---
title: Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII. Searches, seizures, and warrants.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-i-sec-i-para-xiii
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII
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---

# Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII. Searches, seizures, and warrants.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the place or places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

## Cross References

Unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const., amend. IV and § 1-2-6. Searches without a warrant: livestock, § 4-4-62; new mobile homes in transit, § 8-2-140; petroleum products, § 10-1-148; antifreeze businesses, § 10-1-204; hazardous waste management, § 12-8-70; enforcing air quality laws, § 12-9-10; criminal searches, § 17-5-1; fire safety inspections, § 25-2-22; food establishments, § 26-2-36; meat processors, § 26-2-81; soft drink businesses, § 26-2-355; drug treatment facilities, § 26-5-13; commercial hunting and trapping operations, § 27-1-23; ambulance services, § 31-11-9; clinical laboratories, § 31-22-8; insurance records, § 33-22-7; used motor vehicle parts businesses, § 43-48-16; blood samples, § 45-16-46. Inadmissibility in evidence of improperly obtained information, §§ 15-11-31, 16-11-67, and 16-11-68. Prohibited intrusions on privacy, §§ 16-11-62 and 16-11-68. Private surveillance permitted under authority of warrant, § 16-11-64. Emergency situation; application for an investigative warrant, § 16-11-64.3. Procedures for obtaining warrants: administrative inspections, § 16-13-46; arrest warrants, §§ 17-4-40 and 17-4-41; criminal searches, § 17-5-20 et seq. Arrest without warrant: police arrests, § 17-4-20; citizen’s arrest, § 17-4-60; fugitive arrest, § 17-13-34; arrest by the militia, § 38-2-342.

## Law Reviews

For article, ‘‘Personal Rights, Property Rights and Due Process: A Comparison of Constitutional Protection in the Georgia Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court,’’ see 9 Mercer L. Rev. 253 (1958). For article discussing past and present trends in the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in Georgia criminal trials and advocating a state exclusionary rule, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 105 (1976). For article surveying judicial developments in Georgia Criminal Law, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 59 (1979). For annual survey of constitutional law, see 40 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (1988). For annual survey of criminal law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 153 (2004). For annual survey of criminal law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (2005). For article, ‘‘Police Pursuits: A Comprehensive Look at the Broad Spectrum of Police Pursuit Liability and Law,’’ see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 511 (2006). For annual survey of criminal law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2006).

For note, ‘‘Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure: A Reexamination,’’ see 20 J. of Pub. L. 313 (1971). For note on airport searches of drug couriers, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (1981). For note, ‘‘Padgett v. Donald: Why Not So Special,’’ see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 673 (2006). For note, ‘‘The Online Zoom Lens: Why Internet Street-Level Mapping Technologies Demand Reconsideration of the Modern-Day Tort Notion of ‘Public Privacy’,’’ see 43 Ga. L. Rev. 575 (2009).

For comment criticizing McIntyre v. State, 190 Ga. 872, 11 S.E.2d 5 (1940), permitting admission of illegally seized evidence, see 3 Ga. B.J. 53 (1941). For comment on Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 597 (1965), see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (1966). For comment on Talbert v. State, 224 Ga. 291, 161 S.E.2d 279 (1968), see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 256 (1968). For comment on warrantless search of defendant’s home, see 41 Emory L.J. 321 (1992).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X.

## Implied Consent Provision Unconstitutional.

Implied consent provision in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55(a) is unconstitutional as violative of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it authorizes a search and seizure, chemical testing of a suspect’s blood, without probable cause that the suspect had been driving while impaired when the suspect was involved in an accident involving serious injuries or fatalities. Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003).

Right of privacy is derived from natural law and embraced within the absolute right of personal security and liberty. The unlawful entry by an officer of the home, if it is such as to constitute an invasion of the right of privacy of the wife of the head of the family and results in fright and shock to her, is such a willful and intentional tort as to give her cause of action. Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951).

State must be able to point to facts which warrant intrusion on right of

## Privacy.

The mere fact that an officer feels it is unlikely that an individual has regular business where the individual is found is not sufficient alone to authorize an intrusion into an individual’s right of privacy. The state must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn therefrom, reasonably warrant an intrusion. Howard v. State, 150 Ga. App. 847, 258 S.E.2d 652 (1979). nated to public interest in law en-

## Public Interest in Privacy Subordiforcement.

When the police have reasonable cause to believe that public toilet stalls are being used in the commission of crime, and when they confine their activities to the times when such crimes are most likely to occur, they are entitled to institute clandestine surveillance, even though they do not have probable cause to believe that the particular persons whom they may thus catch in flagrante delicto have committed or will commit the crime. The public interest in its privacy must, to that extent, be subordinated to the public interest in law enforcement. Mitchell v. State, 120 Ga. App. 447, 170 S.E.2d 765 (1969).

