---
title: Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I. Counties a body corporate and politic.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-ix-sec-i-para-i
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I
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---

# Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I. Counties a body corporate and politic.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

Each county shall be a body corporate and politic with such governing authority and with such powers and limitations as are provided in this Constitution and as provided by law. The governing authorities of the several counties shall remain as prescribed by law on June 30, 1983, until otherwise provided by law.

## Cross References

Acts changing term of office of incumbent prohibited, § 1-3-11. Local government provisions applicable to counties only, Ch. 1, T. 36. Changing of county boundary lines, § 36-3-1. Boundary line disputes, § 36-3-20. County governing authorities generally, § 36-5-20 et seq. Power of General Assembly to fix compensation for and abolish office of county treasurer, § 36-6-1.

## Editor's Notes

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I and antecedent provisions, which provided that the General Assembly could create tribunals and officers for the transaction of county matters subject to uniformity throughout the state, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Ga. L. 1919 p. 288, § 147 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-101) is not violative of this paragraph. Olliff v. Hendrix, 172 Ga. 497, 158 S.E. 11 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

This paragraph was not violated when term of clerk of city court shortened. Collins v. Russell, 107 Ga. 423, 33 S.E. 444 (1899) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Creation of County Commissioners of Ware County did not violate this paragraph. Crawley v. State, 150 Ga. 86, 102 S.E. 898 (1920); Smith v. Duggan, 153 Ga. 463, 112 S.E. 458 (1922); Rhodes v. Jernigan, 155 Ga. 523, 117 S.E. 432 (1923), overruled on other grounds, Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I). graph. McFarlin v. Board of Drainage Comm’rs, 153 Ga. 766, 113 S.E. 447 (1922) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

For an invalid Act appointing a county treasurer for an unexpired term, see McCants v. Layfield, 149 Ga. 231, 99 S.E. 877 (1919).

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VII and antecedent provisions, which provided that the General Assembly had the power to create and define the duties of county commissioners, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

In light of the similarity of the provisions, opinions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VI and antecedent provisions, which provided that the General Assembly could create tribunals and officers for county matters subject to uniformity throughout the state, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Distinction between constitutional provisions in invalidation of special

In light of the similarity of the provisions, opinions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VII and antecedent provisions, which provided that the General Assembly had the power to create and define the duties of county commissioners, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

## Law Reviews

For article, ‘‘Actions for Wrongful Death in Georgia Part Three and Four,’’ see 21 Ga. B.J. 339 (1959). For article on the historical interpretation and validity of statutes pertaining to Georgia county commissioners, see 15 Mercer L. Rev. 258 (1963). For article surveying important general legal principles of municipal and county government purchasing and contracting in Georgia, see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 371 (1965). For article discussing homestead rights as a means of protecting decedent’s surviving spouse and children, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 447 (1976). For article examining history of recall in Georgia local government law, and considering future developments, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 883 (1976). For article surveying judicial developments in Georgia’s trial practice and procedure laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 249 (1979).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. IX, Sec. I, Paras. I, VII.

## This Paragraph Is Self-executing.

Arnett v. Board of Comm’rs, 75 Ga. 782 (1885) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

For definition of a county, see Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S.E. 479, 36 L.R.A. (n.s.) 77 (1911).

Board of education is not a corporate body. Mattox v. Board of Educ., 148 Ga. 577, 97 S.E. 532, 5 A.L.R. 568 (1918); Smith v. Board of Educ., 153 Ga. 758, 113 S.E. 147 (1922).

2. Powers

Counties can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by law, and a county can exercise no powers except such as are expressly given or necessarily implied from express grant of other powers. DeKalb County v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 228 Ga. 512, 186 S.E.2d 732 (1972).

This section confers no power on a Body Corporate (Cont’d) 2. Powers (Cont’d) county to contest the validity of a constitutional amendment. Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S.E. 479, 36 L.R.A. (n.s.) 77 (1911) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

## Under This Paragraph and Ga.

Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III), there is nothing illegal or unconstitutional nor is it an abuse of discretion for a governing body of a dations from various department heads, advisory committees, and the general public prior to taking official action. Lindsey v. Guhl, 237 Ga. 567, 229 S.E.2d 354 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Right of a county to levy a tax must be clear. Bowers v. Hanks, 152 Ga. 659, 111 S.E. 38 (1922).

## County to Seek Advice and recommen-Liquor Permits.

Section of DeKalb County Code requiring all employees of an establishment holding a license for consumption of beer or wine, except busboys, cooks, and dishwashers, to have permits was not unconstitutional and did not exceed the county’s powers of home rule. Kariuki v. DeKalb County, 253 Ga. 713, 324 S.E.2d 450 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Russell v. City of E. Point, 261 Ga. 213, 403 S.E.2d 50 (1991).

3. Liability

## Acts of Board of Education.

A county acts through its officers and agents. In matters pertaining to education, it acts through its board of education. When the board of education acts upon matters lawfully within its jurisdiction, it is the county acting through its corporate authority, and a county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless made so by statute. But when the board of education, through its members, acts beyond the scope of its lawful jurisdiction and commits an actionable wrong, the act so committed is not ‘‘county action,’’ and in such a case a suit may be maintained in the courts of this state against the wrongdoers. Duffee v. Jones, 208 Ga. 639, 68 S.E.2d 699 (1952).

## Liability of County to Suit Generally.

— This paragraph subjects the counties of this state to suit, but not to suits upon all causes of action. It does not make them generally liable to suits, like individuals or as municipal corporations. Being political subdivisions of the state, they cannot be sued unless made subject to suit expressly or by necessary implication. Decatur County v. Praytor, Howton & Wood Contracting Co., 163 Ga. 929, 137 S.E. 247 (1927) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

## County Liability Based on Constitution or Statute.

The constitutional provision that a county is a body corporate and the statutory provision that a county, as a body corporate, may be sued in any court, do not authorize a suit against a county for damages where the county is not made liable for such damages by the Constitution or by statute. Revels v. Tift County, 235 Ga. 333, 219 S.E.2d 445 (1975).

County is not liable on an implied contract. Smith v. Baker County, 142 Ga. 168, 82 S.E. 557 (1914); Decatur County v. Roberts, 159 Ga. 528, 126 S.E. 460 (1925).

Requirements to enjoin county

## Board Action.

In order to enjoin a county board’s action in selecting a solid waste disposal site, plaintiffs are required to show an abuse of discretion or a constitutional violation. Lindsey v. Guhl, 237 Ga. 567, 229 S.E.2d 354 (1976).

4. Actions rate body to proceed against county

## Suit Must Name County as Corpowith Suit.

Where a suit is brought against the board of county commissioners alleging that the building of a certain road has injured the plaintiff, the suit is intended as one against the county, and where the petition does not name as a defendant the county as a corporate body but instead only names the board of commissioners, who are its agents, the petition cannot be amended and must be dismissed. Merritt v. Dixon, 222 Ga. 432, 150 S.E.2d 644 (1966).

An action must be brought in name of the county. Smith v. Fuller, 135 Ga. 271, 69 S.E. 177, 1912A Ann. Cas. 70 (1910); Henry v. Means, 137 Ga. 153, 72 S.E. 1021 (1911).

## Injunction Against County Governing Officials Proper.

Though suits by and against a county are properly brought in the name of the county, an injunction may be sought in a court of equity in an action which is brought against the governing officials of the county. Olley Valley Estates, Inc. v. Fussell, 232 Ga. 779, 208 S.E.2d 801 (1974). nary (now judge of probate court) as the county official to whom bond of a sole commissioner should be made payable, and can provide that the ordinary should sue on the bond in the event of default. Ordinarily, the sole commissioner would be the person who would institute suits in the name of the county, but this is not such a case. This is not a suit by the county, but is one by the ordinary for the use of the county. The bond was a contract between the ordinary, and the sole commissioner and the surety. McRae v. Sears, 183 Ga. 133, 187 S.E. 664 (1936).

County can bring action to collect

## Legislature Can Designate the Ordidelinquent Payments Due County Facility.

Where county had the legislative authority, by implication, to maintain a hospital for the benefit of paupers and incidentally make charges for the use thereof by persons able to pay in order to help bear the expenses of maintaining said hospital and in accord with a plain and single rule of natural right and justice, such county could bring an action for said charges; such suit was properly brought in the name of the county. Oliver v. Hall County Mem. Hosp., 62 Ga. App. 95, 8 S.E.2d 138 (1940).

County Government

## Former Code 1933, Ch. 23-25, Making Treasurer Ex-officio Officer of Commission Did Not Violate This para-This Paragraph and Ga. Const.

1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I) must be construed together. They confer upon the General Assembly power to create boards of commissioners with such powers as the General Assembly may grant, without regard to uniformity in the powers conferred; and the constitutional prohibition under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. IV, Para. IV), which declares that no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, is not violated by the creation of such boards. Sanders v. Wilkinson County, 69 Ga. App. 676, 26 S.E.2d 467 (1943); Bowen v. Lewis, 201 Ga. 487, 40 S.E.2d 80 (1946); Robert v. Steed, 207 Ga. 41, 60 S.E.2d 134 (1950) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), regarding special laws,


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