---
title: Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X. Bill of attainder; ex post facto laws; and retroactive laws.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-i-sec-i-para-x
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X
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date: 2016
status: active
corpus_version: 2025-supplement-89aa39ab3c68
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heading_path: CONSTITUTION OF THE / BILL OF RIGHTS / RIGHTS OF PERSONS
---

# Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X. Bill of attainder; ex post facto laws; and retroactive laws.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or laws impairing the obligation of contract or making irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities shall be passed.

## Cross References

Bill of attainder, U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, Cl. 1 and § 1-3-5. Statute of limitation defense to contracts, §§ 9-3-24 et seq. and 11-2-725. Statute of frauds defense, §§ 11-1-206, 11-2-201, and 11-8-319. Unconscionable contracts, § 11-2-302. Capacity of parties, § 13-3-20 et seq. Grounds to deny the obligations of contracts, §§ 13-4-22, 13-4-60 et seq., 13-4-81 et seq., 13-5-1 et seq. Fraud, § 13-5-5. Duress, § 13-5-6. Illegal and void contracts generally, § 13-8-1 et seq.

## Law Reviews

For article, ‘‘Constitutionality of Economic Regulations,’’ see 2 J. of Pub. L. 98 (1953). For article discussing Georgia alimony provisions allowing modification of judgments with respect to federal and state constitutional limitations, see 18 Ga. B.J. 153 (1955). For article, ‘‘Personal Rights, Property Rights and Due Process: A Comparison of Constitutional Protection in the Georgia Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court,’’ see 9 Mercer L. Rev. 253 (1958). For article discussing the effect of Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) on marketable title laws, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1005 (1983). For article, ‘‘Federal Preemption, Federal Conscription Under the New Superfund Act,’’ see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 643 (1987). For annual survey on local government law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 213 (2012).

For note, ‘‘Annexation by Municipalities in Georgia,’’ see 2 Mercer L. Rev. 423 (1951). For note, ‘‘Restrictive Covenants: A Need For Reappraisal of the Limitations Period,’’ see 17 Ga. St. B.J. 137 (1981).

For comment on Winston v. State, 186 Ga. 573, 198 S.E. 667 (1938), see 1 Ga. B.J. 46 (1939). For comment on General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Saliba, 260 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1958), see 11 Mercer L. Rev. 235 (1959). For comment on Sanders v. Harper, 220 Ga. 649, 141 S.E.2d 156 (1965), see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 311 (1965). For comment on revival prosecutions and the ex post facto clauses, see 50 Emory L.J. 397 (2001).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. I, Sec. I, Para. VII.

## Status Analogous to Contractual Resequent Provisions.

The approval of school bonds by the electors and their validation according to statute created a status analogous to a contractual relation between such electors and the state, which could not be destroyed or impaired by a subsequent statute or constitutional provision. Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946). tional prohibition. Morris v. Interstate Bond Co., 180 Ga. 689, 180 S.E. 819 (1935).

No bar to tax legislation effective upon business or occupation in year General Consideration (Cont’d)

## Contract Between State and Individual Is Protected by This Constituin Which Enacted.

It is competent for the legislature to enact that a person entering upon the business or occupation upon which the tax provided in an ordinance has been imposed, by the terms thereof, should pay the amount of the tax named for the year, or for any period of time within the year, during which the person should choose to apply for a license. Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City ofAtlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803 (1968).

Statute made no irrevocable grant

## Of Right of Taxation.

Former Code 1933, § 56-1310, (see now O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8) was not unconstitutional because it neither made any irrevocable grant of special privileges and immunities nor did it irrevocably give, grant, limit, or restrain the state’s sovereign right of taxation as proscribed by this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Statute regulating coin operated

## Amusement Machines.

In a suit for tortious interference with contractual relations, the trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment against the owners of coin-operated amusement machines because O.C.G.A. § 50-27-70 et seq. did not void preexisting contracts and it was error to interpret the statute otherwise. All Star, Inc. v. Ga. Atlanta Amuse-ments, LLC, 332 Ga. App. 1, 770 S.E.2d 22 (2015).

## Constitutional Issue on Zoning Ordinance.

Trial court erred by failing to address whether a 1993 county zoning ordinance was constitutional because the record established that the landfill permit applicant raised a constitutional challenge to the zoning ordinance before the trial court in its response to the challengers’ motion for partial summary judgment and, in fact, in its transfer order to the appellate court, the trial court specifically stated that the court did not rule on the applicant’s constitutional argument. Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 878, 769 S.E.2d 823 (2015).

