Amend. IV. Freedom from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Current through: the volume states no acts currency; this is its 2025 edition.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Editor's notes
The Supreme Court has declared that the due process clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14, protects the personal right of privacy from state, as well as federal, action. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 61 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).
Cross references
Security from unreasonable search and seizure, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII. Rights of citizens, § 1-2-6. Emergency situation; application for an investigative warrant, § 16-11-64.3. Searches and seizures generally, § 17-5-1 et seq.
Law reviews
For comment concerning indirect use of illegally seized evidence, in light of Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939), see 2 Ga. B.J. 70 (1940). For comment criticizing McIntyre v. State, 190 Ga. 872, 11 S.E.2d 5 (1940), permitting admission of illegally seized evidence, see 3 Ga. B.J. 53 (1941). For article criticizing operation of U.S. Const., amend. 1, in relation to right of privacy, see 10 Ga. B.J. 53 (1947). For comment on Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 399 (1947), upholding constitutionality of evidence seized during search incident to arrest, see 10 Ga. B.J. 120 (1947). For comment on Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948), holding when the right of privacy must yield to right of search is a matter for judicial officer, not policeman, see 10 Ga. B.J. 498 (1948). For comment on McDonald v. United States, 166 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1948), holding act of looking through transom without search warrant and observing that which is not hidden is not a search, see 11 Ga. B.J. 241 (1948). For comment on United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1954), regarding admissibility of chemical tests of body fluids where U.S. Const., Amends. 4, 5 and 14, objections are made, see 4 J. Pub. L. 202 (1955). For comment on Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S. Ct. 408, 1 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1957), holding that the fourteenth amendment does not extend the protection of this amendment and U.S. Const., amend. 5, to criminal prosecutions in state cases, see 20 Ga. B.J. 126 (1957). For comment discussing reasonableness in search and seizure of narcotics from accused’s body, in light of Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), see 9 Mercer L. Rev. 220 (1957). For comment on Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914, 78 S. Ct. 672, 2 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1958), holding that evidence gained in bodily search of defendant who was attempting to cross the United States border was not obtained through unreasonable search and seizure and did not violate constitutional protections, see 21 Ga. B.J. 269 (1958). For article, “Civil Liberties and Statutory Construction,” see 8 J. of Pub. L. 66 (1959). For comment on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S. Ct. 804, 3 L. Ed. 2d 877 (1959), holding housing inspection without warrant to be reasonable search, see 22 Ga. B.J. 410 (1960). For comment discussing reasonableness of warrantless search of automobile, in light of Patenotte v. United States, 266 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1959), see 22 Ga. B.J. 549 (1960). For comment on Elkins v. United States, 361 U.S. 810, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1960), regarding the extension of the exclusionary rule in federal criminal cases to evidence illegally obtained by state officer, see 12 Mercer L. Rev. 274 (1960). For comment on Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960), holding evidence illegally obtained by state officers is inadmissible in federal as well as state courts, see 23 Ga. B.J. 383 (1961). For comment discussing admissibility of evidence obtained by search and seizure under administrative warrant, in light of Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S. Ct. 683, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1960), see 23 Ga. B.J. 400 (1961). For comment discussing exclusionary rule in state courts, in light of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), see 24 Ga. B.J. 129 (1961). For comment discussing standing to object to unlawful search and seizure, in light of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960), see 24 Ga. B.J. 131 (1961). For comment on Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961), holding police use of “spike mike” violated prohibition against unlawful search and seizure, see 24 Ga. B.J. 135 (1961). For comment on Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1961), see 12 Mercer L. Rev. 422 (1961). For comment on Mapp v. Ohio, 365 U.S. 514, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 5 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1961), and the incorporation of the fourth amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures into the fourteenth amendment, see 13 Mercer L. Rev. 275 (1961). For note discussing retroactive application of constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures, in light of Mapp v. Ohio, see 25 Ga. B.J. 238 (1962). For comment discussing application of exclusionary rule to state, in light of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), see 24 Ga. B.J. 445 (1962). For comment on Harris v. United States, 321 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1963), holding invalid search incident to arrest where primary purpose is to search for evidence and not make a valid arrest, see 26 Ga. B.J. 446 (1964). For note discussing habeas corpus as a means of exerting control by the central government in protecting the constitutional rights of criminal defendants and the ramifications for federalism, see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 281 (1964). For article, “Changing Constitutional Concepts in Criminal Law and Procedure,” see 1 Ga. St. B.J. 421 (1965). For comment on Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965), see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (1966). For article, “The Supreme Court, the Individual and the Criminal Process,” see 1 Ga. L. Rev. 386 (1967). For article, “Federalism in Current Perspective,” see 1 Ga. L. Rev. 586 (1967). For note discussing retroactivity of constitutional rules of criminal procedure in light of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965), see 16 J. of Pub. L. 193 (1967). For note, “Constitutional Rights of a Taxpayer in a Criminal Tax Investigation,” see 16 J. of Pub. L. 403 (1967). For note tracing judicial attempts at enumerating areas protected by the fourth amendment and advocating more uniformity, see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (1967). For comment on extension of exclusionary rule to civil cases in light of Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (1966), see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 501 (1967). For comment discussing Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968), as to propriety of warrantless search of student’s dormitory room pursuant to school regulation, see 3 Ga. L. Rev. 223 (1968). For comment on Tolbert v. State, 224 Ga. 291, 161 S.E.2d 279 (1968), see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 256 (1968). For comment on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967), applying this amendment’s guarantees to unreasonable searches by administrative agencies, see 19 Mercer L. Rev. 259 (1968). For comment on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), finding absence of physical trespass not determinative of fact of illegal search and seizure, see 19 Mercer L. Rev. 442 (1968). For note, “College Searches and Seizures: Privacy and Due Process Problems on Campus,” see 3 Ga. L. Rev. 426 (1969). For comment discussing probable cause for search warrant in obscenity case, in light of Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 638, 88 S. Ct. 2103, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1313 (1968) (per curiam), see 18 J. of Pub. L. 205 (1969). For note discussing the constitutional origins of the substantive right to family autonomy, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 719 (1969). For comment discussing limits on the military’s jurisdiction and the constitutional rights of servicemen in light of O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S. Ct. 1683, 23 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1969), see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 311 (1969). For article, “Warrantless Searches and Seizures,” see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 269 (1971). For note, “Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure: A Reexamination,” see 20 J. of Pub. L. 313 (1971). For article on the judicial development of the fourteenth amendment’s due process clause and the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 533 (1971). For note, “The Constitutionality of the Use of Search Warrant to Obtain Tax Records,” see 6 Ga. L. Rev. 399 (1972). For comment discussing subsequent justification of electronic surveillance, in light of Cox v. United States, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 989 (1972). For article, “Privacy in the Corporate State: A Constitutional Value of Dwin-dling Significance,” see 22 J. of Pub. L. 3 (1973). For article discussing federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the effect credit reporting has upon the constitutional right to privacy, see 22 J. of Pub. L. 67 (1973). For comment on Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972), see 24 Mercer L. Rev. 687 (1973). For article advocating personal privacy as determinative test for standing in suppression of illegally seized evidence, see 23 Emory L.J. 111 (1974). For note, “Limitation Upon Trial Court Discretion in Imposing Conditions of Probation,” see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 466 (1974). For comment on Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 93 S. Ct. 611, 34 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1973), holding compelled production of taxpayers’ records in possession of accountant not violative of taxpayer’s right against self-incrimination, see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 648 (1974). For article discussing the problem of handling hearsay information in determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, see 25 Mercer L. Rev. 741 (1974). For note on fourth amendment search and seizure in the context of air piracy, see 25 Mercer L. Rev. 355 (1974). For note on use of voice exemplars in grand jury investigations, see 25 Mercer L. Rev. 365 (1974). For comment on United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973), discussing search incident to arrest, see 25 Mercer L. Rev. 943 (1974). For article, “The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties: 1974-1975,” see 24 Emory L.J. 937 (1975). For note discussing relaxation of judicial restrictions on search incident to lawful arrest, see 24 Emory L.J. 151 (1975). For note, “Application of the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule to the Grand Jury,” see 24 Emory L.J. 471 (1975). For comment on Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975), as to effect of Miranda warnings on admissibility of a confession made after an unconstitutional arrest, see 25 Emory L.J. 227 (1976). For article advocating a sliding scale approach to deal with governmental investigative techniques intruding on privacy interests under the fourth amendment, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 75 (1976). For article discussing past and present trends in the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in Georgia criminal trials and advocating a state exclusionary rule, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 105 (1976). For comment on Connally v. State, 237 Ga. 203, 227 S.E.2d 352, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 200 (1976). For article discussing meaning and applicability of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 987 (1976). For comment on Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976), as to nonapplicability of privilege against self-incrimination to seizure with search warrant of incriminatory personal business records, see 28 Mercer L. Rev. 581 (1977). For comment discussing satisfaction of the probable cause requirement for issuance of a search warrant by a reasonable inference in light of Murphy v. State, 238 Ga. 725, 234 S.E.2d 911 (1977), see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 347 (1977). For article, “Federal Antibias Legislation and Academic Freedom: Some Problems with Enforcement Procedures,” see 27 Emory L.J. 609 (1978). For comment discussing doctrine of substituted judgment and constitutional underpinnings of a qualified right to refuse medical treatment asserted for an incompetent, in light of Superintendent of Belcherton State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), see 27 Emory L.J. 425 (1978). For article surveying cases dealing with criminal law and criminal procedure from June 1, 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 27 (1978). For comment on United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978), regarding authority of federal judges to authorize break-ins to plant electronic surveillance devices, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 647 (1979). For article surveying judicial developments in Georgia criminal law, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 59 (1979). For note discussing modern trend of judicial authorization of covert police break-ins, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 707 (1979). For note, “Constitutionally Implied Causes of Action: A Policy of Protection, Expansion, or Restriction?,” see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 1023 (1979). For comment on United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978), see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 1087 (1979). For comment on Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10 (M.D. Ala. 1978), see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 1093 (1979). For comment, “Bivens and the Creation of a Cause of Action for Money Damages Arising Directly From the Due Process Clauses,” see 29 Emory L.J. 231 (1980). For comment on Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 563, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979), regarding custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a full-fledged arrest, see 29 Emory L.J. 273 (1980). For comment on Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1980), discussing administrative inspections and OSHA, see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 233 (1980). For article, “Stop and Frisk,” see 17 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1980). For note discussing application of procedural due process requirements to hearings by administrative tribunals, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 359 (1980). For comment, “Private Search and Prior Restraint of Obscene Materials: The Interaction of Two Doctrines,” see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 1029 (1980). For comment on United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 487 (1981). For comment discussing the forcible medication of involuntarily committed mental patients with antipsychotic drugs in light of Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 739 (1981). For article, “Constitutional Criminal Litigation,” see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 993 (1981). For note on United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 1329 (1981). For article discussing Eleventh Circuit court cases in the year 1981 dealing with constitutional criminal procedure, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 1083 (1982). For note discussing property rights as measure of fourth amendment protections, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 1263 (1982). For article, “Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice,” see 32 Emory L.J. 937 (1983). For comment, “Free Press, Privacy, and Privilege: Protection of Researcher-Sub-ject Communications,” see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 1009 (1983). For comment discussing the unconstitutional use of deadly force against nonviolent fleeing felons, see 18 Ga. L. Rev. 137 (1983). For article surveying 1982 Eleventh Circuit cases involving constitutional criminal procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1241 (1983). For article discussing the application of the fourth amendment to searches and seizures at sea, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1537 (1983). For annual survey of criminal law and procedure, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 103 (1983). For article surveying 1983 Eleventh Circuit cases involving constitutional criminal procedure, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 1139 (1984). For annual survey on constitutional law, see 36 Mercer L. Rev. 137 (1984). For article, “The Bail Reform Act of 1984,” see 34 Emory L.J. 685 (1985). For note, “Circling the Wagons: Informational Privacy and Family Testimonial Privileges,” see 20 Ga. L. Rev. 173 (1985). For note, “United States v. Leon: The Long-Awaited Good-Faith Exception Has Finally Arrived,” see 36 Mercer L. Rev. 757 (1985). For note, “Oliver v. United States: Will Exceptions of Privacy Shield Criminal Acts No More?,” see 36 Mercer L. Rev. 1401 (1985). For comment, “Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the Workplace: A Proposal for Federal Legislation Limiting Drug Screening,” see 35 Emory L.J. 1011 (1986). For article, “Employer and Consultant Reporting Under the LMRDA,” see 20 Ga. L. Rev. 533 (1986). For article, “Congress and the Fourth Amendment,” see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 107 (1986). For comment, “Shoemaker v. Handel and Urinalysis Drug Testing: Looking for an American Standard,” see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 467 (1986). For article, “An Alternative Approach to the Good Faith Controversy,” see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 957 (1986). For article, “Court Ordered Surgery to Retrieve Evidence in Georgia in Light of the Supreme Court Decision in Winston v. Lee,” see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 1005 (1986). For survey of 1985 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional criminal procedure, see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 1275 (1986). For annual survey of criminal law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 129 (1986). For article, “After ABSCAM: An Examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations,” see 36 Emory L.J. 75 (1987). For article, “Interception of Communications in Exigent Circumstances: The Fourth Amendment, Federal Legislation, and the United States Department of Justice,” see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1987). For survey of 1986 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional criminal procedure, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 1141 (1987). For comment, “Fourth Amendment Protections in the Elementary and Secondary School Settings,” see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 1417 (1987). For comment, “The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory Testing for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome — AIDS,” see 37 Emory L.J. 217 (1988). For article, “Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis of State Law,” see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 667 (1988). For article, “Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools,” see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 897 (1988). For article, “Juvenileness: A Single-Edged Constitutional Sword,” see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 949 (1988). For survey of 1987 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional criminal procedure, see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 1187 (1988). For survey of Eleventh Circuit cases on evidence, see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 1259 (1988). For article, “More Myths of Parity: State Court Forums and Constitutional Actions for the Right to Shelter,” see 38 Emory L.J. 615 (1989). For article, “Metaphor and Paradox,” see 23 Ga. L. Rev. 1053 (1989). For comment, “Trial by Certainty: Implications of Genetic ‘DNA Fingerprints’,” see 39 Emory L.J. 309 (1990). For comment, “Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: Sober Reflections on How the Supreme Court Has Blurred the Law of Suspicionless Seizures,” see 25 Ga. L. Rev. 199 (1990). For article, “A Report from the Front in the War on Drugs,” see 7 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (1990). For article surveying developments in Georgia constitutional law during 1989, see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 1261 (1990). For article surveying developments in Georgia constitutional law during 1989, see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 1277 (1990). For annual survey on criminal law and procedure, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 141 (1990). For annual Eleventh Circuit survey of constitutional law — civil, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 1313 (1991). For annual Eleventh Circuit survey of constitutional criminal procedure, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 1349 (1991). For annual survey of criminal law and procedure, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 175 (1991). For comment on warrantless search of defendant’s home, see 41 Emory L.J. 321 (1992). For annual Eleventh Circuit survey of constitutional law — civil, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 1075 (1992). For annual Eleventh Circuit survey of constitutional criminal law, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 1113 (1992). For article, “Individual Rights and the Powers of Government,” see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 343 (1993). For article, “Trumping Rights,” see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 435 (1993). For article, “Further Reflections on Rights and Interests: A Reply,” see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 489 (1993). For comment, “Ramseur v. Beyer: The Third Circuit Upholds Race-Based Treatment of Prospective Grand Jurors,” see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 621 (1993). For article, “Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimum Entitlements,” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 525 (1993). For article, “Resources and Rights: Towards a New Prototype of Criminal Representation,” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 599 (1993). For article, “Constitutional Civil Law,” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1107 (1993). For article, “Constitutional Criminal Law,” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1143 (1993). For note, “Davis v. State: Too Young to Consent?” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1367 (1993). For article on police perjury about searches and seizures, see 43 Emory L.J. 1311 (1994). For article, “Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey January 1, 1993 — December 31, 1993: Constitutional Civil Law,” see 45 Mercer L. Rev. 1217 (1994). For article, “Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey January 1, 1993 — December 31, 1993: Constitutional Criminal Law,” see 45 Mercer L. Rev. 1243 (1994). For comment on United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (1994), relating to use of thermal surveillance on private property, see 29 Ga. L. Rev. 819 (1995). For article, “1994 Eleventh Circuit Survey: Constitutional Criminal Procedure,” see 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1297 (1995). For article, “1994 Eleventh Circuit Survey: Constitutional Civil Law,” see 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1275 (1995). For survey of 1995 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional civil law, see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 745 (1996). For survey of 1995 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional criminal procedure, see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 765 (1996). For survey of 1995 Eleventh Circuit cases on evidence, see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 837 (1996). For note, “Arizona v. Evans: Carving Out Another Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule,” see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 1135 (1996). For article, “Fit to Be Tied? Fourth Amendment Analysis of the Hog-Tie Restraint Procedure,” see 33 Ga. L. Rev. 281 (1998). For note, “Gary v. State: The Georgia Supreme Court Dodges a Confrontation With the Good Faith Exception,” see 32 Ga. L. Rev. 927 (1998). For article, “Slaves No More!: The Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings,” see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 709 (1999). For article surveying 1997 and 1998 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional criminal procedure, see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 921 (1999). For comment, “The Government’s Right to Read: Maintaining State Access to Digital Data in the Age of Impenetrable En-cryption,” see 49 Emory L.J, 711 (2000). For comment, “Making the ‘Law of the Land’ the Law on the Street: How Police Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law,” see 49 Emory L.J. 295 (2000). For article, “Chipping Away at the Boundaries of Privacy: Intel’s Pentium III Processor Serial Number and the Erosion of Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations,” see 17 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 331 (2000). For article surveying 1999 Eleventh Circuit cases involving constitutional criminal procedure, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 1089 (2000). For note, “Wyoming v. Houghton: Passengers’ Belongings Subject to Searches Under the ’Automobile Exception’ to the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Requirement,” see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 999 (2000). For comment, “The Fourth Amendment Rights of Trespassers: Searching for the Legitimacy of the Government-Notifica-tion Doctrine,” see 50 Emory L.J. 1357 (2001). For article on constitutional criminal procedure, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 1305 (2001). For article on criminal law, see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 209 (2001). For article, “Statutory Civil Rights,” see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 1499 (2002). For article, “Expanding the Scope of Suspicionless Drug Testing in Public Schools,” see 54 Mercer L. Rev. 1293 (2003). For article, “Constitutional Criminal Procedure,” see 54 Mercer L. Rev. 1403 (2003). For survey article on criminal law and procedure for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (2003). For note, “Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Potta-watomie County v. Earls: Supreme Court Approves Mandatory, Suspicionless Drug Testing Policy in Public High School,” see 54 Mercer L. Rev. 1215 (2003). For note, “Beyond the Four Corners: Objective Good Faith Analysis or Subjective Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protections?,” see 54 Mercer L. Rev. 1719 (2003). For Eleventh Circuit survey article on constitutional criminal procedure decisions in 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 1149 (2004). For note, “How Are Local Governments Responding to Student Rental Problems in University Towns in the United States, Canada, and England?,” see 33 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 497 (2005). For article, “Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process,” see 40 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (2005). For article, “Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search,” see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 507 (2005). For annual survey of criminal law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (2005). For note, “Form Over Substance? Qualified Immunity in Groh v. Ramirez,” see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 1457 (2005). For note, “To Serve and Protect: Thornton v. United States and the Newly Ane-mic Fourth Amendment,” see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 1471 (2005). For note, “Snoop Dogs: An Analysis of Narcotics Canine Sniffs of Storage Units under the Fourth Amendment,” see 40 Ga. L. Rev. 1209 (2006). For article, “Police Pursuits: A Comprehensive Look at the Broad Spectrum of Police Pursuit Liability and Law,” see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 511 (2006). For annual survey of criminal law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2006). For note, “Padgett v. Donald: Why Not So Special,” see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 673 (2006). For article, “Redefining the Right to Be Let Alone: Privacy Rights and the Constitutionality of Technical Surveillance Measures in Germany and the United States,” see 35 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 433 (2007). For survey article on criminal law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (2007). For note, “Hey Officer, Didn’t Someone Teach You To Knock? The Supreme Court Says No Exclusion of Evidence for Knock-and-Announce Violations in Hudson v. Michigan,” see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 779 (2007). For note, “Georgia v. Randolph: What to do With a Yes from One but not from Two?,” see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 1429 (2007). For comment, “The Sliding Scale Approach to Protecting Nonresident Immi-grants against the Use of Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment,” see 22 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 247 (2008). For note, “Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches,” see 42 Ga. L. Rev. 1165 (2008). For note and comment, “Lying to Catch the Bad Guy: The Eleventh Circuit’s Likely Adoption of the Clear Error Standard of Review for a Denial of a Frank’s Hearing,” see 24 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 843 (2008). For comment, “School Bullies — They Aren’t Just Students: Examining School Interrogations and the Miranda Warning,” see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 731 (2008). For comment, “The British Invasion (Of Privacy): DNA Databases in the United Kingdom and United States in the Wake of the Marper Case,” see 23 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 609 (2009). For note, “The Online Zoom Lens: Why Internet Street-Level Mapping Technologies Demand Reconsideration of the Mod-ern-Day Tort Notion of ‘Public Privacy’,” see 43 Ga. L. Rev. 575 (2009). For article, “The Fourth Amendment and Computers: Is a Computer Just Another Container or Are New Rules Required to Reflect New Technologies?,” see 14 (No. 5) Ga. St. B.J. 15 (2009). For article, “Pay to Play: The Poor’s Problems in the BAPCPA,” see 25 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 407 (2009). For article, “Terrorism, Historical Analogies, and Modern Choices,” see 24 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 589 (2010). For article, “The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court Opinions and Justices,” see 60 Emory L.J.408 (2010). For article, “Congressional End-Run: The Ignored Constraint on Judicial Review,” see 45 Ga. L. Rev. 211 (2010). For article, “Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure: Alice in Wonderland Meets the Constitution,” see 26 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 417 (2010). For article, “Herring v. United States: The Continued Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule,” see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 663 (2010). For article, “Police Mistakes of Law,” see 61 Emory L. J. 69 (2011). For comment, “From Backpacks to Blackberries: (Re)Examining New Jersey v. T.L.O. in the Age of the Cell Phone,” see 61 Emory L. J. 111 (2011). For article, “The Political Economy of Criminal Procedure Litigation,” see 45 Ga. L. Rev. 721 (2011). For note, “Imprisoned by Liability: Why Bivens Suits Should Not be Available Against Employees of Privately Run Federal Prisons,” see 45 Ga. L. Rev. 1127 (2011). For comment, “A ‘Fundamental’ Problem: The Vulnerability of Intellectual Property Licenses in Chapter 15 and the Meaning of § 1506,” see 28 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 177 (2011). For comment, “Big Brother Gets a Makeover: Behavioral Targeting and the Third-Party Doctrine,” see 61 Emory L.J. 555 (2012). For comment, “Testing Our Teachers,” 61 Emory L.J. 1493 (2012). For annual survey on criminal law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2012). For annual survey on evidence law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 137 (2012). For article, “Students, Security, and Race,” see 63 Emory L. J. 1 (2013). For article, “(Mis)Conceptions of the Corporation,” see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 731 (2013). For comment, “Drawing the Line: DNA Databasing at Arrest and Sample Ex-pungement,” see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1063 (2013). For comment, “Paddling Past Nicastro in the Stream of Commerce Doctrine: Interpreting Justice Breyer’s Concurrence as Implicitly Inviting Lower Courts to Develop Alternative Jurisdictional Standards,” see 63 Emory L.J. 695 (2014). For article on social services and public assistance, see 31 Ga. St. U.L. 205 (2014). For article, “Crimes and Offenses: Offenses Against Public Order and Safety,” see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 47 (2014). For note, “The Conversational Consent Search: How ‘Quick Look’ and Other Similar Searches Have Eroded Our Constitutional Rights,” see 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1077 (2014). For article, “Clever Contraband: Why Illinois’ Lockstep with the U.S. Supreme Court Gives Police Authority to Search the Bowels of Your Vehicle,” see 47 J. Marshall L. Rev. 425 (2014). For article, “The Contingent Fourth Amendment,” 64 Emory L.J. 1229 (2015). For article, “Original Misunderstand-ings: The Implications of Misreading History in Jones,” see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 471 (2015). For annual survey of criminal law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2015). For comment, “DNA Collection Acts and the Fourth Amendment: A Call for Legislative Reform in Georgia to Implement Collection of Arrestees’ DNA,” see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 513 (2016). For article, “Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public,” see 66 Emory L.J. 527 (2017). For article, “How Both the EU and the U.S. are ‘Stricter’ Than Each Other for the Privacy of Government Requests for Information,” see 66 Emory L.J. 617 (2017). For article, “Biometric Cyberintelli-gence and the Posse Comitatus Act,” see 66 Emory L.J. 697 (2017). For comment, “Lichtenberger, Sparks, and Wicks: The Future of the Private Search Doctrine,” see 66 Emory L.J. 395 (2017). For article, “Missing Police Body Camera Videos: Remedies, Evidentiary Fairness, and Automatic Activation,” see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 57 (2017). For article, “Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing,” see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 109 (2017). For article, “Mass Suppression: Aggre-gation and the Fourth Amendment,” see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (2017). For note, “Simon Didn’t Say: When Reconstruction of a Private Search Goes Awry Under the Private Search Doctrine,” see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 557 (2017). For note, “You have the Right to Free Speech: Retaliatory Arrests and the Pretext of Probable Cause,” see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 607 (2017). For note, “Publicly Funded Private Security: A Critical Examination of Georgia Law Pertaining to the Private Employment of Off-Duty Police Officers,” see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 879 (2017). For annual survey on local government law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 205 (2017). For comment, “Encroachment, Loss of Five Yards: Government Attorneys and the No-Contact Rule’s Place in Civil False Claims Act Investigations,” see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 877 (2017). For article, “The CDC’s Communicable Disease Regulations: Striking the Balance Between Public Health & Individual Rights,” see 67 Emory L.J. 463 (2018). For article, “Digital Searches, the Fourth Amendment, and Magistrates’ Re-volt,” see 68 Emory L.J. 51 (2018). For comment, “Seeking Warrants for Unknown Locations: The Mismatch Between Digital Pegs and Territorial Holes,” see 68 Emory L.J. 185 (2018). For article, “Dead Canaries in the Coal Mines: The Symbolic Assailant Revisited,” see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 513 (2018). For article, “From the Crime Scene to the Courtroom: The Future of Forensic Science Reform: Safety from Flawed Forensic Sciences Evidence,” see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1129 (2018). For article, “Racial Justice and Federal Habeas Corpus as Postconviction Relief from State Convictions,” see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 453 (2018). For note, “To Deceive or not to Deceive: Law Enforcement Officers Gain Broader Approval to Use Deceptive Tactics to Obtain Voluntary Consent,” see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 627 (2018). For article, “The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity Can Categorize Third-Party Data After Carpenter,” see 53 Ga. L. Rev. 1039 (2019). For article, “Transcript: Criminal Procedure and Affirmative Action,” see 35 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 977 (2019). For annual survey on criminal law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 941 (2019). For annual survey on criminal law, see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 69 (2019). For note, “Can You Hear Me Now?: An Individual’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Now Extends to Cell-Site Location Information,” see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 549 (2019). For annual survey of criminal law, see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 967 (2020). For note, “Shoot at Me Once: Shame on You! Shoot at Me Twice: Qualified Immunity. Qualified Immunity Applies Where Police Target Innocent Bystanders,” see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 1171 (2020). For comment, “The Reasonableness and Unreasonableness of Delays in Obtaining Search Warrants,” see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 1149 (2020). For article, “How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence,” see 70 Emory L.J. 521 (2021). For note, “Should Technology be Trusted? The Detrimental Role of Video Footage in a Qualified Immunity Analysis,” see 72 Mercer L. Rev. 977 (2021). For article with annual survey on criminal law, see 72 Mercer L. Rev. 1093 (2021). For article with annual survey on evidence, see 72 Mercer L. Rev. 1149 (2021). For article with annual survey on criminal law, see 73 Mercer L. Rev. 75 (2021). For note, “Facebook, Crime Prevention, and the Scope of the Private Search Doctrine Post-Carpenter,” see 56 Ga. L. Rev. 787 (2022). For article, “Who Should Guard the Attorney – Client Privilege When Documents are Seized by Law Enforcement,” see 28 Ga. St. B.J. 18 (February 2023). For article, “Criminal Law,” see 74 Mercer L. Rev. 1369 (2023).
Other notes (1020 entries, as printed)
- Purpose.
- Origin and history of U.S. Const., amend. 4 clearly shows that it was intended only as a restraint upon activities of sovereign authority, and that a contrary ruling would have no deterrent effect since private persons would be unaware of the rule. Moye v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 230, 214 S.E.2d 920, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1090 (1975). A fundamental purpose of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasion of legitimate privacy interests. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8522 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2145 (1980). The essential purpose of proscriptions in U.S. Const., amend. 4 is to impose standard of “reasonableness” upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law-enforcement agents, in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasion. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2421 (1979). Hostility to seizures based on mere suspicion was prime motivation for adoption of U.S. Const., amend. 4, and common rumor or report, suspicion, or even “strong reason to suspect” is not adequate to support a warrant for arrest. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2421 (1979). U.S. Const., amend. 4 was intended partly to protect against the abuses of the general warrants that had occurred in England and of the writs of assistance used in the colonies. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981).
