---
title: Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III. One subject matter expressed.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-iii-sec-v-para-iii
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III
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date: 2016
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heading_path: CONSTITUTION OF THE / LEGISLATIVE BRANCH / ENACTMENT OF LAWS
---

# Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III. One subject matter expressed.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

No bill shall pass which refers to more than one subject matter or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.

## Law Reviews

For article discussing implications of this paragraph on municipal annexation statutes, see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 35 (1967). For article, ‘‘The 1967 Amendments to the Georgia Civil Practice Act (Ch. 11, T. 9) and the Appellate Procedure Act’’ (Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 5), see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 383 (1967). For article, ‘‘Synopses of 1968 Amendments to the Appellate Procedure Act (Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 5) and Georgia Civil Practice Act’’ (Ch. 11, T. 9), see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 503 (1968). For article, ‘‘The Legislative Process in Georgia Local Government Law,’’ see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1971). For article, ‘‘Selected Oddities in Georgia Municipal Law,’’ see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 783 (1975). For survey article on constitutional law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 53 (1982). For survey article on local government law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1982). For article, ‘‘Federalization of the Mosquito: Structural Innovation in the New Deal Administrative State,’’ see 60 Emory L.J. 325 (2010).

For comment on the constitutionality of Ga. L. 1958, pp. 657, 658; as amended by Ga. L. Ex. Sess., 1964, pp. 16, 17 (§ 53-2-40), reducing the number of required witnesses to a will to two, in light of this paragraph, see 1 Ga. St. B.J. 126 (1964). For comment on Griffith v. Merrit, 223 Ga. 562, 157 S.E.2d 23 (1967), appearing below, see 19 Mercer L. Rev. 436 (1968). For comment on Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969) as to the constitutionality of the State Bar Act (Art. 2, Ch. 19, T. 15), see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 355 (1969).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. IV.

## Origin of Section.

This paragraph was inserted in the Constitution of 1798, and its necessity was suggested by the Yazoo Act. Savannah v. State ex rel. Green, 4 Ga. 26 (1848); Mayor of Macon v. Hughes, 110 Ga. 795, 36 S.E. 247 (1900).

This paragraph was a reverberation from the shock resulting from passage of an Act that under the caption ‘‘for the protection and support of its frontier settlements,’’ a measure disposing of Georgia’s western lands, 35,000,000 acres, for $500,000.00, less than two cents per acre, a territory out of which a few years later the States of Alabama and Mississippi were carved. Cady v. Jardine, 185 Ga. 9, 193 S.E. 869 (1937).

Paragraph a Georgia contribution

## To Constitutional Law.

This paragraph first appeared in the Constitution of 1798, and before that time no other state had such a provision; it is distinctly a Georgia contribution to constitutional law. Cady v. Jardine, 185 Ga. 9, 193 S.E. 869 (1937).

This paragraph is designed for two purposes, first, the prevention of surreptitious legislation typified by the ill-famed ‘‘Yazoo Fraud;’’ and, second, the prevention of ‘‘omnibus’’ bills combining many matters, adverse in their nature, with the view of combining in their favor the advocates of all and thus securing the passage of several measures no one of which could succeed upon its own merits. Camp v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. 35, 189 S.E.2d 56 (1972).

This constitutional provision was inspired by the ‘‘Yazoo Fraud’’ and embodied in the Constitution to prevent the ‘‘smuggling’’ of undesirable legislation, and to provide that in the future the people would have notice of the contents of proposed legislation. Briggs v. State, 80 Ga. App. 664, 56 S.E.2d 802 (1949), overruled on other grounds, Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95, 230 S.E.2d 853 (1976).

Purpose of this provision is to protect the people against covert or surprise legislation. Bray v. City of E. Point, 203 Ga. 315, 46 S.E.2d 257 (1948); Nelson v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 804, 147 S.E.2d 424 (1966); Green v. Bryson, 223 Ga. 862, 159 S.E.2d 56 (1968).

