 30 days after the service of the summons and complaint upon him the
defendant, unless otherwise provided by statute. A cross-claim or counterclaim shall not
require an answer, unless one is required by order of the court, and shall automatically
stand denied.
(2) Unless the court sets a different time, serving a motion under this Code section alters
the time for serving an answer pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection as follows:
(A) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until trial, the answer
shall be served within 15 days after notice of the court's action; or
(B) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the answer shall be
served within 15 days after the more definite statement is served."
"(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading
is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame
a proper responsive pleading, he shall nevertheless answer or respond to the best of his
ability, and he such party may move for a more definite statement. The motion shall point
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order
of the court is not obeyed within 15 days after notice of the order, or within such other time
as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or
make such order as it deems just."
"(j) Stay of discovery.
(1) If a party files a motion to dismiss before or at the time of filing an answer and
pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, discovery shall be stayed for 90 days after
the filing of such motion or until the ruling of the court on such motion; provided,
however, that, if a defendant files an answer before the ruling of the court on such
motion, the stay imposed by this subsection shall immediately terminate with respect to
such defendant, whichever is sooner. The court shall decide the motion to dismiss within
the 90 days provided in this paragraph following the conclusion of briefing on such
motion.
(2) The discovery period and all discovery deadlines shall be extended for a period equal
to the duration of the stay imposed by this subsection.
(3) If the court has not ruled on the motion to dismiss within 90 days following the
conclusion of briefing on such motion, the The court may upon its own motion or upon
motion of a party, and for good cause shown, terminate or modify the stay imposed by
this subsection but shall not extend such stay; provided, however, that such remedy shall
not preclude any other remedy available for the failure to timely rule on such motion,
including, but not limited to, a writ of mandamus.
(4) If a motion to dismiss raises defenses set forth in paragraph (2), (3), (5), or (7) of
subsection (b) of this Code section; or if any party needs discovery in order to identify
persons who may be joined or substituted as proper parties; or if any party needs
discovery in order to establish the jurisdiction of the court, limited discovery needed to
respond to such defenses, to or identify such persons, or to establish such jurisdiction
shall be permitted until the court rules on such motion notwithstanding the stay imposed
by this subsection.
(5) The provisions of this subsection shall not modify or affect the provisions of
paragraph (2) of subsection (f) of Code Section 9-11-23 or any other power of the court
to stay discovery."
SECTION 3.
Said title is further amended in Code Section 9-11-41, relating to dismissal of actions and
recommencement within six months, by revising subsection (a) as follows:
"(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect.:
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of subsection (e) of Code
Section 9-11-23, Code Section 9-11-66, and any statute, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff, without order or permission of court:
(A) By filing a written notice of dismissal at any time before the first witness is sworn
the sixtieth day following the date the opposing party serves an answer; or
(B) By filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action.
(2) Effect. A dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subsection is without prejudice,
except that if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal or state court action based on
or including the same claim, such notice or stipulation operates as an adjudication upon
the merits.
(2)(3) By order of court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, an
action shall not be dismissed upon the plaintiff's motion except upon order of the court
and upon the terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him or her of the plaintiff's motion to
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless the
court order states otherwise, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(3) Effect. A dismissal under this subsection is without prejudice, except that the filing
of a second notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
SECTION 4.
Said title is further amended in Chapter 15, relating to court and litigation costs, by adding
a new Code section to read as follows:
"9-15-16.
(a) In any civil action, no party shall recover the same attorney's fees, court costs, or
expenses of litigation more than once pursuant to one or more statutes authorizing awards
of attorney's fees, court costs, or expenses of litigation, whether such statute or statutes
authorize such awards for compensatory or punitive purposes, unless the statute or statutes
specifically authorize the recovery of duplicate attorney's fees, court costs, or expenses of
litigation.
(b) In any civil action, if a party seeks to recover attorney's fees pursuant to any statute
authorizing an award of reasonable attorney's fees, a contingent fee agreement between
such party and such party's attorney shall not be admissible as proof of the reasonableness
of the fees.
(c) Nothing in this Code section shall limit or diminish any contractual right to recover
attorney's fees, court costs, or expenses of litigation."
