---
title: Ga. Const. Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV. Current property tax exemptions preserved.
collection: code
id: ga-const:art-vii-sec-ii-para-iv
cite_as: Ga. Const. Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV
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heading_path: CONSTITUTION OF THE / TAXATION AND FINANCE / EXEMPTIONS FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION
---

# Ga. Const. Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV. Current property tax exemptions preserved.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

Those types of exemptions from ad valorem taxation provided for by law on June 30, 1983, are hereby continued in effect as statutory law until otherwise provided for by law. Any law which reduces or repeals any homestead exemption in existence on June 30, 1983, or created thereafter must be approved by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly in a roll-call vote and by a majority of the qualified electors of the state or the affected local taxing jurisdiction voting in a referendum thereon. Any law which reduces or repeals exemptions granted to religious or burial grounds or institutions of purely public charity must be approved by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly.

## Cross References

Exemptions relating to agricultural products, § 48-8-5. Exemptions for revenue bonds issued for state, educational, or other nonprofit purposes, §§ 12-3-274, 20-2-558, 20-3-157, 20-3-170, 20-3-209, 20-3-341, 32-10-49, 32-10-109, 50-9-13, 50-9-33, and 50-26-9. Property exempt from taxation, § 48-5-41. Homestead exemptions, § 48-5-44 et seq. Exemptions from sales taxes, § 48-8-3. Exemptions for contractors of state projects, § 50-17-29. Specific continuation of homestead exemptions for certain individuals over age 65, § 48-5-47. Homestead and ad valorem exemptions for disabled veterans, §§ 48-5-48, 48-5-478.

## Editor's Notes

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV and antecedent provisions, relating to specific tax exemptions, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. V and antecedent provisions, which provided: ‘‘All exemptions from taxation heretofore granted to corporate charters are declared to be henceforth null and void.’’, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Effect of charter provision limiting

In light of the similarity of the provisions, opinions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV and antecedent provisions, relating to specific tax exemptions, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

This paragraph is exclusive in the matter of exemptions from taxation and supersedes any other law. 1954-56 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 708 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).

## Law Reviews

For article, ‘‘Freedoms of the First Amendment in Georgia,’’ see 15 Ga. B.J. 405 (1953). For article discussing homestead rights as a means of protecting decedent’s surviving spouse and children, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 447 (1976). For article discussing tax exemptions and deductions as incentives for establishment of foreign business in Georgia, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 629 (1976). For article surveying judicial decisions affecting Georgia’s state and local taxation laws, decided under former Code 1933, Titles 92 and 91A (now T. 48), see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 217 (1979). For article discussing ad valorem taxation and interest in real property in Georgia, prior to enactment of former Code 1933, T. 91A (now T. 48), see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 293 (1979). For survey article on local government law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1982). For survey article on recent developments in Georgia state and local taxation, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 400 (1982). For article, ‘‘Freeport Exemption from Property Taxes for Inventory Stored in Georgia But Destined for Shipment Out-of-State,’’ see 28 Ga. St. B.J. 108 (1991).

For note discussing restrictions on the creation of public purpose corporations, see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 680 (1974).

For comment criticizing Elder v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 185 Ga. 258, 194 S.E. 745 (1938), holding § 48-6-91 contravenes this paragraph, see 2 Ga. B.J. 40 (1939). For comment on Thompson v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 200 Ga. 856, 38 S.E.2d 774 (1946), see 9 Ga. B.J. 207 (1946). For comment criticizing Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, Inc., 205 Ga. 489, 53 S.E.2d 751 (1949), see 1 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (1949). For comment on Delta Airlines v. Coleman, 219 Ga. 12, 131 S.E.2d 768 (1963), see 26 Ga. St. B.J. 201 (1963). For comment criticizing Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Simmons, 224 Ga. 483, 162 S.E.2d 342 (1968), see 20 Mercer L. Rev. 330 (1969). For comment as to tax exempt status of church administrative offices, in light of Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass’n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974), see 26 Mercer L. Rev. 361 (1974).

## 1976 Constitution.

Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV.

## Constitution Limits Effect of Legislative Exemptions.

The constitutional provisions shall govern and, to the extent they are inconsistent therewith, shall limit the effect of legislative attempts to exempt religious, educational, and charitable institutions from taxation where such institutions act as trustees of intangible personal properties under agreement to pay income to donors or their designees. Salvation Army v. Strickland, 253 Ga. 758, 325 S.E.2d 147 (1985).

Tax exemptions are to be strictly construed since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. Athens City Water-Works Co. v. Mayor of Athens, 74 Ga. 413 (1885); Mundy v. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. 292, 30 S.E. 783 (1898); Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass’n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974).

All grants of exemptions must be strictly construed in favor of the state, and nothing passes by implication, but this rule must not be pushed to unreasonableness. Rayle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Cook, 195 Ga. 734, 25 S.E.2d 574 (1943); Collins v. Mills, 198 Ga. 18, 30 S.E.2d 866 (1944); Church of God v. City of Dalton, 213 Ga. 76, 97 S.E.2d 132 (1952).