## Commercial Sexual Activity.

The right of privacy conferred by the Georgia constitution, like that in the federal constitution, does not extend to commercial sexual activity. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. 129, 526 S.E.2d 336 (2000). lic hallway to ascertain probable

## Police Agents’ Listening to Conversations Outside Apartment Door in Pubcause Is Proper.

Police agents’ entry into a public hallway and listening to conversations inside an apartment by placing their ears to the front door was proper to ascertain if probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant. Cox v. State, 160 Ga. App. 199, 286 S.E.2d 482 (1981).

## Looking Through Window Unreasonable.

Police officer unreasonably invaded defendants’ privacy by looking through their window before knocking on their door when executing an arrest warrant for a third party since: (1) there was insufficient evidence that the third party lived with defendants; (2) even if the police were authorized to enter defendants’ home, looking through the window was unreasonable as the officer did not reach the window by traveling the route any visitor would travel to reach the front door; and (3) the officer did not have articulable facts which would warrant a reasonably prudent officer to believe that the third party was a danger. A police officer must have a reasonable belief that forewarning would jeopardize the officer’s safety before actions, such as peering through a window, would be justified. State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742, 583 S.E.2d 573 (2003).

## Use of ‘‘narcotics’’ Dog Authorized.

— Use of a ‘‘narcotics’’ dog, specially trained to detect marijuana and narcotics, is an authorized investigative technique. Lockhart v. State, 166 Ga. App. 555, 305 S.E.2d 22 (1983).

Use of choke-hold unauthorized in

## Obtaining Evidence.

There is nothing in the text, history, or structure of the Fourth Amendment, or for that matter in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, remotely suggesting that the right of the people to be free from unreasonable seizures also includes a concomitant privilege for state actors to use certain neck restraints or force (however reasonable) against the very people the right protects. Therefore, the police officer was properly suspended for using a choke-hold on a handcuffed suspect in an attempt to prevent the suspect from swallowing narcotics in violation of department rules. Mercure v. City of Atlanta Civil Service Board, 327 Ga. App. 840, 761 S.E.2d 393 (2014).

## Standard of Review.

Because a trial court credited a police officer’s testimony and decided the defendant’s suppression motion on an issue of law rather than on any issue of conflicting evidence, the Court of Appeals correctly used the de novo standard of review. Silva v. State, 278 Ga. 506, 604 S.E.2d 171 (2004).

When, in a hearing on a motion to suppress filed in a case in which a defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe for the defendant to drive, when the trial court found there was no evidence that the defendant was an impaired or ‘‘less safe’’ driver, the court’s ruling involved a mixed question of fact and law, and a de novo standard of review did not apply, and, as there was some evidence supporting the trial court’s factual findings made in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, that ruling would not be disturbed. State v. Sanders, 274 Ga. App. 393, 617 S.E.2d 633 (2005).

## Excessive Force Claim.

Sheriff’s deputies were entitled to summary judgment on a claim of excessive force when the plaintiff alleged that because the arrest was unlawful, any force used was unlawful, because the plaintiff did not present a discrete excessive force claim, and the claim failed as a matter of law. Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).

Claim of error raised for first time

## On Appeal Not Reviewed.

Because the defendant on appeal abandoned the ‘‘second-tier’’ argument raised at the suppression hearing, and instead argued that the evidence should have been suppressed because the state failed to show that the officer was in the lawful discharge of any official duty during questioning, the latter argument was not addressed, as it was raised for the first time on appeal. Harper v. State, 285 Ga. App. 261, 645 S.E.2d 741 (2007).

Cited in Huff v. State, 82 Ga. App. 545, 61 S.E.2d 787 (1950); Green v. State, 250 Ga. 610, 299 S.E.2d 544 (1983); State v. Roberson, 165 Ga. App. 727, 302 S.E.2d 591 (1983); Whittington v. State, 165 Ga. App. 763, 302 S.E.2d 617 (1983); Mosley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 30, 348 S.E.2d 555 (1986); Midura v. State, 183 Ga. App. 523, 359 S.E.2d 416 (1987); Ford v. State, 183 Ga. App. 566, 359 S.E.2d 435 (1987); Newsome v. State, 189 Ga. App. 329, 386 S.E.2d 887 (1989); Cole v. State, 254 Ga. App. 424, 562 S.E.2d 720 (2002).

Fourth Amendment Rights

## This Paragraph Is Similar to U.s.

Const., amend. 4, and applies to all departments of government. Smoot v. State, 160 Ga. 744, 128 S.E. 909, 41 A.L.R. 1533 (1925).

## Federal Good-faith Exception Inapplicable.

The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), is not applicable in Georgia in light of the legislatively-mandated exclusionary rule found in O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30. Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 422 S.E.2d 426 (1992). pers’’ which immunizes them from searches otherwise proper under the Fourth Amendment. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 975, 100 S. Ct. Fourth Amendment Rights (Cont’d) 472, 62 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1979).

Searches by private persons not


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