Application of amendments to criminal history record information

## Statute.

Recent amendments to Georgia’s criminal history record information statute, O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37, are to be applied to information regarding arrests occurring prior to the amendments’ effective date as the statute itself made clear that the statute does apply to information regarding arrests pre-dating the amendments, and such application presents no constitutional problem. Mosley v. Lowe, 298 Ga. 363, 782 S.E.2d 43 (2016).

Cited in Cochran v. City of Thomasville, 167 Ga. 579, 146 S.E.2d 462 (1928); State Hwy. Bd. v. Willcox, 168 Ga. 883, 149 S.E. 182 (1929); Camp v. State, 171 Ga. 25, 154 S.E. 436 (1930); Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Saye & Davis Transf. Co., 170 Ga. 873, 154 S.E. 439 (1930); Meyers v. Whittle, 171 Ga. 509, 156 S.E. 120 (1930); Manley v. Mobley, 174 Ga. 228, 162 S.E. 536 (1932); Slater v. Davis, 174 Ga. 633, 163 S.E. 704 (1932); Perkins v. Mayor of Madison, 175 Ga. 714, 165 S.E. 811 (1932); State Bd. of Barber Exmrs. v. Blocker, 176 Ga. 125, 167 S.E. 298 (1932); Hutchinson v. Brown, 47 Ga. App. 82, 169 S.E. 848 (1933); Gormley v. Searcy, 179 Ga. 389, 175 S.E. 913 (1934); West v. Frick Co., 55 Ga. App. 854, 192 S.E. 55 (1937); Walker County Fertilizer Co. v. Napier, 184 Ga. 861, 193 S.E. 770 (1937); Wright v. Cannon, 185 Ga. 363, 195 S.E. 168 (1938); Bowers v. Keller, 185 Ga. 435, 195 S.E. 447 (1938); West v. Trotzier, 185 Ga. 794, 196 S.E. 902 (1938); Benton v. State, 187 Ga. 149, 199 S.E. 749 (1938); Morris v. Stanford, 58 Ga. App. 726, 199 S.E. 773 (1938); West v. Anderson, 187 Ga. 587, 1 S.E.2d 671 (1939); Green & Milam v. State Revenue Comm’n, 188 Ga. 442, 4 S.E.2d 144 (1939); Salter v. Bank of Commerce, 189 Ga. 328, 6 S.E.2d 290 (1939); Barnett v. D.O. Martin Co., 191 Ga. 11, 11 S.E.2d 210 (1940); Town of McIntyre v. Scott, 191 Ga. 473, 12 S.E.2d 883 (1940); National Sur. Corp. v. Gatlin, 192 Ga. 293, 15 S.E.2d 180 (1941); Renfroe v. Butts, 192 Ga. 720, 16 S.E.2d 551 (1941); McCook v. Long, 193 Ga. 299, 18 S.E.2d 488 (1942); FDIC v. Beasley, 193 Ga. 727, 20 S.E.2d 23 (1942); Thacker v. Morris, 196 Ga. 167, 26 S.E.2d 329 (1943); Steward v. Peerless Furn. Co., 70 Ga. App. 236, 28 S.E.2d 396 (1943); Kelley v. Newton County, 198 Ga. 483, 32 S.E.2d 99 (1944); Williams v. Ragsdale, 205 Ga. 274, 53 S.E.2d 339 (1949); South W.R.R. v. Benton, 206 Ga. 770, 58 S.E.2d 905 (1950); Ivy v. Ferguson, 82 Ga. App. 600, 62 S.E.2d 191 (1950); City of Atlanta v. Anglin, 209 Ga. 170, 71 S.E.2d 419 (1952); McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 282, 71 S.E.2d 548 (1952); Biddle v. Moore, 87 Ga. App. 524, 74 S.E.2d 552 (1953); MacNeill v. Fulton County, 210 Ga. 119, 78 S.E.2d 40 (1953); Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 210 Ga. 198, 78 S.E.2d 612 (1953); Stewart v. Davis, 210 Ga. 278, 79 S.E.2d 535 (1954); Crawford v. Irwin, 211 Ga. 241, 85 S.E.2d 8 (1954); Harper v. City Council, 212 Ga. 605, 94 S.E.2d 690 (1956); Murphey v. Murphey, 215 Ga. 19, 108 S.E.2d 872 (1959); Schaffer v. Oxford, 102 Ga. App. 710, 117 S.E.2d 637 (1960); Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354, 127 S.E.2d 909 (1962); Stephenson v. State, 219 Ga. 652, 135 S.E.2d 380 (1964); Bolton v. State, 220 Ga. 632, 140 S.E.2d 866 (1965); Sanders v. Harper, 220 Ga. 649, 141 S.E.2d 156 (1965); Brown v. City of Marietta, 220 Ga. 826, 142 S.E.2d 235 (1965); Webb v. Whitley, 221 Ga. 618, 146 S.E.2d 722 (1966); Veal v. Smith, 221 Ga. 712, 146 S.E.2d 751 (1966); National Factor & Inv. Corp. v. State Bank, 224 Ga. 535, 163 S.E.2d 817 (1968); Bugden v. Bugden, 225 Ga. 413, 169 S.E.2d 337 (1969); Stith v. Hudson, 226 Ga. 364, 174 S.E.2d 892 (1970); Hawes v. National Serv. Indus., Inc., 121 Ga. App. 775, 175 S.E.2d 34 (1970); Whitley v. Whitley Constr. Co., 121 Ga. App. 696, 175 S.E.2d 128 (1970); Smith v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 226 Ga. 715, 177 S.E.2d 249 (1970); Southern Land, Timber & Pulp Corp. v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Carter v. Haynes, 228 Ga. 462, 186 S.E.2d 115 (1971); Chatham County Hosp. Auth. