--- title: Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I. District attorneys; vacancies; qualifications; compensation; duties; immunity. collection: code id: ga-const:art-vi-sec-viii-para-i cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I canonical_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-vi-sec-viii-para-i md_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-vi-sec-viii-para-i.md text_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-vi-sec-viii-para-i/text source_url: https://www.legis.ga.gov/api/document/docs/default-source/joint-features-document-library/2ga-const-(v2)-2016-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=f5de823e_0#page=1150 date: 2016 status: active corpus_version: 2025-supplement-89aa39ab3c68 license: CC0-1.0 publisher: Georgia Commons, an independent project of Georgia Civic Data. Not the State of Georgia. Not legal advice. up: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/index.md previous: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-vi-sec-vii-para-viii.md next: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-vi-sec-viii-para-ii.md index: https://georgiacommons.org/code/index.md omitted: notes omitted_chars: 4084 omitted_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/ga/art-vi-sec-viii-para-i.md?notes=all&start=11526 version: the only printed version in_force: true current_through: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly heading_path: CONSTITUTION OF THE / JUDICIAL BRANCH / DISTRICT ATTORNEYS --- # Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I. District attorneys; vacancies; qualifications; compensation; duties; immunity. A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that. (a) There shall be a district attorney for each judicial circuit, who shall be elected circuit-wide for a term of four years. The successors of present and subsequent incumbents shall be elected by the electors of their respective circuits at the general election held immediately preceding the expiration of their respective terms. District attorneys shall serve until their successors are duly elected and qualified. Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the Governor. (b) No person shall be a district attorney unless such person shall have been an active-status member of the State Bar of Georgia for three years immediately preceding such person’s election. (c) The district attorneys shall receive such compensation and allowances as provided by law and shall be entitled to receive such local supplements to their compensation and allowances as may be provided by law. (d) It shall be the duty of the district attorney to represent the state in all criminal cases in the superior court of such district attorney’s circuit and in all cases appealed from the superior court and the juvenile courts of that circuit to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and to perform such other duties as shall be required by law. (e) District attorneys shall enjoy immunity from private suit for actions arising from the performance of their duties. ## Cross References Duties generally, §§ 15-18-6 and 15-18-7. ## Editor's Notes The constitutional amendment (Ga. L. 1997, p. 1713) creating the Georgia Citizens Commission on Compensation of Public Officials and amending (c) was defeated at the 1998 November general election. ## 1976 Constitution. Art. VI, Sec. XI, Paras. I, II; Art. VI, Sec. XII, Paras. I, II; Art. VI, Sec. XIII, Para. I. ## Construction of Language. The language, ‘‘next preceding the expiration of their respective terms,’’ was intended to designate the election at which the district attorneys should be elected for the full term of four years, and was not intended to designate the ‘‘general election’’ at which a successor should be elected in case of a vacancy. Copland v. Wohlwender, 197 Ga. 782, 30 S.E.2d 462 (1944). ## Age at Time of Election. The word ‘‘election’’ as it appears in this provision means the day votes are cast, not the day when they are finally tabulated and certified by the Secretary of State. Poythress v. Moses, 250 Ga. 452, 298 S.E.2d 480 (1983) (decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIII, Para. I, relating to qualifications of district attorneys and other officials). Qualifications The intent of the legislature when it imposed the three-year practice as ney post was to ensure that the individuals elected to the office of district attorney would be experienced in the practice of law before the courts in which they would be required to perform their functions as district attorneys. It would be contrary to this intent to allow individuals who have not been licensed to practice before the superior courts of this state to include their practice time in other states as partial satisfaction of this paragraph and former Code 1933, § 24-2901 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-18-3). Whitmer v. Thurman, 241 Ga. 569, 247 S.E.2d 104 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I). ## A Requirement for the District attor‘‘Lawful Practice’’ Defined. The three-year practice requirement, one of the qualifications for district attorney, of this paragraph and former Code 1933, § 24-2901 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-18-3) contemplated lawful practice and lawful practice was defined as the practice of law as an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing. Whitmer v. Thurman, 241 Ga. 569, 247 S.E.2d 104 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I). Three-year practice requirement does not include legal practice in other states. Whitmer v. Thurman, 241 Qualifications (Cont’d) Ga. 569, 247 S.E.2d 104 (1978). ## Qualifications at Time of Appointment. This paragraph does not either expressly, or by inference, by any of its terms, purport to deal with the qualifications of a district attorney at the time of the district attorney’s election or appointment. Ray v. Hand, 225 Ga. 589, 170 S.E.2d 692 (1969) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I). Time of effectiveness of ## Active-status Membership. Where an attorney was sworn in to practice law on Nov. 5, 1981, and the attorney’s membership application and dues were received by the State Bar within 60 days as contemplated by the bar’s rules, the attorney’s active-status membership was effective upon the date of the attorney’s admission in the superior court, and thus the attorney was qualified for election as district attorney on Nov. 6, 1984. Weaver v. Cleland, 253 Ga. 482, 322 S.E.2d 56 (1984). Duties ## District Attorneys Performing Duties Are Immune in Civil Cases. District attorneys who send a letter to the parole board describing aspects of crimes, giving their opinion, and including an autobiographical manuscript detailing a murder are protected by the same immunity in civil cases which is applicable to judges, provided their acts are within the scope of their jurisdiction and intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Mosier v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 213 Ga. App. 545, 445 S.E.2d 535 (1994), cert. denied, 5 U.S. 1040, 115 S. Ct. 1409, 131 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1995). ## District Attorney’s Function as Calendar Clerk Not Unconstitutional. Internal Operating Procedure 2000-3 of the Appalachian Judicial Circuit, under which a district attorney set the time for a defendant’s arraignment for aggravated assault and related charges in a road rage incident, was not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers and did not require dismissal of the charges against the defendant; the functions of the district attorney were not exclusively executive, as shown by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I(d), O.C.G.A. § 15-18-6(3), and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 30.1. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006). Internal Operating Procedure 2000-3 of the Appalachian Judicial Circuit, which appoints the district attorney to act as calendar clerk for criminal matters, including setting the time for arraignments, merely aids the judges in the Appalachian Judicial Circuit in organizing their courts and is not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers; the functions of the district attorney are not exclusively executive, as shown by the requirement in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I(d) that the district attorney must perform such other services as shall be required by law, the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 15-18-6(3) that the district attorney shall aid the presiding judge in organizing the courts as the presiding judge may require, and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 30.1, providing that the judge or the judge’s designee shall set the time of an arraignment. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006). partment of Law and not district at- ## Department of Transportation Condemnation Cases Prosecuted by De-torney. In condemnation cases which are brought by the Department of Transportation, it is ‘‘otherwise specially provided for’’ that the Department of Law and not the solicitor general (now district attorney) shall prosecute such actions. State Hwy. Dep’t v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 529, 171 S.E.2d 575 (1969). Proceeding for removal from office ## Of County Board of Education Members Properly Brought by District Attorney. A county board of education was a political subdivision of the state, an agency through which the county acted in school matters, and the state had an interest in whether or not members of a county school board were competent and qualified to act; hence, a proceeding for removal from office of members of a county board of education under former Code 1933, § 32-905 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-53) was properly brought by the district attorney of the county in the state’s name. State v. Walker, 88 Ga. App. 413, 76 S.E.2d 852 (1953). vorce cases where state not named ## Paragraph Not Applicable to Dinor Appears as a Party. According to the usual and ordinary signification of the language employed, this clause applies only to cases in which the state is a formal party, and would not include a divorce case in which the state has not been named and has not appeared as a party, although the state has an interest in all divorce cases. Boykin v. Martocello, 194 Ga. 867, 22 S.E.2d 790 (1942) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I). vate practitioner to file appeals in state’s name when district attorney ## Private Citizen Cannot Procure Pridecides Against Appeal. Where the state, through its authorized legal arm, does not wish to appeal and takes no action in a matter, there is no provision of law allowing a private citizen to procure the services of a private practitioner to file appeals in the name of the state, that being the constitutional and statutory duty of the office of the district attorney. State v. Trice, 150 Ga. App. 588, 258 S.E.2d 270 (1979). Special prosecutor may take part in prosecution of a case on behalf of the state, and by inference of an appeal therefrom, if the special prosecutor is subject to the direction and control of the district attorney. State v. Trice, 150 Ga. App. 588, 258 S.E.2d 270 (1979). Performance of duties in another ## Circuit. A district attorney may be authorized to perform duties in a county constituting another circuit, but which formerly was embraced in the district attorney’s own circuit. Godbee v. State, 141 Ga. 515, 81 S.E. 876 (1914). A district attorney in a judicial circuit of this state was not disqualified by this paragraph, and former Code 1933, §§ 24-2913, 24-2914 and 24-2908 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-18-5 and 15-18-6), or by any other law, to appear before courts of a different judicial circuit at the request of the prosecution on a trial for murder, and assist the district attorney of the latter circuit in the prosecution, notwithstanding the last mentioned officer was not indisposed, or disqualified from interest or relationship, or absent from the circuit, and such assistance was not requisitioned by the presiding judge. Floyd v. State, 182 Ga. 549, 186 S.E. 556 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I). Notice of Appeal Effect of failure to give sufficient notice of sanction of writ of certiorari ## To District Attorney. A failure to give the district attorney at least ten days written notice of sanction of a writ of certiorari to which the state is a party and of the time and place of hearing, unless prevented by unavoidable cause, or to obtain a waiver of such notice, is fatal to the proceedings; and service upon and notice to the district attorney of the criminal court is insufficient to cure the defect. Washburn v. Thompson, 78 Ga. App. 133, 50 S.E.2d 761 (1948). Effect of failure to serve notice of ## Appeal Upon District Attorney. Where a misdemeanor was tried in county criminal court and from judgment therein a certiorari was taken to the superior court and, upon judgment entered after hearing, overruling and denying petition for certiorari, a bill of exceptions was sued out to the Court of Appeals, such bill of exceptions should have been served upon the district attorney of the circuit, and since the district attorney was not so served, and did not acknowledge or waive service, the motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions would be granted. Welch v. State, 91 Ga. App. 86, 84 S.E.2d 838 (1954). Compensation Fixing of district attorney’s salary ## By Grand Jury or Probate Judge. Statute that delegates to grand jury and judge of probate court authority to fix salary to be paid district attorney for years subsequent to 1932 is violative of this paragraph which vests in the General Assembly power to prescribe such salaries, and is violative of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I) of the Constitution which vests the legislative power of the state in the General Assembly. Compensation (Cont’d) Mosley v. Garrett, 182 Ga. 810, 187 S.E. 20 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I). Immunity ## Scope of Immunity. A district attorney is protected by the same immunity in civil cases that is applicable to judges, provided that the district attorney’s acts are within the scope of his jurisdiction. Robbins v. Lanier, 198 Ga. App. 592, 402 S.E.2d 342 (1991). ## Decision to File Charges Is Protected. A prosecutor’s decision to file formal criminal charges against an individual is an act intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, for which act the prosecutor would be protected by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Robbins v. Lanier, 198 Ga. App. 592, 402 S.E.2d 342 (1991). > The printed notes continue for 4,084 more characters, not shown here. 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