--- title: Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II. Power of expenditure. collection: code id: ga-const:art-ix-sec-iv-para-ii cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II canonical_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-ix-sec-iv-para-ii md_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-ix-sec-iv-para-ii.md text_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-ix-sec-iv-para-ii/text source_url: https://www.legis.ga.gov/api/document/docs/default-source/joint-features-document-library/2ga-const-(v2)-2016-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=f5de823e_0#page=1405 date: 2016 status: active corpus_version: 2025-supplement-89aa39ab3c68 license: CC0-1.0 publisher: Georgia Commons, an independent project of Georgia Civic Data. Not the State of Georgia. Not legal advice. up: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/index.md previous: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-ix-sec-iv-para-i.md next: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-ix-sec-iv-para-iii.md index: https://georgiacommons.org/code/index.md omitted: notes omitted_chars: 14995 omitted_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-ix-sec-iv-para-ii.md?notes=all&start=11954 version: the only printed version in_force: true current_through: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly heading_path: CONSTITUTION OF THE / COUNTIES AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS / TAXATION POWER OF COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS --- # Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II. Power of expenditure. A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that. The governing authority of any county, municipality, or combination thereof may expend public funds to perform any public service or public function as authorized by this Constitution or by law or to perform any other service or function as authorized by this Constitution or by general law. ## Editor's Notes In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. II and antecedent provisions, which set forth specific purposes for which county and municipal expenditures were authorized, are included in the annotations for this paragraph. 1. County Government Administration Expenses County authorities have no power to make a contract with a bank, constituting it the fiscal agent of the county, regarding the payments of warrants on the county treasurer. Lettice v. American Nat’l Bank, 133 Ga. 874, 67 S.E. 187 (1910). ## Law Reviews For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979). For annual survey of local government law, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 233 (1983). For article, ‘‘Privatization of Rural Public Hospitals: Implications for Access and Indigent Care,’’ see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 991 (1996). ## 1976 Constitution. Art. IX, Sec. V, Paras. I, II. ## Right of County Citizens and Taxpayers to Enjoin Unlawful Distribution of Public Funds. Citizens and taxpayers of counties have such an interest as will authorize them to maintain actions to enjoin the unlawful distribution of public funds of counties or to recover county funds which were allegedly illegally disbursed. Nelson v. Wainwright, 224 Ga. 693, 164 S.E.2d 147 (1968). ## Mandamus. Before the writ of mandamus will issue to compel county commissioners to issue their warrant upon county treasurer to pay a debt, it must appear that the debt comes within the classes provided in this paragraph. Brunson v. Caskie, 127 Ga. 501, 56 S.E. 621, 9 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1002 (1907); Barksdale v. Hayes, 134 Ga. 348, 67 S.E. 852 (1910); Clark v. Reynolds, 136 Ga. 817, 72 S.E. 254 (1911); Daniel v. Hutchinson, 169 Ga. 492, 150 S.E. 681 (1929) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II). FOR EXPENSES BRIDGES INDIGENT SICK All county employers covered by ## Workers’ Compensation. Since a county is declared to be an ‘‘employer’’ under Ch. 9, T. 34, and has constitutional authority to raise funds therefor, the conclusion is demanded that all county employees in all counties are covered by workers’ compensation. Rosser v. Meriwether County, 125 Ga. App. 239, 186 S.E.2d 788 (1971). Cited in Harrison v. Rainey, 227 Ga. 240, 179 S.E.2d 923 (1971); Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Decatur Tax Payers League, Inc. v. Adams, 236 Ga. 871, 226 S.E.2d 69 (1976); Ledbetter Bros. v. Floyd County, 237 Ga. 22, 226 S.E.2d 730 (1976); Peacock v. Georgia Mun. Ass’n, 247 Ga. 740, 279 S.E.2d 434 (1981); Clayton County v. Otis Pruitt Homes, Inc., 250 Ga. 505, 299 S.E.2d 721 (1983); Malcom v. Newton County, 244 Ga. App. 464, 535 S.E.2d 824 (2000). Public Purposes Counties Empowered to Tax For ## County Not Obligated to Pay Surveyor. Where suit was brought by a surveyor, who was appointed by the Governor to run a disputed line between two counties under Ga. L. 1908, p. 96 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 36), to recover from one of such counties one-half of the charge for such survey, there was no error in dismissing the suit on general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Robert v. Wilkinson County, 137 Ga. 601, 73 S.E. 838 (1912); Smith v. Baker County, 142 Ga. 168, 82 S.E. 557 (1914). Costs of publication of annual statement of the county treasurer not valid expense of county. Howard v. Early County, 104 Ga. 669, 30 S.E. 880 (1898). 2. Acquisition of Public Buildings and Bridges ## Construction of Bridges. This paragraph broadens the taxing power which the legislature may confer upon counties sufficiently to embrace all expenses for constructing and maintaining bridges and roads. Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 850 (1890) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II). Taxation to pay a judgment for personal injuries caused by unrepaired bridge permitted. Dearing v. Shepherd, 78 Ga. 28 (1886). There is no limitation on amount of taxes which may be assessed and collected within the year for building and repairing bridges within counties of this state, excepting the cost of erecting the bridges. Settle v. Howell, 174 Ga. 792, 164 S.E. 189 (1932). 