---
title: Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I. Intergovernmental contracts.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-ix-sec-iii-para-i
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I
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# Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I. Intergovernmental contracts.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

(a) The state, or any institution, department, or other agency thereof, and any county, municipality, school district, or other political subdivision of the state may contract for any period not exceeding 50 years with each other or with any other public agency, public corporation, or public authority for joint services, for the provision of services, or for the joint or separate use of facilities or equipment; but such contracts must deal with activities, services, or facilities which the contracting parties are authorized by law to undertake or provide. By way of specific instance and not limitation, a mutual undertaking by a local government entity to borrow and an undertaking by the state or a state authority to lend funds from and to one another for water or sewerage facilities or systems or for regional or multijurisdictional solid waste recycling or solid waste facilities or systems pursuant to law shall be a provision for services and an activity within the meaning of this Paragraph.

(b) Subject to such limitations as may be provided by general law, any county, municipality, or political subdivision thereof may, in connection with any contracts authorized in this Paragraph, convey any existing facilities or equipment to the state or to any public agency, public corporation, or public authority.

(c) Any county, municipality, or any combination thereof, may contract with any public agency, public corporation, or public authority for the care, maintenance, and hospitalization of its indigent sick and may as a part of such contract agree to pay for the cost of acquisition, construction, modernization, or repairs of necessary land, buildings, and facilities by such public agency, public corporation, or public authority and provide for the payment of such services and the cost to such public agency, public corporation, or public authority of acquisition, construction, modernization, or repair of land, buildings, and facilities from revenues realized by such county, municipality, or any combination thereof from any taxes authorized by this Constitution or revenues derived from any other source. (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. 9, § 3, Para. 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1612, § 3/HR 363; Ga. L. 1992, p. 3329, § 4/HR 732.)

## Cross References

Public works contracts, Ch. 10, T. 36, and Ch. 84, T. 36. Contracts between counties and municipalities for enforcement of building, electrical, and other codes, § 36-13-4. Municipal contracts for general health, §§ 36-34-3 and 36-34-4.

## Editor's Notes

The constitutional amendment (Ga. L. 1986, p. 1612, § 3) which added the present last sentence of subparagraph (a) was approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting at the general election on November 4, 1986.

The constitutional amendment (Ga. L. 1992, p. 3329, § 4) which revised subparagraph (a) to add provisions as to regional or multi-jurisdictional solid waste recycling or solid waste facilities or systems was approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting at the general election held on November 3, 1992.

## Law Reviews

For article, ‘‘Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law,’’ see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 614 (1974). For annual survey of local government law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 267 (2006). For article surveying developments in Georgia local government law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 187 (1981). For annual survey of local government law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (1986). For article, ‘‘Children, Poverty and State Constitutions,’’ see 38 Emory L.J. 577 (1989). For annual survey of local government law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (2004). For annual survey on local government law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 213 (2012).

For note, ‘‘The Legal Nature of Public Purpose Authorities: Governmental, Private, or Neither,’’ see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 680 (1974).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II; Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I.

## This Paragraph and Ga. Const.

1983, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. I being in

## Pari Materia Must Be Construed Together.

Georgia Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. I), and subparagraph (a) of this paragraph were each in the Constitution of 1945 when it was adopted. They deal with the same subject matter, namely, finance, taxation, and public debt. They are of equal dignity and to give full force and effect to the will of the people, as thus expressed, they must be construed together, being in pari materia. The latter lifts out of the former any inhibition against the creation of a debt insofar as the creation of a debt is authorized by the latter clause. Any other construction would render one of them meaningless and the Supreme Court will not ascribe to the people an intention to adopt a Constitution containing inconsistent provisions. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Authority to contract necessarily confers power to pay for use of con-

## Tracted Facilities.

By this paragraph, and in addition to other contracts which may be constitutionally made pursuant thereto, the people authorized the state and state institutions — which includes, of course, the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) — to contract for a period not exceeding 50 years with an authority then or thereafter created for the use of its facilities or services, but the power to so contract was limited to such activities and transactions as the state or a state institution is by law authorized to undertake. The power to so contract for the use of such facilities or services as thus conferred carries with it, by necessary implication, authority to pay for the use of such facilities or services during the contract period. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I). thorized to rent bridge facilities from

## Department of Transportation au-Georgia Highway Authority.

When so construed, authority is found in the Constitution for those provisions of Art. 1, Ch. 10, T. 32, which authorize the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) to expend appropriated tax funds for renting bridge facilities from the State Bridge Building Authority (now Georgia Highway Authority) for state highway uses. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953).