- Primary object is protection of privacy.
- Rather than property rights, primary object of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is protection of privacy. United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16633 (5th Cir. 1979). Nature of rights under fourth
- amendment.
- The rights guaranteed by U.S. Const., amend. 4 are regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty. United States v. Hall, 587 F.2d 177, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 17903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S. Ct. 2405, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1065, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 1963 (1979).
- Intrusions by governmental investigations into zone of privacy.
- No interest legitimately protected by the fourth amendment is implicated by governmental investigative activities unless there is an intrusion into a zone of privacy, into the security a person relies upon when the person places the person or the person’s property within a constitutionally protected area. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 148 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in, SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 104 S. Ct. 2720, 81 L. Ed. 2d 615, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 114 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21416 (9th Cir. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in, Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 3643 (4th Cir. 1987) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.). Applicable to seizures of persons
- and property.
- The simple language of U.S. Const., amend. 4 applies equally to seizures of persons and property. Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 271 S.E.2d 478, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1130 (1980). sons, not just places. State v. Cochran, 135 Ga. App. 47, 217 S.E.2d 181, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1552 (1975).
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects per-Property rights.
- Property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of the fourth amendment inquiry. Other factors enter into the calculus, no single integrant being determinative. The additional circumstances to be considered include whether the property owners enjoyed the right to exclude others from the property, or whether they had a possessory interest in the articles seized, and what precautions were taken to assure their privacy. State v. Jackson, 201 Ga. App. 810, 412 S.E.2d 593, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1612 (1991). Although property concepts are no longer controlling in application of fourth amendment rights, they should be considered in conjunction with the totality of all the circumstances surrounding claimed violations of fourth amendment rights. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1768 (1980). Invocation of fourth amendment rights not to be used as evidence. — A defendant’s refusal of permission to search is analogous to the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination, and as it is forbidden to “parade” a witness in front of a jury for the sole purpose of having the witness invoke the fifth amendment, an individual should be able to invoke fourth amendment rights without having the refusal used against the defendant at trial. Mackey v. State, 234 Ga. App. 554, 507 S.E.2d 482, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1303 (1998).
- Common sense application.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 is not to be applied to searches and seizures in a hypertechnical manner but with a common sense approach. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Negligent or innocent mistakes do not violate the fourth amendment. Maughon v. Bibb County, 160 F.3d 658, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28459 (11th Cir. 1998). Fundamental inquiry is whether search or seizure is reasonable under circumstances, remembering that U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects people, not places. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8522 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2145 (1980). Only unreasonable searches and
- seizures prohibited.
- Only unreasonable searches and seizures come within the interdiction of U.S. Const., amend. 4, and what is reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Bartlett v. United States, 232 F.2d 135, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 3009 (5th Cir. 1956). It is only unreasonable searches and seizures which come within the constitutional interdict. The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Cash v. State, 222 Ga. 55, 148 S.E.2d 420, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 396 (1966); United States v. Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 945, 92 S. Ct. 299, 30 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 614 (1971). The Constitution prohibits only searches which are unreasonable, and reasonableness is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Gugliotta v. State, 117 Ga. App. 212, 160 S.E.2d 266, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1035 (1968). It is only unreasonable searches and seizures which come within the constitutional interdict. Watts v. Cannon, 224 Ga. 797, 164 S.E.2d 780, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 954 (1968). U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects privacy only to extent that it prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” No general right is created by the amendment so as to hold unconstitutional everything which affects privacy. Patterson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 742, 212 S.E.2d 858, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 2268 (1975). Protections of U.S. Const., amend. 4 apply only to unreasonable searches and seizures of governmental agents. Gasaway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 653, 224 S.E.2d 772, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2561, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865, 97 S. Ct. 172, General Consideration (Cont’d) 50 L. Ed. 2d 144, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 2949 (1976).
- Intrusion during safety and well-ness check was minimal and reasonable.
- Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as there was nothing improper about the deputies’ initial warrantless entry onto the property to conduct a safety/wellness check on the victim; the deputies’ conduct in walking over to the detached garage after failing to receive a response from inside the residence and peering into the space between the locked doors to determine if the victim’s car was present was a minimal intrusion and was reasonable for the deputies to attempt to ascertain whether the victim was home and in need of assistance but unable to come to the door; and, once the deputies determined the victim’s vehicle was not on the premises and it appeared no one was home, the deputies concluded the safety/wellness check and left. Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 199, 766 S.E.2d 60, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 912 (2014). Balancing implied consent with
- constitutional rights.
- Stated purpose of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 to protect the citizens of this state from individuals driving under the influence because these drivers constitute “a direct and immediate threat to the welfare and safety of the general public” must be balanced against the intrusion created by chemical testing on the individual’s fourth amendment rights where the individual has been involved in a traffic accident involving serious injuries or fatalities and the investigating officer has probable cause to believe that the individual was driving under the influence if the driver/defendant is seriously injured in an automobile accident, given the presence of probable cause, the requirement that a person submit to a chemical test is inherently reasonable in the balance, and the fourth amendment’s “probable cause yardstick” measures up to be constitutionally sound. Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 647 (2005). rest and search will trigger fourth amendment scrutiny. On the other hand, it equally is clear that certain encounters between law enforcement officers and citizens, even for investigative purposes, are not encompassed by U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14504 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 2998, 64 L. Ed. 2d 861, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2398 (1980). Privacy yields to protection from
- Something less than full scale arcrime.
- Privacy argument has yielded to proposition that public has right to expect state to protect its citizens from flow of illicit drugs and to enforce criminal law so long as there is no more than a minimal intrusion in right of privacy enjoyed by the individual. Dunivant v. State, 155 Ga. App. 884, 273 S.E.2d 621, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2827 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998, 101 S. Ct. 1703, 68 L. Ed. 2d 199, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 1357 (1981).
- Balance of privacy interests and interest in deterring crime.
- The governmental interest in deterring criminal conduct may properly be balanced against an individual’s privacy interests in cases under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Reasonableness in the sense of U.S. Const., amend. 4 always depends upon a balance which must be struck between, on the one hand, the level of official intrusion into an individual privacy and, on the other hand, the public interest to be served by such an intrusion. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981). tim of a crime to be secure against unreasonable search must prevail over the right of the accused to obtain evidence for the accused’s defense. To require the victim of a crime to undergo surgery against the victim’s will to remove a bullet lodged an inch from the victim’s spine, even if medical testimony could be produced that the operation would not be dangerous to the victim’s health, is an unreasonable search and seizure, and violates the victim’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Haynie, 240 Ga. 866, 242 S.E.2d 713, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 858 (1978). Assurance that a person’s fifth amendment right against compelled self- incrimination was not violated does not necessarily overcome a failure to protect the person’s right under the fourth amendment against unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Guillory, 236 Ga. App. 230, 511 S.E.2d 591, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 125 (1999). An unlawful arrest or seizure does not bar a criminal prosecution. Neither does suppression of evidence. State v. Brown, 198 Ga. App. 239, 401 S.E.2d 295, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1598 (1990), cert. denied, No. S91C0476, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 467 (Ga. Jan. 31, 1991).
- Fourth amendment right of the vic-Three tiers of police-citizen encounters.
- The three tiers of police-citizen encounters are: (1) communication between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and therefore without the compass of the fourth amendment; (2) brief seizures that must be supported by reasonable suspicion; and (3) full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause. Gonzalez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 253, 509 S.E.2d 144, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1484 (1998).
- First level police-citizen encounters.
- Because there was no evidence of threats, coercion, or restraint, a police officer’s actions of approaching defendant’s parked car outside a convenience store, asking for proof of car ownership, and asking about defendant’s knowledge of the men who were with defendant, fell within the realm of a first-level police-citizen encounter which carried no fourth amendment protection and did not require any articulable suspicion of criminal activity in order to allow the officer to ask defendant for permission to search defendant’s car; therefore, the trial court erred in suppressing cocaine that was found in the car during the search which followed on the ground that the officer lacked articulable suspicion that illegal drugs were in the car. State v. Cates, 258 Ga. App. 673, 574 S.E.2d 868, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1541 (2002). Questioning outside the scope of a
- valid traffic stop.
- A law enforcement officer’s continued questioning of a vehicle’s driver and passengers outside the scope of a valid traffic stop passes muster under the fourth amendment either when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion of other illegal activity or when the valid traffic stop has de-escalated into a consensual encounter. Daniel v. State, 277 Ga. 840, 597 S.E.2d 116, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 415 (2004), overruled in part, Matthews v. State, 294 Ga. App. 836, 670 S.E.2d 520, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1329 (2008), overruled in part, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 683, 859 S.E.2d 891, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 360 (2021).
- Immunity.
- Because the state failed to show that a police department’s checkpoint program had an appropriate primary purpose other than ordinary crime control when viewed at the programmatic level, the checkpoint violated the fourth amendment, and the defendant’s DUI convictions were reversed. Charales v. State, 329 Ga. App. 533, 765 S.E.2d 701, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 729 (2014). cial process without prior approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4 — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. United States v. Bright, 471 F.2d 723, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 12272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921, 93 S. Ct. 2742, 37 L. Ed. 2d 148, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 2302 (1973).
- Searches conducted outside judi-Private searches.
- Where shipping company employees discovered crates containing contraband and notified law enforcement authorities, the subsequent search of the crates by law enforcement officers did not exceed the scope of the private search in violation of the fourth amendment. Hyatt v. State, 210 Ga. App. 425, 436 S.E.2d 540, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1220 (1993).
- Search by private individuals.
- Upon a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to the facts, became a warrantless search of defendant’s gym locker was conducted by private citizens, and not by law enforcement, said acts did not implicate the fourth amendment; hence, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of said search. Hobbs v. State, 272 Ga. App. 148, 611 S.E.2d 775, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 235 (2005). General Consideration (Cont’d)
- Searches by shipping company employees.
- Shipping company employees did not act as instruments or agents of the government in their searches of a parcel, although they had received training by government law enforcement officers on when to contact government agents after contraband was discovered. United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 10478 (11th Cir. 1990).
- Federal court precedents.
- The Court of Appeals is not bound by the rulings of the Federal Court of Appeals for its circuit concerning when a search and seizure violates the fourth amendment. State v. McCloud, 187 Ga. App. 580, 370 S.E.2d 831, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 779 (1988). Inadvertence does not make proper
- an otherwise violative act.
- An act may have been “inadvertent” in the sense that it was normal or habitual or even that it was the result of ordinary curiosity, but none of these motives would render proper an act otherwise a violation of constitutional requirements. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3186 (1981). Where formal arrest followed quickly on heels of challenged search of defendant’s person, it is not particularly important that the search preceded the arrest, rather than vice versa. Collier v. State, 177 Ga. App. 217, 338 S.E.2d 724, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2945 (1985). Custodial questioning after arrest following lawful discovery of stolen
- goods constitutional.
- If an arrest following discovery of stolen goods in a lawful search of a stolen car is based upon probable cause, custodial questioning after the accused is given Miranda warnings does not offend the fourth amendment protection against custodial interrogation following arrest on less than probable cause. Sanborn v. State, 251 Ga. 169, 304 S.E.2d 377, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 760 (1983). Request to collect gunshot residue evidence after defendant invoked
- rights was not interrogation.
- Detective’s requests to collect evidence of gunshot residue from the defendant after the defendant invoked the defendant’s right to counsel and to remain silent during an interview did not constitute renewed interrogation in violation of the defendant’s rights, and the trial court erred in suppressing the defendant’s subsequent statements. State v. Pauldo, 309 Ga. 130, 844 S.E.2d 829, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 447 (2020). phone call to defendant, telling the defendant “you’ve got to get the stuff out of there,” did not require suppression of marijuana which police seized from the defendant’s automobile after watching the defendant take the marijuana from the defendant’s house and place it in the vehicle. Saylor v. State, 185 Ga. App. 634, 365 S.E.2d 493, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 185 (1988).
- Police surveillant’s deceptive tele-Effect of deception by governmental agents on amendment’s protection.
- Although U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects reasonable expectations of privacy, and although the use of deception by a government agent to gain access to a protected area may certainly result in an unlawful invasion of that privacy, the Constitution does not protect persons who engage in criminal transactions from the risk that those with whom they choose to do business may be government agents or informants. Shuman v. State, 155 Ga. App. 300, 271 S.E.2d 18, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2563 (1980). Transactions of unlawful business
- with government agents.
- If the home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street. A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant. Shuman v. State, 155 Ga. App. 300, 271 S.E.2d 18, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2563 (1980). Business records turned over to government agents in disguise not
- protected.
- Plaintiffs’ fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated when in November 1980 plaintiffs engaged a broker to arrange the sale of either of two restaurants owned by plaintiffs; the broker arranged a meeting with two persons who represented themselves as agents of a prospective purchaser; in reliance on their representations, plaintiffs made available to the persons the business records of one of plaintiffs’ restaurants with the express understanding that such information was confidential; these persons were, in fact, special agents of the Criminal Investigation Division of IRS; in June 1981, based on information garnered from plaintiffs’ records, the IRS obtained a search warrant from a United States magistrate, searched the premises of plaintiffs’ restaurant, and seized certain business records; and in November 1982 the IRS informed plaintiffs they were under investigation for possible violations of the federal tax laws. Hiller v. Murphy, 600 F. Supp. 14, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15198 (N.D. Ga. 1984). forcement officer, whether they are unsupported, outright accusations of criminal activity or suggestions that an innocent person would be willing to relinquish constitutional rights, are not irrelevant to a police-citizen encounter analysis. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 18185 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 457, 74 L. Ed. 2d 609, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4528 (1982). No fourth amendment violation merely because informant obtained
- Offensive statements by a law eninformation by trespassing.
- Defendant’s fourth amendment rights were not violated because the informant obtained defendant’s information by trespassing on defendant’s property. Mosley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 30, 348 S.E.2d 555, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2680 (1986). Protection against subpoena too
- sweeping in its terms.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 provides protection against grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable. Morris v. State, 246 Ga. 510, 272 S.E.2d 254, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1177 (1980).
- Grand jury subpoena.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not require any preliminary showing for issuance of grand jury subpoena, either to compel testimony or to compel production of voice or handwriting exemplars. United States v. McLean, 565 F.2d 318, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 5651 (5th Cir. 1977). Subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain records is subject to no more stringent fourth amendment requirements than is the ordinary subpoena. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 148 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in, SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 104 S. Ct. 2720, 81 L. Ed. 2d 615, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 114 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21416 (9th Cir. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in, Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 3643 (4th Cir. 1987) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.). Issuance of subpoena to third party to obtain records of that party does not violate the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution is contemplated at the time the subpoena is issued. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 148 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in, SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 104 S. Ct. 2720, 81 L. Ed. 2d 615, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 114 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21416 (9th Cir. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in, Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 3643 (4th Cir. 1987) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.).
- Administrative searches.
- Administrative searches are governmental action and fall within protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 933 (1972). Fourth amendment claims should not be used to prevent investigative institutions from determining whether there is cause to believe that violations of the law General Consideration (Cont’d) have occurred. Kelley v. Godbout, 379 F. Supp. 532, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7194 (N.D. Ga. 1974); FTC v. Page, 378 F. Supp. 1052, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7885 (N.D. Ga. 1974). There was no constitutional offense in a state revenue agent and local law enforcement officers coordinating and consolidating their efforts to enforce O.C.G.A. § 3-2-31 which authorizes such cooperation to conduct an administrative search for violations of the Georgia Alcoholic Beverage Code in conjunction with executing arrest warrants for previously observed violations of these laws. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21641 (11th Cir. 1999). Court properly dismissed the paraprofessional educator’s amended civil-rights complaint because there was probable cause in the affidavit for a warrant for the educator’s arrest for committing simple battery, the educator’s potential immunity was not relevant to the probable-cause analysis, and the educator did not state a claim of supervisor liability against the principal of the school in which the arresting officer worked. Elmore v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 605 Fed. Appx. 906, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6001 (11th Cir. 2015). Civil procedure for recovery of
- debts.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 has no reference to civil procedure for the recovery of debts. Jernigan v. Economy Exterminating Co., 327 F. Supp. 24, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13307 (N.D. Ga. 1971). form a person of that person’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4, including that person’s right to be released from unlawful custody following an arrest without a warrant or without probable cause. In order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto, to be broken, requires not merely that the statement meet the standard of U.S. Const., amend. 5 of voluntariness but that it be sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint. Consideration of a statement’s admissibility must be made in light of the distinct policies and interests of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976). erally inapplicable to an action by a foreign sovereign in its own territory in enforcing its own laws, even though American officials are present and cooperate in some degree. Before U.S. Const., amend. 4 applies, the participation of federal agents must be so substantial as to convert the search into a joint venture. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27383 (11th Cir.), modified, 801 F.2d 378, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 31709 (11th Cir. 1986). lice officers from searches carried out in their countries is generally admissible in American courts regardless of whether the search complied with U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27383 (11th Cir.), modified, 801 F.2d 378, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 31709 (11th Cir. 1986). lice officers from searches conducted in their countries may be excluded if the conduct of the foreign officers shocks the conscience of the American court. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27383 (11th Cir.), modified, 801 F.2d 378, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 31709 (11th Cir. 1986). Invocation of one’s constitutional rights gives rise to no inference that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 18185 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 457, 74 L. Ed. 2d 609, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4528 (1982). Initial stages of contact between police officer and citizen are not to be isolated from scrutiny of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Gazaway, 297 F. Supp. 67, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12759 (N.D. Ga. 1969). Although the defendant was merely approached while voluntarily stopped in a parking lot and, only after defendant started behaving in a furtive or bizarre manner, did another officer draw a gun and issue a command, the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. Molaro v. State, 236 Ga. App. 35, 510 S.E.2d 886, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 30 (1999). Decision whether U.S. Const., amend. 4 is implicated by particular police-citizen contact is legal conclusion to be based on the facts appearing on the record. United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786 (5th Cir. 1981). Unless the delay is unreasonable, the police may wait and delay search and seizure in hope of increasing the quantum of evidence which they can present to the magistrate to obtain a warrant. Hall v. State, 176 Ga. App. 428, 336 S.E.2d 291, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2884 (1985).
- Miranda warnings in no way in-Fourth amendment rights are gen-Evidence obtained by foreign po-Evidence obtained by foreign po-Pretrial detainees.
- Whether a pretrial detainee may press a claim of excessive force under the fourth amendment remains open. It is clear, however, that the due process clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Wright v. Whiddon, 951 F.2d 297, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 300 (11th Cir. 1992). If the search of a pretrial detainee’s cell is instigated or conducted by the prosecution solely for the purpose of uncovering incriminating evidence which could be used against the detainee at trial, rather than out of concern for any legitimate prison objectives, the detainee retains a limited but legitimate expectation of privacy that the detainee would be protected in such circumstances from an unreasonable search. State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 517 S.E.2d 61, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 515 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083, 120 S. Ct. 807, 145 L. Ed. 2d 680, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 241 (2000). Waiver of fourth amendment rights
- constitutional.
- Investigators and the officers did not violate a defendant’s rights when investigating information that the defendant was still involved in drug activity; because the defendant, while free on bond for drug offenses, waived the rights U.S. Const., amend. 4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII as a bond condition, the waiver was constitutional under U.S. Const., amend. 8 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII. Rocco v. State, 267 Ga. App. 900, 601 S.E.2d 189, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 841 (2004). Right to wear one’s hair as one sees fit, has not been found to be within the periphery of any of the specific constitutional rights. Ashley v. City of Macon, 377 F. Supp. 540, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12602 (M.D. Ga. 1974), aff’d, 505 F.2d 868, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 16769 (5th Cir. 1975). Searches of students directed to end of providing students a safe and secure environment are reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4 on considerably less than probable cause. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1173, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3803 (1975).
- Recovering stolen property by victim of theft.
- A trial court is fully authorized to conclude, even assuming that a defendant’s spouse’s invitation is not extended freely and voluntarily, that a victim of theft is motivated by the victim’s own personal interest in recovering the victim’s property when the victim enters the house and identifies property as the victim’s, since the victim is not acting on behalf of law enforcement authorities and, consequently, no violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4 results. Carroll v. State, 147 Ga. App. 332, 248 S.E.2d 702, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2680 (1978).
- Person’s presence at suspect place.
- — A citizen does not, by mere presence at a suspect place, lose the constitutional right from unreasonable search of one’s person and property to which one otherwise would be entitled. Collins v. State, 187 Ga. App. 430, 370 S.E.2d 648, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 726 (1988). Attempts to locate missing persons by means of knocking on outer doors. — When police respond to requests to locate missing persons by entering private property only to the extent of knocking on outer doors, U.S. Const., amend. 4 has not been violated. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 873 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982).
- Stopping vessel in open waters.
- Law enforcement officers, having developed reasonable suspicion of illegal activ-General Consideration (Cont’d) ity, could then identify themselves by whatever means were appropriate under the circumstances, such as stopping a vessel in open waters. United States v. Albano, 722 F.2d 690, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 26622 (11th Cir. 1984). No federal question in action by
- dismissed federal employee.
- Where plaintiff, a dismissed federal employee, asserted various fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment claims against the plaintiff’s superiors under the Bivens theory (see Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971)), court found no federal question because Congress had established elaborate remedial scheme for dismissed federal employees. Metz v. McKinley, 583 F. Supp. 683, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19160 (S.D. Ga.), aff’d, 747 F.2d 709, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17517 (11th Cir. 1984). It is often necessary for the police to approach a person with a drawn weapon in a suspiciously dangerous situation in order to protect the physical well-being of both police officers and the public. Franklin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 3, 237 S.E.2d 425, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2170 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 55 L. Ed. 2d 799, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 1347 (1978). Appropriate enforcement of IRS
- summons.
- The enforcement of a summons by the IRS, requiring a taxpayer to testify and to produce certain designated records, did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4, as the government made a preliminary showing that the summons was issued for a legitimate purpose, that the information sought was relevant to that purpose and not already in the commissioner’s possession and that the appropriate administrative steps were followed. United States v. Reis, 765 F.2d 1094, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 20305 (11th Cir. 1985). View through garage window by police officer of defendant’s activities did not violate defendant’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Crane, 445 F.2d 509, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 9812 (5th Cir. 1971). Information revealed to third
- party.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by the third party to government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 148 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in, SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 104 S. Ct. 2720, 81 L. Ed. 2d 615, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 114 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21416 (9th Cir. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in, Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 3643 (4th Cir. 1987) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.). Distributing photo of student with
- sexual organ exposed not constitutional deprivation.
- The conduct of school officials in participating in the distribution of a photograph of a student in which the student’s sexual organ was accidentally exposed, and their refusal to halt distribution of the photograph, while deplorable, reprehensible, and insensitive, was not a constitutional deprivation. Carroll v. Parks, 755 F.2d 1455, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28510 (11th Cir. 1985). Effect of failure to give defendant
- inventory of seized articles.
- The failure to give a defendant an inventory of the articles obtained by a search and seizure does not void the search and seizure. Merrill v. State, 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1248 (1974). Counsel not ineffective for failing
- to challenge all search warrants.
- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge all 12 search warrants because none of the warrants were general warrants lacking sufficient specificity regarding the place or person to be searched; and, as counsel explained, the unchallenged warrants all flowed from the Georgia and Vermont searches and involved only the search of seized electronics for data, and counsel fairly reasoned that, if counsel could successfully suppress the items seized in the first two searches, the subsequent warrants and searches would have been rendered invalid; however, the motions to suppress the first two searches were properly denied. Leili v. State, 307 Ga. 339, 834 S.E.2d 847, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 795 (2019). Expectation of Privacy 1. In General Privacy standard for testing fourth amendment violations contains a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. United States v. Michael, 622 F.2d 744, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15331 (5th Cir. 1980). A fourth amendment violation occurs only if a defendant manifests a subjective expectation of privacy in a class of property protected by U.S. Const., amend. 4 that society accepts as objectively reasonable. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 948 (1992). Reasonable expectation of privacy
- protected.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects individuals from violations of their legitimate or reasonable expectations of privacy. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981). Fourth amendment protection is primarily directed to one’s own home, person, papers, and effects, and to one’s own reasonable expectation of privacy. Dunbar v. State, 163 Ga. App. 243, 292 S.E.2d 897, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3196 (1982). Protected expectations of privacy must be reasonable. Giddens v. State, 156 Ga. App. 258, 274 S.E.2d 595, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3023 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026, 101 S. Ct. 1733, 68 L. Ed. 2d 220, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 1452 (1981). Legitimate expectation of privacy
- must exist.
- An illegal search violates rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 only of those persons who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). As defendant claimed no ownership interest in a backpack that was seized from the defendant’s friend’s apartment and which contained materials for a methamphetamine manufacturing lab, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy and could not assert that denial of suppression of the contents thereof was error. Lough v. State, 276 Ga. App. 495, 623 S.E.2d 688, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1288 (2005).
- Standing.
- If the owner of an automobile relinquishes actual possession to a third party, the owner thereby abandons any expectation of privacy in the automobile, and owner therefore lacks standing to contest the legality of the search and seizure of the vehicle. Gresham v. State, 204 Ga. App. 540, 420 S.E.2d 71, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 907 (1992). Persons aggrieved by a purportedly illegal search solely through the introduction of evidence seized from a third person’s premises or property lack standing to assert a fourth amendment violation. Duque v. State, 228 Ga. App. 391, 491 S.E.2d 841, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1136 (1997). Because the defendant did not have any ownership interest, possessory interest or expectation of privacy in a passenger’s purse, the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in the purse as to charges pending against the defendant. State v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 525, 513 S.E.2d 1, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 90 (Feb. 1, 1999). Defendant, as a mere passenger who did not assert an interest in either the driver’s car or the property found in it, lacked standing to object to a search of the car. State v. Saia, 249 Ga. App. 69, 547 S.E.2d 407, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 443 (2001). Property law analysis replaced by
- privacy analysis.
- Analysis of search and seizure cases in terms of property law has now been replaced by reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981). Expectation of Privacy (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d)
- Capacity to claim protection of U.S.
- Const., amend. 4 depends not upon property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the fourth amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2658 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1251 (1980); Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1768 (1980). What a person knowingly exposes to public is not subject of fourth amendment protection. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 148 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in, SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 104 S. Ct. 2720, 81 L. Ed. 2d 615, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 114 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21416 (9th Cir. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in, Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 3643 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8522 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2145 (1980). (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.).
- Loss of government’s right to challenge expectation of privacy.
- The government, through its assertions, concessions, and acquiescence, may lose its right to challenge the petitioner’s assertion that the petitioner possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in a searched home. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). Lack of right of ownership or pos-
- session.
- Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched, and did not assert any valid right of ownership or possession in the property seized, where the defendant did not reside on the premises, apparently was not present when the materials were seized, and did not claim any right of ownership or possession of the evidence. Boatright v. State, 192 Ga. App. 112, 385 S.E.2d 298, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1213 (1989). Where appellants abandoned item before item was seized, the appellants’ forfeited any expectation of privacy in it. United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786 (5th Cir. 1981).
- Possession of drugs not protected.
- — The right of privacy does not embrace the right to possess dangerous drugs. Blincoe v. State, 231 Ga. 886, 204 S.E.2d 597, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 1269 (1974).
- Expectation of privacy as not extending to drugs in codefendant’s immediate possession.
- The defendant, though acting jointly with another to conceal cocaine on that other person, did not share with that other person a legitimate expectation of privacy, because the defendant could not have asserted control over that other person and could not have excluded access to the other person, and, hence, did not have the requisite standing to contest the legality of the search and seizure of the contraband. United States v. Brown, 743 F.2d 1505, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17816 (11th Cir. 1984).
- Invasion of privacy prior to executing warrant.
- Police officer unreasonably invaded defendants’ privacy by looking through their window before knocking on their door when executing an arrest warrant for a third party where: (1) there was insufficient evidence that the third party lived with defendants; (2) even if the police were authorized to enter defendants’ home, looking through the window was unreasonable as the officer did not reach the window by traveling the route any visitor would travel to reach the front door; and (3) the officer did not have articulable facts which would warrant a reasonably prudent officer to believe that the third party was a danger. A police officer must have a reasonable belief that forewarning would jeopardize the officers before actions, such as peering through a window, would be justified. State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742, 583 S.E.2d 573, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 759 (2003). 2. Leased Property
- Defendant conducting illegal activity in sister’s apartment.
