--- title: Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I. Power vested in General Assembly. collection: code id: ga-const:art-iii-sec-i-para-i cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I canonical_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-iii-sec-i-para-i md_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-iii-sec-i-para-i.md text_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-iii-sec-i-para-i/text source_url: https://www.legis.ga.gov/api/document/docs/default-source/joint-features-document-library/2ga-const-(v2)-2016-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=f5de823e_0#page=799 date: 2016 status: active corpus_version: 2025-supplement-89aa39ab3c68 license: CC0-1.0 publisher: Georgia Commons, an independent project of Georgia Civic Data. Not the State of Georgia. Not legal advice. up: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/index.md previous: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-ii-sec-iii-para-ii.md next: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-iii-sec-ii-para-i.md index: https://georgiacommons.org/code/index.md omitted: notes omitted_chars: 24819 omitted_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-iii-sec-i-para-i.md?notes=all&start=11556 version: the only printed version in_force: true current_through: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly heading_path: CONSTITUTION OF THE / LEGISLATIVE BRANCH / LEGISLATIVE POWER --- # Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I. Power vested in General Assembly. A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that. The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General Assembly which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. ## Cross References Separation of legislative, judicial, and executive power, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III. Delegation of legislative powers to municipalities, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II. Acts changing term of office of incumbent prohibited, § 1-3-11. ## Law Reviews For article, ‘‘The Bi-cameral Principle in State Legislatures,’’ see 11 J. of Pub. L. 310 (1962). For article tracing the history of municipal annexation, and the General Assembly’s role therein, see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 35 (1967). For article discussing the impact of home rule on local governments, see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 317 (1968). For article discussing the evolution of municipal annexation law in light of Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970), see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 499 (1971). For article, ‘‘History of the Veto Power in Georgia,’’ see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 513 (1972). For article analyzing the changing relationship between state and local governments in Georgia in light of ‘‘Amendment 19,’’ see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 757 (1975). For article, ‘‘Selected Oddities in Georgia Municipal Law,’’ see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 783 (1975). For article, ‘‘The Status of Administrative Agencies under the Georgia Constitution,’’ see 40 Ga. L. Rev. 1109 (2006). For comment on Rogers v. Medical Ass’n, 244 Ga. 151, 259 S.E.2d 85 (1979), invalidating Georgia statute requiring Governor’s appointments to Composite State Board of Medical Examiners be made solely from nominees submitted by state medical society as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to a private organization, see 29 Emory L.J. 1183 (1980). ## 1976 Constitution. Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I. ## Exclusively in General Assembly. Southern Coop. Foundry Co. v. Drummond, 76 Ga. App. 222, 45 S.E.2d 687 (1947). Only General Assembly has right to legislate and prescribe laws of this state. Long v. State, 202 Ga. 235, 42 S.E.2d 729 (1947). Distinction between legislative and ## Judicial Roles. Legislative power is that which declares what the law shall be; judicial is that which declares what law is, and applies it to past transactions and existing cases; the one makes the law, the other expounds and judicially administers it; the one prescribes a rule of civil conduct, the other interprets and enforces it in a case in litigation. Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947). Legislature has power to serve as partments, and this function is properly performed by enactment of laws; if the legislature wishes to have the law other than what the judiciary construes it to be, it has the power and duty to so write it within the limits of the Constitution. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956). Acts void if beyond authority of de- ## Check Upon Executive and Judicial Department. If any department of the government, including the judiciary, acts beyond the bounds of its authority, such action is without jurisdiction, is unconstitutional, and is void. Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947). Power to create crimes and to pretive. Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930). Legislature determines whether ## Scribe Punishment Therefor Is Legislacrime a Felony. A crime is a felony or not, according to the penalty fixed by the legislature; and it is not within the province of the courts to help out the legislature. Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930). Legislature can fix determinate term of punishment for infraction of a criminal law; and the judiciary is without authority to exercise any discretion in imposing such penalty. Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930). ## Power of Legislature as to Determinate or Indeterminate Sentences. All legislation is exclusively within the power of the legislature. This being so, it can prescribe determinate or indeterminate sentences for crime. Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930). tence acts in pursuance of legislative ## Judge Imposing Indeterminate Senpower. The legislature can authorize the judiciary to impose an indeterminate sentence, and clothe the judge with discretion in fixing the quantum of punishment within the minimum and maximum limits of punishment prescribed by the Act creating the crime. In exercising such power and discretion, the judge acts, not upon any inherent power residing in the judicial department, but in pursuance of power conferred upon the judge by the legislature. Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930). nicipal systems of government is vested in legislature. Lee v. City of Jesup, 222 Ga. 530, 150 S.E.2d 836 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 993, 87 S. Ct. 1307, 18 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1967). Legislature retains power to adopt ## Authority to Create and Alter Muentirely New Charter. The power to adopt an entirely new charter cannot be found in either or both of the home rule statutes (Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I [see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II] and § 36-35-6). Consequently, this legislative power still resides in the General Assembly. Jackson v. Inman, 232 Ga. 566, 207 S.E.2d 475 (1974). Power of Secretary of State to con- ## Fer with Charter Applicants. The Secretary of State could not confer alone or concurrently with the individuals who might apply for a charter. Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Thornton, 134 Ga. 405, 67 S.E. 849 (1910). Rule of Public Service Commission ## Prescribing Penalty Valid. A rule of the Railroad Commission (now Public Service Commission) prescribing a penalty where a carrier fails to furnish cars does not violate the provisions of this paragraph. Southern Ry. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S.E. 665 (1909). City charter delegating to mayor and council power to extend city limtutional. Bennett v. City of Baxley, 149 Ga. 275, 99 S.E. 864 (1919). tion, is legislative act. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Young, 83 Ga. 512, 10 S.E. 197 (1889). ## Its Within Given Range Not unconsti-Adoption of a Code, Not compila-Failure of Legislature to Observe Internal Procedure No Grounds for Review. If in the exercise of power to enact laws, the General Assembly merely fails to observe certain rules of internal procedure, the judiciary would not be authorized to review such action, and the same would be true as to any action of the officers of that body within the sphere of their jurisdiction. Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947). Operation of presumption of ## Proper Enactment. A duly enrolled Act, properly authenticated by the regular presiding officers of both houses of the General Assembly, approved by the Governor, and deposited with the Secretary of State as an existing law, will be conclusively presumed to have been enacted in accordance with constitutional requirements; and it is not permissible to show, by the legislative journals or other records, that it did not receive on its passage a majority vote of all the members elected to each House, or that there was any irregularity in its enactment. Capitol Distrib. Co. v. Redwine, 206 Ga. 477, 57 S.E.2d 578 (1950). Legislative journal and photostatic copies of bill not permissible to im- ## Peach Act. Where a copy of an enrolled Act levying excise taxes on malt beer and wine and purporting to contain the signatures of the Speaker of the House, Clerk of the House, President of the Senate, Secretary of the Senate, and the Governor, is set out and made a part of the amended petition, which seeks to show invalidity upon the contention that a portion of the title was composed and inserted by some method or agency in an irregular manner during the process of its passage, neither the legislative journals nor photostatic copies of the bill are permissible to impeach the Act, because of the conclusive presumption against any irregularity in its enactment; and, accordingly, this court cannot consider violations of the state constitution that are dependent on being so shown. Capitol Distrib. Co. v. Redwine, 206 Ga. 477, 57 S.E.2d 578 (1950). Delegation of power to adopt name ## After Merger of Corporations Valid. An Act authorizing a board of directors of a consolidated railroad to adopt for its name ‘‘Selma, Rome & Dalton Railroad Company,’’ and to adopt as its charter that of the Alabama & Tennessee River Railroad Company is valid. Southern Ry. v. Lancaster, 149 Ga. 434, 100 S.E. 380 (1910). Cited in Central Ga. Land & Lumber Co. v. Exchange Bank, 101 Ga. 345, 28 S.E. 863 (1897); Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930); Maner v. Dykes, 52 Ga. App. 715, 184 S.E. 438 (1936); State Bd. of Educ. v. County Bd. of Educ., 190 Ga. 588, 10 S.E.2d 369 (1940); Huiet v. Schwob Mfg. Co., 196 Ga. 855, 27 S.E.2d 743 (1943); Reliable Transf. Co. v. May, 70 Ga. App. 613, 29 S.E.2d 187 (1944); Bibb County v. Garrett, 204 Ga. General Consideration (Cont’d) 817, 51 S.E.2d 658 (1949); Atkins v. Manning, 206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949); State v. State Toll Bridge Auth., 210 Ga. 690, 82 S.E.2d 626 (1954); Spence v. Rowell, 213 Ga. 145, 97 S.E.2d 350 (1957); Russell v. Venable, 216 Ga. 137, 115 S.E.2d 103 (1960); Jamison v. City of Atlanta, 225 Ga. 51, 165 S.E.2d 647 (1969); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969); Gainer v. Ellis, 226 Ga. 79, 172 S.E.2d 608 (1970); Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Renfroe, 130 Ga. App. 621, 204 S.E.2d 317 (1974); Harrell v. Courson, 234 Ga. 350, 216 S.E.2d 105 (1975); Harmon v. State, 235 Ga. 329, 219 S.E.2d 441 (1975); Rich v. State, 237 Ga. 291, 227 S.E.2d 761 (1976); Department of Natural Resources v. Padgett, 146 Ga. App. 121, 245 S.E.2d 480 (1978); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008). Delegation of Powers 1. In General This paragraph renders void any ers. Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953). egate power to make law is violation of this paragraph. Flynn v. State, 88 Ga. App. 52, 76 S.E.2d 38 (1953). gated except in cases where definite courses are indicated. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956). ## Attempt to Delegate Legislative pow-Attempt by Legislature Without Express Constitutional Authority to del-Legislative Power Cannot Be dele-Two Types of Delegation Not Unconstitutional. Two types of legislation are not repugnant to the Constitution. First is in cases where after a legislative enactment has plainly set forth the purpose of the legislation and marked its limits, it then provided that designated administrative officers should have power to promulgate rules within the scope of the legislation, designed to fully administer and give effect to that law. The second is in legislation to which a referendum is attached which provided that it would become a law only after having received a favorable vote of the people to be affected. Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953). The delegation of the setting of compensation is constitutional where the Constitution is silent as to how compensation is set. McCray v. Cobb County, 251 Ga. 24, 302 S.E.2d 563 (1983). The former Courts of Limited Jurisdiction Compensation Act of 1982, Ga. L. 1982, p. 1737, repealed in its entirety by Ga. L. 1983, pp. 884, 928, did not unlawfully delegate the duty to set the compensation for justices of the peace to a lesser body, in giving this power to the governing authority of each county, since there was no provision in the 1976 Georgia Constitution that the legislature itself must fix the salary for the judicial office in question. McCray v. Cobb County, 251 Ga. 24, 302 S.E.2d 563 (1983). > The printed notes continue for 24,819 more characters, not shown here. Continue at https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-iii-sec-i-para-i.md?notes=all&start=11556