---
title: Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV. Benefit of counsel; accusation; list of witnesses; compulsory process.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-i-sec-i-para-xiv
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV
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---

# Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV. Benefit of counsel; accusation; list of witnesses; compulsory process.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel; shall be furnished with a copy of the accusation or indictment and, on demand, with a list of the witnesses on whose testimony such charge is founded; shall have compulsory process to obtain the testimony of that person’s own witnesses; and shall be confronted with the witnesses testifying against such person.

## Cross References

Jury trials generally, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI. Juvenile delinquency proceedings, §§ 15-11-30 and 15-11-31. Benefit of counsel, §§ 17-7-24, 17-12-31, and 38-2-395. Process to obtain witnesses, §§ 17-7-25, 17-7-191, and 38-2-440. Notice of state witnesses, §§ 17-7-31 and 17-7-110. Defendant to be furnished with copy of indictment and list of witnesses, § 17-7-110. Notice of the accusation, §§ 17-7-110 and 38-2-415. Exclusion of public from courtroom, § 17-8-53. Counsel for indigents, Ch. 12, T. 17. Competence of appointed counsel, § 17-12-8.

## Editor's Notes

Prior to the 1983 Constitution, the provisions of this paragraph were combined with the provisions now appearing at Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI, and reference is made to opinions noted under that paragraph.

Waiver is based upon knowledge; it cannot be implied when the fact or the right which is claimed to have been waived by the party in whose favor the right existed is ignorant of the party’s right or of any fact which would substantially or materially affect the exercise of that right and tend to prevent a waiver. Jones v. State, 57 Ga. App. 344, 195 S.E. 316 (1938).

Provisions of this paragraph may be waived by defendant. Fortson v. State, 96 Ga. App. 350, 100 S.E.2d 129 (1957). tual and credibility determinations

## Law Reviews

For article detailing historical use of injunctive law enforcement in equity including discussion of disadvantages of criminal injunctions, see 1 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (1949). For article analyzing Georgia business entries provisions, see 4 Mercer L. Rev. 313 (1953). For article, ‘‘Personal Rights, Property Rights and Due Process: A Comparison of Constitutional Protection in the Georgia Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court,’’ see 9 Mercer L. Rev. 253 (1958). For article, ‘‘The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress,’’ see 8 J. of Pub. L. 381 (1959). For article, ‘‘The Indigent Defendant in Georgia,’’ see 26 Ga. B.J. 395 (1964). For article, ‘‘The Indigent Defendant in Georgia Prior to Gideon v. Wainwright,’’ see 2 Ga. St. B.J. 207 (1965). For article supporting the adoption of comprehensive right to counsel legislation, see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 157 (1966). For article discussing available means of discovery for criminal cases in Georgia, see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 134 (1976). For article surveying cases dealing with criminal law and criminal procedure from June 1, 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 27 (1978). For article surveying judicial developments in Georgia Criminal Law, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 59 (1979). For article, ‘‘Investigating and Preparing an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim,’’ see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 927 (1986). For annual survey of criminal law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 129 (1986). For annual survey of legal ethics, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 269 (1986). For article, ‘‘Misdemeanor Sentencing in Georgia,’’ see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 8 (2001). For annual survey of criminal law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (2005). For annual survey of criminal law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2006). For annual survey of evidence law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 151 (2006). For survey article on death penalty law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 105 (2008). For annual survey on criminal law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2012).

For note, ‘‘The Monster in the Closet: Declawing the Inequitable Conduct Beast in the Attorney-Client Privilege Arena,’’ see 25 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 735 (2009). For note, ‘‘Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Blues: Navigating the Muddy Waters of Georgia Law After 2010 State Supreme Court Decisions,’’ see 45 Ga. L. Rev. 1199 (2011). For note, ‘‘Padilla v. Kentucky: The Criminal Defense Attorney’s Obligation to Warn of Immigration Consequences of Criminal Conviction,’’ see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 891 (2012).

For comment on Cannady v. State, 190 Ga. 227, 9 S.E.2d 241 (1940), see 3 Ga. B.J. 55 (1940). For comment on Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 153, 51 S.E.2d 13 (1948), see 11 Ga. B.J. 488 (1949). For comment on Hill v. Balkcom, 213 Ga. 58, 96 S.E.2d 589 (1957), holding that where court appointed counsel in a criminal case is a member of the bar in good standing, which is prima-facie evidence of his competency as an attorney, and serves his client in good faith and with loyalty, the requirements of due process are met, see 19 Ga. B.J. 519 (1957). For comment on Roach v. State, 111 Ga. App. 114, 140 S.E.2d 919 (1965), see 2 Ga. St. B.J. 494 (1966). For comment on Weiner v. Fulton Co., 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143 (1966), see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 477 (1967). For comment on Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969) as to the constitutionality of the State Bar Act (Ch. 9-7), see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 355 (1969). For comment criticizing Mercer v. Hopper, 233 Ga. 620, 212 S.E.2d 799 (1975), see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 325 (1975). For comment, ‘‘The Right to a Speedy Trial,’’ see 13 Ga. St. B.J. 197 (1977). For comment on the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, see 47 Emory L.J. 1079 (1998).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI.