- Defendant’s sibling, who was lessee of an apartment, could consent to a search of the entire apartment, including the bedroom where the defendant’s brother was staying, and defendant had no legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in conducting criminal business in the sibling’s home. Ford v. State, 214 Ga. App. 284, 447 S.E.2d 334, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 861 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1830, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1178 (Ga. Dec. 2, 1994). Apartment tenant who requested repair service for a plumbing leak had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the tenant’s apartment to the extent it was invaded by an off-duty police officer who responded in the officer’s capacity as a maintenance supervisor after being advised by another officer that there were suspected illicit activities going on at the apartment. State v. Almand, 196 Ga. App. 40, 395 S.E.2d 609, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 839 (1990).
- Motel room.
- Defendant who was not present in a motel room when police officers entered it and had neither a proprietary nor a possessory interest in the room could not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the room, with the result that the defendant had no standing to assert a fourth amendment violation. Rutherford v. State, 191 Ga. App. 505, 382 S.E.2d 205, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 652 (1989). Two defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room and the room’s safe because the defendants were staying there overnight and had clothing there, although neither was a registered guest, so that the defendants both had standing under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(a) to object to a search of the room. Because the male guest was illegally detained, that guest’s consent to search the room was not valid. State v. Woods, 311 Ga. App. 577, 716 S.E.2d 622, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 790 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0130, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 422 (Ga. Apr. 24, 2012).
- Abandoned motel room.
- Having abandoned motel room, defendant no longer had any expectation of privacy, and could not complain of entry and search of room. Buttrum v. State, 249 Ga. 652, 293 S.E.2d 334, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1181 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156, 103 S. Ct. 801, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1004, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 3156 (1983); 479 U.S. 902, 107 S. Ct. 300, 93 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1986). Because a motel manager opened the door to a room across the hall from the room in which the crimes were committed and saw no luggage or other signs of occupancy, after which the police entered the room and gathered evidence, finding that the manager had authority to open the room because it was abandoned and that defendant no longer had any expectation of privacy with respect to the room was not clearly erroneous. Stovall v. State, 216 Ga. App. 138, 453 S.E.2d 110, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 46 (1995), cert. denied, No. S95C0709, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 558 (Ga. Apr. 14, 1995).
- Guests in a rented home.
- Trial court erred in granting three defendants’ motion to suppress evidence seized from a rental home because, whether or not the landlord could consent to the search, the defendants had no standing to contest the search and no expectation of privacy at the rental home, which was not leased to the guests, and when there was no evidence that the guests lived there. State v. Carter, 305 Ga. App. 814, 701 S.E.2d 209, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 818 (2010).
- Visitor has no expectation of privacy in hotel room.
- In a prosecution for, inter alia, felony murder, a defendant did not have standing to suppress the evidence of a gun recovered from a hotel room pursuant to a search warrant as the defendant was not the registered guest at the hotel but merely visited the guest on three occasions and, thus, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 107, 674 S.E.2d 275, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 138 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1121, 130 S. Ct. 1070, 175 L. Ed. 2d 900, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 323 (2010). Order suppressing evidence seized from a hotel room was error because the defendant was a mere invitee visiting the room and, under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(a), only a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure was permitted to move to suppress evidence; the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room searched, and thus the Expectation of Privacy (Cont’d) 2. Leased Property (Cont’d) defendant was not “aggrieved” by the search within the meaning of § 17-5-30(a) and the fourth amendment and lacked standing to contest the search. State v. Carter, 299 Ga. App. 3, 681 S.E.2d 688, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 816 (2009). 3. Vehicles
- Expectation of privacy in automobile.
- Expectation of privacy analysis is especially appropriate in cases which involve an individual’s rights with respect to an automobile; insofar as U.S. Const., amend. 4’s protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of the inquiry. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981).
- Automobile in plain view.
- Defendant’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 were not violated and the trial court properly refused to suppress evidence relating to defendant’s car in a hit and run case where a police officer, after tracing the license plate of the suspect vehicle to defendant, gained probable cause to search defendant’s car based on the officer’s observations of defendant’s car gained from the vantage point of a public sidewalk before the officer ever entered the curtilage of defendant’s home to inspect the car more carefully; such observations included damage to the side of the car which was consistent with the accident, and the type, color, and license plate number of the car, all of which matched the description and plate number of the hit and run vehicle as described by witnesses. Additionally, the officer had probable cause to seize the car as an instrumentality of the crime since the officer had no way of determining who might have access to the vehicle to remove and destroy evidence. Jackson v. State, 258 Ga. App. 806, 575 S.E.2d 713, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1581 (2002), writ denied, No. S03C0619, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 472 (Ga. Apr. 29, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1006, 124 S. Ct. 536, 157 L. Ed. 2d 413, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8249 (2003). Diminished expectation of privacy surrounds an automobile. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8522 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2145 (1980). Search and seizure cases involving vehicles have recognized that an individual’s expectation of privacy in that individual’s automobile is less than in other property. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981).
- Abandonment of vehicle.
- If an abandoned car is a necessary part of a criminal investigation, its search is lawful even though no search warrant was obtained. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 652 (1966). The following facts supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant abandoned the defendant’s car prior to its seizure and no longer retained a legitimate expectation of privacy in it: (1) the vehicle was found over 100 yards from the nearest home on land not belonging to the defendant; (2) it was down a deserted field road; (3) the tag and battery had been removed; and (4) the vehicle was covered with freshly cut bushes and debris. Williams v. State, 171 Ga. App. 546, 320 S.E.2d 389, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2987 (1984). Expectation of privacy in police
- car.
- The search of a police car did not offend defendant’s right to be protected against unlawful search and seizure as defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the back seat of a police car. Mullinax v. State, 227 Ga. App. 670, 490 S.E.2d 201, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 973 (1997). Expectation of privacy in premises
- of truck.
- A court would be authorized to find that the driver of a truck did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises of the truck, since the owner of the truck was riding in the truck, which contrasts with the expectation of privacy in a room maintained in another’s house, where the expectation would be prima facie. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 933 (1972).
- Items in automobile.
- Although the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office, an individual enjoys an expectation of privacy with respect to items secreted within the interior of the automobile. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 9854 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968, 99 S. Ct. 458, 58 L. Ed. 2d 427, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 3851 (1978). Where codefendant denied any interest in the property seized from the vehicle, but testified that clothing and bedding belonging to the codefendant were contained in the van, codefendant was more than a mere passenger in the vehicle. The codefendant’s position was instead analogous to that of a lessee of a rented vehicle, with the result that codefendant could legitimately claim a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to it. State v. Diaz, 191 Ga. App. 830, 383 S.E.2d 195, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 830 (1989).
- Items thrown from car.
- Because law officers observed defendant throw a paper napkin containing a quantity of cocaine from a car, defendant affirmatively abandoned it by throwing it from the vehicle as the officers approached, thereby placing it within plain view on the public highway. Since neither abandoned property nor items in plain view of law enforcement officers, who are where they have a right to be, can be the subject of a motion to suppress when the abandonment of the evidence and the simultaneous placing of it in plain view occurs during the course of a legal stop, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. Howell, 180 Ga. App. 449, 349 S.E.2d 476, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2183 (1986).
- Search of automobile for contraband.
- If police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, they may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody. Gonzalez v. State, 195 Ga. App. 249, 392 S.E.2d 893. Because a defendant was pulled over for playing the car radio too loudly in violation of city noise ordinances and the officer noted that the windshield was cracked, and because the officer confirmed by radio that the defendant’s license had been suspended, there was probable cause for arrest; because of the lawful arrest and the necessity to impound the defendant’s vehicle due to its unsafe condition, the officer was authorized to search the passenger compartment. Thus, the trial court properly refused to suppress evidence of contraband on the basis that it stemmed from a pretextual stop unsupported by articulable suspicion or probable cause. Freeman v. State, 195 Ga. App. 357, 393 S.E.2d 496, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 484 (1990).
- Expectation of privacy in automobile or property seized.
- Passengers in an automobile, who assert neither a possessory interest in the automobile searched nor an interest in the property seized, do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of the car to be searched, and, accordingly, do not have fourth amendment rights infringed by the search and seizure. Meyer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 613, 258 S.E.2d 217, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2228 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 952, 100 S. Ct. 1602, 63 L. Ed. 2d 788, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1341 (1980). Mere assertion of ownership in items seized does not alone lead to the conclusion that a legitimate expectation of privacy exists if defendant claims no proprietary or possessory interest in the car in which they were found and all the evidence indicates that defendant was a mere passenger in the car, and as such, had no legitimate expectation of privacy therein. Keishian v. State, 202 Ga. App. 718, 415 S.E.2d 324, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 131 (1992).
- Search of spare tire cavity.
- The incongruity of a worn, oddly sized spare tire from a different manufacturer than the other tires of a late model sedan provided a state trooper with probable cause to support a search of the tire cavity, even though the defendant’s consent to a search did not include permission to slash the spare tire to investigate its contents. United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8825 (11th Cir. 1990). Expectation of Privacy (Cont’d) 3. Vehicles (Cont’d) Mere possessor-driver of stolen automobile in operation on public highway has no legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle identification number observable through the windshield. United States v. Pitts, 588 F.2d 102, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 17565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948, 99 S. Ct. 2171, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1051, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 1874 (1979). An unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy after the driver was placed under arrest and acquiesced in the impoundment of the vehicle. Hall v. State, 223 Ga. App. 211, 477 S.E.2d 364, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1098 (1996), cert. denied, No. S97C0263, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 211 (Ga. Feb. 21, 1997).
- Search of passengers on commercial bus.
- Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of drugs found in a bag that the defendant acknowledged belonged to the defendant during a bus search conducted by the Motor Carrier Compliance Division of the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Safety as the defendant was not in custody when the defendant answered an officer’s questions that the bag belonged to the defendant and that the officer could search the bag. As a result, no seizure under the fourth amendment occurred, and it was not necessary for the officer to advise the defendant of the defendant’s Miranda rights since no arrest or seizure took place. Solano-Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga. App. 896, 673 S.E.2d 351, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 108 (2009). cionless stops of boats to check for hicle registration, promoted the state’s important interest in maintaining safe conditions for boaters on Georgia’s lakes and rivers, and the procedure used was minimally intrusive, so that the statute did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. Peruzzi v. State, 275 Ga. 333, 567 S.E.2d 15, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 586 (2002). 4. Conversations and Communications Wrongdoer’s expectation of privacy
- O.C.G.A. § 52-7-25, allowing suspirequired safety equipment and veregarding confidence.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 affords no protection to a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that person to whom the wrongdoer voluntarily confides the wrongdoing will not reveal it. Goodwin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 46, 267 S.E.2d 488, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2039 (1980).
- Conversations with accomplice.
- Whether the conversation be face-to-face, or via telephone, expectations of privacy of defendant’s accomplice are the same. The accomplice has no right under U.S. Const., amend. 4 to silence detectives or to exclude recordings of conversations the accomplice had with them and which they could relate in their testimony. Thornton v. State, 139 Ga. App. 483, 228 S.E.2d 919, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1856 (1976). However strongly defendant may trust apparent colleague, the defendant’s expectations in this respect are not protected by U.S. Const., amend. 4 when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the authorities. For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the agent, instead of immediately reporting and transcribing the conversations with defendant, either: (1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which the agent is carrying on the agent’s person; or (2) carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency. Thornton v. State, 139 Ga. App. 483, 228 S.E.2d 919, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1856 (1976). Telephone toll and billing records are not owned or possessed by defendant, but are business records belonging to the telephone company. Kesler v. State, 249 Ga. 462, 291 S.E.2d 497, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1147 (1982). Although defendants had general standing to attack the illegality of a wiretap on their telephone, they lacked the standing to assert that the illegality was due to the fact that their telephone toll records were illegally obtained, because telephone toll and billing records are not owned or possessed by the telephone customer but are business records belonging to the telephone company. Van Nice v. State, 180 Ga. App. 112, 348 S.E.2d 515, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2684 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931, 107 S. Ct. 1568, 94 L. Ed. 2d 760, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 1238 (1987). “Pinging” cellular phone to locate
- defendant.
- Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object that the defendant’s fourth amendment rights were violated when police requested, without a warrant, that defendant’s cellular telephone provider “ping” defendant’s phone in order to locate the defendant, because the defendant was only “pinged” while traveling in a vehicle, in which defendant had no expectation of privacy. Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 689 S.E.2d 293, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 107 (2010). 5. Outdoors
- Approach to outside of dwelling.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 extends beyond the pragmatic entry into a private dwelling by a law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. But it does not extend so far as to prevent the police from making any contact with the citizenry — and to hold that the police may not, upon request, although exigent circumstances do not appear, approach the outer doors of a dwelling absent a warrant or consent of an owner or occupant would work that result. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 873 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982).
- Curtilage.
- It is well settled that fourth amendment protection extends to the curtilage of a dwelling house, and a roofed structure within 50 or 60 feet of the back door is well within the protected area, provided it is used for purposes related to the family household and domestic economy. McGee v. State, 133 Ga. App. 184, 210 S.E.2d 355, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1011 (1974). The curtilage is the area to which the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life extend, and therefore has been considered part of the home for fourth amendment purposes. Payton v. State, 177 Ga. App. 104, 338 S.E.2d 462, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2925 (1985); Thomas v. State, 203 Ga. App. 529, 417 S.E.2d 353, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 515 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0876, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 455 (Ga. June 4, 1992). Yard of a private residence is curtilage within the protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Bloodworth v. State, 233 Ga. 589, 212 S.E.2d 774, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1381 (1975). Curtilage includes the yards and grounds of a particular address, its gardens, barns, buildings, etc. Payton v. State, 177 Ga. App. 104, 338 S.E.2d 462, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2925 (1985).
- Helicopter hovering over noncurtilage area.
- Even if a low-flying helicopter would have been in a place which violated an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to honor if an officer in the helicopter was observing activities in the home, it was not violating the resident’s fourth amendment rights when it hovered over the non-curtilage area. Thomas v. State, 203 Ga. App. 529, 417 S.E.2d 353, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 515 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0876, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 455 (Ga. June 4, 1992).
- Non-enclosed garden.
- Where defendants deliberately chose to grow marijuana in a non-enclosed area (i.e., outside any kind of structure) and thus open to plain view to those having an opportunity to approach or pass by the field (or garden) and the facts reasonably supported the trial court’s conclusion that the deputies were present on the premises looking for a defendant and not conducting a search for marijuana, defendants waived any reasonable expectation of privacy and forsook any protection otherwise afforded by the fourth amendment and could not invoke any such protection simply by claiming the “garden” was a part of the curtilage. Gravley v. State, 181 Ga. App. 400, 352 S.E.2d 589, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2832 (1986).
- Wooded area not part of curtilage.
- Expectation of Privacy (Cont’d) 5. Outdoors (Cont’d) — In a woods 50 yards from the defendant’s home, police found items used to manufacture methamphetamine under a tarp. The wooded area where the contraband was found was not so closely tied to the defendant’s home as to warrant protection as curtilage under the fourth amendment. Minor v. State, 298 Ga. App. 391, 680 S.E.2d 459, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 687 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1744, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 771 (Ga. Nov. 9, 2009). Expectation of privacy in open
- field.
- Defendant could not claim a legitimate expectation of privacy that the defendant’s conduct in the open field would be free from observation from the easement area, as those persons granted the easement were likely to be found within that area. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 948 (1992); Manley v. State, 217 Ga. App. 556, 458 S.E.2d 179, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 515 (1995).
- Open field.
- Defendant had no expectation of privacy to an area behind the defendant’s house where marijuana plants grew because the area was separated by trails leading away from the defendant’s mowed lawn, the plants were not growing inside any structure nor were they protected from view, and many of the plants were protected by mesh wire; the warrantless seizure of the plants did not violate the fourth amendment. Smithson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 421, 634 S.E.2d 184, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 865 (2006).
- Open fields.
- The security of person and home from unreasonable search and seizure does not extend to open fields. Kennemore v. State, 222 Ga. 252, 149 S.E.2d 471, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 450 (1966). Searches and seizures of uninhabited lands or open fields do not fall within the function of U.S. Const., amend. 4, and this also applies to property which is considered abandoned. State v. Roberts, 133 Ga. App. 206, 210 S.E.2d 387, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1018 (1974). Since the special protection accorded by U.S. Const., amend. 4 to the people in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects” is not extended to open fields, evidence obtained from an aerial search of an open field is not inadmissible as the product of an illegal search. Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 3076 (1979). Party has no protection under U.S. Const., amend. 4 against seizure of contraband in open fields of another. Thompson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 704, 269 S.E.2d 474, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2349 (1980). If a field is located beyond all of the buildings on a person’s property and thus is beyond the curtilage of the home, the owner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the field and a warrantless search of the field and seizure of any drugs grown thereon does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 24666 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209, 104 S. Ct. 2397, 81 L. Ed. 2d 354, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 2334 (1984). The constitutional protection does not extend to open fields, orchards, or other lands not an immediate part of the dwelling site, and a warrant is not a necessary prerequisite to a search of such an area. Thus, there cannot be an illegal extension of a search warrant beyond the curtilage, for beyond the curtilage a search warrant is not needed. Ray v. State, 181 Ga. App. 42, 351 S.E.2d 490, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2801 (1986). Open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the fourth amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance, and there is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. Thomas v. State, 203 Ga. App. 529, 417 S.E.2d 353, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 515 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0876, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 455 (Ga. June 4, 1992). Surveillance of defendant’s house by officer stationed on defendant’s property in a woods over 200 yards from the house was not illegal intrusion into curtilage of defendant’s residence. Mattingly v. State, 205 Ga. App. 777, 423 S.E.2d 709, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1385 (1992). It is not generally true that fences or “No Trespassing” signs effectively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. For these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that society recognizes as reasonable. Likewise, ineffective as a bar of the public from viewing or hearing in open fields are gates which cannot be closed and trafficable dirt roadways. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 948 (1992); Manley v. State, 217 Ga. App. 556, 458 S.E.2d 179, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 515 (1995). Special protection against unlawful search and seizure in one’s home, pursuant to U.S. Const., amend. 4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, extended to the curtilage of defendant’s home but not into the open fields; accordingly, since police officers were in an unoccupied, undeveloped densely wooded/swamp area on defendant’s property, it was part of the open fields, the officers had a right to be there, and evidence observed thereon was not subject to suppression for constitutional violations. Furthermore, there was no reasonable privacy right that was infringed by government intrusion in an open field, the fact that defendant owned the property was not determinative, nor was it instructive that being on that property would have constituted a trespass at common law. State v. Clark, 263 Ga. App. 480, 588 S.E.2d 254, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1183 (2003). Open beach, like an open field, has no protection against a search or seizure under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 964 (1974).
- Visual surveillance from airplane.
- — The mere fact that the person observed has an expectation of privacy is not the whole story; rather, the expectation must be reasonable. Thus, defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy to be free from a visual surveillance from an airplane flying at lawful height over the premises where defendant is. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3186 (1981). 6. Other Places and Things to Which Right Extends Primarily protects citizen, home,
- and effects.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 is primarily directed to protection of the citizen in one’s home, one’s person, and one’s papers or effects which may be in the home or on one’s person. Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 964 (1974). Protection not extended to places
- not specified or included.
- Fourth amendment protection simply does not extend to places which amendment does not specify or include. Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 964 (1974).
- Privacy expectation as not extending to another’s abode.
- Although the defendant claimed that the defendant lived with the defendant’s friend in the apartment searched, where illegal drugs were found, the records of the apartment complex showed that only the friend’s family lived in the apartment searched and that the defendant lived in a different apartment and, therefore, the defendant had no proprietary interest nor expectation of privacy in the apartment and no standing to object to the search. Moss v. State, 171 Ga. App. 571, 320 S.E.2d 553, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2991 (1984). Defendant lacked standing to challenge warrantless search of victim’s condo where defendant’s father testified that defendant lived with defendant’s parents, which controverted defendant’s assertion that defendant was more than a mere overnight guest at victim’s condo. White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 428 S.E.2d 789, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 409 (1993).
- Privacy expectation does not extend to clothing worn by another.
- Defendant did not have standing to claim a violation of the defendant’s own constitutional rights in connection with the recovery of drugs in the course of a pat-down of another person and the search of defendant’s jacket which was being worn by that person. Robinson v. State, 226 Ga. App. 406, 486 S.E.2d 667, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 629 (1997). Expectation of Privacy (Cont’d) 6. Other Places and Things to Which Right Extends (Cont’d) Privacy interests regarding the
- home.
- Individual’s privacy interests are nowhere more clearly defined or rigorously protected by the courts than in the home — the core of fourth amendment rights. Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15755 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Ascertainment of whether structure is dwelling.
- It is not the physical character of a structure that determines whether it is a “dwelling”; rather, it is the actual habitation of a structure that makes it a “dwelling.” Olson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 104, 303 S.E.2d 309, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3209 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209, 104 S. Ct. 2397, 81 L. Ed. 2d 354, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 2335 (1984). Dwelling place, whether flimsy or firm, permanent or transient, is its inhabitant’s unquestionable zone of privacy under U.S. Const., amend. 4, for in one’s dwelling a citizen unquestionably is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Kelley v. State, 146 Ga. App. 179, 245 S.E.2d 872, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2204 (1978). Police may investigate complaint
- on private property.
- Police officers do not need probable cause to proceed onto private property merely to investigate a complaint. State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 307 S.E.2d 285, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3348 (1983); Guess v. State, 197 Ga. App. 40, 397 S.E.2d 453, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1156 (1990). Officer on way to front door not in
- violation.
- Officer who witnessed the defendant in possession of marijuana, followed the defendant into the defendant’s kitchen, arrested the defendant and, seeing cocaine in plain view, proceeded to search the rest of the house, was not in violation of defendant’s fourth amendment rights, regardless of whether the initial observation took place in the street, in defendant’s yard or on the steps to the defendant’s porch. Jenkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 486, 477 S.E.2d 910, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1213 (1996).
- Threshold of one’s dwelling.
- An officer may arrest a suspect without an arrest warrant if an offense has been committed in the officer’s presence and while an officer generally must have a search warrant or consent to enter a home to make an arrest, an officer can enter a home to arrest a suspect when the officer has followed the suspect there in “hot pursuit.” A suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place. . . by the expedient of escaping to a private place. For fourth amendment purposes, one who is in the threshold of one’s dwelling is in a public place and not within the dwelling. Lawson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 865, 684 S.E.2d 1, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 845 (2009), cert. dismissed, No. S10C0118, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 206 (Ga. Mar. 1, 2010), cert. denied, No. S10C0117, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 195 (Ga. Mar. 1, 2010). able cause to investigate a crime, the fourth amendment prohibited them from entering defendant’s home or its curtilage without a warrant absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances; consequently, the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a 10-foot high marijuana plant plainly growing in defendant’s backyard. Kirsche v. State, 271 Ga. App. 729, 611 S.E.2d 64, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 150 (2005).
- Although police officers had prob-Probable cause for search of home.
- — In reviewing the defendant’s conviction for the murder of the defendant’s spouse, the court found that there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to search the defendant’s home for electronic equipment and computers based on the spouse’s disappearance, defendant’s delay in reporting the spouse missing, the history of domestic abuse, the discovery of a woman’s body near the residence, and the defendant’s extensive security camera system. Leili v. State, 307 Ga. 339, 834 S.E.2d 847, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 795 (2019).
- Searching home of sibling.
- Warrantless search of a defendant’s sister’s home and the seizure of evidence from the home was authorized by the sister’s valid consent to search, given verbally (and audiotaped by an officer) and in writing. The officers testified at trial that the sister was not coerced or threatened. Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 404, 703 S.E.2d 624, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 844 (2010).
- Warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances required to enter fire-damaged premises.
- Because reasonable privacy expectations may remain in fire-damaged premises, official entries into those premises require a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. Davis v. State, 178 Ga. App. 760, 344 S.E.2d 730, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2568 (1986).
- Search of rubble of burned building.
- Defendant, who was charged with arson after the defendant’s home and office were totally consumed by a fire, had no reasonable objective expectation of privacy in the structure, and the seizure of items exhumed from openly visible ashes and rubble did not violate the defendant’s fourth amendment rights. Pervis v. State, 181 Ga. App. 613, 353 S.E.2d 200, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2553 (1987).
- Commercial premises.
- The protection of constitutional rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 includes commercial premises. State v. Cochran, 135 Ga. App. 47, 217 S.E.2d 181, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1552 (1975). Night club and owner’s U.S. Const., amends. 4, 14, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII claims against two police officers survived summary judgment where the club and the owners alleged that the officers entered the club without a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances, ordered the lights turned on and the music stopped, frisked the club’s patrons and handcuffed some of them without making any arrests, and acted in an intimidating manner. Illusions of the South, Inc. v. City of Valdosta, No. 7:07-cv-6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27154 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2009). pers” which immunizes them from searches otherwise proper under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979).
- There is nothing inherent in “pa-Subpoena of brokerage records upheld.
- Neither the first amendment nor the fourth amendment required a federal district court to quash a subpoena to obtain a brokerage firm’s records relating to members of an association, where the subpoena had been issued in connection with an investigation of possible criminal violations of the tax laws and the association’s financial system may have been used to evade requirements for reporting taxable income. In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 842 F.2d 1229, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 4052 (11th Cir. 1988).
- Abandoned property.
- The personal right to fourth amendment protection of property against search and seizure is lost when that property is abandoned. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Constitutional protection under U.S. Const., amend. 4 and U.S. Const., amend. 14, does not apply to property that has been abandoned. The issue of abandonment vel non of the property is a factual issue to be resolved by the trier of fact. Vines v. State, 142 Ga. App. 616, 237 S.E.2d 17, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1422 (1977). The constitutional protection of the fourth and fourteenth amendments does not apply to property that has been abandoned. Ramsey v. State, 183 Ga. App. 48, 357 S.E.2d 869, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1869 (1987), cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 905; Cooper v. State, 186 Ga. App. 154, 366 S.E.2d 815, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 270 (1988); Guess v. State, 197 Ga. App. 40, 397 S.E.2d 453, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1156 (1990). A defendant has no fourth amendment rights with respect to discarded or abandoned property. Evans v. State, 192 Ga. App. 832, 386 S.E.2d 712, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1253 (1989). State trooper was entitled to treat the contents of a trash can located near a vehicle trooper was about to search as abandoned property. Lirousa v. State, 200 Ga. App. 475, 408 S.E.2d 436, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1020 (1991). Because defendant was lawfully detained, claim could not be made that defendant was coerced into abandoning a bag of cocaine and, accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. Edwards v. State, 239 Ga. App. 44, 518 S.E.2d 426, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 722 (1999). If contraband is discarded during flight or before a suspect is seized, it is admis-Expectation of Privacy (Cont’d) 6. Other Places and Things to Which Right Extends (Cont’d) sible as evidence, even if there is an issue as to whether the officers possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Watson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 498, 544 S.E.2d 469, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 10 (2001).
- Determination of abandonment.
- The question of abandonment for fourth amendment purposes does not turn on strict property concepts but on whether the accused has relinquished an interest in the property to the extent that the accused no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises at the time of the search. Bloodworth v. State, 233 Ga. 589, 212 S.E.2d 774, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1381 (1975). The issue of abandonment of property is a factual issue to be resolved by the trier of fact, the trial court, and the court’s finding on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed if there is evidence to support the court’s determination of abandonment. Holley v. State, 157 Ga. App. 863, 278 S.E.2d 738, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2038 (1981). ing property were not part of the curtilage of defendant’s residence. Olson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 104, 303 S.E.2d 309, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3209 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209, 104 S. Ct. 2397, 81 L. Ed. 2d 354, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 2335 (1984).
- Abandoned house and its surround-Garbage.
- The fourth amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection at the curb outside the home. Perkins v. State, 197 Ga. App. 577, 398 S.E.2d 702, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1393 (1990). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30, because there was no violation of defendant’s fourth amendment rights by the seizure of garbage bags from the garbage cans near defendant’s residence, as they were a distance away from the house, there was no enclosure, and the sanitation workers had access to them; defendant was not found to have a subjective expectation of privacy that society would have accepted as objectively reasonable, as the cans were not found to be within the curtilage area of the home and their seizure was proper. Scott v. State, 270 Ga. App. 292, 606 S.E.2d 312, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1406 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0504, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 208 (Ga. Mar. 7, 2005).
- Appropriation of abandoned property.
- There is nothing unlawful in the government’s appropriation of abandoned property, which does not constitute a search or seizure in the legal sense, such as when the accused drops a certain article at the approach of a police officer. Green v. State, 127 Ga. App. 713, 194 S.E.2d 678, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1006 (1972). There is nothing unlawful in the appropriation by governmental agents of abandoned contraband property, which act in and of itself is not a search or seizure in a legal sense. Holley v. State, 157 Ga. App. 863, 278 S.E.2d 738, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2038 (1981).
- Luggage.
- While one has a right under U.S. Const., amend. 4 to expect privacy of the contents of one’s luggage, this right does not extend to the bags’ exterior or to control of who actually handles them once they have been released to the custody of an airline. Yocham v. State, 165 Ga. App. 650, 302 S.E.2d 390, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3176 (1983).
- Contents of luggage.
- An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the contents of the individual’s luggage and that these contents will not be exposed absent consent or a legally acquired search warrant. Pullano v. State, 169 Ga. App. 377, 312 S.E.2d 857, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3471 (1983).
