---
title: Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX. Advertisement of notice to introduce local legislation.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-iii-sec-v-para-ix
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX
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---

# Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX. Advertisement of notice to introduce local legislation.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

The General Assembly shall provide by law for the advertisement of notice of intention to introduce local bills.

## Cross References

Force of law of local Acts, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I. Local referenda on abolishing offices or changing term, § 1-3-11. Notice of introduction of local legislation, §§ 28-1-14 and 36-34-8.

## Editor's Notes

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. IX and antecedent provisions, specifying the method by which intention to introduce local legislation was to be advertised, are included in the annotations for this paragraph. lation to continue the effectiveness of a 1952 constitutional amendment allowing the establishment of a joint board of tax assessors in a population category applying only to Fulton County and the City of Atlanta was sufficient, notwithstanding that the notice did not specifically refer to either Fulton County or the City of Atlanta. Lomax v. Lee, 261 Ga. 575, 408 S.E.2d 788 (1991).

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. IX and antecedent provisions, which specified the method by which intention to introduce local legislation was to be advertised, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Legal requirements for publication

## Law Reviews

For article discussing trend to abolish fee system for compensation of public officials and court resistance manifested in rigid interpretation of notice requirements, see 9 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (1958). For article on the historical interpretation and validity of statutes pertaining to county commissioners, see 15 Mercer L. Rev. 258 (1963). For article, ‘‘Bill Drafting — Some Guidelines and Pitfalls,’’ see 2 Ga. St. B.J. 181 (1965). For article discussing consent considerations in municipal annexations by the Legislature, see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 35 (1967). For article, ‘‘Local Legislation in Georgia: The Notice Requirement,’’ see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 22 (1972). For article analyzing the changing relationship between state and local governments in Georgia in light of ‘‘Amendment 19,’’ see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 757 (1975). For article discussing standards for determining whether constitutional amendments are general or special, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 169 (1975). For article examining history of recall in local government law, and considering future developments, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 883 (1976).

For note on the validity of population statutes, see 2 Ga. St. B.J. 533 (1966). For note discussing the notice requirement of local legislation in light of purportedly general population bills, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 602 (1971).

For comment on Smith v. McMichael, 203 Ga. 74, 45 S.E.2d 431 (1947), appearing below, see 10 Ga. B.J. 227 (1947). For comment on Gay v. Laurens County, 213 Ga. 518, 100 S.E.2d 271 (1957), appearing below, see 20 Ga. B.J. 535 (1958).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. IX.

## Notice of Intent to Introduce legis-Purpose of Paragraph.

One of the purposes of this paragraph is to prevent local and special laws which affect only a particular locality, such as a county or municipality, from becoming laws unless notice of intention to introduce such bills be given during a specified time preceding their introduction in the General Assembly by newspaper advertisement published in the locality affected, with the General Consideration (Cont’d) object of preventing duties and obligations from being imposed on local governments without giving those in charge of such governments an opportunity to oppose their passage. Fleming v. Daniell, 221 Ga. 43, 142 S.E.2d 804 (1965); Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

## Purpose of Advertisement Is to Protect Against Surprise Legislation.

The purpose of the advertisement under this paragraph as to local legislation is ‘‘to protect the people against covert or surprise legislation.’’ Brown v. Clower, 225 Ga. 165, 166 S.E.2d 363 (1969) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Cannot restrain power to create or

## Abolish Charters of Municipal Corporations.

This paragraph may not be extended by implication to place restraint upon power of General Assembly to create or abolish charters of municipal corporations, either by local or general law, since municipalities are creatures of the legislature, and their existence may be established, altered, amended, enlarged, or diminished, or utterly abolished by the legislature. City of Mt. View v. Clayton County, 242 Ga. 163, 249 S.E.2d 541 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 902, 99 S. Ct. 1205, 59 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Paragraph as test of whether bill is

## Special.

A decisive proof that laws are not local or special within the meaning of the Constitution is, that by this paragraph every local or special bill has to be advertised beforehand in the locality where the matter or thing to be affected may be situated. Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga. 804, 11 S.E. 1018 (1890) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX). ties are local and special Acts. Fleming v. Daniell, 221 Ga. 43, 142 S.E.2d 804 (1965).

## Acts Which Affect Only Certain coun-Standing to Challenge Constitutionality of Act.

Parties as citizens and taxpayers are entitled to challenge the constitutionality under this paragraph of an Act purporting to incorporate town. Bracewell v. Warnock, 208 Ga. 388, 67 S.E.2d 114 (1951) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Changes in Local Government pends upon law under which the incumbent holds office. If the law is capable of being repealed, the right of the officer is gone. City of Mt. View v. Clayton County, 242 Ga. 163, 249 S.E.2d 541 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 902, 99 S. Ct. 1205, 59 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1979). fringement on power of ordinary

## Right of Incumbent to Office de-Creation of Board of County Commissioners Not Unconstitutional In(now Judge of the Probate Court).

