---
title: Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV. Suits against joint obligors, copartners, or joint trespassers.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-vi-sec-ii-para-iv
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV
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date: 2016
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heading_path: CONSTITUTION OF THE / JUDICIAL BRANCH / VENUE
---

# Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV. Suits against joint obligors, copartners, or joint trespassers.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

Suits against joint obligors, joint tort-feasors, joint promisors, copartners, or joint trespassers residing in different counties may be tried in either county.

## Cross References

Actions against certain codefendants residing in different counties, § 9-10-31. Venue in juvenile proceedings, § 15-11-15.

## Law Reviews

For article discussing aspects of third party practice (impleader) under the Georgia Civil Practice Act (Ch. 11 of T. 9), see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 355 (1968). For article, ‘‘Current Problems With Venue in Georgia,’’ see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 71 (1975). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 239 (1978). For article surveying judicial developments in Georgia’s trial practice and procedure laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 249 (1979). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 469 (1990). For annual survey of commercial law, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 119 (1991). For annual survey of domestic relations cases, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 173 (2005).

For note criticizing strict venue requirement that third party defendants be impleaded in the counties of their residence in light of Register v. Stone’s Independent Oil Distribs., Inc., 227 Ga. 123, 179 S.E.2d 68 (1971), see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 667 (1972). For note discussing venue for actions against joint trespassers residing in different counties, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 553 (1978).

For comment on Stroud v. Doolittle, 213 Ga. 32, 96 S.E.2d 876 (1957), a suit against joint tort-feasors in which the dismissal of the cause of action against the resident defendant ended the court’s jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, see 20 Ga. B.J. 260 (1957). For comment on Bennett v. Bagwell & Stewart, 214 Ga. 115, 103 S.E.2d 561 (1958), see 21 Ga. B.J. 564 (1959).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. IV.

## Paragraph Permits Joinder of Nonresident Tortfeasor.

This paragraph provides the right to bring an action in the county of the residence of a resident of Georgia and join as a defendant a tort-feasor who is a nonresident of the state if the nonresident can be lawfully served with process. Record Truck Line v. Harrison, 109 Ga. App. 653, 137 S.E.2d 65, aff’d, 220 Ga. 289, 138 S.E.2d 578 (1964) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

This provision only comes into play volved. Bergen v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 245 Ga. 742, 267 S.E.2d 10 (1980) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

The constitutional provision regarding joint tort-feasors applies only to resident joint tort-feasors. Dodd v. Simpson, 191 Ga. App. 369, 381 S.E.2d 585 (1989).

General Assembly’s authority to fix

## When Two Resident Defendants Are Inresidence of Corporation.

The General Assembly may fix the residence of a corporation under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) and there appears to be no reason it cannot also fix the residence of a corporation under this paragraph. White v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 233 Ga. 919, 213 S.E.2d 879 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

## Jurisdiction and Venue Distinguished.

Jurisdiction means the power of a court to render a binding judgment in the case, and venue means the place of trial. Williams v. Fuller, 244 Ga. 846, 262 S.E.2d 135 (1979).

In a borrower’s suit asserting various claims against a lender, which was a citizen of Delaware and California, and an appraiser in connection with a loan that encumbered the borrower’s property with a debt that exceeded the property’s value, jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 did not exist where the borrower and the appraiser were both citizens of Georgia; the fact that the borrower may have filed the suit in an inappropriate venue under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV did not render the appraiser’s joinder fraudulent under the doctrine of fraudulent pleading because such a pleading of jurisdictional facts did not destroy diversity, as the appraiser was still a resident of Georgia. Austin v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2007). sions may not be altered or changed by the legislature or the courts and the adoption of procedural devices for adjudicating claims of various parties in the same action does not effect a change in the General Consideration (Cont’d) venue requirements of the Constitution. Pemberton v. Purifoy, 128 Ga. App. 892, 198 S.E.2d 356 (1973); Haley v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 141 Ga. App. 13, 232 S.E.2d 362 (1977).