- Abandoned luggage.
- Deplaned airline passenger abandoned any rights passenger may have had in bag prior to its search, where passenger disclaimed the bag, refused to pick it up after officers requested that passenger select passenger’s bag, and stood silent while co-defendant claimed ownership of the bag and while it was searched. Orman v. State, 207 Ga. App. 671, 428 S.E.2d 813, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 300 (1993). Abandoned luggage properly
- turned over to police.
- Because the defendant, in making no provision for the luggage, had in effect abandoned it in an individual’s automobile with no undertaking from the individual to keep it, the individual was at best a reluctant bailee, and thus defendant’s argument that the individual had no authority to dispose of the luggage, by turning it over to the police, was clearly erroneous. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979).
- Briefcases.
- Independent source doctrine did not apply in a situation in which an allegedly illegal seizure of a briefcase containing incriminating evidence of a defendant engaged in sex acts with a 15-year-old victim, that had been left by the defendant with a friend, was followed by a legal search of the briefcase pursuant to a warrant. Wilder v. State, 290 Ga. 13, 717 S.E.2d 457, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 863 (2011).
- Search of lost wallet.
- Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the drug evidence found in defendant’s wallet, which defendant lost at a concert, and the shell of a plastic pen in defendant’s pocket after being searched, since by losing the wallet and not abandoning the wallet, defendant never lost the expectation of privacy regarding the wallet. Wolf v. State, 291 Ga. App. 876, 663 S.E.2d 292, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 670 (2008).
- Closed refrigerator.
- A police officer’s opening the door of an operating, closed refrigerator in a storage unit, after having been called to investigate vandalism and possible burglary, did not rise to the level of emergency involving immediate threats to life or limb, and the warrantless search of the refrigerator was not justified. State v. Gallup, 236 Ga. App. 321, 512 S.E.2d 66, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 156 (1999).
- Bank records.
- There is no legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 148 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in, SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 104 S. Ct. 2720, 81 L. Ed. 2d 615, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 114 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21416 (9th Cir. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in, Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 3643 (4th Cir. 1987) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.). eral Bank Secrecy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq., which requires certain financial institutions to file currency transaction reports, were not unconstitutional as applied to defendants charged with a money laundering scheme, as an individual who engages in a currency transaction with a bank has no reasonable expectation of privacy which is protected by U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Sanchez Vazquez, 585 F. Supp. 990, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
- Reporting requirements of the fed-Search of desk at work.
- Trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence seized by the police from defendant’s desk at work and concluding that no warrant was required for the search of the desk because it was unlocked and was in a workspace shared by numerous coworkers. A warrant was required for the search of the desk and, since the warrant authorizing the search was issued without a showing of probable cause based on the tip of an unidentified caller, and there was no exception to the warrant requirement shown, the fruits of the search of the desk had to be suppressed. Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 657 S.E.2d 213, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 150 (2008). Statement by juvenile questioned by school official, who was agent of
- state.
- Juvenile court properly suppressed one incriminating statement made by a juvenile, regarding the robbery of two students in a bathroom during a basketball game, as the juvenile was questioned by an agent of the police with the involvement and participation of the school resource officer. Further, the juvenile was in custody and, thus, entitled to Miranda warnings, which had not been given. In the Interest of T.A.G., 292 Ga. App. 48, 663 S.E.2d 392, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 683 (2008). Expectation of Privacy (Cont’d) 6. Other Places and Things to Which Right Extends (Cont’d)
- Outbuildings.
- With regard to a defendant’s convictions for sexual abuse of a child, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress various items found in an outbuilding that the defendant, the victim, and the victim’s parent had been living in as the owners of the outbuilding consented to the entry by the police as well as had brought certain items to the police themselves. The defendant’s failure to retrieve the items for over three months, despite repeated requests on the part of the owners to get the items, as well as the defendant moving out of state sufficiently established that the defendant had abandoned the property, thus, no illegal search and seizure was possible. Driggers v. State, 295 Ga. App. 711, 673 S.E.2d 95, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 81 (2009).
- Public meetings.
- Fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution was not violated by the arrest of citizens who attended a city council meeting to express views on renaming a public park but refused to obey the rules of order because probable cause to arrest existed, even though O.C.G.A. § 16-11-34, which criminalized the disruption of a public meeting, was later struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad. Harris v. City of Valdosta, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31998 (M.D. Ga. 2009).
- Stillborn fetus.
- Defendant’s quasi-property interest in the defendant’s stillborn fetus did not support a privacy claim sufficient to implicate the search and seizure provisions under U.S. Const., amend. 4, and defendant enjoyed no reasonable expectations of privacy to suppress evidence of traces of cocaine discovered in the fetus pursuant to Georgia’s Death Investigation Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-16-20 et seq. Jackson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 391, 430 S.E.2d 781, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 501, cert. dismissed, 263 Ga. 403, 436 S.E.2d 632, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 810 (1993). Jails and Prisons
- Detention in jail.
- The sheriff’s office violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments when, without probable cause, deputies seized defendant and took defendant to a jail and locked defendant in a cell for approximately 30 to 45 minutes before the defendant was taken to the sheriff’s office where Miranda warnings were given and defendant was questioned. State v. Harris, 256 Ga. 24, 343 S.E.2d 483, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 691 (1986).
- Prisoners.
- The ruling in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984), making U.S. Const., amend. 4 inapplicable to searches of convicted prisoners’ cells, reflects the proper interpretation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII. State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 517 S.E.2d 61, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 515 (1999).
- Deliberate indifference to prisoner’s health care needs.
- Sheriff’s knowledge of prisoner’s need for medical care and the sheriff’s intentional refusal to provide that care constituted “deliberate indifference,” and the sheriff lost entitlement to qualified immunity to suit under § 1983 for violating the prisoner’s fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3d 388, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12394 (11th Cir. 1994).
- Municipal liability for confinement.
- — The defendant, who was arrested without a warrant, charged with, inter alia, possession of a controlled substance, and confined in the city jail, was deprived of liberty without due process where the defendant requested a lab analysis and, pursuant to the practice of the municipal court, the case was reset, delaying the determination of probable cause until over two months later. The city, who was the responsible custodian of those confined in the jail, was liable. Lambert v. McFarland, 612 F. Supp. 1252, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22707 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Refusal of cheek swab during jail
- processing admissible.
- Trial court did not err by allowing the state to introduce evidence of defendant’s refusal to consent to a cheek swab because the United States Supreme Court has held that post-arrest cheek swabs do not violate the fourth amendment because the swabs are accepted police booking and jailing procedures, similar to fingerprinting and photographing. Johnson v. State, 368 Ga. App. 762, 890 S.E.2d 325, 2023 Ga. App. LEXIS 332 (2023). Warrantless search of a county jail inmate’s rectal cavity, from which a balloon containing marijuana was removed, violated the inmate’s fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, where the state failed to establish any legitimate penological necessity for the degree of the intrusion employed in conducting the search. McCullough v. State, 177 Ga. App. 741, 341 S.E.2d 241, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2467 (1986). Property that an arrestee takes with the arrestee to jail is subject to search under analysis similar to that allowing search incident to an arrest. Loden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 683, 406 S.E.2d 103, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 609 (1991).
- Prisoner letters.
- For security and maintenance purposes, jail officials must have access to the cells and personal effects of all prisoners (including pretrial detainees). Letters found as a result of these searches are not within the scope of protection of the fourth amendment and are therefore admissible. Thomas v. State, 263 Ga. 85, 428 S.E.2d 564, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 382 (1993). Search of a letter the defendant sent from the defendant’s jail cell and placed in outgoing mail did not violate the defendant’s fourth amendment rights as the letter was recovered during a search conducted for security purposes after a deputy noticed the letter’s thickness and gang signs. Leslie v. State, 301 Ga. 882, 804 S.E.2d 351, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 710 (2017). Letters written by codefendants to one another while in jail pending trial and left by them under the jail barber’s chair were not protected. Thomas v. State, 263 Ga. 85, 428 S.E.2d 564, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 382 (1993).
- Search of letter at county jail.
- Trial court did not err by admitting a letter that county jail personnel opened because the search did not violate defendant’s fourth amendment rights as the record showed that the letter was opened for security and maintenance purposes rather than for prosecutorial purposes. A sergeant stated the letter was opened for the administrative purpose of processing the mail because the sergeant did not know to whom the letter should be routed and the jail administrator testified that all mail was opened and monitored for contraband. Davis v. State, 307 Ga. 625, 837 S.E.2d 817, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 7 (2020). Recorded conversations while in
- jail.
- Recordings of telephone conversations the defendant had with the defendant’s mother while the defendant was in jail were properly admitted into evidence; the Miranda warnings against self-incrimination did not apply because there was no interrogation, and the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the calls under the fourth amendment. Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 477 (2007). Trial court erred in concluding that the sheriff’s practice of sharing jail phone calls with the District Attorney violated the fourth amendment because the defendant, a pretrial detainee, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his jail phone calls not made to counsel. State v. Brantley, 321 Ga. 370, 914 S.E.2d 807, 2025 Ga. LEXIS 77 (2025). Testimony of inmate acting in self
- interest admissible.
- An inmate who acts upon the expectation of an unpromised reward in testifying as to the jailhouse confession of a fellow inmate does not thereby become an agent for the state so as to bar introduction of the testimony. Baxter v. State, 254 Ga. 538, 331 S.E.2d 561, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 780, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935, 106 S. Ct. 269, 88 L. Ed. 2d 275, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 5006 (1985). Probation and Probationers Rights may not be waived as condi-
- tion of probation.
- Defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in imposing a waiver of defendant’s fourth amendment rights was correct in that a waiver of defendant’s fourth amendment rights should not have been imposed absent a negotiated plea or waiver of such right. However, any error that might have taken place at sentencing was harmless as no warrantless search had taken place in assertion of defendant’s fourth amendment waiver. Furthermore, the court will Probation and Probationers (Cont’d) not presume that any search that might take place in the future under the authority of a probation officer will be unreasonable. Millsap v. State, 261 Ga. App. 427, 582 S.E.2d 568, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 650 (2003). ment rights through plea bargaining process, because the defendant agreed to a special condition of probation in the sentence which provided that the defendant would “waive all fourth amendment rights and submit to random searches . . . .” Allen v. State, 258 Ga. 424, 369 S.E.2d 909, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 323 (1988).
- Defendant waived fourth amend-Probationers.
- Right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to all persons, including probationers. A defendant’s status as a probationer, however, is a factor to be considered in determining whether a search and seizure by a probation officer is unreasonable. Hunter v. State, 139 Ga. App. 676, 229 S.E.2d 505, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1946 (1976). Right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to all persons, including probationers. A defendant’s status as a probationer, however, is a factor to be considered in determining whether a search and seizure by a probation officer is unreasonable. Austin v. State, 148 Ga. App. 784, 252 S.E.2d 696, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1657 (1979), overruled in part, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 438 (2011). Right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to all persons, including probationers. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 16816 (11th Cir. 1982).
- Rights of probationers.
- Trial court did not err when it revoked defendant’s probation after defendant tried to run from officers and six or seven dime bags of marijuana were found in defendant’s pocket; the brief, investigatory detention that led to defendant’s arrest was based on a reasonable suspicion, and defendant waived defendant’s fourth amendment rights when defendant agreed to the special condition of defendant’s probation. Witcher v. State, 258 Ga. App. 430, 574 S.E.2d 455, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1476 (2002).
- Consent of probationer to search.
- — When officers went to a defendant’s residence to conduct a probation search based on a tip that the defendant was involved with drugs, as the defendant willingly led them to a concealed gun, and voluntarily furnished a urine sample that tested positive for methamphetamine, the defendant gave valid consent to the search, which eliminated the need for either probable cause or a search warrant under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Brooks v. State, 285 Ga. 424, 677 S.E.2d 68, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 155 (2009). Voluntary consent by probationer
- to searches.
- Because a person voluntarily agrees, as a condition of probation, to the possibility that periodic “shake down” searches may be conducted, the person consents to a search of the individual’s person, the individual’s property, and the individual’s room, and waives rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Dean v. State, 151 Ga. App. 847, 261 S.E.2d 759, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2707 (1979). When officers went to the defendant’s residence to conduct a probation search based on a tip that the defendant was involved with drugs, as the defendant willingly led them to a concealed gun, and voluntarily furnished a urine sample that tested positive for methamphetamine, the defendant gave valid consent to the search, which eliminated the need for either probable cause or a search warrant under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Brooks v. State, 285 Ga. 424, 677 S.E.2d 68, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 155 (2009). Consent of probationer to waiver of
- rights.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a search of the defendant’s person and home because the defendant validly waived the defendant’s fourth amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, when the defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to possession of a firearm and possession of marijuana; the transcripts of the defendant’s guilty plea revealed that the defendant was informed by the assistant district attorney that a fourth amendment waiver was part of the negotiation, neither the defendant nor the attorney objected to the fourth amendment waiver during the plea, the trial court explained the fourth amendment waiver to the defendant on the record, and the defendant signed a waiver as a special condition of probation. Morrow v. State, 311 Ga. App. 323, 715 S.E.2d 744, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 716 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1872, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 993 (Ga. Nov. 30, 2011).
- Search by probation officer.
- The search by a probation officer is reasonable if, under all the circumstances, it is actuated by the legitimate operation of the probation supervision process and the probation officer acts reasonably in performing those duties. Hunter v. State, 139 Ga. App. 676, 229 S.E.2d 505, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1946 (1976); Austin v. State, 148 Ga. App. 784, 252 S.E.2d 696, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1657 (1979), overruled in part, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 438 (2011).
- Condition of probation.
- The defendant’s waiver of fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was consented to and was a valid condition of probation since the defendant was informed of the waiver at sentencing in the presence of counsel, who did not object. Johnson v. State, 248 Ga. App. 454, 546 S.E.2d 562, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 304 (2001). Probation condition permitting
- warrantless searches.
- A probationer’s fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated by a condition of probation that permits warrantless searches of the probationer’s person and property by probation supervisors and law enforcement officers. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 16816 (11th Cir. 1982). Probation condition allowing law enforcement officers to make warrantless searches without “reasonable cause” is not violative of Fourth Amendment. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 16816 (11th Cir. 1982). For probation conditions to be free of intrusion on constitutionally protected freedoms, the conditions must be “reasonably related” to the purposes of the Federal Probation Act (18 U.S.C. § 3651). Consideration of three factors is required to determine whether a reasonable relationship exists: (1) the purposes sought to be served by probation; (2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding citizens should be accorded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 16816 (11th Cir. 1982). Any search conducted pursuant to the search condition of probation must be carried out in a reasonable manner and only in furtherance of the purposes of probation. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 16816 (11th Cir. 1982). While a probationer’s consent to search may relax the fourth amendment standard for a search of the probationer, probationer does not waive all fourth amendment rights by agreeing to submit to a search at the request of a probation or law enforcement officer. Thus, a probationer did not relinquish fourth amendment rights by consenting to the conditions of probationer’s probation. Anderson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 676, 434 S.E.2d 122, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 951 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1783, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 1087 (Ga. Nov. 4, 1993). The waiver of defendant’s fourth amendment rights as a condition of probation was not valid because defendant did not give it as part of the plea bargain agreement, and defendant was not given the option to consider whether prison was an acceptable alternative in light of this condition of probation. Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163, 527 S.E.2d 847, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 213 (2000). Whether defendant agreed to waive fourth amendment rights as a condition of probation was a factor properly considered by the trial court in its decision to impose probation or imprisonment. Because the record shows defendant conferred with counsel and consented to the waiver, it was a valid condition of the probation. Shannon v. State, 258 Ga. App. 689, 574 S.E.2d 889, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1563 (2002), cert. denied, No. S03C0551, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 274 (Ga. Mar. 10, 2003). Probation and Probationers (Cont’d) Warrantless search as a condition
- of probation.
- A probation condition allowing warrantless searches during the term of probation without probable cause was valid. Even if not specifically stated, the condition carried with it the implied requirement that there be at least reasonable grounds for any such search. Ellis v. State, 221 Ga. App. 103, 470 S.E.2d 495, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 365 (1996). Search pursuant to probation
- agreement lawful.
- The lack of a probation officer’s involvement in a warrantless search pursuant to a probational agreement did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights given the express language of that agreement and the investigative officer’s good faith suspicion of drug transacting. State v. Bethune, 207 Ga. App. 340, 427 S.E.2d 795, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 195 (1993).
- Search at probation/parole facility.
- — Motion to suppress marijuana found in the defendant’s wallet during a search at a probation facility was properly denied because the searches at the facility served a legitimate governmental interest in protecting against violence and the defendant’s expectation of privacy was diminished by warning signs and the defendant’s status as a convicted offender reporting to a probation appointment. Day v. State, 350 Ga. App. 328, 829 S.E.2d 418, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 300 (2019). Warrantless search of probationer’s
- residence.
- Trial court erred in denying a probationer’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the probationer’s apartment as, even though the entry into the apartment for the purpose of effecting an arrest of the probationer was permissible, most of the evidence was seized without a warrant after the probationer was not found in the apartment and had to be excluded under the fourth amendment as the search conducted was only permissible insofar as it involved the observation of items of obvious evidentiary value in plain view during the time and activities required to attempt the probationer’s arrest. The probationer was never placed on notice that the probationer was going to be subjected to warrantless searches, and the state failed to demonstrate any exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 784, 653 S.E.2d 456, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 795 (2007). Search of probationer’s home was not reasonable because it was not based upon “reasonable grounds” to believe that contraband would be found at the home and because it was conducted by a law enforcement official without any communication with a probation officer. Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163, 527 S.E.2d 847, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 213 (2000). Use of illegally obtained evidence an infringement of probationer’s
- rights.
- A defendant’s probation may not be revoked on basis of illegally seized evidence. Evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure may not be admitted in a hearing to revoke probation in determining whether there has been a violation of the conditions of the probation. Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784, 219 S.E.2d 28, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1825 (1975), overruled in part, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 438 (2011).
- Search in executing probation arrest warrant.
- Contraband seized in a search of defendant’s home upon execution of a probation arrest warrant should have been suppressed because the warrant was invalid, having been issued on the basis of an earlier illegal search of defendant. Boatright v. State, 225 Ga. App. 181, 483 S.E.2d 659, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 357 (1997). rization appearing in defendant’s spouse’s probation order was justified, where the search of the marital residence was actuated by the legitimate operation of the probation supervision process rather than by some other, more nefarious motive. Luke v. State, 178 Ga. App. 614, 344 S.E.2d 452, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2555 (1986).
- Officers’ reliance on a search autho-Urine sample from probationer.
- Probationer’s fourth amendment rights were not violated by the invocation of the mandatory conditions of probationer’s probation to obtain a urine sample for use as evidence against probationer in an independent criminal prosecution, where, although the request for urinalysis was not made as a routine incident of the probation supervision process, it was prompted by a good-faith suspicion that the probationer was dealing in drugs. Green v. State, 194 Ga. App. 343, 390 S.E.2d 285, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 98 (1990), aff’d, No. S90G0665, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 457 (Ga. Dec. 3, 1990). Evidence found based on DNA match did not violate probationer’s
- fourth amendment rights.
- Evidence produced after a comparison of DNA from a robbery scene to a Georgia Bureau of Investigation database did not violate the defendant’s fourth amendment rights because the sample was taken pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 35-3-160(b) and 35-3-165(b), while the defendant was serving a sentence under Georgia’s First Offender Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60, and the match was made when the defendant was on probation with a reduced expectation of privacy. United States v. Hinton, 676 Fed. Appx. 842, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 828 (11th Cir. 2017). Probable Cause 1. In General
- Probable cause for arrest required.
- — The United States Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested, but a warrantless and malicious arrest based on no probable cause violates liberty. Scott v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 255, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12449 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
- Probable cause required for warrantless arrest.
- Although a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it must be made with probable cause. United States v. Brookins, 423 F.2d 463, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10411 (5th Cir. 1970). If an arrest warrant has not been issued, a law enforcement officer may not arrest a person unless the officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed or is committing a crime. Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15367 (M.D. Ga. 1980). Where an arrest is effected without a warrant, the fourth amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause following arrest as a prerequisite to an extended restraint of liberty (other than the condition that one appear for trial). City of Marietta v. Kelly, 175 Ga. App. 416, 334 S.E.2d 6, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2805 (1985). tion must be supported by probable cause. United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13723 (5th Cir. 1980). Requirement that searches be
- Detention for custodial interrogabased on probable cause.
- The requirement under U.S. Const., amend. 4 that searches be based on probable cause applies only to searches of constitutionally protected areas. Thompson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 704, 269 S.E.2d 474, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2349 (1980). Probable cause for arrest does not necessarily constitute probable cause
- to search defendant’s residence.
- United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13471 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff’d, 647 F.2d 568, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12398 (5th Cir. 1981). quirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution. As a general rule, the judgment of a magistrate on the probable cause issue and the issuance of a warrant are also required before a search is made. State v. Bradley, 138 Ga. App. 800, 227 S.E.2d 776, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2325 (1976). It is the purpose behind the search that is controlling as to which standard — probable cause or reasonable suspicion — will be applied. Lowe v. City of Macon, 720 F. Supp. 994, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11161 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 925 F.2d 1475, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1404 (11th Cir. 1991). Test of “probable cause” required by U.S. Const., amend. 4 can take into account nature of search that is being sought. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Marshall, 496 F. Supp. 1178, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13274 (N.D. Ga. 1980), rev’d, 689 F.2d 950, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 24659 (11th Cir. 1982). Evidence to be considered as a
- Probable cause is a minimum rewhole.
- The evidence presented to establish probable cause for a search war-Probable Cause (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) rant must be considered as a whole. Clarington v. State, 178 Ga. App. 663, 344 S.E.2d 485, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2554 (1986). Determination of sufficiency of
- probable cause.
- Determination of whether there was sufficient showing of probable cause to justify issuance of search warrant depends on resolution of two questions: first, whether or not the facts as stated in the affidavit constitute a sufficient showing of probable cause, and second, whether in the light of all of the sworn evidence placed before the magistrate, the magistrate was justified in ordering the issuance of the warrant. Campbell v. State, 226 Ga. 883, 178 S.E.2d 257, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 725 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002, 91 S. Ct. 1246, 28 L. Ed. 2d 535, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 2632 (1971). In a case where defendants were convicted of trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in finding that there was probable cause to arrest the two defendants because after co-defendant met the two defendants in a nearby apartment complex, the co-defendant returned with the package of cocaine to sell to the undercover agent, and the second defendant parked a truck facing the area of the anticipated exchange, apparently so that the second defendant and the first defendant could watch the drug deal; therefore, the trial court did not err by denying the first defendant’s motion to suppress. Lopez v. State, 267 Ga. App. 532, 601 S.E.2d 116, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 719 (2004). Trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because the facts outlined in the affidavits authorized the judge to infer that someone associated with the sedan used the cell phone number to call the victim about purchasing drugs in the bowling alley parking lot, and that during the drug deal, the caller of one of his accomplices shot and killed the victim, and, therefore, the judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search warrants. Perez v. State, 316 Ga. 433, 888 S.E.2d 526, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 118 (2023). In dealing with probable cause, as the very name implies, the court deals with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons, not legal technicians, act. Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 899 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 1657 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in Godfrey v. Francis, 251 Ga. 652, 308 S.E.2d 806, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 938 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 727 S.E.2d 670, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 338 (2012); Duffy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 847, 275 S.E.2d 658, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3221 (1980); McConnell v. State, 156 Ga. App. 612, 275 S.E.2d 697, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3141 (1980).
- Standard of probabilities.
- The inquiry reduces to a standard of probabilities, that is, whether the magistrate can reasonably conclude that the items described in the warrant are probably at the residence. United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13471 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff’d, 647 F.2d 568, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12398 (5th Cir. 1981). Burden of proof is upon state to able cause existed and were presented to the magistrate before the warrant was issued. Bell v. State, 128 Ga. App. 426, 196 S.E.2d 894, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1502 (1973). Marginal cases of probable cause determined by preference accorded
- show what facts constituting probwarrants.
- Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. State v. Babb, 134 Ga. App. 302, 214 S.E.2d 397, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1991 (1975); Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 774 (1981). Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress the search of the defendant’s cell phones based on a lack of probable cause because the defendant did not make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion; and doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of upholding the determination that issuance of a warrant was proper. Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 784 S.E.2d 343, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 194 (2016). In reaching judgment on probable cause for search warrant, judge must use common-sense approach because the judge is dealing with a probability and not a certainty that a crime has been committed. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1313 (1975). Determination of probable cause does not rest upon a technical framework; instead, it depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons, not legal technicians, act. Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15367 (M.D. Ga. 1980). If the underlying circumstances are detailed, if the reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and if a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense, manner. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 774 (1981). Probable cause determination for issuance of warrant must be made by neutral and detached magistrate instead of the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Mitchell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 2, 220 S.E.2d 34, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1226 (1975). In determining whether to issue search warrant, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the magistrate, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Futch v. State, 178 Ga. App. 115, 342 S.E.2d 493, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2507 (1986); Lowe v. State, 203 Ga. App. 277, 416 S.E.2d 750, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 500 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0790, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 523 (Ga. May 21, 1992). Magistrate determination’s as a
- reasonable person.
- The fourth amendment requirement that probable cause be shown for a warrant to issue means, in essence, that the magistrate must be presented with information as to facts or circumstances sufficient to give the magistrate, as a reasonable person, grounds to believe that a crime is being or has been committed. Rothfuss v. State, 160 Ga. App. 863, 288 S.E.2d 579, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2986 (1982). Magistrate must have information
- sufficient to form independent judgment.
- Judicial officer issuing warrant must be supplied with sufficient information to support independent judgment that probable cause exists for issuance of warrant. Morgan v. Kiff, 230 Ga. 277, 196 S.E.2d 445, 1973 Ga. LEXIS 882 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Jacobs v. Hopper, 238 Ga. 461, 233 S.E.2d 169, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1065 (1977). The trial court in reviewing the probable cause determination made by the issuing magistrate must be convinced by the state that the magistrate had enough information to make an independent judgment that probable cause existed to search the defendant’s premises. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 939 (1977). Rule under U.S. Const., amend. 4 that warrant be issued by neutral and detached magistrate requires magistrate’s severance and disengagement from activities of law enforcement. Although the magistrate may be engaged only in part-time law enforcement activities, this association with law enforcement is an appropriate setting for a per se rule of disqualification. Baggett v. State, 132 Ga. App. 266, 208 S.E.2d 23, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1670 (1974). ment as neutral and disinterested magistrates. The fourth amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may Probable Cause (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) be reasonably exercised. This judicial role accords with the basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedom will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels of government. Vaughn v. State, 160 Ga. App. 283, 287 S.E.2d 277, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 3212 (1981). tice of peace having pecuniary interest in issuing warrant effects a violation of the protections afforded by U.S. Const., amend. 4 and U.S. Const., amend. 14. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 97 S. Ct. 546, 50 L. Ed. 2d 444, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 27 (1977). Justice of peace who also holds position as deputy sheriff is “per se” disqualified as a neutral and detached magistrate. Vaughn v. State, 160 Ga. App. 283, 287 S.E.2d 277, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 3212 (1981). Validity of search warrant issued
- Fourth amendment does not contemplate executive officers of govern-Issuance of search warrant by jusby mayor involved in investigation.
- Because the mayor was personally involved, along with the chief of police, in investigating the case against the defendant, and in fact encouraged the chief to catch the defendant, it cannot be maintained that the mayor acted independently of the police and prosecution, and the search warrant issued by the mayor was issued in violation of the defendant’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Jackson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 67, 256 S.E.2d 670, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2096 (1979). “Probable cause” determinations are not always jury questions. Scott v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 255, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12449 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
- Conflict between testimony of magistrate and law enforcement officer.
- — Where any conflict between testimony of magistrate and law enforcement officer seeking warrant as to circumstances surrounding seeking of warrant was resolved by the court and supported by the record, motion to suppress evidence was properly denied. Daitch v. State, 168 Ga. App. 830, 310 S.E.2d 703, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3444 (1983). termined by subjective conclusion of
- Scope of fourth amendment not deofficer.