SECTION 5.
Title 40 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to motor vehicles, is amended
in Code Section 40-8-76.1, relating to use of safety belts in passenger vehicles, by revising
subsection (d) as follows:
"(d)(1) The failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt in any seat
of a motor vehicle which has a seat safety belt or belts shall not be considered evidence
of negligence or causation, shall not otherwise be considered by the finder of fact on any
question of liability of any person, corporation, or insurer, shall not be any basis for
cancellation of coverage or increase in insurance rates, and shall not may be considered
in any civil action as evidence admissible on the issues of negligence, comparative
negligence, causation, assumption of risk, or apportionment of fault or for any other
purpose and may be evidence used to diminish any recovery for damages arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, occupancy, or operation of a motor vehicle; provided,
however, that this paragraph shall not prevent a court from determining the admissibility
of such evidence pursuant to Code Section 24-4-403 or any other statutory or common
law rule of evidence.
(2) The failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt in any seat of
a motor vehicle which has a seat safety belt or belts shall not be any basis for a
cancellation of insurance coverage or an increase in insurance rate."
SECTION 6.
Title 51 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to torts, is amended in Chapter 3,
relating to liability of owners and occupiers of land, by adding a new article to read as
follows:
"ARTICLE 5
51-3-50.
As used in this article, the term:
(1) 'Negligent security' means any claim against an owner or occupier, or against a
security contractor, that:
(A) Sounds in tort or nuisance, including, but not limited to, any claim under Article 1
of this chapter;
(B) Seeks to recover damages for bodily injury or wrongful death; and
(C) Arises from an alleged failure to keep the premises and approaches safe from the
wrongful conduct of third persons.
(2) 'Owner or occupier' means any person that owns, leases, occupies, operates,
maintains, or manages real property of any kind or any director, officer, employee, or
agent of such person.
(3) 'Particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person' means
information actually known to an owner or occupier and deemed credible by the owner
or occupier, which causes the owner or occupier to consciously understand that a third
person is likely to imminently engage in wrongful conduct on the premises that poses a
clear danger to the safety of persons upon the premises, such information being specific
as to the identity of the third person, the nature and character of the wrongful conduct, the
degree of dangerousness of the wrongful conduct, and the location, time, and
circumstances of the wrongful conduct.
(4) 'Premises' means the real property that is owned, leased, occupied, operated,
maintained, or managed by an owner or occupier.
(5) 'Prior occurrences of substantially similar wrongful conduct' means prior occurrences
of wrongful conduct which are sufficiently similar in nature and character, degree of
dangerousness, proximity, location, time, and circumstances to the wrongful conduct
from which a claim of negligent security arises to lead a reasonable person in the position
of the owner or occupier to apprehend that such wrongful conduct is reasonably likely to
occur upon the premises, to understand the risk of injury to persons upon the premises
presented by such wrongful conduct, and to understand that a specific and known
physical condition of the premises has created a risk of such wrongful conduct on the
premises that is substantially greater than the general risk of such wrongful conduct in the
vicinity of the premises.
(6) 'Security contractor' means any person that contracts with an owner or occupier to
provide protective or security services upon any premises or any director, officer,
employee, or agent of such person.
(7) 'Third person' means any person other than an owner or occupier or a security
contractor or a person under the direction, control, or supervision of an owner or occupier
or security contractor.
(8) 'Wrongful conduct' means:
(A) Any violation of a law of this state or an ordinance of any political subdivision
thereof that is punishable as a felony or misdemeanor, regardless of whether such
violation results in an arrest, citation, accusation, indictment, or conviction; or
(B) Any other conduct that amounts to an intentional, or willful and wanton, tort.
51-3-51.