## The Constitutional Venue provi‘‘Trespass’’ Broadly Employed.

The word ‘‘trespass’’ is employed in a broad sense, and comprehends any misfeasance, transgression, or offense which damages another person’s health, reputation, or property. Cox v. Strickland, 120 Ga. 104, 47 S.E. 912, 1 Ann. Cas. 870 (1904); Williams v. Inman, 1 Ga. App. 321, 57 S.E. 1009 (1907).

Trespass includes libels. Howe v. Bradstreet Co., 135 Ga. 564, 69 S.E. 1082 (1911).

Threatened trespass enjoined pursuant to this paragraph. Baker v. Davis, 127 Ga. 649, 57 S.E. 62 (1907) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV). dant has been stricken and case is in default as to the resident defendant, a verdict against both the resident and nonresident defendant is authorized. Smith v. Ross, 168 Ga. App. 817, 310 S.E.2d 567 (1983).

## Where Answer of Resident defen-Waiver of Jurisdiction.

Once a timely objection to jurisdiction and venue has been raised by a nonresident defendant in an action where Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV is the sole basis for the court’s jurisdiction over the nonresident, affirmative conduct inconsistent with the objection is necessary to support a finding that it has been waived. Owens v. Pollock, 214 Ga. App. 107, 447 S.E.2d 325 (1994).

Cited in Powell v. Perry, 63 Ga. 417 (1879); Graham v. Marks & Co., 95 Ga. 38, 21 S.E. 986 (1894); Harrell v. Williams, 11 Ga. App. 552, 75 S.E. 904 (1912); Lee v. Perry, 19 Ga. App. 48, 90 S.E. 988 (1916); McConnon & Co. v. Martin, 33 Ga. App. 392, 126 S.E. 272 (1925); Georgia Creosoting Co. v. Moody, 41 Ga. App. 701, 154 S.E. 294 (1930); Felton v. Macon County, 43 Ga. App. 651, 159 S.E. 730 (1931); Wilson Bros. v. Heard, 46 Ga. App. 497, 167 S.E. 913 (1933); Gazaway v. Nicholson, 190 Ga. 345, 9 S.E.2d 154 (1940); Hays v. Jones, 81 Ga. App. 597, 59 S.E.2d 404 (1950); A.K. Adams & Co. v. Douglas-Coffee County Hosp. Auth., 209 Ga. 62, 70 S.E.2d 730 (1952); Grimaud v. Knox-Georgia Homes, Inc., 210 Ga. 514, 81 S.E.2d 476 (1954); Rylee v. Abernathy, 210 Ga. 673, 82 S.E.2d 220 (1954); Schwarcz v. Charlton County, 211 Ga. 923, 89 S.E.2d 881 (1955); Dawson v. Altamaha Land Co., 215 Ga. 700, 113 S.E.2d 129 (1960); Trailmobile, Inc. v. Combs, 105 Ga. App. 699, 125 S.E.2d 574 (1962); Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Concrete Coring Contractors v. Mechanical Contractors & Eng’rs, 220 Ga. 714, 141 S.E.2d 439 (1965); Hinson v. First Nat’l Bank, 221 Ga. 408, 144 S.E.2d 765 (1965); Byrd v. Moore Ford Co., 116 Ga. App. 292, 157 S.E.2d 41 (1967); Register v. Stone’s Indep. Oil Distribs., 225 Ga. 490, 169 S.E.2d 781 (1969); Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 121 Ga. App. 427, 174 S.E.2d 211 (1970); J.H. Ewing & Sons v. Montgomery, 124 Ga. App. 836, 186 S.E.2d 335 (1971); Shell v. Watts, 125 Ga. App. 542, 188 S.E.2d 269 (1972); Bibb County v. McDaniel, 127 Ga. App. 129, 192 S.E.2d 544 (1972); Shell v. Watts, 127 Ga. App. 378, 193 S.E.2d 566 (1972); Carter v. Grogan, 230 Ga. 249, 196 S.E.2d 434 (1973); Williamson v. Perret’s Farms, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 687, 197 S.E.2d 754 (1973); Jere Power Car Land, Inc. v. Moss, 134 Ga. App. 523, 215 S.E.2d 288 (1975); Graham v. Tallent, 235 Ga. 47, 218 S.E.2d 799 (1975); Daniel & Daniel, Inc. v. Cosmopol-itan Co., 137 Ga. App. 383, 224 S.E.2d 44 (1976); Wilhite v. Mays, 140 Ga. App. 816, 232 S.E.2d 141 (1976); Logan Paving Co. v. Liles Constr. Co., 141 Ga. App. 81, 232 S.E.2d 575 (1977); Davis v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 143 Ga. App. 460, 238 S.E.2d 553 (1977); Sylvester Motor & Tractor Co. v. Farmers Bank, 153 Ga. App. 614, 266 S.E.2d 293 (1980); Fosgate v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 154 Ga. App. 510, 268 S.E.2d 780 (1980); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 159 Ga. App. 416, 283 S.E.2d 647 (1981); National Bank v. Moore, 159 Ga. App. 729, 285 S.E.2d 78 (1981); Cassells v. Bradlee Mgt. Servs., Inc., 161 Ga. App. 325, 291 S.E.2d 48 (1982); Trammell v. Eberhardt, 162 Ga. App. 753, 293 S.E.2d 32 (1982); Dennard v. Freeport Minerals Co., 250 Ga. 330, 297 S.E.2d 222 (1982); Georgia Power Co. v. Harrison, 253 Ga. 212, 318 S.E.2d 306 (1984); Unger v. Bryant Equip. Sales & Servs., Inc., 255 Ga. 53, 335 S.E.2d 109 (1985); Currahee Constr. Co. v. Rabun County Sch. Dist., 180 Ga. App. 471, 349 S.E.2d 487 (1986); Gay v. Piggly Wiggly S., Inc., 183 Ga. App. 175, 358 S.E.2d 468 (1987); Watkins v. M & M Clays, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 54, 404 S.E.2d 141 (1991); Calhoun County Hosp. Auth. v. Walker, 205 Ga. App. 259, 421 S.E.2d 777 (1992); Johnson v. Woodard, 208 Ga. App. 41, 429 S.E.2d 701 (1993); Zepp v. Toporek, 211 Ga. App. 169, 438 S.E.2d 636 (1994); Sikes v. Norton, 185 Bankr. 945 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995); HD Supply, Inc. v. Garger, 299 Ga. App. 751, 683 S.E.2d 671 (2009).