- Even though a police officer believed that probable cause for a search was lacking, the court still had the duty to objectively determine if probable cause was present. The scope of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is not determined by the subjective conclusion of the law enforcement officer. United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 11509 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S. Ct. 516, 54 L. Ed. 2d 457, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 4126 (1977). What constitutes probable cause is evidence that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a felony has been committed, and such evidence must be measured by the facts of the particular case in which legality is questioned. Cook v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 90, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10272 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff’d, 427 F.2d 1172, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8649 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 299, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10031 (S.D. Ga. 1969). Where the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer are such as to warrant a person of prudence and caution in believing an offense has been committed, the quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause does not require proof of guilt. Hood v. State, 122 Ga. App. 547, 178 S.E.2d 44, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 942 (1970). Probable cause exists under U.S. Const., amend. 4 if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent person in believing that the offense has been committed. United States v. Brookins, 423 F.2d 463, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10411 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 20518 (11th Cir. 1982). Probable cause for arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. United States v. Bullock, 441 F.2d 59, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10598 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Williams, 322 F. Supp. 1074, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14505 (N.D. Ga. 1971); State v. Causey, 132 Ga. App. 17, 207 S.E.2d 225, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1588 (1974); Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1699 (1974); Fenning v. State, 136 Ga. App. 569, 222 S.E.2d 122, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1420 (1975); Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975); United States v. Casey, 540 F.2d 811, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 6660 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 15078 (5th Cir. 1979); Palmer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 291, 274 S.E.2d 692, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3038 (1980); Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15367 (M.D. Ga. 1980); McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13851 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Test for probable cause is whether under facts a person of reasonable caution would believe that evidence was being possessed by defendant in the defendant’s house. This requires merely a probability and not a certainty but does require more than a mere suspicion. Brooks v. State, 140 Ga. App. 371, 231 S.E.2d 138, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1482 (1976); Gordon v. State, 150 Ga. App. 862, 258 S.E.2d 664, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2401 (1979). Probable cause means reasonable grounds, and is that apparent state of facts which seems to exist after reasonable and proper inquiry. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1610 (1976). To establish probable cause (whether for the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate or, under exigent circumstances, for search without a warrant) three elements are essential: that there is reason to accept the informer’s reliability; that the facts are sufficient to show how the informer obtained the information or that the criminal activity is described in such detail as to negate its being a mere rumor; and, that the information is current, not stale. State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2391 (1980). What is “reasonable, articulable ground” for detention may be less than probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search, but must be more than mere caprice or arbitrary harassment. Each case depends on its own facts. Where there are some reasonable articulable grounds for suspicion, the state’s interest in the maintenance of community peace and security outweigh the momentary inconvenience and indignity of investigatory detention. Allen v. State, 140 Ga. App. 828, 232 S.E.2d 250, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1643 (1976).
- Test for probable cause.
- Judge may consider totality of information before the judge to determine if probable cause exists, before issuing a search warrant. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1313 (1975). Test for probable cause is the totality of the evidence before the magistrate. Inferences of probable cause may be drawn only by a neutral and detached magistrate, not by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. State v. Guhl, 140 Ga. App. 23, 230 S.E.2d 22, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1336 (1976), rev’d, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 791 (1977). The test for probable cause is the totality of the evidence before the magistrate. Walker v. State, 140 Ga. App. 418, 231 S.E.2d 386, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1503 (1976). Under the “totality-of-the-circumstances test,” evidence supplied by a citizen informant, corroborated by observation and information from police officers, plus complaints of other citizens to the police of late-night traffic at the location, provide a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause exists for a search. Whitten v. State, 174 Ga. App. 867, 331 S.E.2d 912, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2759 (1985).
- What constitutes reasonable suspicion.
- Specific and articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, constitute reasonable suspicion. United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 20518 (11th Cir. 1982). After an officer observed defendant’s vehicle parked at a baseball park where there was no activity and saw a wide-eyed, scared look on the face of defendant’s passenger, the officer did not have Probable Cause (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) to have a reasonable suspicion that defendant or defendant’s passenger were engaged in criminal activity to approach the passenger’s side of the car and ask the passenger to roll down the passenger’s window. Akins v. State, 266 Ga. App. 214, 596 S.E.2d 719, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 343 (2004). Determination of probable cause
- for arrest without warrant.
- Probable cause for an arrest without a warrant exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to give them reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed a felony. McConnell v. State, 156 Ga. App. 612, 275 S.E.2d 697, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3141 (1980). Probable cause standards for items
- sought to be seized.
- The requirements of U.S. Const., amend. 4 secure the same protection of privacy whether the search is for mere evidence or for fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband. There must be a nexus — automatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband — between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. In the case of mere evidence, however, probable cause to conduct a search must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. In so doing, consideration of police purposes will be required. United States v. Munroe, 421 F.2d 644, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851, 91 S. Ct. 79, 27 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 1208 (1970). Search warrant issuable upon fair
- probability.
- In issuing a search warrant, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the magistrate, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. Morrow, 175 Ga. App. 743, 334 S.E.2d 344, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2827 (1985). Requirements for issuance of
- search warrant generally.
- Under U.S. Const., amend. 4, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless the officer can find probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to the officer under oath or affirmation. Farmer v. Lawson, 510 F. Supp. 91, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12674 (N.D. Ga. 1981). Temporary protective order not
- substitute for search warrant.
- Temporary protective order (TPO) obtained by the defendant’s girlfriend did not constitute a valid search warrant and was not a substitute for a search warrant authorizing entry into the defendant’s home and, therefore, the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the TPO did not meet the warrant and probable cause standard of the fourth amendment and O.C.G.A. § 17-5-20 and the state did not articulate a need to deviate from the requirement of obtaining a warrant to search the defendant’s home. State v. Burgess, 349 Ga. App. 486, 826 S.E.2d 352, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 191 (2019). ability of information presented to the magistrate and reasonableness of the magistrate’s issuing the search warrant. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 939 (1977). Difference between requirements
- Emphasis is on credibility and relifor guilt and probable cause.
- There is a great difference between what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest or search. Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859, 165 S.E.2d 302, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 977 (1968); Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 899 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 1657 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in Godfrey v. Francis, 251 Ga. 652, 308 S.E.2d 806, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 938 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 727 S.E.2d 670, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 338 (2012); Duffy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 847, 275 S.E.2d 658, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3221 (1980). While the prosecution must bear the burden of persuasion with regard to probable cause for a warrantless search, it need not establish probable cause beyond a reasonable doubt, nor must a finding of probable cause rest upon evidence which is legally competent in a criminal trial. United States v. Rodgers, 442 F.2d 902, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10440 (5th Cir. 1971). Law sanctions difference between methods permitted to prove ultimate issue of guilt and that of probable cause for search or arrest. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1313 (1975). The “reasonable cause” necessary to support arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused’s guilt upon a trial. Duffy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 847, 275 S.E.2d 658, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3221 (1980). A lesser standard of proof is required to establish probable cause than to prove guilt. McConnell v. State, 156 Ga. App. 612, 275 S.E.2d 697, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3141 (1980). Legal evidence not required for
- probable cause.
- To show probable cause for the search and seizure it is not necessary that the arresting officer should have had before the officer legal evidence of the suspected illegal act. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 652 (1966). “Staleness” as relates to probable cause is measured by the probability that the thing to be seized is located at the place to be searched and it involves the interval between: (1) the time when the thing to be seized is indicated by the evidence or information to be at the place to be searched; and (2) the time when the search warrant is issued. Cline v. State, 178 Ga. App. 470, 343 S.E.2d 506, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2543 (1986).
- Information not stale.
- Updated affidavit alleging ongoing criminal activity and a continuing relationship between coconspirators prior to the time of the search was not fatally stale. United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 10377 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 967, 115 S. Ct. 434, 130 L. Ed. 2d 346, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 7642 (1994). Suppression of evidence from
- “good” search.
- Court erred by suppressing evidence in defendant’s drug case because the search warrant was supported by probable cause as the informant’s information was reliable, the information in the warrant was not stale, and the curtilage was properly searched. State v. Graddy, 262 Ga. App. 98, 585 S.E.2d 147, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 850 (2003), aff’d, 277 Ga. 765, 596 S.E.2d 109, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 318 (2004).
- Suppression of evidence upheld.
- Because the police had no information that two men were involved in any criminal conduct and the officers saw nothing that would give rise to reasonable suspicion, there was no error in the trial court’s suppression of evidence. State v. Harris, 261 Ga. App. 119, 581 S.E.2d 736, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 561 (2003).
- Collective knowledge of peace officers may form probable cause.
- Probable cause for arrest is to be determined on basis of collective information of officers involved rather than only the one who makes the arrest. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Whether probable cause for arrest existed is to be decided by courts on basis of collective information of police involved in the arrest rather than upon the extent of knowledge of particular officer making arrest. The individual knowledge of the officer who made the arrest is not the standard by which the legality of a warrantless arrest is measured, but rather the existence of probable cause is determinable on the basis of the collective information of the officers participating in the arrest. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Probable cause for arrest can rest upon collective knowledge of police, rather than solely on that of the officer who actually makes the arrest, when there is some degree of communication between the two. United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12091 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853, 99 S. Ct. 163, 58 L. Ed. 2d 159, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 2972 (1978). Probable Cause (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) Where there is communication between the two, probable cause can rest upon the collective knowledge of the various peace officers involved. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3186 (1981). Observations of fellow officers of government engaged in common investigation are reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number. Walker v. State, 140 Ga. App. 418, 231 S.E.2d 386, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1503 (1976). Probable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observe as trained officers. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 9854 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968, 99 S. Ct. 458, 58 L. Ed. 2d 427, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 3851 (1978).
- Information conveyed by radio dispatch.
- When a county deputy sheriff hears a radio dispatch concerning a crime in another jurisdiction, the deputy has probable cause to stop any suspects, arrest them, search their car, and seize any contraband contained therein, particularly where there is suspicious conduct once the suspects are spotted by the officer. Sanborn v. State, 251 Ga. 169, 304 S.E.2d 377, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 760 (1983). Direct observation is not essential
- to the existence of probable cause.
- United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13471 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff’d, 647 F.2d 568, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12398 (5th Cir. 1981). demeanor committed out of officer’s
- Probable cause for arrest for mispresence.
- If an arrest is made by an officer for a misdemeanor committed out of the officer’s presence, probable cause therefor may be established by the possession of knowledge and facts justifying the belief on the part of one of reasonable prudence that the person arrested was guilty of the crime charged. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Sufficient probability exists when nexus is shown between items to be
- seized and residence to be searched.
- — Without direct observation, the appropriate indicia establishing this nexus include the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the extent of an opportunity for concealment and normal inferences as to where a criminal would hide the instruments and fruits of the crime. United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13471 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff’d, 647 F.2d 568, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12398 (5th Cir. 1981). Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of the defendant’s sister’s apartment as the search warrant particularized the items that were related to the commission of the crime and there was a fair probability that the items listed in the search warrant would be found at the sister’s apartment because several witnesses had identified the defendant as the shooter before officers applied for a search warrant; numerous items relating to the killing had not yet been recovered; and the defendant had been residing in the sister’s apartment. Glenn v. State, 302 Ga. 276, 806 S.E.2d 564, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 874 (2017). vide probable cause that a crime is being committed, in appropriate circumstances it can supply the key ingredient justifying the decision of a law enforcement officer to take action. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414 (5th Cir. 1980). Determination of probable cause to
- Although flight alone will not prosearch automobile.
- Probable cause to search an automobile exists when the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. In determining whether there was reasonable cause to believe that a vehicle contained contraband, the court will look to the totality of the circumstances, including, but not limited to, information obtained by law enforcement agents conducting a common investigation. McDonald v. State, 156 Ga. App. 143, 273 S.E.2d 881, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2915 (1980). Probable cause to search an automobile exists if the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the contents of the vehicle offend the law. Williams v. State, 167 Ga. App. 42, 306 S.E.2d 46, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3295 (1983). Reasonable cause required for
- search and seizure of automobile.
- While Georgia has less stringent requirements for a warrantless search of an automobile than a permanent dwelling, the fact that it is an automobile is not talismanic. The right to search and the validity of the seizure are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. State v. Avret, 156 Ga. App. 527, 275 S.E.2d 113, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3109 (1980).
- Probable cause for search of automobile believed to contain contraband.
- An automobile in which contraband is concealed and transported may be searched without a warrant if police have probable cause for believing the automobile to be searched contains the contraband. The search without a warrant is permitted where it is impractical to obtain one because of the automobile’s potential for instant mobility. State v. Avret, 156 Ga. App. 527, 275 S.E.2d 113, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3109 (1980). dant in vehicle for improper turn and
- Facts justified initial stop of defenlater arrest.
- Where the defendant, in the defendant’s vehicle proceeded along the emergency lane and turned therefrom despite the presence of a solid white line indicating the end of such emergency lane prior to entry into the intersection, the officer was justified in stopping the defendant for making an improper right turn. Since this was true, the officer had specific and reasonably articulable facts warranting the defendant’s detention and the request for identification. Upon learning that the defendant was driving with a revoked license, the officer then had probable cause to make a lawful arrest and to conduct a limited inventory search of the automobile. State v. Williams, 156 Ga. App. 813, 275 S.E.2d 133, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3210 (1980). Probable cause present for search
- of car on school premises.
- Police officers, having been called to investigate an accident on school premises and finding a motor vehicle trespassing thereon in the early hours of the morning, which are, to say the least, suspicious circumstances, did not perform an illegal search and seizure in taking the ignition keys out of the car and unlocking the trunk where they found stolen goods. Craft v. State, 124 Ga. App. 57, 183 S.E.2d 37, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 810 (1971). Probable cause for search of auto
- stopped in roadway.
- Trial court order suppressing drug evidence seized after a Terry stop of the defendant for parking in the middle of the road was error because O.C.G.A. § 40-6-200(a) made it improper to park in the middle of a two-way roadway, and provided a sound basis for the officer’s decision to stop the defendant; as a result, the stop of the defendant was proper. Stafford v. State, 284 Ga. 773, 671 S.E.2d 484, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 989 (2008). ably be found in place to be searched. — A probable cause finding must be based on more than the conclusion that a crime was committed and that the items sought are connected with the crime. The magistrate must also have a sufficient reason to believe that the items will be found in the place to be searched. Murphy v. State, 238 Ga. 725, 234 S.E.2d 911, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1182 (1977). Probable cause for self-protective
- Requirement that items will probsearch for weapons.
- In case of self-protective search for weapons, police officers must be able to point particularly to facts from which it reasonably can be inferred that individual is armed and dangerous. Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 94, 230 S.E.2d 101, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1359 (1976). gaged in crime does not without more justify either arrest or search. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3186 (1981).
- Mere propinquity with others en-Elimination of illegal drug manufacturing.
- The governmental interest in eliminating illegal drug manufacture is Probable Cause (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) a persuasive reason to permit minimally intrusive practice. Thus, an intermediate response based on something less than probable cause, is a proper investigatory tool to aid law enforcement agents in discovering and eliminating clandestine laboratory operations. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981).
- Eavesdropping to ascertain probable cause.
- Police agents’ entry into a public hallway and listening to conversations inside an apartment by placing their ears to the front door was proper to ascertain if probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant. Cox v. State, 160 Ga. App. 199, 286 S.E.2d 482, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2952 (1981).
- No probable cause created by refusing to furnish identification.
- A police officer does not have probable cause to believe a suspect has violated Georgia law by falsely identifying himself when the suspect refuses to furnish identification. The refusal to furnish identification may create suspicion that the suspect has used a false name, but falls far short of probable cause. United States v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1491, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22620 (11th Cir.), modified, 743 F.2d 1505, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17816 (11th Cir. 1984).
- Use of sworn unrecorded oral evidence outside affidavit.
- The magistrate issuing a search warrant may consider sworn unrecorded oral evidence outside the affidavit to establish probable cause. Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 303 S.E.2d 437, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 721 (1983), rev’d, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 86 (1984). Determination of probable cause
- before extradition.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 requires that determination of probable cause to arrest be made by neutral magistrate before pretrial interstate extradition. Batton v. Griffin, 240 Ga. 450, 241 S.E.2d 201, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 752 (1978). Magistrate is entitled to rely on sions of member of narcotics squad of a distant police force in determining whether it was probable that the box police officer had observed was being used to ship marijuana illegally. United States v. Black, 344 F. Supp. 537, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12712 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 476 F.2d 267, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 10582 (5th Cir. 1973). Specificity of evidence constituting
- personal observations and concluprobable cause to stop vehicle.
- Police officers who stopped vehicle without first obtaining search warrant did not err in so doing even though the information they possessed before stop was not specific enough to authorize issuance of a search warrant. State v. Estrado, 170 Ga. App. 889, 318 S.E.2d 505, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2937 (1984). Right to search and validity of seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1696 (1974). tain articles subject to seizure are in dwelling cannot of itself justify a search without a warrant. Black v. State, 119 Ga. App. 855, 168 S.E.2d 916, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1279 (1969). If considered a search, probable cause is to be determined on a case by case basis in light of the particular circumstances. Grimes v. United States, 405 F.2d 477, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 4595 (5th Cir. 1968). Police officers who stopped and taining warrant did not err by so doing because additional corroborative evidence, including accuracy of confidential information and strong odor of marijuana detected at time of stop, provided probable cause to search, even though prior information was not detailed enough to authorize issuance of warrant. State v. Estrado, 170 Ga. App. 889, 318 S.E.2d 505, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2937 (1984). Presence of accused at probable
- Probable cause for belief that cersearched vehicles without first obcause hearing.
- The arrested person need not be present when the judicial officer is determining whether probable cause to detain the arrested person exists following the arrest. It is the independent and neutral determination by a judicial officer of whether probable cause exists which is fundamental under the fourth amendment and which must be made within 48 hours, not the presence of the defendant. Fiscus v. City of Roswell, 832 F. Supp. 1558, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13402 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
- Nature of probable cause hearing.
- — In a pretrial hearing, U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not require a full-fledged adversarial commitment hearing, although it does require some minimal probable cause hearing that has nothing to do with whether the accused should be prosecuted, at which the sole question is whether the accused should be detained pending further proceedings. If the suspect is incorrectly detained without a hearing in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4, the accused may be entitled to habeas corpus relief, but in no event will the illegal detention void a subsequent conviction. State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52, 222 S.E.2d 343, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 766 (1976). Utilization of hearing testimony on
- issue of probable cause.
- If testimony adduced at post-conviction hearing can be utilized to show whether or not there was probable cause for arrest, then it follows that testimony adduced at commitment hearing and at trial may be utilized for same purpose. Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 899 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 1657 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in Godfrey v. Francis, 251 Ga. 652, 308 S.E.2d 806, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 938 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 727 S.E.2d 670, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 338 (2012). Deference on review to finding of
- probable cause.
- When an application for a search warrant has been made by the police to a neutral and detached magistrate, and the magistrate has issued the warrant based on a finding of probable cause, a reviewing court will pay substantial deference to the magistrate’s finding. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 774 (1981). After-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a search warrant should not take the form of a de novo review. Instead, a magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts. State v. Fultz, 171 Ga. App. 886, 321 S.E.2d 381, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3010 (1984). Evidence that is seized in good-faith reliance upon a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate will generally not be subject to suppression on fourth amendment grounds, regardless of whether the allegations upon which the magistrate based the issuance of the warrant were sufficient to establish the probable cause for the search. Rodriguez v. State, 191 Ga. App. 241, 381 S.E.2d 529, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 555 (1989). 2. Affidavits fidavit must be submitted to court setting forth necessary facts and circumstances whereby the judge may determine probable cause. United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 12134 (5th Cir. 1976). Affidavit upon which justice of the peace issues search warrant is inadequate where it does not show facts and circumstances which would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the articles sought are located at the place where it is proposed to search. Farmer v. Lawson, 510 F. Supp. 91, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12674 (N.D. Ga. 1981). Information supporting finding of probable cause may be presented to magistrate by means of affidavit or by oral testimony. Marshall v. State, 113 Ga. App. 143, 147 S.E.2d 666, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 999 (1966). Affidavit enough to provide basis for magistrate’s finding of probable
- Before valid warrant may issue, afcause.
- See Borders v. State, 173 Ga. App. 110, 325 S.E.2d 626, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3102 (1984); Whitehead v. State, 184 Ga. App. 307, 361 S.E.2d 188, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2207 (1987). In a murder prosecution, an affidavit in support of a search warrant stated that the victim and defendant left a ballpark where they worked in close temporal prox-Probable Cause (Cont’d) 2. Affidavits (Cont’d) imity; that the victim’s car was found abandoned at a gas station next to the park; that a person fitting defendant’s voice characteristics made two telephone calls claiming to have the victim; that the victim’s ring was found near the pay phone from which the second call was made; and that defendant had a history of assaults on the opposite sex, having abducted a victim and secreted the victim to the defendant’s home, gave the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding there was probable cause that evidence pertaining to the victim’s disappearance would be found in defendant’s home. Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 390 (2006). Determination by court of whether
- magistrate justified in issuing warrant.
- In determining whether the magistrate was justified in issuing the search warrant, the court is not limited to the facts on the face of the affidavit, and is free to make judgments on the veracity of any or all of the evidence. Campbell v. State, 226 Ga. 883, 178 S.E.2d 257, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 725 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002, 91 S. Ct. 1246, 28 L. Ed. 2d 535, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 2632 (1971). able cause need only show facts and circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the articles sought were located at the place where it was proposed to search. United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13471 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff’d, 647 F.2d 568, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12398 (5th Cir. 1981).
- Affidavit to support finding of prob-Affidavit not required.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not by its terms require that probable cause be shown by affidavit, but that the judicial officer be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant. Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 530, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 633 (1981). Common-sense testing of affidavits
- for search warrants.
- Affidavits for search warrants must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a common-sense and realistic fashion, and technical requirements of elaborate specificity have no proper place in this area. Driscoll v. State, 129 Ga. App. 702, 201 S.E.2d 11, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1115 (1973); State v. Babb, 134 Ga. App. 302, 214 S.E.2d 397, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1991 (1975). stances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to perform a detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 774 (1981).
- Recital of underlying circum-Affidavit must recite specifics of informant’s basis for information.
- Although it is not required as a showing of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant that the informant’s name be stated, there must be a recital of specifics as to what the informant based the informant’s information upon. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1212 (1969). stances in support of issuance of war-
- Presentation of underlying circumrant.
- The Constitution requires that there be presented to the judicial officer issuing the search warrant some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the officer applying for the warrant, and, if the officer relies on an informant, some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was reliable. Wood v. State, 118 Ga. App. 477, 164 S.E.2d 233, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1435 (1968).
- Detail in affidavit sufficient to support issuance of search warrant.
- Although an affidavit for procurement of a search warrant was not as detailed as it might be in affording information showing reliability of the informant upon whose information the police officer was proceeding, but because the information as to the activities and the whereabouts of the parties came from one who, in the past, had supplied information leading to the arrest and conviction of persons who had committed crimes, as well as from parties in stores who complained that the parties sought had passed altered or counterfeit money to them, there was sufficient detail to afford reasonable cause for seeking and obtaining the search warrant. Bostwick v. State, 124 Ga. App. 113, 182 S.E.2d 925, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 834 (1971). Defendant’s motion to suppress items seized during the search of the defendant’s Vermont residence was properly denied because the affidavits supporting the warrants plainly set out the real possibility that the defendant had saved or hidden electronic devices containing digital data relevant to the victim’s murder that had been previously unavailable to law enforcement. Leili v. State, 307 Ga. 339, 834 S.E.2d 847, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 795 (2019). Personal observation by affiant
- plus informant’s information sufficient for issuance.
- Personal observation by the affiant that known violators of the law sought to be enforced frequented the defendant’s home, plus information from an informant, who had proven reliable in the past, of specific facts sufficient to constitute probable cause, will authorize the issuance of the warrant. Wood v. State, 118 Ga. App. 477, 164 S.E.2d 233, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1435 (1968). Affidavit must contain underlying
- circumstances supporting hearsay.
- Although an affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the articles were where the informant claimed they were. Knowles v. State, 124 Ga. App. 377, 183 S.E.2d 617, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 924 (1971); Maddox v. State, 133 Ga. App. 709, 213 S.E.2d 1, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 2249 (1975). Requirements for officer’s affidavit
- relying upon informant.
- If an officer making an affidavit for a search warrant relies upon an informant, the officer must give sufficient information of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was reliable. In the officer’s affidavit should appear a recital of what the informant actually said, and why the officer thought that the information was credible, especially when the name of the informant is not stated. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1212 (1969).
- Production of nonaffidavit testimony when warrant challenged.
- If the magistrate issuing the warrant does so not on the basis of the affidavit but on other testimony, such testimony should itself be produced when, on the trial of a criminal case, the affidavit and warrant are challenged. Veasey v. State, 113 Ga. App. 187, 147 S.E.2d 515, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 1010 (1966). Affidavit based on information
- from ISP.
- GBI agent was authorized to rely on information regarding sexually explicit images of children as reported by an internet service provider (ISP) pursuant to the ISP’s statutory reporting obligation set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b)(1); the ISP’s report was the equivalent of one made from a law-abiding concerned citizen, and therefore was afforded a preferred status insofar as testing the credibility of the information. Manzione v. State, 312 Ga. App. 638, 719 S.E.2d 533, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1000 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0485, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 308 (Ga. Mar. 19, 2012). Probable cause cannot be made out by affidavits which are purely conclusory. Veasey v. State, 113 Ga. App. 187, 147 S.E.2d 515, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 1010 (1966).
- Mere conclusion based on unspecified information insufficient.
- It is not enough to show probable cause simply to recite in an affidavit that from information received from a reliable informant the affiant has come to suspect or to believe that a named person is in possession of contraband items. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1212 (1969); Courson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 373, 187 S.E.2d 554, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1340 (1972).
- Unsubstantiated conclusory allegation.
- Exclusionary rule did not bar admission of seized contraband alleged to be the fruit of a search warrant issued without probable cause, because defendant did not substantiate with evidence the conclusory allegation that the magistrate did not act impartially and disinterestedly but instead rubber stamped a detective’s offered affidavit. Giles v. State, Probable Cause (Cont’d) 2. Affidavits (Cont’d) 197 Ga. App. 895, 400 S.E.2d 368, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1503 (1990). Deficiency in affidavit for search warrant cannot be supplied by facts discovered in making the search, for the sufficiency of the affidavit must be determined as of the time the warrant issues, and an appellate court can consider only the information brought to the magistrate’s attention. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1212 (1969). Factual inaccuracies of peripheral
- relevance.
- If, on the hearing of a motion to suppress evidence, the testimony of an informant is consistent with the material allegations in the affidavit, factual inaccuracies of peripheral relevance that are not the personal observations of the affiant do not destroy an otherwise adequate showing of probable cause. Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 182 S.E.2d 779, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 825 (1971). Consideration of attacks on legality
- of nonessential allegations in affidavit.
- If certain allegations in a search warrant affidavit are sufficient per se to establish probable cause, the court need not consider a defendant’s attacks on the legality or sufficiency of the other allegations in the affidavit. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 15078 (5th Cir. 1979).
- Sufficiency of affidavit where defective affidavit unnecessary.
- Even if police officer’s affidavit filed in support of the issuance of a search warrant was fatally defective because it did not establish the reliability of informant, this was immaterial because the affidavit, without the informant’s statement, was sufficient to establish probable cause and justify issuance of the search warrant. Roth v. State, 164 Ga. App. 347, 297 S.E.2d 107, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3300 (1982). mony as well as the affidavit in issuing a search warrant. Not only what is stated in the affidavit for the search warrant but also the totality of the sworn circumstances before the magistrate may be considered in establishing probable cause. Franklin v. State, 135 Ga. App. 718, 218 S.E.2d 641, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1795 (1975). Oral testimony must be under oath
- Magistrate may consider oral testior affirmation.
- The magistrate, in considering whether to issue a search warrant, may consider both the affidavit and oral testimony as to probable cause. However, in considering matter other than that contained in the affidavit, such proof must be under oath or affirmation. Maddox v. State, 133 Ga. App. 709, 213 S.E.2d 1, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 2249 (1975).
- Coverage of oath administered after affidavit signed.
- If the magistrate does not administer any oath until after the affidavit is signed, the oath covers only the truthfulness of the statements contained in the written affidavit and not the oral statements given to show probable cause. Riggins v. State, 136 Ga. App. 279, 220 S.E.2d 775, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1321 (1975). evant to probable cause in affidavit is
- Absence of time information relfatal.
- Failure to include in the affidavit for search warrant the time of the occurrence witnessed by informer upon which probable cause was based is a fatal defect. Windsor v. State, 122 Ga. App. 767, 178 S.E.2d 751, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1028 (1970). If there is nothing appearing in an affidavit supporting a search warrant whereby the issuing officer could determine the time of the events relied upon for probable cause, and this fatal defect is asserted as a ground of a motion to suppress the evidence, a trial judge errs in overruling the motion. Flournoy v. State, 123 Ga. App. 658, 182 S.E.2d 159, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1335 (1971). able cause absent time information in
- Determination of existence of probaffidavit.
- Absent any statement in an affidavit as to the time of the occurrence on which a warrant is based, a magistrate cannot make an independent determination as to whether probable cause still existed for the issuance of the search warrant. It is not necessary in an affidavit that the precise date of an occurrence on which a search warrant is based be given, but it should appear from the facts that the occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant. Terry v. State, 123 Ga. App. 746, 182 S.E.2d 513, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1365 (1971). Sufficient lawful information to
- overcome taint.
- If the lawfully obtained information amounts to probable cause and would have justified issuance of the warrant, apart from the tainted information, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is admissible. Rothfuss v. State, 160 Ga. App. 863, 288 S.E.2d 579, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2986 (1982).
- Effect of misinformation in affidavit.