Except as provided in Code Section 51-3-54, an owner or occupier shall be liable for
negligent security arising from any injury sustained by any person upon the premises of the
owner or occupier as an invitee if the plaintiff proves that:
(1) The wrongful conduct by a third person that caused the injury sustained by the invitee
was reasonably foreseeable because the owner or occupier:
(A) Had particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person; or
(B) Reasonably should have known that a third person was reasonably likely to engage
in such wrongful conduct upon the premises, based on:
(i) Prior occurrences of substantially similar wrongful conduct upon the premises of
which the owner or occupier had actual knowledge;
(ii) Prior occurrences of substantially similar wrongful conduct upon the property
adjoining the premises, or otherwise occurring within 500 yards of the premises, of
which the owner or occupier had actual knowledge; or
(iii) Prior occurrences of substantially similar wrongful conduct by the third person
whose wrongful conduct caused the injury, if the owner or occupier knew or should
have known, by clear and convincing evidence, that such third person was or would
be upon the premises and if the owner or occupier had actual knowledge of such prior
occurrences of substantially similar wrongful conduct;
(2) The injury sustained by the invitee was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such
wrongful conduct by a third person;
(3) Such wrongful conduct by a third person was a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of such third person exploiting a specific physical condition of the premises known to the
owner or occupier, which created a reasonably foreseeable risk of wrongful conduct on
the premises that was substantially greater than the general risk of wrongful conduct in
the vicinity of the premises;
(4) The owner or occupier failed to exercise ordinary care to remedy or mitigate such
specific and known physical condition of the premises and to otherwise keep the premises
safe from such wrongful conduct by a third person; and
(5) Such failure of the owner or occupier to exercise ordinary care was a proximate cause
of the injury sustained by the invitee.
51-3-52.
Except as provided in Code Section 51-3-54, an owner or occupier shall be liable for
negligent security arising from any injury sustained by any person upon the premises of the
owner or occupier as a licensee if the plaintiff proves that:
(1) The wrongful conduct by a third person that caused the injury sustained by the
licensee was reasonably foreseeable because the owner or occupier had particularized
warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person;
(2) The injury sustained by the licensee was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
such wrongful conduct by a third person;
(3) Such wrongful conduct by a third person was a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of such third person exploiting a specific physical condition of the premises known to the
owner or occupier, which created a reasonably foreseeable risk of wrongful conduct on
the premises that was substantially greater than the general risk of wrongful conduct in
the vicinity of the premises;
(4) The owner or occupier willfully and wantonly failed to exercise any care to remedy
or mitigate the specific and known physical condition of the premises and to otherwise
keep the premises safe from such wrongful conduct by a third person; and
(5) Such failure of the owner or occupier to exercise any care was a proximate cause of
the injury sustained by the licensee.
51-3-53.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this Code section, the
provisions of this article shall be the sole and exclusive remedy for negligent security
against owners or occupiers, and no owner or occupier shall be liable for negligent security
except as provided in this article.
(b) Nothing in this article shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect any cause of action
brought pursuant to Code Section 51-1-56 or any other applicable law or theory of recovery
otherwise recognized by law, including, but not limited to, negligence and nuisance, in
connection with an alleged violation of Code Section 16-5-46.
(c) Nothing in this article shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect any claim or
remedy for breach of contract or any other claim, remedy, or cause of action not arising
under Article 1 of this chapter.
51-3-54.
Notwithstanding Code Sections 51-3-51 and 51-3-52, no owner or occupier shall be liable
for negligent security:
(1) Arising from an injury sustained by a person upon the premises of the owner or
occupier as a trespasser;
(2) Arising from an injury sustained by a person not upon the premises of the owner or
occupier;
(3) Arising from the wrongful conduct of a third person, if such wrongful conduct did
not occur upon the premises and in a place from which the owner or occupier had the
legal right and authority to exclude such third person;
(4) Arising from the wrongful conduct of a third person, if such third person was upon
the premises as a tenant or as a guest of a tenant, if the owner or occupier had
commenced eviction proceedings against such tenant at the time of the wrongful conduct;
(5) Arising from an injury sustained by a third person upon the premises of the owner
or occupier as an invitee or a licensee, if such person:
(A) Came upon the premises for the purpose of committing any violation of a law of
this state that is punishable as a felony or any violation of Chapter 8 of Title 16 that is
punishable as a misdemeanor; or
(B) Was engaged at the time of the injury in the commission of any violation of a law
of this state that is punishable as a felony or any violation of Chapter 8 of Title 16 that
is punishable as a misdemeanor, provided that this subparagraph shall not apply to a
victim of a violation of Code Section 16-5-46;
(6) Arising from an injury sustained upon premises that is used as a single-family
residence; or
(7) Based on a particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person,
if the owner or occupier made any reasonable effort to provide such information to law
enforcement personnel, provided that calling 9-1-1 or otherwise making a report about
such information to law enforcement personnel shall be deemed a reasonable effort.