## Appellate Courts Must Accept Facmade by Trial Court.

Factual and credibility determinations of whether a justice of peace was prevented from being a neutral and detached magistrate by the justice’s work as a deputy sheriff six years before or by the justice’s association with individuals in the sheriff’s office made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing must be accepted by appellate courts unless such determinations are clearly erroneous. Sanders v. State, 151 Ga. App. 590, 260 S.E.2d 504 (1979).

Writ of habeas corpus cannot be used merely as substitute for writ of error or other remedial procedure to correct errors of law, of which the defendant had opportunity to avail oneself, and no question as to guilt or innocence or as to any irregularity can be so raised, unless it was such as to render the judgment wholly void. Sanders v. Aldredge, 189 Ga. 69, 5 S.E.2d 371 (1939).

Defendant not deprived of right to

## Fair Trial.

Argument that defendant was deprived of the right to a fair trial under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV because the prosecutor injected an irrelevant matter into the trial when the prosecutor asked defendant on cross-examination whether defendant had filed an ante litem notice that defendant intended to sue the city because of the actions of its police officers in the case, failed; this subject of cross-examination was relevant to defendant’s financial interest in the outcome of the trial. Golden v. State, 276 Ga. App. 538, 623 S.E.2d 727 (2005).

Failure to object to appointment of

## Magistrate.

Defendant failed to meet General Consideration (Cont’d) the burden of establishing that defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel’s failure to object to the alleged improper appointment of a chief magistrate who presided over the trial, sitting by designation following a request for judicial assistance by the superior court judge assigned to the case, since defendant failed to show that defendant was denied a fair trial by virtue of the appointment. Further, trial counsel testified at defendant’s hearing on a motion for a new trial that trial counsel thought it would benefit defendant to have the particular magistrate preside over the trial rather than a superior court judge, which established that the failure to object to the appointment was a matter of trial strategy or tactics, which was not a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Mazza v. State, 292 Ga. App. 168, 664 S.E.2d 548 (2008).

## Failure to Object to Jury.

Because the defense counsel only sought to have a juror removed before the second day of a three-day jury trial based on that juror’s acquaintance with three state witnesses, did not ask the jury pool questions related to such information during voir dire, and did not move for a mistrial when the issue arose during trial, the defendant waived any claim that a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated, and the trial court was not required to grant a mistrial, sua sponte; moreover, because the excused juror was not questioned about any familiarity with the witnesses during voir dire, that juror’s selection to sit on the panel was not the result of any concealment or misleading statements. Artega v. State, 282 Ga. App. 751, 639 S.E.2d 634 (2006).

Claim that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance failed as the defendant could not show that any competent attorney would have decided not to object further to the composition of the jury pool. Leslie v. State, 292 Ga. 368, 738 S.E.2d 42 (2013).

Presumption that proceedings in

## Trial Court Were Rightly Done.

In habeas corpus proceedings when the record is silent on the question of whether the defendant did or did not have counsel, or was or was not furnished with a list of witnesses, or was or was not notified of the nature of the offense charged against the defendant, it will be presumed that whatever ought to have been done in the trial court was done and rightly done. Plocar v. Foster, 211 Ga. 153, 84 S.E.2d 360 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 962, 75 S. Ct. 893, 99 L. Ed. 1284 (1955).

Prosecutorial misconduct not

## Found.

Defendant waived any error in a prosecutor’s request during opening statements that the jury ‘‘hold (defendant) accountable and send a message that street justice—’’ as the defendant did not renew an objection after a curative instruction and never moved for a mistrial; further, it was not improper for a prosecutor to appeal to the jury to convict for the safety of the community, or to stress the need for enforcement of the laws and to impress on the jury its responsibility in that regard. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006).

Discharge under habeas writ when

## Judgment Absolutely Void.

A discharge under a writ of habeas corpus, after a conviction, cannot be granted unless the judgment is absolutely void; as when the convicting court was without jurisdiction, or when the defendant in the defendant’s trial was denied due process of law. Sanders v. Aldredge, 189 Ga. 69, 5 S.E.2d 371 (1939); Aldredge v. Williams, 188 Ga. 607, 4 S.E.2d 469 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 661, 60 S. Ct. 512, 84 L. Ed. 1009 (1940).

Erroneous Harris charge did not result in unfair trial since evidence of malice was overwhelming in the malice murder case and, therefore, it was highly probable that the charge did not contribute to the verdict. A Harris charge involved an erroneous presumption that if a defendant used a deadly weapon, intent to kill could be inferred. Franks v. State, 278 Ga. 246, 599 S.E.2d 134 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1058, 125 S. Ct. 870, 160 L. Ed. 2d 784 (2005).

Freedom of press subordinate to

## Proper Administration of Justice.

No freedoms, including the freedoms of speech and press, are absolute, and liberty of the press is subordinate to the independence of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice. The latter is necessarily true, for only in the courts can freedom of the press and other constitutional rights be preserved. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).

District attorney has wide latitude

## In Management of State’s Case.

In the trial of an accusation, counsel for the state certainly has as wide a latitude in the management of the state’s case as does the private practitioner in representing clients, and can call or refuse to call a particular witness as the state’s counsel sees fit. Bonds v. State, 232 Ga. 694, 208 S.E.2d 561 (1974).

Provision for rights to information


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