- If there was sufficient information in an affidavit to support a finding of probable cause despite the presence of other mistaken information, the court did not err in finding that the affidavit was sufficient. Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 303 S.E.2d 437, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 721 (1983), rev’d, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 86 (1984). If an affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause once its false material is set aside, then evidence obtained by means of a search warrant issued in reliance on the affidavit is inadmissible. However, if the remaining information is sufficient to show probable cause, the search warrant is valid. Rimmer v. State, 197 Ga. App. 294, 398 S.E.2d 282, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1241 (1990).
- False statements in affidavit.
- A supporting affidavit was found to have established probable cause, even though it contained false material which the officer submitting the affidavit knew was not true. Kelly v. State, 184 Ga. App. 337, 361 S.E.2d 659, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2778, cert. denied, 257 Ga. 562, 362 S.E.2d 200, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 972 (1987). Under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, if a defendant makes a preliminary showing that: (1) an affiant knowingly and intentionally included a false statement in an affidavit; or (2) an affiant made a false statement with reckless disregard for its truth; and (3) the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause; then constitutional mandate requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request but if, after eliminating statements alleged to be false, sufficient allegations in the warrant affidavits remain to support a finding of probable cause, defendant’s attempt to question the sufficiency of the warrant lacks merit. United States v. Sims, 845 F.2d 1564, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 7103 (11th Cir. 1988).
- Affidavit as a whole examined.
- Remaining information was sufficient to show probable cause although the affiant’s statement that affiant had maintained “constant surveillance”, even though affiant had not witnessed actual transactions, may have implied to the trial judge that the agent observed the entire transaction, including the handing over of money in exchange for the drugs. The trial court could not conclude that this was the only implication flowing from those words, therefore, the search warrant was valid. State v. Thomas, 203 Ga. App. 623, 417 S.E.2d 328, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 555 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0917, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 594 (Ga. June 25, 1992).
- Practical reading.
- Items described in an affidavit were “fruits” of the crimes although the affidavit did not list “robbery” as one of the crimes and although some of the items were also instrumentalities, because the affiant had stated that affiant had probable cause to believe the items taken were in defendant’s residence or vehicle; it was obvious from a practical reading of the affidavit that the items to be seized were fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of the crimes. Mozier v. State, 207 Ga. App. 264, 427 S.E.2d 551, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 148 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C0777, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 420 (Ga. Apr. 8, 1993). In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit containing false statements and omitting material information, the false statements must be deleted, the omitted truthful material must be included, and the affidavit must be reexamined to determine whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant. Redding v. State, 192 Ga. App. 87, 383 S.E.2d 640, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 907 (1989). Probable Cause (Cont’d) 2. Affidavits (Cont’d) tional errors in affidavit on validity of
- Effect of intentional and unintenwarrant.
- If a misrepresentation in an affidavit for a search warrant is made with the intention of deceiving the magistrate it will invalidate the warrant regardless of whether the error is material to the showing of probable cause. On the other hand, if the error was unintentional, it is of no moment unless it was material to the establishment of probable cause. United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 11340 (5th Cir. 1976). When an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains information which is in part unlawfully obtained, the validity of a warrant and search depends on whether the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue. Rothfuss v. State, 160 Ga. App. 863, 288 S.E.2d 579, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2986 (1982).
- Sufficiency of affidavit to be determined as of time warrant issued.
- A void search warrant cannot be validated and property illegally seized introduced in evidence merely because the officers were in fact reliably informed and did in fact recover contraband, nor can a deficiency be supplied by facts discovered in making the search, for the sufficiency of the affidavit must be determined as of the time the warrant issued. Anderson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 25, 270 S.E.2d 263, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2440 (1980). Present belief of affiant as to com-
- mission of offense charged.
- In determining whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant, it is necessary to determine whether the affiant, at the time of making the affidavit and the issuance of the warrant, had reasonable grounds to believe the offense charged was being or had been committed. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127, 101 S. Ct. 946, 67 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1981). United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 15078 (5th Cir. 1979). Affidavit provided substantial
- probable cause basis.
- Affidavit containing investigator’s corroboration of informant’s statements describing people involved in operations, locations, and movements and report of a controlled buy presented a picture from which magistrate could conclude a search warrant should issue. United States v. Wright, 811 F. Supp. 1576, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 411 (S.D. Ga. 1993). Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s suppression motion as the affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant under the totality of the circumstances test where: (1) the controlled buy from defendant was described; (2) defendant’s willingness to turn over the cocaine at defendant’s residence was set forth; and (3) a statement from the witness who was with defendant at the time of defendant’s arrest that defendant had taken the witness to the residence to pick up cocaine was set forth. Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 549, 600 S.E.2d 667, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 710 (2004). Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied as: (1) the search warrant affidavit outlined the information provided by a New Hampshire detective’s investigation, including the fact that the defendant had electronically sent the detective sexually explicit photographs of young children; (2) the officer’s affidavit also included information regarding the New Hampshire detective’s extensive background and vast experience in the investigation of child sexual exploitation cases; (3) the New Hampshire detective’s investigation provided probable cause to search the defendant’s residence wherever that was; (4) the warrant sought sexually explicit photographs and other sexually explicit visual depictions of children, as well as the computer hardware and software used to create, store, and distribute those depictions; and (5) the affidavit contained information based on the New Hampshire detective’s contact and electronic correspondence with the defendant indicating the likelihood that defendant’s computer files would contain evidence of child sexual exploitation, given that the affidavit stated that those who sexually exploited children often kept sexually explicit photographs and other images in their possession and often stored those images in computer files. Walthall v. State, 281 Ga. App. 434, 636 S.E.2d 126, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1121 (2006). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 to suppress evidence seized pursuant to search warrants because the applications for search warrants to search the defendant’s apartment and the car for which registration information was given in the detective’s affidavit contained sufficient information from which a judicial officer could determine there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found at those sites as the sites were likely methods of transporting the victim and the likely destination of appellant and the victim; in the detective’s affidavit, the detective related the discovery of the victim’s body and the statements of the victim’s friend and roommate concerning the victim’s relationship with the defendant, and the victim’s pregnancy and identification of the defendant as the father, who was not pleased about the pregnancy. Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462, 704 S.E.2d 794, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 946 (2010). chases the beer, affidavit sworn to by agent as informant is sufficient to establish the probable cause element in issuing a search warrant in the investigation of the defendant for the illegal sale of beer. Johnson v. State, 121 Ga. App. 477, 174 S.E.2d 246, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1258 (1970).
- Where state revenue agent pur-Arrest warrant held invalid.
- Arrest warrant was issued without probable cause, where the incorporated affidavit supporting the warrant stated only that the affiant swore that “to the best of (his or her) knowledge and belief Teresa Ann Garmon did . . . commit the offense of false report of a crime.” Garmon v. Lumpkin County, 878 F.2d 1406, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 11386 (11th Cir. 1989).
- Search warrant held invalid.
- Where an affidavit for a search warrant alleges that numerous complaints have been made to the sheriff’s department that a person is selling illegal beer and whiskey, and that heavy traffic and large amounts of beer cans have been observed on the road around that person’s residence, but no date is set as to these occurrences, and where the only dated occurrence in the affidavit is four months before the issuance of a warrant, a search warrant based on such an affidavit is invalid. Terry v. State, 123 Ga. App. 746, 182 S.E.2d 513, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1365 (1971). Affidavit held ineffective to provide basis for magistrate’s finding of probable cause. See Poole v. State, 175 Ga. App. 374, 333 S.E.2d 207, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2802 (1985). Mere existence of “hearsay upon hearsay” was not fatal to a search warrant because under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate was informed of the underlying circumstances involving an undercover buy from the defendant, independent of the double hearsay, which did not depend upon the reliability of the hearsay declarations; further, a known informant’s statements to police against a penal interest elevated that statements’ reliability. Cochran v. State, 281 Ga. 4, 635 S.E.2d 701, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 580 (2006). Affidavit did not support second
- search warrant.
- Investigator’s affidavit did not supply a substantial basis on which the magistrate could find probable cause for issuing a second warrant since the extensiveness of the first search allowed for a second search only if new information established probable cause to believe that defendant’s home still contained seizable items. United States v. Wright, 811 F. Supp. 1576, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 411 (S.D. Ga. 1993). Deficiency of state statutes failing to require affidavit to show probable
- cause.
- Before a warrant for either arrest or search can issue, the judicial officer issuing such warrant must be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant. Former Code 1933, §§ 27-103, 27-103.1, and 27-104, and the forms prescribed therein (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-4-41 and 17-4-45) do not contain this requirement, and to that extent they are deficient. The better Probable Cause (Cont’d) 2. Affidavits (Cont’d) practice clearly would be for the affidavit to show probable cause. Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 530, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 633 (1981). tion to suppress by affidavit attached
- Showing of probable cause on moto warrant.
- Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, on a motion to suppress, may be shown by the affidavit attached to the warrant, together with evidence of the sworn testimony adduced before the issuing magistrate. State v. Causey, 132 Ga. App. 17, 207 S.E.2d 225, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1588 (1974). Effect on validity of warrant of fail-
- ure to record affidavit.
- If information sufficient to uphold a determination of probable cause is presented under oath to a state magistrate, the failure to record the information in the form of an affidavit will not invalidate the search warrant. Marshall v. State, 113 Ga. App. 143, 147 S.E.2d 666, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 999 (1966). dence in lower court may support
- Although affidavit deficient, eviprobable cause finding.
- Although the affidavit supporting a search warrant did not itself show probable cause, it was sufficient where the evidence of the law enforcement officer in the lower court as to what the officer told the issuing magistrate under oath supported a finding of probable cause. Daitch v. State, 168 Ga. App. 830, 310 S.E.2d 703, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3444 (1983). 3. Informants nished by reliable informants are not constitutionally inadequate. McSears v. State, 247 Ga. 48, 273 S.E.2d 847, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 602 (1981). Probable cause to search may be neous information from reliable confidential informant. Smith v. State, 135 Ga. App. 424, 218 S.E.2d 133, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1689 (1975); Collier v. State, 177 Ga. App. 217, 338 S.E.2d 724, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2945 (1985). Present reliability of informant
- Search warrants supported by affidavits based upon information furprovided by reasonably contemporaand totality of circumstances control.
- — An averment of previous reliability is not essential, the question being whether the informant’s present information is truthful and reliable. Hence the facts known to the officer must be weighed and evaluated, not in terms of “prior reliability” of the informant or a judicial analysis of “probable cause” to search, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement under the “totality of the circumstances” test. State v. Bassford, 183 Ga. App. 694, 359 S.E.2d 752, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2730 (1987).
- “Totality of circumstances” test.
- The U.S. Supreme Court discarded the strict two-pronged, requirement of (a) demonstrating an informant’s reliability and (b) providing the source of the informant’s tip in an affidavit to support issuance of a search warrant, and adopted the “totality of the circumstances” test. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision, whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the magistrate, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Carr v. State, 185 Ga. App. 504, 364 S.E.2d 633, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 23 (1988). The sufficiency of information obtained from an informant is not to be judged by any rigid tests. Generally, probable cause is determined by the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding (1) the basis of the informant’s knowledge and (2) the informant’s veracity or reliability. A deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 508 (1992). Name and description of defendant
- enough for arrest.
- Because the arresting officer was given the name and description of defendant as perpetrator of both a murder and an aggravated assault, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant without a warrant outside the defendant’s home. Gibbons v. State, 253 Ga. 283, 319 S.E.2d 861, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 887 (1984).
- Reliability of informant.
- One may act on the information of an informer as to whom the magic phrase “has given reliable information in the past” cannot be applied. An averment of previous reliability is not essential; the question is whether the informant’s present information is truthful and reliable. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1696 (1974). Informant’s lack of previous contact with authorities is not fatal to the informant’s veracity. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1948 (1980). Police officer’s statement that informant was known personally to the police officer, had no criminal record, and had supplied reliable information leading to nine drug-related arrests and one conviction in the past 14 months was sufficient to establish the informer’s reliability for purposes of issuing a search warrant. Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 297 S.E.2d 227, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1235 (1982). Because the affidavit provided the justice of the peace (now magistrate) with the knowledge that the informant had personally observed defendants in possession of the cocaine and the informant’s reliability was demonstrated within the affidavit by statements that the informant had furnished information in the previous six months leading to the issuance of three felony warrants for possession of illegal drugs and that all information provided by the informant had proven to be true, both prongs of the test for a showing of probable cause based upon an unidentified informant’s tip were met in the affidavit. Law v. State, 165 Ga. App. 687, 302 S.E.2d 570, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3189, aff’d, 251 Ga. 525, 307 S.E.2d 904, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 899 (1983). An informant is established as reliable, if the informant has on more than one occasion given to the sheriff truthful information which led to at least one conviction. Lang v. State, 168 Ga. App. 693, 310 S.E.2d 276, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3434 (1983). In considering the totality of the circumstances, the information disclosed to the officer was insufficient to establish reasonable cause for belief that the defendant was currently in possession of cocaine, where reliable informants had told the officer that defendant was a drug dealer, but there was no showing as to how those informants had come to that conclusion. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 508 (1992). Warrant to search defendant’s residence was supported by probable cause, despite the fact that the affidavit in support thereof made only a conclusory statement regarding the “reliability” of the informant; the deficiency regarding reliability of the informant was corrected by the officer’s independent investigation. Munson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 80, 438 S.E.2d 123, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1448 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0389, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 374 (Ga. Feb. 3, 1994). The uncorroborated statement of an unnamed third-party source, as filtered through a reliable informant to a police affiant, did not give rise to probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant. Wood v. State, 214 Ga. App. 848, 449 S.E.2d 308, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1077 (1994), cert. denied, No. S95C0288, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 294 (Ga. Feb. 17, 1995). Probable cause supported a warrant for the search of the defendant’s residence since the affidavit stated: (1) that a confidential and reliable informant told police that the codefendant, driving a described vehicle was delivering methamphetamine to the residence; (2) that approximately two weeks after receiving this information, police saw the vehicle parked at the above address; and (3) that the car was stopped and searched and trafficking amounts of methamphetamine were confiscated. The reliability of the informant was established by the confiscation of methamphetamine from the codefendant’s car. Gordon v. State, 248 Ga. App. 776, 546 S.E.2d 925, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 392 (2001). Determination of truthfulness of
- informant.
- The reliable manner of acquisition of information having been demonstrated, it must now be determined whether the individual supplying this re-Probable Cause (Cont’d) 3. Informants (Cont’d) liable information is a truthful person. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1948 (1980). Information from one not known to
- be reliable, coupled with verification.
- — Information from an unidentified informant not known to be reliable, coupled with verification of that information in essential particulars, may form a basis for probable cause to arrest. United States v. Crane, 445 F.2d 509, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 9812 (5th Cir. 1971). ability of the informant is presumed as matter of law. State v. Causey, 132 Ga. App. 17, 207 S.E.2d 225, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1588 (1974); Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1699 (1974); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3186 (1981). If coupled with corroboration by the personal observation of a law enforcement officer, a reliable informant’s tip is sufficient to establish probable cause. State v. Hancock, 203 Ga. App. 577, 417 S.E.2d 381, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 536 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0864, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 588 (Ga. June 25, 1992).
- If police officer is informant, reli-Reliability of informant and informant’s informant.
- If a search warrant is issued pursuant to an affidavit based upon information supplied by a confidential informant, who in turn based the information upon another unidentified informant, then there must be a showing as to why the informant and informant’s informant are reliable. Osbourne v. State, 128 Ga. App. 81, 195 S.E.2d 662, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1398 (1973). Probable cause existed for issuance of search warrant where informant was credible and stated, inter alia, that marijuana was being stored at and sold from a specific house in Atlanta, as personally witnessed by the informant within 72 hours before the warrant was sought. Wilbanks v. State, 176 Ga. App. 533, 336 S.E.2d 312, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2361 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1087, 106 S. Ct. 1473, 89 L. Ed. 2d 728, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 953 (1986). formant’s previous credibility not
- Inadvertent error in describing ingrounds for voiding warrant.
- Where all that was shown at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress was that the affiant mistakenly substituted the name of the victim of a burglary for the name of the burglar in the portion of the affidavit showing the reliability of a confidential informant, but the officer freely admitted the mistake, ascribing it to confusion arising from a change in filing systems, the trial court was authorized to find that there had been no intentional and knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth making the warrant void under either the federal or state Constitution. Wells v. State, 180 Ga. App. 133, 348 S.E.2d 681, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2689 (1986).
- Identity of informant.
- Where reasonable grounds for belief that exigent circumstances exist relieving police officers of their duty to give verbal notice of their authority and purpose in the execution of a search warrant are supplied by an informer, the informant’s identity need not be disclosed if the information meets the same tests as those for probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, i.e., reliability of the informer shown and the tip sufficiently detailed. Scull v. State, 122 Ga. App. 696, 178 S.E.2d 720, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1005 (1970). Where sole question is whether information offered to support the warrant meets the test for probable cause, there is no need to reveal the informer’s identity. Where the state relied on information supplied by an informer to establish probable cause for a search warrant, the state need not reveal the names of its informers at a motion to suppress. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 939 (1977); State v. Burnett, 249 Ga. App. 334, 548 S.E.2d 443, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 505 (2001). Absent a showing that the disclosure of an informer’s identity or the contents of the informer’s communications, if any, are relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or are essential to a fair determination of a cause relating to the guilt or sentence of such accused, it was error to require disclosure of the identity of an informant whose participation is limited to the establishment of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. State v. Martin, 156 Ga. App. 554, 275 S.E.2d 129, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3121 (1980). There is no necessity to reveal name of informer where issue is preliminary one of probable cause and where guilt or innocence is not at stake. Even if the informant were a witness, this would not be controlling where such evidence is not necessary to obtain a conviction. State v. Martin, 156 Ga. App. 554, 275 S.E.2d 129, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3121 (1980). Prosecution need not disclose name of informant who provided police with probable cause for a search. State v. Martin, 156 Ga. App. 554, 275 S.E.2d 129, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3121 (1980). Where information supplied to the magistrate was sufficient to demonstrate the informant’s reliability, although the better practice would have been to include the informant’s felony history, the omission was not fatal and did not warrant revealing the informant’s identity. Kessler v. State, 221 Ga. App. 368, 471 S.E.2d 313, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 500 (1996); Gremillion v. State, 233 Ga. App. 393, 504 S.E.2d 265, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 981 (1998), cert. denied, No. S98C1784, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 1177 (Ga. Nov. 20, 1998). Whether informer really exists is question of evidence to be decided by trial court after the officers have been thoroughly questioned and cross-examined. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 939 (1977).
- Issue of informer’s privilege of anonymity is evidentiary, not constitutional.
- When the state relies on information supplied by an informer to establish probable cause for a warrant, the informer’s privilege to remain anonymous presents a question of evidentiary rather than constitutional magnitude at a motion to suppress, where the issue is the preliminary one of probable cause, and guilt or innocence is not at stake. If the informer’s privilege to remain anonymous at a probable cause hearing is a state evidentiary question, the court must look to Georgia law. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 939 (1977). Requirement of specificity where
- informant not named.
- Where the information upon which an officer seeks the issuance of a search warrant comes from an informant who is not named, it is essential that sufficient facts be stated with specificity to indicate that the informant was reliable. Courson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 373, 187 S.E.2d 554, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1340 (1972). identified persons cannot form basis for issuance of search warrant. Thornton v. State, 125 Ga. App. 374, 187 S.E.2d 583, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1341 (1972).
- Rumors or information from un-Tip from known informant.
- A tip from an informant of unknown reliability will not ordinarily create a reasonable suspicion of criminality, but information from a known informant of unknown reliability has more indicia of reliability than an anonymous telephone tip. Burse v. State, 209 Ga. App. 276, 433 S.E.2d 386, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 841 (1993).
- Corroboration of tip’s details by independent police work.
- If a tip is sufficiently detailed so as to show a reliable basis for the informant’s information, independent police work can corroborate the details of the tip. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1948 (1980). Independent police corroboration
- of inadequate tip.
- To support the issuance of a search warrant the informant’s tip must contain a sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer reached the conclusions forming the basis of the tip, but the inadequacy of an informant’s tip does not ipso facto invalidate the search warrant since independent corroboration can be supplied by police investigation. Farmer v. Lawson, 510 F. Supp. 91, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12674 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
- Insufficient corroboration of tip.
- Where the independent investigation revealed only that defendant resided at certain premises and that defendant had been arrested on drug-related charges a decade prior, this minor corroboration did not infuse with reliability anonymous in-Probable Cause (Cont’d) 3. Informants (Cont’d) formant’s tip regarding controlled substances on the premises. State v. Goodrich, 209 Ga. App. 280, 433 S.E.2d 390, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 867 (1993). Determination of reliability of tip without reference to independent
- verification.
- In determining the reliability of the manner in which an informant obtained information, determination of whether the tip meets the “sufficient detail” test is based exclusively on what information came from the informant without reference, at this point, to independent verification of the information. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1948 (1980). Informer’s tip which is insufficient to justify grant of search warrant may be buttressed by either: (1) independent observations by the affiant officer to corroborate sufficient details of the tip (whether suspicious or not) to negate the possibility that the informer fabricated the report out of whole cloth, or (2) independent observations by the affiant that contribute to a showing of probable cause by revealing not merely normal patterns of activity but activity that reasonably arouses suspicion. Davis v. Smith, 430 F.2d 1256, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7842 (5th Cir. 1970).
- Consideration of corroborating information only when informant’s report defective.
- No corroborating information can be considered by a magistrate considering an application for a search warrant until the magistrate determines that the informant’s report, standing alone, does not meet U.S. Const., amend. 4’s standards. United States v. Black, 344 F. Supp. 537, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12712 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 476 F.2d 267, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 10582 (5th Cir. 1973). legations constituting probable cause
- Facts corroborating informer’s alfor search.
- See United States v. Rodgers, 442 F.2d 902, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10440 (5th Cir. 1971). mant, coupled with affiant’s own knowledge of accused’s background, affords sufficient grounds upon which a magistrate can reasonably issue a warrant. Crumley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 394, 217 S.E.2d 464, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1679 (1975). Where information in an affidavit was supplied by a “concerned citizen,” and the information had been corroborated by the affiant, the magistrate had sufficient basis for finding that probable cause existed for issuance of a warrant. State v. Davis, 217 Ga. App. 225, 457 S.E.2d 194, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 411 (1995), aff’d, 266 Ga. 212, 465 S.E.2d 438, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 15 (1996). Police officer’s affidavit was insufficient where the informant had given no facts from which the officer could conclude that contraband might be found in defendants’ home, and the officer admitted the information amounted to “just a suspicion” on the part of the informant. State v. Brown, 186 Ga. App. 155, 366 S.E.2d 816, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 297 (1988).
- Factual basis for believing infor-Where affidavit contains false statements as to informant.
- Where the police officer who executed the search warrant affidavit acknowledged during the hearing and defendant’s motion to suppress that the allegedly reliable information was actually just “street talk” picked up at various times from more than one person, and that the police officer/affiant, instead of receiving the material information from a single person possessing appropriate credentials as an informant, had pieced together fragments of information obtained from at least three persons and had concocted the fictitious “reliable informant” from three different people, and, affiant admitted, no single one of the three actual informants could have fully qualified, under the criteria recited in the affidavit as the sort of reliable informant whose information can ordinarily constitute the basis for probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the inculpatory evidence seized during the search. Daniels v. State, 183 Ga. App. 651, 359 S.E.2d 735, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2735 (1987). Affidavit based on information
- from informant sufficient.
- Where the affidavit related that the affiant was told by an informant whose information had previously led to an arrest in a drug case and an arrest and conviction in a burglary case that the informant had personally observed marijuana and cocaine in defendant’s possession within the past 36 hours, that information was sufficient, under the totality of the circumstances, to show probable cause to believe that appellant was in possession of contraband and to support issuance of a search warrant. Wells v. State, 180 Ga. App. 133, 348 S.E.2d 681, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2689 (1986). mant’s basis of knowledge in affidavit
- Effect of failure to include inforor testimony.
- It clearly is the better practice, if an informant has obtained information through personal observation, or contact, or through some other reliable manner, to include this fact in the affidavit or so inform the magistrate considering its issuance; however, failure to include a statement of the informant’s basis of knowledge in the affidavit or to specifically inform the magistrate of that basis by sworn testimony does not always cause the resulting warrant to be fatally defective. Where neither the affidavit nor the sworn oral testimony demonstrates that the magistrate was informed of the manner in which the information was obtained by the informant, it is necessary to decide whether the affidavit and testimony concerning the informant’s tip supplied the magistrate with a detailed report of the sort which in common experience may be recognized as having been obtained in a reliable way. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1948 (1980).
- Purpose of “underlying circumstances” requirement.
- The “underlying circumstances” requirement is designed to locate the original source of the incriminating information and to examine the validity or reliability of that information, but is not concerned with the overall reliability of the informant. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1948 (1980). Informant only a “tipster” where participation in the offense merely
- established probable cause.
- Where the informant’s participation merely established probable cause to search the defendant’s residence, and the defendant is charged with possession with intent to distribute and not for the sale of marijuana to the informant, in the strict sense, the informant was a “tipster” and not a “participant” in the offense charged against the defendant. State v. Martin, 156 Ga. App. 554, 275 S.E.2d 129, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3121 (1980). mant’s observation of contraband
- Search warrant based on inforwas valid.
- Where the affidavit related that the informant personally observed contraband at appellants’ residence, the informant’s observation was sufficient to establish the basis for information of the contraband. Therefore, appellants’contentions of error in regard to the sufficiency of the search warrant are not meritorious. Davidson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 457, 274 S.E.2d 807, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3066 (1980). Informant’s observation of where contraband concealed supported
- probable cause finding.
- Evidence affirming details of an informant’s tip, i.e., that defendant matched the description of a drug dealer and that defendant had “a large bulge” in the area of the defendant’s pants where the informant had seen defendant conceal contraband, was sufficient to verify the tipster’s veracity and support the trial court’s finding that the police had probable cause on which to arrest the defendant. Manzione v. State, 194 Ga. App. 227, 390 S.E.2d 121, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 41 (1990).
- Informant’s information not stale.
- — Information was sufficiently detailed to show that it was more than a mere casual rumor or accusation made on reputation and not stale, where it stated that the informant had been on the property “in the very recent past” and that defendant “is presently storing marijuana in the described building.” Lang v. State, 168 Ga. App. 693, 310 S.E.2d 276, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3434 (1983). An affidavit for a search warrant stating that an informant has seen drugs on a suspect’s premises within the past week is not invalid as containing stale informa-Probable Cause (Cont’d) 3. Informants (Cont’d) tion. Black v. State, 167 Ga. App. 204, 305 S.E.2d 837, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3313 (1983).
- Stale information held not sole basis of probable cause.
- Where, based upon information of an informant, surveillance is carried out for several months and up to one day prior to the securing of the warrant, which surveillance shows an activity and the manner in which it occurs, which activity indicates a very probable violation of the lottery law, the activity being a repetitive one and such as would ordinarily occur when a lottery was being carried on (in the manner as previously stated by the informant) as distinguished from a chance occurrence, the stale information of the informant is not the sole basis of probable cause. Logan v. State, 135 Ga. App. 879, 219 S.E.2d 615, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1857 (1975). 4. Hearsay Hearsay itself can form basis for existence of probable cause if it is reliable or otherwise corroborated, and observations of fellow officers engaged in a common investigation are also plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number. Dudley v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 456, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13346 (N.D. Ga. 1970). An arrest may be made upon hearsay evidence. Duffy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 847, 275 S.E.2d 658, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3221 (1980).
- Requirements for sufficient hearsay.
- If hearsay tip of a reliable informer on which warrant is based does not sufficiently state the underlying circumstances from which informant has concluded the defendants are violating the law, or does not sufficiently detail the informant’s activities, but is relying on mere casual rumor or general reputation, a warrant, search, or seizure based thereon is illegal. Register v. State, 124 Ga. App. 136, 183 S.E.2d 68, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 844 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919, 92 S. Ct. 947, 30 L. Ed. 2d 790, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 3633 (1972). Creditable hearsay sufficient to
- support issuance of warrant.
- Insufficiency of probable cause for a search warrant does not appear from the fact alone that some or all of the facts recited in an affidavit come from information furnished by others, if there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1212 (1969). An affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information so long as there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 774 (1981).
- Substantial basis required for crediting hearsay.
- Hearsay may support the issuance of a valid warrant if the magistrate is informed of some of the underlying circumstances supporting the affiant’s conclusions and the affiant’s belief that the informant was credible or the informant’s information reliable; there must be a substantial basis for crediting such hearsay. Smith v. State, 136 Ga. App. 17, 220 S.E.2d 11, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1230 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 938, 96 S. Ct. 1671, 48 L. Ed. 2d 179, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 1353 (1976). Affidavit based on hearsay, without
- more, insufficient to support issuance.
- If the affidavit submitted for the issuance of a search warrant does not set forth the underlying circumstances upon which the informer’s conclusions are based and does not present facts to show the credibility and reliability of the informer, the magistrate should not issue the warrant. United States v. Williams, 322 F. Supp. 1074, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14505 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
- Necessity of underlying circumstances to support hearsay information.
- Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was credible or the informant’s information reliable. Gordon v. State, 150 Ga. App. 862, 258 S.E.2d 664, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2401 (1979). Insufficient support where affidavit
- recites no underlying facts supporting hearsay.
- There is insufficient probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant on its face if the affidavit states no factual reasons for the reliability of the unnamed informer nor any facts to support the reiterated, bare conclusion that the property was stolen. Johnson v. State, 128 Ga. App. 51, 195 S.E.2d 754, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1381 (1973). Probable cause not precluded by “hearsay upon hearsay.” — That there is “hearsay upon hearsay” for the information upon which an affidavit is based does not preclude a finding of probable cause. Gordon v. State, 150 Ga. App. 862, 258 S.E.2d 664, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2401 (1979). Reliable hearsay information plus
- affiant’s personal observations sufficient support.
- Information received from an informant who has proven to be reliable in the past, in conjunction with affiant’s personal observation that violators of the law sought to be enforced frequent the place to be searched, is sufficient to sustain a search warrant. Thornton v. State, 125 Ga. App. 374, 187 S.E.2d 583, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1341 (1972). Hearsay information sufficient to
- support issuance of warrant.
- If the underlying circumstances on which the warrant is sought and upon which the informant concluded the stolen articles sought were where the informant claimed them to be are disclosed in the affidavit, the fact that the circumstances involved hearsay information is immaterial so long as the information was sufficient to show probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. Knowles v. State, 124 Ga. App. 377, 183 S.E.2d 617, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 924 (1971). Hearsay declarant reliable where
- identified as interested citizen.
- On the defendant’s contention that the affidavit on which a search warrant was based was defective because the hearsay declarants were not shown to be reliable, because the hearsay declarants were identified as interested citizens, the mere averments of those who provided the information were enough to support a presumption of reliability, credibility, and accuracy, and the hearsay statements therefore could serve as the foundation for probable cause. Cash v. State, 166 Ga. App. 835, 305 S.E.2d 618, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2345 (1983). Information relayed by police to other law enforcement officers not
- double hearsay.
- Factual information relayed by police to other law enforcement officers is not per se subject to “double hearsay” objection, question being whether probable cause is shown. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1696 (1974). 5. Probable Cause Found Facts sufficient to find probable
- cause for search in drug transaction.
- — Considering the totality of the facts, including an informant’s statement, a timely connection between the informant’s drug buy at defendant’s apartment and the application for a warrant to search that apartment, the drugs found in the informant’s car, and observations of the informant entering and leaving defendant’s apartment, a magistrate had a substantial basis to find a fair probability that contraband would be found at defendant’s apartment. Evans v. State, 263 Ga. App. 572, 588 S.E.2d 764, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1197 (2003), cert. denied, No. S04C0348, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 166 (Ga. Feb. 16, 2004). Facts sufficient to find probable cause to arrest defendant for drug
- offenses.
- Probable cause for a warrantless arrest existed since: (1) after receiving information from a county sheriff’s department that a certain pager number might be that of a drug dealer, an agent of a narcotics squad called the pager number and arranged a drug buy using a confidential informant; (2) the buy took place, two individuals were arrested, and one of them informed the arresting officers that the defendant had given the arrested person the cocaine to sell and observed the transaction from a nearby alleyway; and (3) the officers went to the defendant’s home and found defendant outside the home, running, and carrying a flashlight and a police scanner. Fortson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 533, 544 S.E.2d 719, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 32 (2001). Probable Cause (Cont’d) 5. Probable Cause Found (Cont’d) Facts justified officer’s belief that
- officer had seen possession of marijuana.
- Because a police officer, upon observing a person smoking what the officer believed to be a marijuana cigarette and upon discovering a partially smoked cigarette in the same area, the officer clearly had probable cause to believe the person possessed less than one ounce of marijuana, a misdemeanor (O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b)), thus authorizing a warrantless arrest. Corbitt v. State, 166 Ga. App. 311, 304 S.E.2d 123, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2147 (1983). Odor of burning marijuana coming from defendant’s vehicle was sufficient to provide probable cause for the warrantless search of the vehicle since the officer’s initial approach was permissible. State v. Folk, 238 Ga. App. 206, 521 S.E.2d 194. Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress since the police had probable cause to search the driver’s vehicle because a police officer smelled the odor of burning marijuana coming from the car following a valid traffic stop and the driver gave consent to search the car, the police did not need to establish that probable cause existed to search individual containers in the car which might contain contraband since the probable cause that existed to search the car gave them the right to also search each of the car’s containers, and, thus, the trial court should not have suppressed evidence of contraband found in the book bag of the passenger, the defendant. State v. Selph, 261 Ga. App. 541, 583 S.E.2d 212, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 697 (2003). Police dog’s positive reaction to
- presence of drugs as probable cause.
- — A police dog’s positive reaction to the presence of drugs in the defendant’s suitcase, along with the other facts present, supplied DEA agents with requisite probable cause to seek a search warrant for the luggage, where the defendant had given false information to the airline concerning the defendant’s call back telephone number, as well as false information to a DEA agent concerning the telephone number of the defendant’s residence, the defendant was traveling alone on a revalidated ticket paid for with cash from a known source city with little luggage and the defendant became nervous when interrogated by DEA agents. Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1012, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3545, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1393, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 781 (1983); Carter v. State, 222 Ga. App. 345, 474 S.E.2d 240, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 819 (1996). A drug dog’s alert, together with the defendant’s behavior, demeanor, and responses to the questions posed by law enforcement officers, provided probable cause for a search warrant for defendant’s luggage. Rivera v. State, 247 Ga. App. 713, 545 S.E.2d 105, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 106 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0767, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 506 (Ga. June 12, 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 901, 122 S. Ct. 231, 151 L. Ed. 2d 165, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 6737 (2001).
- Probable cause based on companion’s possession of contraband.
- Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied where defendant was stopped at an airport but the initial contact by the officers was terminated by them, the second stop was made only after contraband was discovered in the possession of the defendant’s traveling companion, at which point the officers had probable cause to resume their investigation to determine defendant’s relationship, if any, to the contraband, the defendant voluntarily accompanied them to the private room and chose to surrender the marijuana in the defendant’s possession after the defendant was read the defendant’s rights and consented to the search, and the defendant was then arrested and a valid search incident to the arrest revealed that the defendant was in possession of cocaine. Seals v. State, 181 Ga. App. 687, 353 S.E.2d 577, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1531 (1987).
- Probable cause for murder arrest.
- — There was probable cause for a murder defendant’s arrest where police officers had been informed by other residents in the home where the defendant was living that the defendant had admitted killing the victims and that the defendant had shown the residents a tooth from one of the victims. Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 128 (2007). Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of the defendant’s sister’s apartment as the search warrant did show probable cause that the defendant was the murderer because the defendant had been identified through still photographs taken from the surveillance video of the robbery and shooting; the defendant had been identified as the actual shooter by another person involved in the crime; and a warrant for the defendant’s arrest had been issued. Glenn v. State, 302 Ga. 276, 806 S.E.2d 564, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 874 (2017). Admitted possession or voluntary production of controlled substance
- gives rise to probable cause.
- Even in the absence of consent, a defendant’s admitted possession of controlled substances gives rise to probable cause to search the defendant’s body and totebag, and in the alternative, defendant’s voluntary production of the controlled substances gives rise to probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of controlled substances. Once probable cause to arrest is established, any search of the person incident to the arrest is valid. United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13480 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097, 102 S. Ct. 669, 70 L. Ed. 2d 638, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 2844 (1981).
- Profiling of drug carrier.
- Defendant’s fourth amendment rights were not violated when drug agents searched the bag defendant was carrying after defendant got off a train in a Georgia city and defendant fit the profile of a drug courier who a confidential informant told one drug agent would be on the train; defendant’s actions in attempting to flee after defendant had consented to speak with another drug agent and the totality of the circumstances in general showed that the drug agents had probable cause to search the bag and, thus, the search was part of a valid arrest. Higdon v. State, 261 Ga. App. 729, 583 S.E.2d 556, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 747 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C1556, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 923 (Ga. Oct. 20, 2003).
- Probable cause based on law enforcement affidavit.
- Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during the execution of a search warrant as the appellate court found that, after reviewing all of the information in the affidavit as a whole, it provided sufficient probable cause for the magistrate to issue the search warrant and that the information provided was not stale. The warrant was executed the same day that it was issued and was supported by a law enforcement affidavit reciting a stop made of defendant’s vehicle for a failure to have tags and various drugs and drug-related items found in the vehicle that served as the basis for obtaining the search warrant for defendant’s home. Cleveland v. State, 290 Ga. App. 835, 660 S.E.2d 777, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 325 (2008), aff’d, 285 Ga. 142, 674 S.E.2d 289, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 72 (2009). Probable cause based on earlier
- corroborated allegations.
- Affidavit indicating that attesting agent learned several months earlier that defendant had sold marijuana and that this information was corroborated by other unnamed, but multiple sources, was sufficient to establish probable cause for purposes of a search warrant. Welch v. State, 231 Ga. App. 74, 498 S.E.2d 555, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 330 (1998). Information obtained from reliable
- confidential informant.
- Probable cause existed for a warrantless search of the defendant because: (1) a reliable confidential informant told a police officer that the defendant was transporting cocaine, specifically described the vehicle the defendant would be operating, identified the passenger who would be accompanying the defendant, and identified the route the defendant would be taking; (2) the officers found the vehicle being driven by the defendant traveling in the direction described by the informant, and the defendant was accompanied by the person who had been identified by the informant; (3) the defendant was not completely cooperative when asked to step out of the vehicle; and (4) a search of the defendant revealed a small plastic bag which appeared to contain cocaine residue. Meadows v. State, 247 Ga. App. 634, 545 S.E.2d 76, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 71 (2001). Probable cause supported the issuance of a search warrant since: (1) a reliable Probable Cause (Cont’d) 5. Probable Cause Found (Cont’d) confidential informant informed a law enforcement officer about seeing a quantity of an off-white chunky substance in the defendant’s residence within the past 72 hours and that the defendant represented the substance as methamphetamine; (2) the informant had provided information in the past month that led to the seizure of controlled substances and the arrest of individuals; (3) the informant rode with the officer to the defendant’s home and pointed it out; and (4) the informant gave more detail by alerting the officer that the defendant carried a handgun. Claire v. State, 247 Ga. App. 648, 544 S.E.2d 537, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 73 (2001).
- Police bulletin description plus additional evidence.
- Because the descriptions in a police bulletin clearly were sufficient to justify detaining the defendant based upon the reasonable suspicion that the defendant was wanted for past criminal conduct and the arrest did not occur until after the legitimate discovery of additional evidence caused the officers’ reasonable suspicion to ripen into probable cause for defendant’s arrest, the arrest being proper, the officers’ subsequent search of the defendant’s car was justified as being incident to a lawful arrest. Thomas v. Newsome, 821 F.2d 1550, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 9637 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 967, 108 S. Ct. 461, 98 L. Ed. 2d 401, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 4983 (1987).
- Detailed directions to, and description of, defendant’s home.
- There was a reasonable basis for probable cause where the affidavit contained detailed directions to the defendant’s address as well as a detailed description of the defendant’s house. Sims v. State, 207 Ga. App. 353, 427 S.E.2d 842, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 185 (1993). Clearly defined paths between known contraband and defendant’s house gave reasonable cause to believe that contraband was present in house. Brooks v. State, 140 Ga. App. 371, 231 S.E.2d 138, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1482 (1976). rest of driver for driving with sus-
- Probable cause based on prior arpended license.
- There was probable cause for arrest because, upon approaching a vehicle, a police officer recognized the driver as someone the officer had previously stopped and found to be driving with a suspended license, and when asked for the license, the driver stated that the driver did not have one and the officer confirmed via a radio call that the license was indeed suspended. Hightower v. State, 166 Ga. App. 177, 303 S.E.2d 515, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2090 (1983). Handwriting samples described
- sufficiently.
- Where, because of their nature, only a generic description of handwriting samples sought in warrant was possible, there was sufficient probable cause for issuance of the warrant. Lowe v. State, 203 Ga. App. 277, 416 S.E.2d 750, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 500 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0790, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 523 (Ga. May 21, 1992). Giving of false name as probable
- cause.
- Defendant’s giving of a false name to a Drug Enforcement Administration agent constituted probable cause for the defendant’s arrest. Moran v. State, 170 Ga. App. 837, 318 S.E.2d 716, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2931 (1984). Facts sufficient to find probable
- cause to arrest defendant for battery.
- — Where, upon arriving at the scene, an officer observed the reported victim bleeding from the head and saw the defendant outside the victim’s shop, and where the defendant became hostile when the officer attempted to ask the defendant what had happened, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for a battery upon the victim as well as a battery upon the officer in that the defendant acted in a hostile manner and resisted arrest. Newsome v. State, 149 Ga. App. 415, 254 S.E.2d 381, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1876 (1979).
- Violation of building code regulation sufficient.
- Plaintiffs violated building code regulation by transporting a house through the streets of the county without having obtained a permit or given the county the required 24 hours notice, and damaging a traffic light in the process. In the course of investigating the offense and determining how and whether to cite the plaintiffs, the police officer detained them and although the police officer perhaps could have acted somewhat more quickly in making a determination and perhaps could have been more solicitous of the discomfort that the plaintiffs purportedly suffered by having to sit in a hot car during the process, neither the officer nor the county violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Lyle v. Dodd, 857 F. Supp. 958, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896 (N.D. Ga. 1994). Facts constituting probable cause tilled spirits. See United States v. Ramey, 464 F.2d 1240, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8045 (5th Cir. 1972). Probable cause for stop of vehicle
- to search vehicle for non-tax-paid disnear burglary site.
- Because a police officer, answering a burglary call at a house located on a narrow, sparsely populated, little travelled dirt road at 11:40 P.M., stopped a truck the police officer noticed driving by the burglarized home, and upon stopping the truck, noticed the smell of alcohol upon the defendant driver and arrested the driver for driving under the influence, although no traffic violation was observed, the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify stopping defendant, and the defendant’s fourth amendment rights were not violated. Smith v. State, 182 Ga. App. 58, 354 S.E.2d 681, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1626 (1987). No probable cause when switching
- out family cars.
- In the plaintiff’s action for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force, the plaintiff’s explanation to the officer that the plaintiff was in the parking lot only looking to switch out the plaintiff and plaintiff’s spouse’s vehicles precluded finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for loitering under O.G.C.A. § 16-11-36(a); therefore, the officer’s actions in arresting the plaintiff constituted a violation of clearly established fourth amendment rights. Perkins v. Thrasher, 701 Fed. Appx. 887, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12945 (11th Cir. 2017). tering alcohol test after valid vehicle
- Probable cause found for adminisstop.
- Under the fourth amendment, an officer had probable cause to have a defendant submit to an alco-sensor test. The officer had validly stopped the defendant’s car after a passenger littered, and the officer saw open beer bottles in the car and smelled alcohol in the car even after the bottles and the passenger had been removed. Hinton v. State, 289 Ga. App. 309, 656 S.E.2d 918, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 85 (2008). Facts constituting probable cause that vehicle contained non-tax-paid
- whiskey.
- See United States v. Hill, 442 F.2d 259, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10367 (5th Cir. 1971). Probable cause based on belief that
- defendant was driving under suspended license.
- Because a police officer learned that defendant’s license was suspended and the officer had just seen defendant driving a car, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving without a license; because the officer could thereafter search defendant incident to arrest, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Edge v. State, 269 Ga. App. 88, 603 S.E.2d 502, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1082 (2004).
- Search warrant of defendant’s car.
- — Magistrate had probable cause to issue a search warrant for a defendant’s car the day after the victim was kidnapped and murdered; there was a fair probability that evidence of the crimes would be found in the car, which the defendant had parked in the victim’s driveway. Dalton v. State, 282 Ga. 300, 647 S.E.2d 580, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 523 (2007).
- Probable cause for arrest in hindering law enforcement.
- When an initial stop was lawful and the defendant failed to stop when ordered to do so, there was probable cause to believe O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) was violated and the defendant’s apprehension and arrest did not violate the fourth amendment. United States v. Foskey, 455 Fed. Appx. 884, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 956, 133 S. Ct. 460, 184 L. Ed. 2d 283, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8050 (2012). 6. Probable Cause Not Found ation not supported by probable Probable Cause (Cont’d) 6. Probable Cause Not Found (Cont’d)
- Arrest based upon subjective evalucause.
- Because accused never denied having something in the accused’s boot but said the bulge was money, and the officer, while acknowledging that the bulge could have been currency, made the subjective evaluation that it was contraband, and that subjective evaluation became an integral part of the officer’s decision to arrest the accused, the law enforcement officer did not have probable cause to arrest the accused, and the accused’s motion to suppress the evidence uncovered in the ensuing search should have been granted. Rebeiro v. State, 186 Ga. App. 518, 367 S.E.2d 857, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 405 (1988).
- Hindsight as basis.
- The existence of probable cause cannot be determined on the basis of hindsight, such as a subsequent post-arrest search of defendant which produces drugs. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 508 (1992). Probable cause nonexistent when
- rug first seen by officer.
- When the officer first viewed the rug, officer only suspected that it was one of the stolen turquoise rugs. It was not immediately apparent to the officer that the rug was stolen property; thus, it cannot be said that the officer had probable cause to seize a rug when it was first seen by the officer. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1610 (1976). Mere suspicion that two young people look nervous and that “things didn’t add up” is insufficient to warrant an arrest. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976).
- Spouse’s prior drug possession insufficient.
- Possession by defendant’s spouse of contraband drugs in another county some two weeks prior did not show probable cause. State v. Suddeth, 207 Ga. App. 103, 427 S.E.2d 76, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 81 (1993).
- Facts insufficient to establish probable cause.
- Even though a tip, combined with the discovery of defendant and prior information relating to the defendant, gave rise to an articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing sufficient to support an investigatory detention, these facts were insufficient under the circumstances to establish probable cause for the defendant’s arrest for unlawful possession of drugs. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 508 (1992). A nervous black person standing outside an apartment complex at 7:00 P.M. with the person’s hand in the person’s pocket did not, standing alone, give rise to an articulable suspicion that the person was engaged in unlawful activity. State v. Banks, 223 Ga. App. 838, 479 S.E.2d 168, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1315 (1996). Where a white person in a black neighborhood late at night picked up a black person at a location considered by police to be a high-crime area and then drove slowly through the neighborhood, such behavior was not alone sufficient to indicate that the individuals were or might be engaged in illegal activity. Hughes v. State, 269 Ga. 258, 497 S.E.2d 790, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 274 (1998). Where the defendant was arrested without a warrant, but none of the statutory exceptions to the warrant requirement applied, no probable cause existed, and no authority to enter the defendant’s dormitory room had been given, the arrest was illegal and a subsequent confession subject to exclusion. State v. Guillory, 236 Ga. App. 230, 511 S.E.2d 591, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 125 (1999). Stopping in a parking lot while lost, being from out-of-state, and being in a car with a tag from another state were not factors that alone were sufficient to suggest criminal activity, and the fact that defendants were parked in a high drug area did not constitute a justification for a brief detention. State v. Kwiatkowski, 238 Ga. App. 390, 519 S.E.2d 43, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 825 (1999). An officer who stopped defendant’s vehicle for tinted windows had no probable cause to detain the defendant while the officer obtained the services of a drug dog to investigate the sealed package in the trunk for which defendant had withdrawn consent to search; the officer’s knowledge that drugs were being transported down the interstate provided no basis whatsoever to establish probable cause as to defendant. Montero v. State, 245 Ga. App. 181, 537 S.E.2d 429, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 913 (2000). Probable cause did not support a search warrant since: (1) the affidavit failed to mention that it was based on hearsay evidence from two confidential informants; (2) the affidavit failed to disclose that one informant had a criminal background and was being paid for the information; (3) the affidavit had no information regarding the reliability of the second informant; (4) the attesting officer had no personal knowledge of the reliability of either informant; and (5) there was insufficient corroboration of the information supplied by the informants to otherwise establish their credibility. Elom v. State, 248 Ga. App. 273, 546 S.E.2d 50, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 244 (2001). Even though defendant matched a “sex offender profile,” because there was no link established between defendant’s apartment and the alleged molestation of the victim, the search of defendant’s apartment and subsequent search of computer files was illegal. State v. Staley, 249 Ga. App. 207, 548 S.E.2d 26, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 462 (2001). Since a trial court found probable cause for a vehicle search based, in part, on the discovery of contraband in the vehicle, and it was unclear whether the trial court would have reached the same result absent this factor, the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress in this regard was improper. Quick v. State, 279 Ga. App. 835, 632 S.E.2d 742, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 714 (2006). sonable cause to believe defendant
- Facts insufficient to provide reahad committed burglary.
- The fact the appellant’s automobile was seen late at night, 500 yards from the location of a recent burglary, did not in and of itself provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the burglary or that the defendant’s automobile contained stolen property. State v. Avret, 156 Ga. App. 527, 275 S.E.2d 113, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3109 (1980). Reasonable suspicion not probable
- cause.
- Where the drug enforcement officer identified travel characteristics of defendant consistent with drug trafficking; an incorrect phone number was given to a Miami ticket agent; the defendant showed manifestations of nervousness and gave inconsistent answers regarding whom defendant was visiting in Miami; and a roll of plastic wrap was found in defendant’s backpack, while these factors may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of illicit drug activity, they were insufficient, even when combined, to constitute probable cause to believe a suspect is transporting drugs. State v. Williams, 242 Ga. App. 34, 528 S.E.2d 554, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 81 (2000). Reasonableness
- Factors for determining reasonableness.
- In determining the reasonableness of a particular law enforcement practice, a court must weigh the public interest promoted by the practice against its intrusion upon the personal rights of the individual protected by the fourth amendment. Some of the factors that the court should consider are the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15755 (5th Cir. 1980). Unreasonableness depends on
- facts.
- Reasonableness in terms of search and seizure is not determined by the hindsight of appellate court judges after weeks of academic deliberation; it is determined by the foresight of the police officer on the scene who must act in the public interest in a very short space of time. The reasonableness of the officer’s action must be judged in relation to the circumstances then existing and is in the first instance a question for the trial judge to determine. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 652 (1966). The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms and each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Watts v. Cannon, 224 Ga. 797, 164 S.E.2d 780, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 954 (1968). Reasonableness (Cont’d) Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. United States v. Cassell, 542 F.2d 279, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 6257 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985, 97 S. Ct. 1684, 52 L. Ed. 2d 380, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1632 (1977). Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4 depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. Martasin v. State, 155 Ga. App. 396, 271 S.E.2d 2, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2599 (1980). The standard against which U.S. Const., amend. 4 requires that we judge the validity of a search or seizure is one of reasonableness in light of the totality of the circumstances. Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15755 (5th Cir. 1980). It was reasonable for police officers, knowing that premises were to be the subject of the immediate execution of a search warrant, to detain temporarily a vehicle containing the defendant which had just left the property, in order to identify the occupants and see if one of them was the person they had just overheard discussing gambling and drugs on the phone. Garmon v. State, 235 Ga. App. 671, 510 S.E.2d 350, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1585 (1998), aff’d, 271 Ga. 673, 524 S.E.2d 211, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1999).
- “Reasonable” not construed in abstract.
- The word “reasonable” with respect to arrests is not to be construed in the abstract or in a vacuum unrelated to the field to which it applies. Standards which might be reasonable for the apprehension of bank robbers might not be reasonable for the arrest of narcotics peddlers. United States v. Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 945, 92 S. Ct. 299, 30 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 614 (1971). Reasonableness a question for
- judge.
- In the first instance the reasonableness of a search is a question for the trial judge to determine. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 652 (1966). What may be unreasonable search of house may be reasonable in the case of a motorcar; but even in the case of motorcars, the test is still whether the search is unreasonable. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 652 (1966). Stop was reasonable in light of the verification of the information supplied by the tipster, coupled with the agents’ observations of defendant’s behavior upon exiting the plane and defendant’s hostility upon being advised of the reason for the stop. Gordon v. State, 242 Ga. App. 50, 528 S.E.2d 838, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 88 (2000).
- Stop of juvenile was reasonable.
- Juvenile court properly denied a juvenile’s motion to suppress the physical and testimonial evidence as well as properly adjudicated the juvenile delinquent as a result of the evidence obtained by the police not being the product of an illegal detention. The officers who stopped the juvenile and three other cohorts had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the juvenile should have been in school at the time and day of the stop, the juvenile matched the description of a youth involved in home burglaries with three others, and the four were stopped while canvassing the same neighborhood where a rash of burglaries had been occurring. In the Interest of J.T., 297 Ga. App. 636, 678 S.E.2d 111, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 503 (2009). Searches 1. In General
- When search occurs.
- A search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. Thomas v. State, 203 Ga.App. 529, 417 S.E.2d 353, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 515 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0876, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 455 (Ga. June 4, 1992).
- Reasonableness determines legality of search.
- Test of whether search was legal, is whether search was reasonable. Andreu v. State, 124 Ga. App. 793, 186 S.E.2d 137, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1108 (1971). Police officers’ pat-down search of the defendant, after detaining the defendant as the defendant left the site of a house about to be searched pursuant to a search warrant, was reasonable and justified under the circumstances. Garmon v. State, 235 Ga. App. 671, 510 S.E.2d 350, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1585 (1998), aff’d, 271 Ga. 673, 524 S.E.2d 211, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1999). Because the defendant was detained after leaving a residence at which a search warrant was about to be executed, and because the police, having ascertained the defendant’s identity, relied on information regarding prior drug involvement to initiate a “free air search,” there was sufficient articulable suspicion to justify the search. Garmon v. State, 235 Ga. App. 671, 510 S.E.2d 350, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1585 (1998), aff’d, 271 Ga. 673, 524 S.E.2d 211, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1999). Reasonable articulable suspicion existed to stop defendant in an investigative detention after a motel manager notified the police that drugs were being sold from a specific motel room, an officer placed the motel room under surveillance, defendant approached the motel room door while looking to see if anyone was observing, defendant walked away when the officer approached, and defendant refused to take hands out of pants pockets after the officer caught up with the defendant; therefore, the bag of crack cocaine found on the ground where defendant had been ordered to lie down was admissible evidence. Edwards v. State, 253 Ga.App. 837, 560 S.E.2d 735, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 226 (2002), cert. denied, No. S02C1161, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 599 (Ga. July 15, 2002). termined by hindsight of appellate court judges after weeks of academic deliberation; it is determined by the foresight of the police officer on the scene who must act in the public interest in a very short space of time. The reasonableness of the officer’s action must be judged in relation to the circumstances then existing and is in the first instance a question for the trial judge to determine. Andreu v. State, 124 Ga. App. 793, 186 S.E.2d 137, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1108 (1971); Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1696 (1974). Requirements of reasonable
- Reasonableness of search is not desearch.
- Even though the execution of a warrant is directed to all peace officers, a search pursuant to it meets the requirements of the United States and Georgia Constitutions if it was limited in its scope to physically described persons in a specific vicinity, and the description sufficiently permitted a prudent officer with a search warrant to be able to locate the person and place definitely and with reasonable certainty. Fomby v. State, 120 Ga. App. 387, 170 S.E.2d 585, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 786 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008, 90 S. Ct. 1236, 25 L. Ed. 2d 421, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 2375 (1970).
- General searches are prohibited.
- Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1610 (1976). jective standards which ensure that invasion of personal privacy is justified by legitimate governmental interests. The governmental interests to be served in the detection or prevention of crime are subject to traditional standards of probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2421 (1979).
- Grounds for search must satisfy ob-Officer’s discretion limited by language of warrant.
- Language in search warrants authorizing a search for “any other item(s) that tend to lead to probable cause that a crime has been committed” did not cause the warrants to be general warrants prohibited by the fourth amendment because the language was preceded by a list of specific items which sufficiently limited the executing officers’ discretion. Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 664 S.E.2d 211, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 622 (2008), overruled in part, Tatum v. State, 319 Ga. 187, 903 S.E.2d 109, 2024 Ga. LEXIS 137 (2024). To violate U.S. Const., amend. 4, a search must be: (1) an unreasonable search; and (2) by a state or federal officer. A search by a private individual for purely private reasons does not fall within fourth amendment proscriptions. United States v. McDaniel, 574 F.2d 1224, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 10776 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952, 99 S. Ct. 2181, 60 L. Searches (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) Ed. 2d 1057, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 1927 (1979).
- Search requires state conduct.
- Public utility’s termination of plaintiff’s employment pursuant to the results of a urinalysis drug screening test were not actionable under U.S. Const., amend. 4 as it was conducted by a private actor under no governmental compulsion to do so. Parker v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 818 F. Supp. 345, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4975 (S.D. Ga. 1993). Right of privacy balanced against
- right of search.