51-3-55.
(a) No owner or occupier shall be required to exercise extraordinary care to keep persons
on or around any premises safe from wrongful conduct by a third person, and no owner or
occupier shall be required to assume the responsibilities and obligations of government for
law enforcement and public safety.
(b) In any action for negligent security, in assessing whether an owner or occupier has
breached a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep persons on or around any premises safe
from wrongful conduct by a third person, the trier of fact shall consider the security
measures employed by the owner or occupier at the time of the injury from which the claim
of negligent security arises, the need for additional or other security measures, the
practicality of additional or other security measures, whether additional or other security
measures would have prevented the injury, the respective responsibilities of owners or
occupiers with respect to the premises and government with respect to law enforcement and
public safety, and any other relevant circumstances.
51-3-56.
In any action for negligent security:
(1) If the trier of fact finds that any defendant is liable to the plaintiff, the trier of fact
shall make an apportionment of fault under Code Section 51-12-33, and in making such
an apportionment, the trier of fact shall reasonably apportion fault to:
(A) The owner or occupier;
(B) Any third person whose wrongful conduct was a cause of the injury from which
the claim of negligent security arises; and
(C) Any other persons to whom fault otherwise should be apportioned under Code
Section 51-12-33;
(2) In connection with an apportionment of fault under Code Section 51-12-33, no party
shall offer evidence, or make an argument or other comment in the hearing of any juror
or prospective juror, concerning:
(A) Any sentence of imprisonment or probation, fine, or other punishment that has
been, or could be, imposed in a criminal prosecution of any third person for the
wrongful conduct from which the claim of negligent security arises;
(B) The financial resources of any party or nonparty; or
(C) The effect of an apportionment of fault upon any award of damages to the plaintiff;
and
(3) If a jury fails as the trier of fact to apportion a reasonable degree of fault to the third
person whose wrongful conduct was a cause of the injury from which the claim of
negligent security arises, the trial court shall set aside the verdict of the jury and order a
retrial of liability and damages. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that an
apportionment of fault is unreasonable if the total percentage of fault apportioned to all
third persons for their wrongful conduct is less than the total percentage of fault
apportioned to all owners or occupiers, security contractors, and other persons and
entities that did not engage in wrongful conduct.
51-3-57.
(a) If a security contractor assumes and undertakes a duty to invitees and licensees to keep
all or part of a premises of an owner or occupier safe from the wrongful conduct of a third
person, the security contractor may be liable for negligent security only in the same
manner, to the same extent, and subject to the same limitations and provisions applicable
to an owner or occupier contained in this article. In no event shall a security contractor be
subject to liability for negligent security to an extent greater than the liability for negligent
security of an owner or occupier.
(b) No security contractor shall be liable for negligent security except as provided in this
Code section.
(c) Nothing in this Code section shall limit or otherwise affect any claim or remedy of an
owner or occupier for breach of contract."
SECTION 7.
Said title is further amended in Article 1 of Chapter 12, relating to general provisions relative
to damages, by adding a new Code section to read as follows:
"51-12-1.1.
(a) In any civil action to recover damages resulting from injury or death to a person,
special damages for medical and healthcare expenses shall be recoverable only as provided
in this Code section.
(b) Special damages for medical and healthcare expenses shall be limited to the reasonable
value of medically necessary care, treatment, or services, and the amount of such special
damages shall be determined by the trier of fact.
(c) If the plaintiff in any such civil action has any form of public or private health
insurance, including benefits under a governmental workers' compensation program,
evidence relevant to the determination of the reasonable value of medically necessary care,
treatment, or services pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section shall include both the
amounts charged for past, present, or future medical and healthcare expenses and the
amounts actually necessary to satisfy such charges pursuant to the insurance contract or the
applicable governmental workers' compensation program, regardless of whether the health
insurance has been used, is used, or will be used to satisfy such charges.