All grants of exemptions must be construed against the taxpayer. Presbyterian Ctr., Inc. v. Henson, 221 Ga. 750, 146 S.E.2d 903 (1966); Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972).

Exemption from taxation must be strictly construed, and the exemption will not be held to be conferred unless the terms under which it is granted clearly and distinctly show that such was the intention of the legislature. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Jones, 231 Ga. 881, 204 S.E.2d 584 (1974).

## Narrowest Possible Meaning Not Required.

The rule of strict construction of tax exemptions does not require that the narrowest possible meaning be given to words descriptive of the exemption. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944).

## Ordinary Rules of Construction Apply.

The strict construction rule does not relieve a court of the duty of interpreting the exemption by ordinary rules of construction in order to carry out the intention of the legislature, and does not apply where there is no language in an act justifying or requiring construction. A fair and reasonable construction of a statute or contract must always be adopted, giving the language used its ordinary meaning, and taking into consideration the purpose and spirit of the exemption as well as the public policy entertained at the time and the history of the times when the statute was passed. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944).

## Effect of Doubt.

The rule that exemptions must be strictly construed in favor of the taxing power does not mean that if there is a possibility of doubt it is to be resolved against the exemption. It simply means that if, after the application of all rules of interpretation for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the legislature, a well founded doubt exists, then an ambiguity occurs which may be settled by the strict rule of construction. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944). tion from taxation must be construed favorably to the state and against the taxpayer. Brandywine Townhouses, Inc. v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 231 Ga. 585, 203 S.E.2d 222 (1974).

All property must be taxed and no property except that specifically mentioned in the Constitution can be exempted from taxation. Brandywine Townhouses, Inc. v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 231 Ga. 585, 203 S.E.2d 222 (1974).

## Any Ambiguity in an Alleged exemp-Natural and Ordinary Meaning.

In interpreting a constitutional exemption, it is to be presumed that the words used were employed in their natural and ordinary meaning, and where a constitutional provision or statute is plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, a court has no authority to place a different construction upon it, but must construe it according to its terms. Rayle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Cook, 195 Ga. 734, 25 S.E.2d 574 (1943).

Property not deemed tax until tax

## Levied.

Since ‘‘taxation’’ includes determination of rate of levy and imposition of levy, as an essential part of sovereign power and process, it follows that property will not be deemed as taxed until the tax has been levied. Rayle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Cook, 195 Ga. 734, 25 S.E.2d 574 (1943).

Municipality cannot exempt a class

## Not Enumerated in This Paragraph.

Tarver v. Mayor of Dalton, 134 Ga. 462, 67 S.E. 929, 29 L.R.A. (n.s.) 183, 20 Ann. Cas. 281 (1910) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Property, whatever its species, if simply exempt, pays nothing. Georgia Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Cedartown, 134 Ga. 87, 67 S.E. 410, 19 Ann. Cas. 954 (1910).

## Contract Cannot Defeat Government Right to Tax.

Aside from exemptions from taxation as exists in this paragraph, the parties cannot by contract defeat right of the government to collect taxes for which property would otherwise be liable. Real Estate Loan Co. v. Union City, 177 Ga. 55, 169 S.E. 301 (1933); City of Leesburg v. Forrester, 59 Ga. App. 503, 1 S.E.2d 584 (1939) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). nue purposes are radically different from ad valorem taxes, and are not tion. Crestlawn Mem. Park v. City of Atlanta, 235 Ga. 194, 219 S.E.2d 122 (1975).

State has not waived and cannot waive its right to tax private property on federal land and indeed the Constitution demands that it be taxed. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).

## Special Assessments Not for Revetaxes Within Meaning of the Constitu-Exemption Not Destroyed by Incidental Income Derived From Operation of Charitable or Educational Institution.

The proviso that ‘‘the General Consideration (Cont’d) property so exempted be not used for purposes of private or corporate profit or income’’ was not intended to destroy the exemption already granted where incidental income was derived from the operation of the charitable or educational institution. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933).

Property subject to taxation should

## Not Be Exempted.

Apart from permitted exemptions, the Constitution evinces an intention that no property which is subject to taxation in this state shall be relieved therefrom, and the statutes express with equal certainty an intention by the lawmakers to lay a tax upon all property of every kind or class which the State of Georgia has jurisdiction to tax, nothing excepted. Suttles v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 19 S.E.2d 396 (1942), later appeal, 201 Ga. 84, 38 S.E.2d 786 (1946). tion which was used for provision of inflight meals was subject to taxation where provisions of lease did not preserve the public’s ‘‘rightful, equal, and uniform use’’ of the property as required by O.C.G.A. § 6-3-25. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. App. 864, 298 S.E.2d 544 (1982).

Places of Religious Worship

Test for charitable immunity from suit is not the use to which the income is put, but the nature of the source from which the income is derived. This is the same test applied in determining the taxability of property. The scheme of exemption as to other than public property seems to be this: to exempt all that is used immediately and directly as a part of the establishment in the conduct of the regular business, there carried on, but not such as may be devoted to other uses, such as farming, merchandising, manufacturing, etc., and from which profit or income is derived. Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d 915 (1972).


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