Jurisdiction

1. Lack of Jurisdiction

## Instance of Lack of Jurisdiction.

Fact that plaintiff, as surety, guaranteed performance of a contract by a contracting company, as principal, would not give superior court of county of residence of contracting company jurisdiction on petition of the surety to hear and determine the controversy between contracting company and city for which the work was to be performed as to whether or not there had been a breach of contract on the part of the contracting company, nor would the fact that plaintiff and contracting company had entered into separate contract by application for performance bond give plaintiff any right to compel the city to join in a suit with reference to this separate contract, since the city was not a party to the application and had no interest therein. Maryland Cas. Co. v. City of Adel, 87 Ga. App. 138, 73 S.E.2d 237 (1952).

Reason jurisdiction of action by

## Common Carrier and Insurance Company Lacking.

Common carrier that negligently injured a person, and the insurance company that issued the carrier an indemnity policy under provisions of former Code 1933, § 68-612, were neither joint tort-feasors nor joint contractors, so as to bring them within the provisions of this paragraph, since the liability of the carrier to the injured person arose from a tort in the commission of which the insurance company was not concerned, while the insurance company’s obligation to pay damages caused by the carrier’s negligence was a contractual duty not assumed by the carrier. Bolin v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 92 Ga. App. 726, 89 S.E.2d 831 (1955) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

2. Loss of Jurisdiction

Must be able to prove claim against


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