## Proper Interpretation and Construction of This Paragraph.

This provision of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to authorize the state and its institutions and subdivisions to enter into any and every contract which they might in their discretion deem advisable. It simply means that the state and its agencies and subdivisions may contract with each other with reference to facilities and services theretofore authorized by the Constitution. This provision does not supersede all other provisions of the Constitution with reference to the limitations on and powers of the state, its agencies and subdivisions and authorize them to undertake to maintain and provide additional facilities and services which are prohibited under other provisions of the Constitution, except to undertake to contract with reference to facilities and services authorized by other provisions of the Constitution. Mulkey v. Quillian, 213 Ga. 507, 100 S.E.2d 268 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Purpose of this paragraph was to authorize counties and municipalities to create an organization which could carry out and make more workable the duty which the state owed to its indigent sick; and therefore the court should construe it most liberally. DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth., 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

## Parties.

This paragraph relates to and deals only with contracts and conveyances which are authorized between parties who are empowered to contract with each other for services which one of the contracting parties is authorized to render for the other. McKelvey v. Logan, 220 Ga. 197, 137 S.E.2d 651 (1964) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

## Limited Applicability of Clause.

This clause has reference only to corporations and authorities created by the state of Georgia, and does not include any public authorities created by another state or country. State v. Blasingame, 212 Ga. 222, 91 S.E.2d 341 (1956).

General term ‘‘any’’ given restricted

## Construction.

Although the general term ‘‘any’’ is employed, it is given a restricted construction that excludes corporations of foreign states and countries. This clause contemplates performance within this state of services that are essentially governmental and therefore constitutes the exercise of the powers of the sovereign. State v. Blasingame, 212 Ga. 222, 91 S.E.2d 341 (1956).

Constitutional amendment prevails

## Over Previous Constitutional Provision When Conflict Arises.

If a constitutional amendment duly adopted dealing with the establishment of area schools necessarily conflicts with some previous provision, the amendment, being the last expression of the sovereign will of the people, will prevail as an implied modification pro tanto of the former provision. Cason v. State, 217 Ga. 339, 122 S.E.2d 232 (1961).

Constitutional amendment on area schools germane to constitutional

## Provisions.

A constitutional amendment, adopted by the voters in a general election, that deals with only one subject matter, the establishment of area schools, which under the amendment can be established only by contract between counties, or municipalities, or a county and a municipality, or combination thereof, is germane to the provisions of the Constitution, pertaining to the contractual powers of counties and municipalities, and does not violate the Constitution. Cason v. State, 217 Ga. 339, 122 S.E.2d 232 (1961).

## Contract Between County and Cities.

Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Homestead Option Sales Tax Act (HOST), O.C.G.A. § 48-8-100 et seq., did not allow a county to disburse funds to various cities in order to facilitate the capital outlay requirement under O.C.G.A. § 48-8-104(c)(2)(A), as HOST was implemented under the ‘‘special district’’ provision of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VI, and as it was not a ‘‘county tax,’’ it was subject to such an arrangement; however, the intergovernmental agreement between the county and cities had to be authorized under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I in order to be valid. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 277 Ga. 292, 589 S.E.2d 561 (2003).

Intermediate appellate court erred in holding that because an agreement between a county and cities did not pertain to the provision of services for purposes of the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. 1(a), but was a tax-sharing agreement, it was constitutionally invalid. The court lacked appellate jurisdiction to construe the meaning of ‘‘services’’ as used in the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause, because that term had not previously been construed by the Georgia Supreme Court. DeKalb County v. City of Decatur, 297 Ga. App. 322, 677 S.E.2d 391 (2009).

Trial court did not err in granting a county summary judgment in cities’ action for breach of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) the parties entered into pursuant to the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax Act (HOST), O.C.G.A. § 48-8-100 et seq., because the IGA was not a valid intergovernmental contract under the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a), since the focus and clear purpose of the IGA was to provide a formula for the distribution of the HOST revenues, and the IGA could not be deemed an agreement for the provision of authorized ‘‘services’’; the IGA was an agreement about how to divide and distribute HOST revenues between the county and the cities, with the cities agreeing to expend the monies disbursed solely for capital outlay projects to be located within the geographical boundaries of the county and to be owned, operated, or both either by the county, one or more cities or any combination thereof, and the fact that the IGA required the cities to expend the tax proceeds in accordance with the mandates of the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax Act, O.C.G.A. § 48-8-102, did not transform it into either a contract for services or one for the use of facilities. City of Decatur v. Dekalb County, 289 Ga. 612, 713 S.E.2d 846 (2011).

## Contracts Between Counties.

Although this paragraph does not expressly authorize a county board of education to enter into a contract with a county board of education of another county, contracts made by a county board of education are corporate actions of the county. Therefore, this constitutional authority given to counties includes county boards of education. Walker v. McKenzie, 209 Ga. 653, 74 S.E.2d 870, later appeal, 210 Ga. 189, 78 S.E.2d 486 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Counties authority to enter rental contracts mechanism for rental agreements by Georgia Education

## Authority (Schools).

Although the constitutional provision upon which Ga. L. 1949, p. 1009, (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 5, Ch. 3, T. 20), and all proceedings taken thereunder are based does not expressly authorize a county board of education as such to enter rental contracts, it does expressly authorize counties to do so, and, under repeated rulings of the Georgia Supreme Court, such contracts by the county boards of education are the corporate actions of the counties. Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952).

Entire plan of securing school buildings under Ga. L. 1949, p. 1009 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 5, Ch. 3, T. 20) is


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