---
title: Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV. Limitations on special legislation.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-iii-sec-vi-para-iv
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV
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date: 2016
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---

# Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV. Limitations on special legislation.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

(a) Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state and no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, except that the General Assembly may by general law authorize local governments by local ordinance or resolution to exercise police powers which do not conflict with general laws.

(b) No population bill, as the General Assembly shall define by general law, shall be passed. No bill using classification by population as a means of determining the applicability of any bill or law to any political subdivision or group of political subdivisions may expressly or impliedly amend, modify, supersede, or repeal the general law defining a population bill.

(c) No special law relating to the rights or status of private persons shall be enacted.

## Cross References

Equal protection, U.S. Const., amend. 14, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. Prohibition on laws relating to social status of a citizen, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXV. Population bill defined, § 28-1-15.

## Editor's Notes

The cases noted under this heading were decided prior to the 1983 Constitution, which provides that no population bill shall be passed except as defined by the General Assembly. tion of counties by population are that: the bases of classification must have some reasonable relation to the subject matter of the law, and must furnish a legitimate ground of differentiation; the classification must be open to let in counties subsequently falling within the class, as well as open to let out a county which, either by increase or decrease of population, ceases to have the required population; and the law must apply uniformly to all counties within the class, and must not be so hedged about and restricted that the Act applies only to one county. Estes v. Jones, 203 Ga. 686, 48 S.E.2d 99 (1948).

The legislature would be authorized to make a classification of cities on the basis of population, and pass a general law with reference to such classification, provided the basis of classification has some reasonable relation to the subject matter of the law, and furnishes a legitimate ground for differentiation, and provided that the Act is so framed as to let in all cities coming within the population classification, and let out all cities falling below the classification. City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368, 116 S.E.2d 738 (1960).

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Paras. VI and VII, and antecedent provisions, are included in the annotations for this paragraph. The 1983 Constitution now provides that counties shall have such governing authorities as are provided by the 1983 Constitution (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I) and by law.

## Law Reviews

For article discussing constitutional limitations on special legislation, see 13 Ga. B.J. 147 (1950). For article analyzing alternative means of implementing home rule legislation and advocating home rule for municipalities in light of numerous attempts to pass such legislation in Georgia, prior to repeal of Municipal Home Rule Law of 1951 and adoption of the Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965, see 8 Mercer L. Rev. 337 (1957). For article on the historical interpretation and validity of statutes pertaining to Georgia county commissioners, see 15 Mercer L. Rev. 258 (1963). For article, ‘‘Bill Drafting — Some Guidelines and Pitfalls,’’ see 2 Ga. St. B.J. 181 (1965). For article discussing the constitutionality of retaining local legislation which deviates from statutes of general application, see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 309 (1969). For article, ‘‘Delegation in Georgia Local Government Law,’’ see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 9 (1970). For article, ‘‘The Legislative Process in Georgia Local Government Law,’’ see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1971). For article discussing the evolution of municipal annexation law in Georgia in light of Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970), see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 499 (1971). For article discussing the effect of the general criminal statute on self-interest and municipal purchasing (§ 16-10-6) on the general statute on votes by municipal councilmen in matters of personal interest (§ 36-30-6) and on local statutory law, see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 431 (1971). For article, ‘‘Local Legislation in Georgia: The Notice Requirement,’’ see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 22 (1972). For article analyzing the changing relationship between state and local governments in Georgia in light of ‘‘Amendment 19,’’ see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 757 (1975). For article, ‘‘Selected Oddities in Georgia Municipal Law,’’ see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 783 (1975). For article discussing standards for determining whether constitutional amendments are general or special, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 169 (1975). For article examining history of recall in Georgia local government law, and considering future developments, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 883 (1976). For article providing an overview of Georgia’s treatment of special or local legislation, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 1167 (1976). For article discussing effect of City of Atlanta v. Myers, 240 Ga. 261, 240 S.E.2d 60 (1977), appearing below, on limits of municipal government autonomy, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 805 (1978). For article, ‘‘Unlawful Special Laws: A Postscript on the Proscription,’’ see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 319 (1978). For article on the effect on receiving government-issued licenses after a conviction based on a nolo contendere plea, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 723 (1979). For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979). For article surveying developments in Georgia local government law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 187 (1981). For article surveying developments in Georgia real property law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 219 (1981). For article on constitutional law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 53 (1982). For article, ‘‘The United States Supreme Court as Home Rule Wrecker,’’ see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 363 (1982). For article, ‘‘The Georgia Supreme Court and Local Government Law: Two Sheets to the Wind,’’ see 16 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 361 (1999).

For note on the validity of population statutes in Georgia, see 2 Ga. St. B.J. 533 (1966). For note discussing the notice requirement of local legislation in light of purportedly general population bills, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 602 (1971).

For comment on Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953), see 16 Ga. B.J. 343 (1954).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII; Art. IX, Sec. V, Paras. I, II.

## Duties.

What this paragraph seeks to do is to prevent the creation of special laws giving any one community any more rights or privileges than another, or putting any more duties on one community than any other similarly situated. DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth., 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

## Immunity of Water Authority.

The immunity provision of the charter of the Macon Water Authority Act that exempted the Authority from vicarious liability was not preempted by O.C.G.A. § 51-2-2, and did not offend Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a). Matthews v. Macon Water Auth., 273 Ga. 436, 542 S.E.2d 106 (2001).

General and special laws mutually

## Exclusive.

A law territorially general, and a subsequent law territorially special, General Consideration (Cont’d) for the same order of cases, are mutually exclusive of each other. The legislature may have either, but, in the nature of things, cannot have both. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942).

## State Statutes Preempted City’s Ordinance.

Conviction and fine against a convenience store operator for violating a city ordinance that prohibited certain retailers of packaged alcoholic beverages from allowing coin operated amusement machines (COAMs) on the same premises was reversed because the state’s COAM Laws, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12-35 and 50-27-70 to 50-27-104, preempted the city’s ordinance at least insofar as the ordinance applied to COAMs as defined by the state statutes. Gebrekidan v. City of Clarkston, No. S15A1442, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 238 (Mar. 21, 2016).

Statute providing for recovery of costs for converting from oil-burning

## To Coal-burning Facility.

O.C.G.A. § 46-2-26.3, relating to recovery of costs of conversion from oil-burning to coal-burning generating facility, is not unconstitutional as a special law for which provision has been made by general law, because O.C.G.A. § 46-2-23 does not divest the General Assembly of its power to regulate public utilities. Lasseter v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 253 Ga. 227, 319 S.E.2d 824 (1984).

The County Building Authority Act was not a special law or population bill and was not unconstitutional under either the 1976 or the 1983 Constitutions. Therefore, the Fulton County Building Authority was authorized to issue bonds to finance the acquisition and construction of mental retardation training centers and to finance studies, services, and reports incidental to preparing plans for a county office building, because such projects were within the scope of the Act, which was a ‘‘general law,’’ as referred to in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I. BuildingAuth. v. State, 253 Ga. 242, 321 S.E.2d 97 (1984).

Supreme Court’s approval of a local court rule providing that civil actions seeking primarily money damages up to $25,000 or in an unspecified amount would be referred to compulsory but nonbinding arbitration did not abridge the rights of any litigants or conflict with any federal or state constitutional provision or Georgia statute. Davis v. Gaona, 260 Ga. 450, 396 S.E.2d 218 (1990).

Condemning property for utility

## Company.

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 46-3-201(b)(9), the electric corporation, which had to condemn property in order to effectuate its project, did not have to demonstrate to the county the necessity or the appropriateness of its proposed project; thus, the county ordinance prohibiting the electric lines for three years was unconstitutional. Rabun County v. Ga. Transmission Corp., 276 Ga. 81, 575 S.E.2d 474 (2003).

Amendment changing retroactive

## Effect of Prior Amendment.

An amendment which changed the retroactive effect of an earlier amendment to O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1, the implied consent warning law, so that it applied only to stops made after the effective date of the earlier amendment, rather than to cases pending on such date, did not violate the uniformity or special laws provisions of the state constitution. State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 466 S.E.2d 216 (1996).

County ordinance was proper use


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