Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. VI. Faith and credit of state pledged debt may be validated.

State debt, investment, and depositories, Ch. 17, T. 50.

1976 Constitution.

Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. II.

Purpose of paragraph.

The purpose of this paragraph is to provide that every valid bond of the state should be paid, whether the state was liable thereon as principal or as endorser. Park v. Candler, 113 Ga. 647, 39 S.E. 89 (1901) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. VI). The debt of an authority or agency of the state does not obligate the state or pledge credit of the state as is required to be made explicit by the authority on the face of the bonds it issues. Rich v. State, 237 Ga. 291, 227 S.E.2d 761 (1976). Revenue bonds of authority not

state obligations.

While the State Bridge Building (now Georgia Highway) Authority is an instrumentality of the state, it is nevertheless not the state, nor a part of the state, nor an agency of the state. It is a mere creature of the state; a distinct corporate entity. Its revenue bonds are not obligations or debts of the state, nor a pledge of the credit of the state, but they are payable solely and exclusively from revenue derived from a use of its facilities; and the state is not directly, indirectly, or contingently obligated to levy or pledge any form of taxation whatsoever therefor or to make any appropriation for the payment of them, and Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 23 (see now O.C.G.A. § 32-10-39) required that the bonds, when issued, must contain recitals on their face to this effect. They are first, last, and always a corporate debt of the authority and in no sense a debt of the state. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953). Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 1, Ch. 10, T. 32), insofar as it authorized the issuance of negotiable revenue bonds, did not offend the constitutional provisions. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953). Ga. L. 1949, p. 1009 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 5, Ch. 3, T. 20), forbid any attempt to obligate the state, pledge the state’s faith or credit or donate anything belonging to the state; therefore, neither the article, lease contract executed thereunder, nor the revenue bonds issued pursuant thereto offend constitutional inhibitions against state debts, donations, or pledging the faith and credit of the state. Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952). An obligation incurred by the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia is not a debt of the state and, therefore, is not affected by constitutional limitations upon state indebtedness. State v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 179 Ga. 210, 175 S.E. 567 (1934). Cited in State v. State Toll Bridge Auth., 210 Ga. 690, 82 S.E.2d 626 (1954); Carter v. Burson, 230 Ga. 511, 198 S.E.2d 151 (1973); Fuller v. State, 232 Ga. 581, 208 S.E.2d 85 (1974).

Unemployment compensation.

Payment of unemployment compensation is not a purpose for which public debt may be incurred as set forth in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Paras. I and II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Paras. I and II). 1982 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 82-35.