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 325 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Ga. 1971); Montaquila v. Cranford, 230 Ga. 442, 197 S.E.2d 357 (1973); Stith v. Hudson, 231 Ga. 520, 202 S.E.2d 392 (1973); House v. James, 232 Ga. 443, 207 S.E.2d 201 (1974); Spalding County v. East Enters., Inc., 232 Ga. 887, 209 S.E.2d 215 (1974); Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Johnson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 67, 213 S.E.2d 170 (1975); Town of Lyerly v. Short, 234 Ga. 877, 218 S.E.2d 588 (1975); Thompson v. Hornsby, 235 Ga. 561, 221 S.E.2d 192 (1975); Busbee v. Georgia Conference, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 235 Ga. 752, 221 S.E.2d 437 (1975); Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975); Bell v. Bell, 237 Ga. 464, 228 S.E.2d 850 (1976); Nelson v. Bloodworth, 238 Ga. 264, 232 S.E.2d 547 (1977); Stith v. Morris, 241 Ga. 247, 244 S.E.2d 817 (1978); Savage v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 671, 251 S.E.2d 268 (1978); Bryan v. Bryan, 242 Ga. 826, 251 S.E.2d 566 (1979); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Henson, 150 Ga. App. 788, 258 S.E.2d 706 (1979); Hollowell v. Jove, 628 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1980); Holley v. State, 157 Ga. App. 863, 278 S.E.2d 738 (1981); State v. Hasty, 158 Ga. App. 464, 280 S.E.2d 873 (1981); Stone v. First Nat’l Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207 (1981); Hart v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 831, 289 S.E.2d 544 (1982); DOT v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 162 Ga. App. 252, 291 S.E.2d 104 (1982); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates, 542 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Clark & Stephenson v. State Personnel Bd., 252 Ga. 548, 314 S.E.2d 658 (1984); Eig v. Savage, 177 Ga. App. 514, 339 S.E.2d 752 (1986); Stinchcomb v. Clayton County Water Auth., 177 Ga. App. 558, 340 S.E.2d 217 (1986); Stegall v. Leader Nat’l Ins. Co., 256 Ga. 765, 353 S.E.2d 484 (1987); Holler v. Holler, 257 Ga. 27, 354 S.E.2d 140 (1987); Horton v. State Employee Retirement Sys., 262 Ga. 458, 421 S.E.2d 703 (1992); Bieling v. Battle, 209 Ga. App. 874, 434 S.E.2d 719 (1993); Chandler v. State, 281 Ga. 712, 642 S.E.2d 646 (2007).

Bill of Attainder

Removal of county commissioner

## From Office.

Local act, which had the effect of removing a county commissioner from office before the end of the two-year term to which the commissioner had been appointed to fill a vacancy left by a deceased commissioner, was a bill of attainder prohibited by both the Georgia and United States Constitutions. Fulton v. Baker, 261 Ga. 710, 410 S.E.2d 735 (1991). Bill of Attainder (Cont’d)

## Discovery.

The amended discovery procedure of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1 et seq. is not a bill of attainder, which refers to legislative imposition of punishment on specific persons or on a class of persons without any judicial proceeding. Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007).

Local deannexation statute that included the area of the city in which the mayor resided, making the mayor ineligible to hold office, was not an unconstitutional bill of attainder because it neither singled out the mayor nor punished the mayor as an officeholder. Lee v. City of Villa Rica, 264 Ga. 606, 449 S.E.2d 295 (1994).

Local act providing for selection of chair of board of education was un-


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