(d) In any claim for medical and healthcare expenses rendered under a letter of protection
or any other arrangement by which a healthcare provider renders treatment in exchange for
a promise of payment for the plaintiff's medical and healthcare expenses from any
judgment or settlement of a civil action to recover damages resulting from injury or death
to a person, regardless of how such arrangement is referred to, the following shall be
relevant and discoverable:
(1) A copy of the letter of protection;
(2) All charges for the plaintiff's medical and healthcare expenses, which shall be
itemized and, to the extent applicable, coded according to generally accepted medical
billing practices;
(3) If the healthcare provider sells the accounts receivable for the plaintiff's medical and
healthcare expenses to a third party at less than the invoice price:
(A) The name of the third party; and
(B) The dollar amount for which the third party purchased such accounts receivable;
and
(4) Whether the claimant was referred for treatment under a letter of protection or other
similar arrangement and, if so, the identity of the person who made the referral.
(e) It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Code section abrogates the common
law collateral source rule to the extent necessary to introduce the evidence described in this
Code section; provided, however, that nothing in this Code section shall be construed or
applied to prevent the court from issuing appropriate jury instructions to clarify the role of
collateral source payments and to prevent potential jury confusion regarding the effect of
collateral source payments on the plaintiff's recovery.
(f) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed or applied to limit the right of a plaintiff
or defendant to present evidence or testimony, or both, challenging the reasonableness of
medical and healthcare expenses, whether incurred or projected future expenses, or the
medical necessity of any treatment."
SECTION 8.
Said title is further amended in said article by adding a new Code section to read as follows:
"51-12-15.
(a) In any action to recover damages for bodily injury or wrongful death, any party may
elect, by written demand prior to the entry of the pretrial order, to have fault and any award
of damages determined at trial in the following manner:
(1) In the first phase of the trial, the trier of fact shall determine the fault of each
defendant, and if the trier of fact finds that any defendant is at fault for the plaintiff's
injuries or wrongful death, the trier of fact shall further determine through an appropriate
form of the verdict the percentages of fault of all persons or entities that contributed to
such injuries or wrongful death as provided in Code Section 51-12-33, prior to any
determination of the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any such findings are
required. The evidence and arguments of counsel in the first phase of the trial shall be
limited to the issues provided for in this paragraph;
(2) If the trier of fact finds in the first phase of the trial that any defendant is at fault for
the plaintiff's injuries or wrongful death, the trial shall be recommenced immediately with
the same judge and the same jury. In the second phase of the trial, the trier of fact shall
determine all compensatory damages to be awarded to the plaintiff, if any, and the
evidence and arguments of counsel shall be limited to this issue; and
(3) If the trier of fact finds in the second phase of the trial that any compensatory
damages are to be awarded to the plaintiff, the trial may be recommenced immediately
with the same judge and the same jury for such further proceedings as may be required,
including, but not limited to, proceedings provided for in subsection (d) of Code Section
51-12-5.1 concerning punitive damages and proceedings to determine liability for, and
the amount of, any attorney's fees, court costs, or expenses of litigation that may be
awarded by the trier of fact as provided by law.
(b) The court may reject an election by any party made pursuant to subsection (a) of this
Code section and order the concurrent trial of fault and damages only upon motion by any
party in opposition to such election and upon the court's determination that:
(1) The plaintiff, or if the plaintiff is the legal guardian of a minor, the minor, was
injured by an alleged sexual offense and would be likely to suffer serious psychological
or emotional distress as a result of testifying more than once in a bifurcated proceeding;
or
(2) The amount in controversy is less than $150,000.00."
SECTION 9.
(a) This Act shall become effective upon its approval by the Governor or upon its becoming
law without such approval.
(b) Sections 6 and 7 of this Act shall apply only with respect to causes of action arising on
or after the effective date of this Act, and any prior causes of action shall be governed by
prior law. It is the intention of the General Assembly that all other provisions of this Act
shall apply to causes of action pending on the effective date of this Act, unless such
application would be unconstitutional.
SECTION 10.
All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed.