---
title: Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III. County officers; election; term; compensation.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-ix-sec-i-para-iii
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III
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# Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III. County officers; election; term; compensation.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

(a) The clerk of the superior court, judge of the probate court, sheriff, tax receiver, tax collector, and tax commissioner, where such office has replaced the tax receiver and tax collector, shall be elected by the qualified voters of their respective counties for terms of four years and shall have such qualifications, powers, and duties as provided by general law.

(b) County officers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph may be on a fee basis, salary basis, or fee basis supplemented by salary, in such manner as may be directed by law. Minimum compensation for said county officers may be established by the General Assembly by general law. Such minimum compensation may be supplemented by local law or, if such authority is delegated by local law, by action of the county governing authority.

(c) The General Assembly may consolidate the offices of tax receiver and tax collector into the office of tax commissioner.

## Cross References

Qualifications of candidates for county offices generally, § 21-2-6. Effective dates of general Acts providing increases in compensation to officers listed in Paragraph, § 1-3-4.1.

## Editor's Notes

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VIII and antecedent provisions, which used the phrase ‘‘county officers’’ without setting out specific examples, are included in the annotations for this paragraph. ficer. Andrews v. Butts County, 29 Ga. App. 302, 114 S.E. 912 (1922) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

This paragraph refers only to such county offices as were in existence at the time of its adoption, and does not apply to offices thereafter created by statute. Marshall v. Walker, 183 Ga. 44, 187 S.E. 81 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Members of board of county tax assessors are not county officers within this paragraph. Barnes v. Watson, 148 Ga. 822, 98 S.E. 500 (1919) (see Ga. County Officers (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Office of county commissioner is a

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VIII and antecedent provisions, which provided that a person was eligible to be a county officer only if the person was a qualified voter and resident of the county for two years, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Pardoned felon may be barred from

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VIII and antecedent provisions, which provided for removal of county officers upon conviction for malpractice in office, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

## Law Reviews

For article discussing trend to abolish fee system for compensation of public officials in Georgia and court resistance manifested in rigid interpretation of notice requirements, see 9 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (1958). For article on historical interpretation and validity of statutes pertaining to Georgia county commissioners, see 15 Mercer L. Rev. 258 (1963). For article, ‘‘The Selection and Tenure of Judges,’’ see 2 Ga. St. B.J. 281 (1966). For annual survey of local government law, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 233 (1983). For article, ‘‘Georgia Local Government Officials and the Grand Jury,’’ see 26 Ga. St. B.J. 50 (1989).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. IX, Sec. I, Paras. VIII-X.

## Office Any Constitutional Officer If pur-Inherent Authority of State Official.

— A duly elected, constitutional officer must have the inherent authority to implement certain public safety policies. One such public safety policy is the random drug screening of personnel who are authorized to carry weapons. The state has a compelling reason for randomly drug testing law enforcement employees because drug use by them undermines public confidence in the integrity of law enforcement and poses a danger to fellow employees, prison inmates, and the public at large. Mayo v. Fulton County, 220 Ga. App. 825, 470 S.E.2d 258 (1996).

Cited in Stewart v. Anderson, 140 Ga. 31, 78 S.E. 457 (1913); Culbreth v. Cannady, 168 Ga. 444, 148 S.E. 102 (1929); Overton v. Gandy, 170 Ga. 562, 153 S.E. 520 (1930); McGill v. Simmons, 172 Ga. 127, 157 S.E. 273 (1931); McBrien v. Starkweather, 43 Ga. App. 818, 160 S.E. 548 (1931); Gay v. Laurens County, 213 Ga. 518, 100 S.E.2d 271 (1957); Best v. State, 109 Ga. App. 553, 136 S.E.2d 496 (1964); Gruber v. Fulton County, 111 Ga. App. 71, 140 S.E.2d 552 (1965); Daniel v. Yow, 226 Ga. 544, 176 S.E.2d 67 (1970); Pitts v. Cates, 536 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1976); Barbour v. Democratic Executive Comm., 246 Ga. 193, 269 S.E.2d 433 (1980); In re Irvin, 171 Ga. App. 794, 321 S.E.2d 119 (1984); Clark v. State, 255 Ga. 370, 338 S.E.2d 269 (1986); Hart v. Madden, 256 Ga. 497, 349 S.E.2d 737 (1986); Thompson v. Carter, 905 F. Supp. 1073 (M.D. Ga. 1995); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).

County Officers

1. In General

## This Paragraph Defines a County Ofcounty Office Governed by Constitutional Provisions of This Paragraph.

Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

An incumbent in office as a member of the board of county commissioners as provided for in Ga. L. 1929, p. 568, is a county officer. Sweat v. Barnhill, 171 Ga. 294, 155 S.E. 18 (1930).

An incumbent in office as ordinary (now judge of probate court) is a county officer within the meaning of this paragraph. Lee v. Byrd, 169 Ga. 622, 151 S.E. 28 (1929) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

## Office of County School Superintendent Is a Constitutional Office.

Thus, the superintendent is to be elected by the voters of the superintendent’s district, the superintendent’s district being the county of the superintendent’s residence exclusive of any independent school system in existence in such county. Kemp v. Mitchell County Democratic Executive Comm., 216 Ga. 276, 116 S.E.2d 321 (1960). ficers’’ within the meaning of this paragraph. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Lewis, 109 Ga. App. 476, 136 S.E.2d 518 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

## Deputy Sheriffs Are Not ‘‘county of-Sheriff Is a County Officer.

Sheriff, pursuant to the state constitution, was a county officer and was not an employee of the county commission; however, as a county officer, the sheriff’s budget and accounts were subject to the authority of the county commission, which could cut the sheriff’s budget, but the trial court erred in granting the sheriff’s petition for writ of mandamus and injunctive relief after concluding that the county commission’s adopted budget that delineated specific functions within the sheriff’s department improperly dictated to the sheriff how to operate the sheriff’s office, as the real issue was whether the budget it adopted reasonably and adequately allowed the sheriff to perform the sheriff’s duties. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Saba, 278 Ga. 176, 598 S.E.2d 437 (2004).

Trial court’s determination that a county sheriff was not also a State of Georgia employee for workers compensation purposes under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a), the exclusive remedy provision, was proper, as sheriffs were only authorized to act within their county, they were defined as county officers under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III, and sheriffs’ salaries were subject to change. Freeman v. Barnes, 282 Ga. App. 895, 640 S.E.2d 611 (2006).

The Georgia Tort Claims Act did not apply to a wrongful death suit brought against a county, a sheriff, and a deputy; under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III(a), sheriffs are county officers and O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(5) excludes counties from the Act, and moreover the county paid the salaries and employee benefits of the sheriff and the sheriff’s employees and funded the sheriff’s department. Nichols v. Prather, 286 Ga. App. 889, 650 S.E.2d 380 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 766 (Ga. 2007).

Trial court properly denied a sheriff’s motion to dismiss the negligence suit brought against the sheriff and eight other employees of the sheriff’s department arising from the death of a court reporter as the sheriff was an elected official and was not a county employee; therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a), did not bar the suit. Freeman v. Brandau, 292 Ga. App. 300, 664 S.E.2d 299 (2008).

County sheriff’s office was not a proper defendant in plaintiff’s injury action because the sheriff’s office was not an entity capable of being sued under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 in that the sheriff was a constitutionally created office under both Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III(a), and Fla. Const. Art. 8, Sec. 1, and employees acted in the name of the sheriff and not as an employee of the sheriff’s office under O.C.G.A. § 15-16-23 and Fla. Stat. § 30.07. Harris v. Lawson, No. 7:08-CV-70 (HL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78808 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2008).

Trial court did not err in dismissing a sheriff’s deputy’s widow’s claims against the sheriff and the deputy’s fellow deputies on the basis that the Worker’s Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., provided her exclusive remedy under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a). The sheriff was the deputy’s ‘‘employer’’ under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III(a), and O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(3). Teasley v. Freeman, 305 Ga. App. 1, 699 S.E.2d 39 (2010). missions generated by use of county

## Sheriff Has No Authority Over Comjail.

County sheriff was not entitled to keep commissions received from a company that provided telephone services to county jail inmates as revenue generated using county property or facilities—such as the jail—was itself county property and therefore subject to county authority under O.C.G.A. § 36-5-22.1. Although a sheriff could collect certain fees, such as fees for attending court, O.C.G.A. § 15-16-21 provided that such fees had to be turned over to the county’s treasurer or fiscal officer. Lawson v. Lincoln County, 292 Ga. App. 527, 664 S.E.2d 900 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 899 (Ga. 2008).

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 45-2-2, a deputy sheriff could not serve as a school board member for the same county. Black v. Catoosa County Sch. Dist., 213 Ga. App. 534, 445 S.E.2d 340 (1994). ated county offices is upon election, and appointments to fill such offices are authorized only when there is a vacancy in an existing office. Lance v. Stepp, 232 Ga. 675, 208 S.E.2d 559 (1974).

To be termed and classified as a county officer within the provisions of this paragraph, a person must be: (1) elected by qualified voters of the county; (2) hold office for four years; (3) be a resident of the county for two years; and (4) be a qualified voter. Houlihan v. Saussy, 206 Ga. 1, 55 S.E.2d 557 (1949); Employees Retirement Sys. v. Lewis, 109 Ga. App. 476, 136 S.E.2d 518 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

## Emphasis of the Constitution Dealing with Membership of Newly cre-Office of School Superintendent.

Although a county school superintendent is a ‘‘county officer’’ for several purposes, the office of school superintendent is not always a county office. Bradfield v. Wells, 262 Ga. 198, 415 S.E.2d 638 (1992).

A local constitutional amendment which prohibits ‘‘county officers’’ from succeeding themselves after two successive terms in office does not govern the qualifications or eligibility for the office of superintendent of the Telfair County School District. Bradfield v. Wells, 262 Ga. 198, 415 S.E.2d 638 (1992).

## Authority of Officers Over Expenditures.

Since county commissioners approved a budget for the office of the superior court clerk that included a miscellaneous line item for a specified amount of money for certain years, the item had already been budgeted to the clerk by the commission in the exercise of its authority over the clerk’s budget; thus, the decision of how to spend this money fell solely to the clerk in the exercise of the clerk’s duties, and not to the commission. Griffies v. Coweta County, 272 Ga. 506, 530 S.E.2d 718 (2000).


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