Art. VI, Sec. IX, Para. I. Administration of the judicial system; uniform court rules; advice and consent of councils.

For article, ‘‘Planning for the Future of our Courts,’’ see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 395 (1993).

1976 Constitution.

Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. II; Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. I.

Supreme Court powers enumerated.

The Supreme Court has the inherent power to protect the judiciary as an independent branch of state government and to maintain a court system capable of providing for the administration of justice in an orderly and efficient manner. Garcia v. Miller, 261 Ga. 531, 408 S.E.2d 97 (1991).

Judicial power of holdover superior court judges.

Because a complete and continuous judicial system is required to ensure that governmental functions continue without interruption, the judicial power of holdover superior court judges remains vested in them until their successors are qualified. Garcia v. Miller, 261 Ga. 531, 408 S.E.2d 97 (1991). tional requirement under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Para. I, just as speedy trial is a defendant’s right under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI. Williams v. State, 187 Ga. App. 355, 370 S.E.2d 210 (1988). Refusal to restore budget cuts for

Speedy resolution is a constitudistrict attorney.

Trial court exercised proper caution in denying a requested writ of mandamus to require county commissioners to restore budget cuts for the district attorney’s office. Wilson v. Southerland, 258 Ga. 479, 371 S.E.2d 382 (1988). Supreme Court’s approval of a local court rule providing that civil actions seeking primarily money damages up to $25,000 or in an unspecified amount would be referred to compulsory but nonbinding arbitration did not abridge the rights of any litigants or conflict with any federal or state constitutional provision or Georgia statute. Davis v. Gaona, 260 Ga. 450, 396 S.E.2d 218 (1990). ‘‘Two-term’’ rule not applicable to

bar candidates.

Bar examinee’s motion to admit the examinee to the practice of law by default, because the Georgia Supreme Court did not dispose of the examinee’s appeal during the term of court in which it was filed or the term next following, was denied; the ‘‘two-term’’ rule did not apply to those cases filed in the Supreme Court in furtherance of the Court’s exercise of its inherent authority to supervise and regulate the practice of law in Georgia. In re Singh, 276 Ga. 288, 576 S.E.2d 899 (2003).

Challenges to criminal indictment.

— Because O.C.G.A. § 17-10-36 did not grant the Supreme Court of Georgia the power to abrogate or interfere with an otherwise-valid statutory enactment, such as the statutory procedure by which prosecutors procured indictments and conducted criminal prosecutions through them, the trial court did not err in refusing to quash the indictment filed against the defendant, despite the fact that a 6.04 percentage point under-representation of white persons on the grand jury list from which the defendant’s grand jury was selected violated the standard outlined in Ga. Unif. R. Super. Ct. 34, Unif. App. P. II(E). Edwards v. State, 281 Ga. 108, 636 S.E.2d 508 (2006). Cited in Dugger v. Danello, 175 Ga. App. 618, 334 S.E.2d 3 (1985); Dallas Blue Haven Pools, Inc. v. Taslimi, 180 Ga. App. 734, 350 S.E.2d 265 (1986); Atlanta Journal & Atlanta Constitution v. Long, 258 Ga. 410, 369 S.E.2d 755 (1988); Wheeler’s, Inc. v. Wilson, 196 Ga. App. 622, 396 S.E.2d 790 (1990); O’Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 670 S.E.2d 388 (2008).