Since the General Assembly has constitutional authority to create a board of county commissioners, and since the ordinary (now judge of the probate court) is given jurisdiction over county matters only when such a board has not been created, a contention that an Act creating such a board unconstitutionally infringes upon and restricts the power and authority of an ordinary (now judge of the probate court) is without merit. Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

Authority of General Assembly to prescribe powers of ordinary (now judge of the probate court) over county affairs necessarily includes authority to increase or diminish such powers. Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

## Changing Commission Form of Government Not Violation of Paragraph.

— Act replacing one county commissioner with three member board of commissioners, and keeping the incumbent commissioner as member of board, did not abolish the office of the commissioner in violation of this paragraph. Webb v. Echols, 211 Ga. 724, 88 S.E.2d 625 (1955) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

To abolish office means to abrogate, annihilate, destroy, extinguish, or put an end to it. Webb v. Echols, 211 Ga. 724, 88 S.E.2d 625 (1955).

General Assembly may not provide for initial appointment of new county

## Commissioners.

This paragraph requires new members of the board of commissioners of a county to be elected, and it is not constitutionally permissible for the GeneralAssembly to provide for the initial appointment of additional commissioners pending a subsequent election. Lance v. Stepp, 232 Ga. 675, 208 S.E.2d 559 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX). vided for under special Act does not abolish or modify term of office but merely creates a vacancy in the office and such a recall procedure does not abolish, shorten, or lengthen the term of office. Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975).

Paragraph not violated when office and court of justice of the peace abolished at end of term of such officer, at which time the magistrate’s court will operate in lieu of the justice court. Burpee v. Logan, 216 Ga. 434, 117 S.E.2d 339 (1960) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX). graph not violated by Act which classed judge as ‘‘junior,’’ because the Act does not change the office held, the duties thereof, or the term. Mulling v. Houlihan, 205 Ga. 735, 55 S.E.2d 150 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948, 70 S. Ct. 486, 94 L. Ed. 585 (1950) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Proof of Notice

Enrolled copy of local bill must show copy of required notice and certificate or affidavit in order to become law. Smith v. Clayton, 80 Ga. App. 21, 55 S.E.2d 171 (1949).

## Recall of County Officeholder pro-Former Third Sentence of This para-Advertisement Required.

Under this paragraph, the absence of the required proof of advertisement prevents an Act from becoming a law. It follows that a referendum approving theAct is unlawful, and the result of the unlawful referendum is likewise unlawful. Smith v. City Council, 203 Ga. 511, 47 S.E.2d 582 (1948) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Notice as proven becomes integral part of bill itself and as such must be embodied within the enrollment of such bill. Smith v. McMichael, 203 Ga. 74, 45 S.E.2d 431 (1947), commented on in 10 Ga. B.J. 227 (1947).

Inclusion of proof of notice imputes

## Absolute Verity as to Contents.

When the enrollment of any local or special bill has incorporated therein the required proof of notice, and after it has been properly signed and filed with the Secretary of State, it will not only impute absolute verity as to its contents, but it will also conclusively show upon its face its validity with respect to this paragraph; whereas, if such enrollment fails to show the required proof of notice, it is upon its face invalid. Smith v. McMichael, 203 Ga. 74, 45 S.E.2d 431 (1947); Bracewell v. Warnock, 208 Ga. 388, 67 S.E.2d 114 (1951); Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969), commented on in 10 Ga. B.J. 227 (1947). (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX). lowed to speak in lieu of contents of

## No Presumption or Evidence Alenrolled Act.

It is the manifest intention of the first two paragraphs of this section that the bill finally enrolled as the statute shall speak for itself, and that no presumption and no sort of evidence shall be allowed to speak in lieu of what the enrolled Act says for itself; this clear manifestation of intent can not be defeated by mere punctuations that might appear therein. Smith v. McMichael, 203 Ga. 74, 45 S.E.2d 431 (1947); Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969), commented on in 10 Ga. B.J. 227 (1947). (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX). tive, see Speer v. Mayor of Athens, 85 Ga. 49, 11 S.E. 802 (1890); Peed v. McCrary, 94 Ga. 487, 21 S.E. 232 (1894); Fullington v. Williams, 98 Ga. 807, 27 S.E. 183 (1896); Chamlee v. Davis, 115 Ga. 266, 41 S.E. 691 (1902); Lee v. Tucker, 130 Ga. 43, 60 S.E. 164 (1908).

## For Decisions Holding That Presumption of Proper Notice Is opera-No Particular Form of Affidavit Required.

An affidavit of publication of notice of intention to introduce a local Act into the General Assembly is essential to its validity. It certifies that the local people are notified of the proposed legislation as required by law. However, no particular form of affidavit is required. City of Mt. View v. Clayton County, 242 Ga. 163, 249 S.E.2d 541 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 902, 99 S. Ct. 1205, 59 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1979). Proof of Notice (Cont’d)


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