3. Education ## Supplementing County Agents’ Salaries by Counties Permissible. The board of regents, through the college of agriculture, controls the general scope of the agricultural extension work and is empowered to employ and discharge county agents, while the counties may, if they choose to levy the tax therefor, supplement the salaries of the county agents. Royal Indem. Co. v. Humphries, 90 Ga. App. 567, 83 S.E.2d 565 (1954). Payment of salaries with county ## Funds. County commissioners can expend county funds for limited purpose of paying salary of personnel to aid and assist in administration of county government. Whatley v. Taylor County, 224 Ga. 669, 164 S.E.2d 121 (1968). County commissioners imbued with large discretion in expending ## Money for Specified Purposes. While county commissioners cannot expend public money beyond the specified purposes enumerated in the Constitution, large discretion is vested in the county commissioners in the expenditure of public money within the specified purposes enumerated in the Constitution. Whatley v. Taylor County, 224 Ga. 669, 164 S.E.2d 121 (1968). Supreme Court will not interfere with the discretionary action of county commissioners within the sphere of their legally delegated powers, unless such action amounts to an abuse of discretion. Whatley v. Taylor County, 224 Ga. 669, 164 S.E.2d 121 (1968). Payment of retirement benefits to ture for an ‘‘educational purpose.’’ — Rather, payment of retirement benefits for county school employees from general county funds is authorized by this paragraph and by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. X, Sec. I, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III), as it represents a separate and distinct public purpose. Lomax v. McBrayer, 248 Ga. 753, 286 S.E.2d 35 (1982) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II). 4. Roads rized to develop asphalt production ## School Employees Is Not an expendi-By Implication, Counties Authofacilities. Given the general and broad powers of counties authorized by this paragraph and Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 32-4-41) to levy taxes and expend funds for the construction and maintenance of roads, it is reasonable to imply authority to develop facilities for production of asphalt for use in the county road system. Ledbetter Bros. v. Floyd ered to Tax For (Cont’d) 4. Roads (Cont’d) County, 237 Ga. 22, 226 S.E.2d 730 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II). 5. Airports Uniform Airport Act is not void as violative of this paragraph of the Constitution. Swoger v. Glynn County, 179 Ga. 768, 177 S.E. 723 (1934) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II). 6. Mass Transit System Facilities This paragraph does not limit use ties’’ for a transit system. Camp v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. 35, 189 S.E.2d 56 (1972) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II). 7. Operation of Courts ## Public Purposes Counties Empow-of Tax Proceeds to Providing ‘‘facili-Expenses of Court. Salaries of judges of the city courts may be properly classed as expenses of court within the meaning of this paragraph. Clark v. Eve, 134 Ga. 788, 68 S.E. 598 (1910) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II). Salaries of judges of the superior courts cannot be classed as expenses of the court. Clark v. Hammond, 134 Ga. 792, 68 S.E. 600 (1910). sentments of the grand jury are not expenses of court. Houston County v. Kersh & Wynne, 82 Ga. 252, 10 S.E. 199 (1899). point and pay a detective, or employ a special officer to detect an escaped prisoner. Maxwell v. Cumming, 58 Ga. 384 (1877). 8. County Litigation ## Costs of Publishing the General pre-A Superior Court Judge Cannot ap-Litigation. The term ‘‘litigation’’ does not include litigation arising out of violations of a prohibitory liquor law. Koger v. Hunter, 102 Ga. 76, 29 S.E. 141 (1897). ment of counsel to resist legislative action. DeVaughn v. Booten, 146 Ga. 836, 92 S.E. 629 (1917). mission (now Board of Corrections) for removal of the warden in charge of the convicts in a given county, instituted by a majority of the commissioners of roads and revenues (board of county commissioners) of such county. Humber v. Dixon, 147 Ga. 480, 94 S.E. 565 (1917). tration Act was constitutionally valid ## Litigation Does Not Include engage-Litigation Does Not Include a Proceeding Before the State Prison com-Action by Public Official Questioning Validity of Repealed Voters Regis-litigation Payable From County Funds. — Where it was the right and, therefore, the duty of a public official to, in good faith, raise the question as to the validity of the ‘‘Voters Registration Act,’’ former Ga. L. 1949, p. 1204 (now Art. 6, Ch. 2, T. 21), the official need not do so at the official’s own expense, since it is the county’s funds sought to be protected and not the official’s own funds. The Constitution, when enumerating the purposes for which counties could levy and collect taxes, used the word ‘‘litigation’’ and that language was intended to cover just such a situation as is here presented. Richmond County v. Harper, 206 Ga. 517, 57 S.E.2d 595 (1950). 9. Medical Care and Hospitalization For Indigent Sick Contract with hospital for indigent ## Sick. Contract by county with a hospital in the county, to provide a ward for hospitalization and medical treatment of indigent sick, is neither gratuity nor otherwise prohibited unless in violation of statutory limitations on the levy of taxes to support such a contract. Brock v. Chappell, 196 Ga. 567, 27 S.E.2d 38 (1943). Invalid Uses of County Taxes It can never be a valid county purpose to provide revenue to a municipality because municipalities are not citizens of nor creatures of counties — they are an entirely different form of government. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979). press constitutional authorization for allowing a county to impose a tax for a particular purpose. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979). List of purposes for which the state may tax in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I and Para. II) is the only purposes of taxation the state may validly delegate to its creatures power to tax. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979). Though the purposes listed in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I) are capable of delegation, the right of the state to tax to grant funds to municipalities is not capable of delegation to counties or to any other subdivision of the state. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979). State may not grant to counties the right to tax and to give part of the proceeds to municipalities, and consequently this may not be ‘‘such other public purpose[s] as may be authorized by the General Assembly’’ within the meaning of this paragraph or the similar language of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV). City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II). Purposes for which a county may tax are listed in this paragraph, and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV) and taxation by counties for the purpose of sharing the resulting revenue with cities does not appear in that list. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II). Use of county funds to procure pasproval of constitutional amendment > The printed notes continue for 14,995 more characters, not shown here. Continue at https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-ix-sec-iv-para-ii.md?notes=all&start=11954