This paragraph is mandatory upon legislature and not directory, and

## Acts in Violation Thereof Are Void.

McCaffrey v. State, 183 Ga. 827, 189 S.E. 825 (1937); Black v. Jones, 190 Ga. 95, 8 S.E.2d 385 (1940).

This paragraph stands as bar to any legislation which embodies more than one subject matter. Fields v. Arnall, 199 Ga. 491, 34 S.E.2d 692 (1945).

## Purpose Is Not to Prevent Comprehensive Legislation.

The purpose of this paragraph is to prevent the passage of a law which is not indicated in a general way in the title of the Act. Its object, therefore, is not to prevent comprehensive, but surreptitious legislation. Kaigler v. Board of Comm’rs of Rds. & Revenues, 174 Ga. 849, 164 S.E. 193 (1932). bidding comprehensive Acts would

## Construction of Paragraph as Forbe Incorrect.

This paragraph is intended to stop the vicious practice of joining in one Act incongruous and unrelated matters; but any construction of it which would interfere with the very commendable policy or practice of incorporating the entire body of statutory law upon one general subject in a single Act, instead of dividing it into a number of separate Acts, would not only be contrary to its spirit, but also seriously embarrassing to honest legislation. Crews v. Cook, 220 Ga. 479, 139 S.E.2d 490 (1964); Lord v. State, 235 Ga. 342, 219 S.E.2d 425 (1975).

Act which does not specify all of its consequences and effects in its title does not necessarily violate this paragraph. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981). ers should stand or fall upon its own merits, without, on the one hand, receiving any adventitious aid from another and perhaps more popular one, or, on the other hand, having to carry the burden of supporting a less meritorious and popular measure. No voter should be compelled, in order to support a measure which the voter favors, to vote also for a wholly different one which the voter’s judgment disapproves, or, in order to vote against the proposition which the voter desires to defeat, to vote also against the one which commends itself to the approval of the voter’s judgment. Wall v. Board of Elections, 242 Ga. 566, 250 S.E.2d 408 (1978).

Legislature empowered to legislate

## Each Proposition Submitted to Votin One Act Upon General Subject.

The General Assembly is empowered under this paragraph to legislate in one Act upon a general subject and to embody therein all elements of the general subject, and such an Act is valid. Fields v. Arnall, 199 Ga. 491, 34 S.E.2d 692 (1945).

An Act which attempted to annex land alleged to be within the corporate limits of another municipality, explicitly named in the Act, violated this paragraph. The General Assembly is incompetent to amend, repeal, or modify the charters of two separate and distinct municipal corporations in one Act, and to attempt to do so causes the Act to impermissibly refer to more than one subject matter. Schneider v. City of Folkston, 207 Ga. 434, 62 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

An Act whose title referred only to one city, but which also attempted to amend, partially repeal, and nullify the charter of another municipality caused the Act to contain matter different from what was expressed in the title in violation of this paragraph. Schneider v. City of Folkston, 207 Ga. 434, 62 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

This paragraph is not applicable to proposals by legislature to amend constitution. Cooney v. Foote, 142 Ga. 647, 83 S.E. 537 (1916); Goolsby v. Stephens, 155 Ga. 529, 117 S.E. 439 (1923).

Adoption of Code containing Act violating this paragraph waives the defect. Central of Ga. Ry. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 31 S.E. 531 (1898); Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S.E. 243 (1906); Davis v. Davison, 160 Ga. 545, 128 S.E. 743 (1925).

Necessity of showing injury from

## Unconstitutional Statute.

An attack upon a statute that it contains matter different from that expressed in the title is of necessity limited to the subject area that affects the attacking party since a party who attacks a statute as being unconstitutional must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature of the statute injures that party and so operates as to deprive the party of rights protected by the Constitution. Lord v. State, 235 Ga. 342, 219 S.E.2d 425 (1975).


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