- When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a police officer or a government enforcement agent. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828, 1961 U.S. LEXIS 1396 (1961). Necessity for kind of search made is weighed heavily in balance against expectation of privacy. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1173, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3803 (1975). There can be no ready test for determining reasonableness of a search other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. In determining the reasonableness of a search, the social utility of the search must be balanced against the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1173, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3803 (1975). Where a fourth amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context. Chandler v. Miller, 952 F. Supp. 804, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21067 (N.D. Ga. 1994). No standing to challenge search
- and seizure.
- Where defendants deny having any right of possession or interest in the searched building or the items seized, they have no standing to challenge the search or seizure. Byers v. State, 204 Ga. App. 552, 420 S.E.2d 23, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 911 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 928, 113 S. Ct. 1305, 122 L. Ed. 2d 694, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 1388 (1993). Defendant, who was a visitor at a motel room, had no expectation of privacy in the motel room and therefore lacked standing to challenge a search of the motel room in which defendant was found with crack cocaine. Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App. 128, 690 S.E.2d 449, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 55 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C0870, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 438 (Ga. June 1, 2010).
- Balancing of employer’s and agency’s interests.
- The employer’s right under U.S. Const., amend. 4 to be free from unreasonable searches must be offset against the weight to be accorded Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s need to determine if the regulations it has issued to the industry are too oppressive. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Marshall, 496 F. Supp. 1178, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13274 (N.D. Ga. 1980), rev’d, 689 F.2d 950, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 24659 (11th Cir. 1982). Reasonableness of search and
- nexus of seized items thereto.
- Where an investigation of the accused was underway in connection with the accused’s forging and uttering stolen bonds, the accused’s use of a bank account in an assumed name, and the accused’s forged endorsements of stolen bonds, and where the accused was connected in an affidavit to such a scheme, and where documents seized pursuant to a search warrant were used as handwriting exemplars, the nexus of the seized documents to the search and to their use as handwriting exemplars was ample. United States v. Munroe, 421 F.2d 644, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851, 91 S. Ct. 79, 27 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 1208 (1970).
- Reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulate facts.
- Because the police officer had reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that defendant was engaged in criminal activity, the brief holdover of defendant until the canine unit arrived did not amount to a violation of defendant’s rights. United States v. Gonzalez, 952 F. Supp. 813, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 735 (M.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 189 F.3d 483, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 27168 (11th Cir. 1999). Search need not precede formal arrest if probable cause exists absent the result of the search and if formal arrest follows on the heels of the search. United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 20518 (11th Cir. 1982); Berry v. State, 163 Ga. App. 705, 294 S.E.2d 562, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3242 (1982).
- Extent of search.
- A search may be as extensive as reasonably required to locate the objects of the search. When searching for documents, some perusal may be needed to determine their relevance, and removal of documents for subsequent review can be appropriate. United States v. Lambert, 887 F.2d 1568, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 17005 (11th Cir. 1989).
- Knocking on outer doors as search.
- — Where a police officer enters upon private property only to the extent of knocking on outer doors, the fourth amendment is not violated. Dean v. State, 200 Ga. App. 752, 409 S.E.2d 667, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1140 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1484, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 583 (Ga. Sept. 6, 1991).
- Abandoned property.
- The constitutional protection of the fourth and fourteenth amendments does not apply to property which has been abandoned. Thus, if a defendant has abandoned property, there is no entitlement to protection of that property by the fourth or fourteenth amendments from an illegal search or seizure. Gresham v. State, 204 Ga. App. 540, 420 S.E.2d 71, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 907 (1992). Duffle bag that a deputy sheriff found on the grass near a driveway of a house from which the defendant fled was abandoned property for purposes of the fourth amendment. Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 647 S.E.2d 15, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 480 (2007). Not all containers and packages serve protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar’s tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Dressler v. State, 158 Ga. App. 11, 279 S.E.2d 454, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2050 (1981). Stolen goods found during lawful
- found by police during search desearch for other items.
- Once officers lawfully conducting a search for marijuana ascertained that the contents of a bag was silverware of various patterns and one of the officers believed the patterns were consistent with certain silverware reported stolen as well as the fact that it was concealed in a container which reasonably could hold marijuana and was located in a place where one does not expect to find silverware, this was sufficient to arouse the suspicion that the silverware was stolen and justify its seizure. Whittington v. State, 165 Ga. App. 763, 302 S.E.2d 617, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2010 (1983). Disclaimer of contraband found on companion after it is in possession of
- government did not preclude search.
- — Where defendant’s disclaimer of a companion and the companion’s luggage followed the search, the fact that defendant’s disclaimer occurred after the contraband was in the possession of the government did not preclude a finding of abandonment of the defendant’s expectations of privacy with respect to the luggage, since at the time the defendant denied knowing the companion the defendant was not aware that the cocaine had been discovered, and during the suppression hearing the defendant admitted that the defendant never intended to acknowledge an ownership interest in the bag or retake possession unless the companion reached the companion’s final destination without incident. United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 5153 (11th Cir. 1987).
- Incriminatory matter does not legalize unlawful search.
- If one is unlawfully searched, fact that incriminatory matter is found will not render the search legal. Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 900 (1970). Illegal search taints all evidence Searches (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d)
- obtained.
- An illegal search of the defendant’s watch pocket tainted all evidence obtained as a result of the search and the trial court erred when it denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in an inventory search of the defendant’s car arising out of the arrest which had followed the illegal search. Corley v. State, 236 Ga. App. 302, 512 S.E.2d 41, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 152 (1999). An after-the-search procedural deficit is not a violation of any right under U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Baty, 486 F.2d 240, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 7488 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 942, 94 S. Ct. 1948, 40 L. Ed. 2d 294, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 600 (1974). Violation of state procedural rule vs. Violation of federal procedural
- rule.
- Evidence seized from the defendant’s apartment pursuant to a search warrant would not be suppressed because a violation of state procedural law did not rise to the level of a fourth amendment violation, and there was no fourth amendment violation as police were in possession of a search warrant, signed by a judge and based on probable cause, at the time police seized evidence, and an affidavit provided ample probable cause for the search; even if the defendant could show that violation of a state procedural rule was analogous to a violation of a federal procedural rule for fourth amendment purposes, there was no evidence that the search might not have occurred if the video recording of an application hearing were maintained as part of the record in accordance with state rule. United States v. Gordon, No. 1:14-cr-312-WSD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162150 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2015), aff’d, 686 Fed. Appx. 702, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7002 (11th Cir. 2017). Use of pre-Miranda statements to
- obtain search warrant.
- Defendant did not show that warrants to search the defendant’s home were invalid when the defendant’s pre-Miranda statements were used to obtain the warrants because the defendant did not allege that the statements were involuntary, and physical evidence seized pursuant to a warrant obtained with a voluntary statement taken in violation of Miranda was admissible. Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 664 S.E.2d 211, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 622 (2008), overruled in part, Tatum v. State, 319 Ga. 187, 903 S.E.2d 109, 2024 Ga. LEXIS 137 (2024). lice officer does not constitute a “custodial search.” United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Search not done at point of deten-
- Request for identification by a potion.
- Search is not rendered illegal by fact that it was not done at point of detention. Davis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 931, 219 S.E.2d 598, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1879 (1975). Police may assume belongings on
- premises are part of it.
- Without notice of some sort of the ownership of a belonging, the police are entitled to assume that all objects within premises lawfully subject to search under a warrant are part of those premises for the purpose of executing the warrant. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2337 (1981). Broadscale search of premises in
- executing arrest warrant.
- Police officers who entered a home while executing an arrest warrant for the homeowner’s child had no authority to conduct a broadscale search, looking into cabinets and drawers. Nash v. Douglas County, 733 F. Supp. 100, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16462 (N.D. Ga. 1989). Searches of persons not named in ises to be searched are illegal absent independent justification for a personal search. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2337 (1981). Probable cause required to search
- search warrant but found on premvisitor’s belongings.
- An analysis which focuses entirely on whether a belonging is in the physical possession of a nonresident visitor to premises searchable under a warrant, while it serves to protect the zone of privacy around the visitor’s person, ignores the substantial interest the visitor has in the privacy of all the visitor’s possessions, wherever located. To overcome that interest, the federal and state Constitutions require a warrant supported by probable cause. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2337 (1981). Notice that items belong to visitor
- to searched premises.
- Whether the police had notice that they were searching the personal effects of a visitor to searched premises must be determined on the facts of each case. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2337 (1981). Pat down search of passenger in a
- stopped vehicle.
- Trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence by a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for a traffic violation because the state failed to meet its burden of being able to articulate a reasonable basis for the officer conducting a pat-down search of the passenger in that searching passengers who exit a stopped vehicle as a common practice was not sufficient grounds to justify the pat-down search of defendant. Milby v. State, 256 Ga. App. 429, 569 S.E.2d 256, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 922 (2002). Search of vehicle passenger not the fic stop and did not exceed the scope
- product of an illegally expanded trafof the consent given.
- Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of pills found on the defendant’s person during a traffic stop and convicted the defendant of possession of dihydrocodeinone, since the pat down search of the defendant did not exceed the scope of the consent search and was authorized to ensure the officer’s safety, and the safety of others, based on the vehicle driver identifying various weapons in the car. Further, the traffic stop was not illegally expanded since the defendant’s arrest occurred nine minutes into the stop and the driver’s radar check remained outstanding at the time. Stagg v. State, 297 Ga. App. 640, 678 S.E.2d 108, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 497 (2009). Consent search by owner uncovers
- illegal drugs of visitor.
- Trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress evidence where officers found marijuana in a bag under a bed in a trailer after the trailer’s owner consented to the search and the person who owned the bag and was visiting the trailer at first denied ownership of the bag. Osment v. State, 256 Ga. App. 591, 569 S.E.2d 262, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 967 (2002). Frisk must be confined to search
- for weapons.
- A frisk involves the patting-down of a person’s outer clothing by a police officer. Unlike a full search, a frisk is conducted solely for the purpose of insuring the safety of the officer and of others nearby, not to procure evidence for use at a subsequent trial; it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer. Clark v. State, 208 Ga. App. 896, 432 S.E.2d 220, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 729 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1456, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 1012 (Ga. Oct. 12, 1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1454, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 973 (Ga. Oct. 12, 1993). Because a police officer was unable to provide specific facts to justify a concern that the item in defendant’s pocket was a weapon, defendant’s fourth amendment rights were violated when the officer reached into defendant’s pockets; consequently, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Castleberry v. State, 275 Ga. App. 37, 619 S.E.2d 747, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 882 (2005). Search of persons arriving on
- premises being searched.
- The pat down or “frisk” of the defendant when the defendant arrived at the scene of a police search, given all of the facts known to the police on the scene, i.e., that the defendant carried a gun and that earlier arrestees were frightened of the defendant, did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Bonds, 829 F.2d 1072, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 13724 (11th Cir. 1987). Personal belongings brought by owner on visit to friend’s house retain their constitutional protection until their owner meaningfully abdicates control or responsibility. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2337 (1981). Search by merely testing locks not
- illegal.
- A law officer does not commit an illegal search when, with keys taken Searches (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) from the accused, the law officer tests the locks, but does not then enter the premises, never crosses the threshold of the premises, does not open the door, does not see or hear anything inside, receives no response to the law officer’s knock, and then makes an affidavit and obtains a search warrant. Thomas v. State, 145 Ga. App. 69, 243 S.E.2d 250, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1867 (1978). Normal security sweep prompting
- intrusion.
- Officers who find an apparently closed business unlocked during a normal security sweep may conduct a limited intrusion on the business premises for the sole purpose of securing the area and ensuring no intruders are present. Banks v. State, 229 Ga. App. 414, 493 S.E.2d 923, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1421 (1997), overruled in part, Calbreath v. State, 235 Ga. App. 638, 510 S.E.2d 145, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1592 (1998).
- Searches of prisoners’ cells.
- No one can rationally doubt that room searches represent an appropriate security measure and neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals has prohibited such searches, and even the most zealous advocate of prisoner’s right would not suggest that a warrant is required to conduct such a search. Riden v. State, 151 Ga. App. 654, 261 S.E.2d 409, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2737 (1979). A trespass does not of itself constitute an illegal search. Ehlers v. Bogue, 626 F.2d 1314, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13479 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909, 101 S. Ct. 1979, 68 L. Ed. 2d 298, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 1700 (1981).
- Observations of defendant from adjacent field not illegal search.
- Observations of defendant, a known liquor violator, from an adjacent property owner’s field about 50 yards away, by the use of binoculars, did not constitute an illegal search. United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9181 (5th Cir. 1970).
- First-tier encounter.
- Encounter between defendant, who was sitting with another person in a parked car at night near the edge of a wooded area, and three police officers who approached the car was a first-tier encounter that did not require an articulable suspicion, and contraband on defendant’s person that defendant proffered in a consensual search was admissible at trial. Carrera v. State, 261 Ga. App. 832, 584 S.E.2d 2, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 795 (2003). Reasonable cause sufficient to carry on clandestine surveillance in
- public toilets.
- Where the police have reasonable cause to believe that public toilet stalls are being used in the commission of crime, and when they confine their activities to the times when such crimes are most likely to occur, they are entitled to institute clandestine surveillance, even though they do not have probable cause to believe that the particular persons whom they may thus catch in flagrante delicto have committed or will commit the crime. The public interest in its privacy must, to that extent, be subordinated to the public interest in law enforcement. Mitchell v. State, 120 Ga. App. 447, 170 S.E.2d 765, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 813 (1969).
- Strip search of juvenile.
- Law enforcement officers may subject a juvenile who is lawfully in custody to a strip search based upon reasonable suspicion that the juvenile is concealing a weapon or contraband, when the strip search is conducted in the least intrusive manner, even where the juvenile is in custody after being arrested for an offense that is not a felony. Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 10481 (11th Cir. 1992).
- School students.
- Even though a teacher had the requisite suspicion to conduct some type of search of the students in the teacher’s fifth grade class for missing money, the conduct of strip searches exceeded the bounds of reasonableness, which means that they also exceeded constitutional limits. Thomas v. Clayton County Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21556 (N.D. Ga. 1999). When there is merely generalized suspicion that one member of an entire class is hiding some contraband, the nature of the contraband becomes an important consideration in deciding how intrusive the search should be. Thomas v. Clayton County Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21556 (N.D. Ga. 1999). Searches of students, during which the students were required to remove articles of clothing and to reveal their underwear, following the apparent disappearance of an envelope containing $26 from the teacher’s desk were unconstitutional since the disappearance of $26 did not present such an extreme threat to school discipline or safety that the students could properly be subjected to intrusive strip searches without individualized suspicion; however, a more limited search of a single student, who entered the restroom in which searches were being conducted, was not unconstitutional. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18375 (11th Cir. 2001).
- Strip searches to discover contraband.
- There is no reason to differentiate between strip searches to discover contraband to protect the security of the institution and strip searches within the institution which may lead to contraband (drugs) to be used as evidence of a crime. Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 10481 (11th Cir. 1992). Degree of intrusion into suspect’s
- privacy.
- The degree of intrusion into a suspect’s privacy is relevant in deciding whether any of the suspect’s constitutional rights have been infringed. Thus, intrusions into the human body, because of their extremely invasive nature, require more justification to satisfy the fourth amendment, than does a limited stop and frisk. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981). Slight physical intrusion is insignificant if it infringes no privacy interest. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981). Obtaining of contraband during
- pat-down.
- Because an officer was patting-down defendant’s outer garments in search of weapons or contraband and felt what seemed to be contraband in a pocket that was accessible only from the inside of defendant’s jacket, the agent acted well within the scope of a reasonable narcotics pat-down by reaching into that inside pocket and removing what was later determined to be cocaine hydrochloride. United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 11833 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S. Ct. 1521, 75 L. Ed. 2d 945, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 3774 (1983). Officer who exceeds a pat-down search without first discovering an object which feels reasonable, like a knife, gun, or club, must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably support a suspicion that the particular suspect is armed with an atypical weapon which would feel like the object felt during the pat-down. Only then can judges satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a neutral evaluation of the reasonableness of a particular search by comparing the facts with the officer’s view of those facts. Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747, 188 S.E.2d 879, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1460 (1972). Search of male defendant’s outer clothing and pockets by female police officer was not an unreasonable search in contravention of fourth amendment rights to personal privacy and dignity. Although a male officer was present and could have conducted the search, the search was not of such an intrusive nature that it could not be conducted by a female officer. Singer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 416, 274 S.E.2d 612, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3050 (1980). vidual who was not named in a warrant but who was on premises believed to be frequented by purchasers of illegal drugs was authorized where the warrant authorized searching the premises and any persons who might reasonably be involved in the crime of possession of illegal drugs. Jenkins v. State, 184 Ga. App. 844, 363 S.E.2d 35, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2434 (1987). son’s arm and of item in person’s pocket have been treated as searches of the person. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. Searches (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) 613, 281 S.E.2d 349, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2337 (1981). Surgical extraction of bullet from
- Search of pants pocket of indi-Searches of item carried under perdefendant’s leg.
- Where there was no medical reason to remove a bullet from defendant’s leg and the procedure required to retrieve the evidence posed an unnecessary risk to defendant’s health, the trial court’s order requiring surgical removal of the bullet overstepped defendant’s fourth amendment right and the court erred in admitting testimony regarding defendant’s resistance to removal of the bullet. Curry v. State, 217 Ga. App. 623, 458 S.E.2d 385, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 538 (1995), cert. denied, No. S95C1518, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 1032 (Ga. Sept. 25, 1995). Search of purse found close to de-
- fendant.
- Police, executing a search warrant in the home of defendant’s child, properly searched a purse found a few inches away from defendant, where the child was absent and the purse was by its nature a holding object and one capable of concealment of such items as drugs or weapons. Bonds v. State, 188 Ga. App. 135, 372 S.E.2d 448, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 926 (1988).
- Search of defendant’s purse unauthorized.
- Defendant was a visitor in a house in which narcotics were found in plain view by a law enforcement officer. Defendant was not suspected of any crime and consented to a search of defendant’s locked vehicle. When the officer asked the defendant where the vehicle keys could be located, the defendant informed the officer where the defendant thought the keys might be. Defendant never specifically consented to a search of defendant’s purse. Under these circumstances, the trial court was authorized to find that a typical reasonable person would not have understood the exchange between defendant and the officer to grant the officer permission to search the defendant’s purse; therefore, defendant’s motion to suppress narcotics found in the purse was properly granted. State v. Fulghum, 288 Ga. App. 746, 655 S.E.2d 321, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1284 (2007).
- Use of seized property in investigation.
- Officers were not required to obtain a warrant to use a cap that was seized from defendant at the time of arrest as a scent article for sniff dogs employed in a search near the crime scene. Carter v. State, 224 Ga. App. 367, 480 S.E.2d 376, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 84 (1997).
- Use of trained dogs.
- The use of a “narcotics” dog, especially trained to detect marijuana and narcotics, is an authorized investigative technique. Lockhart v. State, 166 Ga. App. 555, 305 S.E.2d 22, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3249 (1983); State v. Montford, 217 Ga. App. 339, 457 S.E.2d 229, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 433 (1995), cert. denied, No. S95C1349, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 1005 (Ga. Sept. 5, 1995). Use of a trained drug detection dog, in a location where the dog is entitled to be, to sniff the exterior of a container, is not an unreasonable search. O’Keefe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 519, 376 S.E.2d 406, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1462 (1988). A dog sniff of a person’s property located in a public place is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Hearn v. Board of Pub. Educ., 191 F.3d 1329, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24841 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1109, 120 S. Ct. 1962, 146 L. Ed. 2d 794, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3197 (2000).
- Pistol thrown into vacant lot.
- Where the appellant was not trying to hide the pistol but threw it in an overgrown vacant lot, separated from the appellant’s back yard by a brick wall and shed, unwarranted search of the area did not intrude upon the appellant’s reasonable expectations of privacy. Simmons v. State, 164 Ga. App. 643, 298 S.E.2d 313, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3337 (1982). Officers had no knowledge of bond
- order when conducting search.
- Defendant’s drug-related convictions were reversed on appeal as the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of a bond order against the defendant to justify the search of the defendant’s person by two officers on patrol in a high crime area when the officers had no knowledge of the bond order at the time the search was conducted. The trial court should have conducted a hearing to determine the validity of the defendant’s waiver of the defendant’s fourth amendment rights and the reasonableness of imposing such a waiver as a condition of the defendant’s pretrial release on the bond. Cantrell v. State, 295 Ga. App. 634, 673 S.E.2d 32, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 58 (2009).
- Search warrant supported by probable cause.
- Search warrant was properly issued based on information from a caller to social services that methamphetamine was being made in the defendant’s home in the presence of a six-year-old and on information from an officer that the defendant had been investigated for the drug, that the defendant had a reputation of dealing, using, and making the drug, and that numerous tips about the defendant’s manufacturing the drug had been received. Moreover, the information was not stale as the information received from multiple sources indicated a long-term involvement in the manufacture of the drug and therefore a likelihood that the equipment for the drug’s production would remain in place over time. Chambliss v. State, 298 Ga. App. 293, 679 S.E.2d 831, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 652 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1750, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 545 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2009).
- Denial of motion to suppress.
- There was no error in denial of a motion to suppress the evidence, where the items seized from the home were obviously relevant to the crime and were properly seized as evidence and the warrants were issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Ward v. State, 262 Ga. 293, 417 S.E.2d 130, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 441 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1085, 113 S. Ct. 1061, 122 L. Ed. 2d 366, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 977 (1993). 2. Warrantless Searches
- Per se unreasonableness of warrantless searches.
- A search without warrant is prima facie illegal and must be shown to come within some recognized exception before the evidence can be admitted. Hunter v. State, 127 Ga. App. 664, 194 S.E.2d 680, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 991 (1972). The United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, with the requirement that those seeking exemption from the rule must show exigency that necessitated search without a judicially approved warrant. Lowe v. Hopper, 400 F. Supp. 970, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13332 (S.D. Ga.), aff’d, 520 F.2d 1405, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 12642 (5th Cir. 1975). Rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable does not apply to evidence discovered in inventorying the effects of arrestees or suspects that are properly in possession of law enforcement officers. Lowe v. Hopper, 400 F. Supp. 970, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13332 (S.D. Ga.), aff’d, 520 F.2d 1405, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 12642 (5th Cir. 1975). Searches conducted outside judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. State v. Guhl, 140 Ga. App. 23, 230 S.E.2d 22, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1336 (1976), rev’d, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 791 (1977). Search without warrant is per se unreasonable unless within certain clearly defined exceptions. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3186 (1981). Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, which must be shown by those who seek the exemption to be necessary under the exigencies of the situation. Brown v. State, 181 Ga. App. 768, 353 S.E.2d 572, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2573 (1987). Warrantless searches must come
- under recognized exception.
- Generally, searches conducted without the prior approval of a judge or magistrate must be justified under one of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. McDonald v. State, 156 Ga. App. 143, 273 S.E.2d 881, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2915 (1980). Searches conducted without prior approval of judge or magistrate must be Searches (Cont’d) 2. Warrantless Searches (Cont’d) justified under one of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8522 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2145 (1980).
- Warrantless conduct by police.
- Questions as to whether warrantless conduct by the police is lawful under the fourth amendment are not strictly determined by common-law property law concepts, but are determined by whether the police action was reasonable under all the circumstances. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 948 (1992). Burden on government to show that warrantless search is within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirements of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Lowe v. Hopper, 400 F. Supp. 970, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13332 (S.D. Ga.), aff’d, 520 F.2d 1405, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 12642 (5th Cir. 1975).
- Requirement of warrant not absolute.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 has never been held to require that every valid search and seizure be effected under authority of search warrant. Search and seizure incident to lawful arrest is a practice of ancient origin and has long been an integral part of the law enforcement procedures of the United States and of the individual states. Cash v. State, 222 Ga. 55, 148 S.E.2d 420, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 396 (1966). U.S. Const., amend. 4 has never been held to require that every valid search and seizure be effected under authority of a search warrant. Watts v. Cannon, 224 Ga. 797, 164 S.E.2d 780, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 954 (1968). To make a search reasonable on the spot it must either be incident to arrest or contain other elements sufficient in themselves to authorize the peremptory action, and, as to the latter, probable cause may be a contributing or even a sufficient factor. Hunter v. State, 127 Ga. App. 664, 194 S.E.2d 680, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 991 (1972). Warrantless search of a passenger in an automobile was unreasonable where the officer testified that the officer felt no particular threat from the passenger during the officer’s questioning and pat-down of the driver, and saw nothing unusual or threatening. United States v. Hale, 934 F. Supp. 427, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11407 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
- Dog sniff.
- Because the dog sniff was conducted while the officer was waiting for the return of the computer records check on the passenger’s identification, which was an ordinary safety measure related to the mission of the traffic stop, the dog sniff did not prolong the stop at all. State v. Allen, 298 Ga. 1, 779 S.E.2d 248, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 789 (2015). Probable cause requirements for
- warrantless searches.
- The probable cause requirements for a search without a warrant are the same requirements necessary for the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate. Morgan v. Kiff, 230 Ga. 277, 196 S.E.2d 445, 1973 Ga. LEXIS 882 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Jacobs v. Hopper, 238 Ga. 461, 233 S.E.2d 169, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1065 (1977). No probable cause for warrantless
- search of automobile.
- Officer’s warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle following defendant’s arrest for loitering was not a valid search incident to the arrest because defendant was not within reach of the defendant’s vehicle at the time and there was no likelihood that there would be evidence of loitering in the vehicle. Nor was the search valid under the automobile exception because defendant’s pulling on car door handles was insufficient probable cause for the officer to believe that there was evidence in the vehicle of thefts from other cars. Holsey v. State, 306 Ga. App. 75, 701 S.E.2d 538, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 864 (2010). Warrantless seizures with respect
- to automobile and home.
- Whatever justification for seizing an automobile without a warrant may be spelled out of its fugitive and ambulatory abilities, none may be advanced to excuse the compulsory search of and seizure in a private home without one. Ray v. United States, 84 F.2d 654, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 4570 (5th Cir. 1936).
- Warrantless entry into a home.
- Search of private dwelling without warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws. Congress has never passed an act purporting to authorize the search of a house without a warrant. Ray v. United States, 84 F.2d 654, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 4570 (5th Cir. 1936). Absent exigent circumstances or consent, the entry into a private dwelling to conduct a search or effect an arrest is unreasonable without a warrant. Thompson v. State, 248 Ga. 343, 285 S.E.2d 685, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 1012 (1981). Probable cause, however well founded, cannot provide justification for a warrantless intrusion of a person’s home absent a showing that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. Phillips v. State, 167 Ga. App. 260, 305 S.E.2d 918, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3320 (1983). Warrantless entry into a home merely to question someone in the investigation of a misdemeanor offense and without probable cause to search or arrest is unreasonable, absent consent or exigent circumstances. Griffith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 255, 322 S.E.2d 921, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3044 (1984). Where officers did not have a search warrant for the plaintiff’s residence when they entered the house, nor did they have probable cause to believe that a crime was taking place at the plaintiff’s house, as such, the officers should have known that entry risked violating the residents’ constitutional rights. Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 9444 (11th Cir. 1995). Police officer violated the fourth amendment by entering defendant’s home without a warrant and without defendant’s consent to question defendant about a report received from a concerned citizen that defendant had been seen by the citizen just minutes before driving erratically across lanes of traffic. Threatt v. State, 240 Ga. App. 592, 524 S.E.2d 276. Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence after police officers found about one gram of methamphetamine in defendant’s residence upon entering defendant’s residence without a warrant. Although as the police officers approached they saw defendant, through an open door, start to run away, their entry into defendant’s residence was not justified by any exigent circumstances; thus, defendant’s fourth amendment rights were violated. Bolton v. State, 258 Ga. App. 217, 573 S.E.2d 479, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1397 (2002). Contraband found by police officers in the defendant’s hotel room was properly seized under the fourth amendment because the hotel manager had the authority to terminate the defendant’s rental agreement without prior notice on the ground the defendant was selling drugs from the room and creating a disturbance at the hotel, and did so before the officers went to the room; thus, the defendant no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. The officers had to determine if anyone was in the room before the clerk could lock the door and effectuate the eviction, and thus properly entered the room to search in places where someone could be hiding and properly seized marijuana found on a table in plain view, as well as marijuana located under the bed. Johnson v. State, 285 Ga. 571, 679 S.E.2d 340, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 288 (2009). Marijuana was properly seized from the pocket of a coat hanging outside the bathroom door in the defendant’s hotel room; the officer who needed to enter the closed bathroom was justifiably concerned for safety and was worried if a bulge in the coat was a gun. A pat-down of the coat pocket was a reasonable step, and the officer was authorized to seize a baggie found in the pocket. Johnson v. State, 285 Ga. 571, 679 S.E.2d 340, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 288 (2009). Trial court erred by basing the court’s decision to grant a motion to suppress solely on a dislike of police officers’ “knock and talk” procedures and in concluding that the officers did not have the right to use such procedures; although the trial court forcefully expressed the court’s disdain for knock-and-talk procedures, such measures were unquestionably constitutional. State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 742 S.E.2d 149, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 359 (2013).
- Looking under couch cushions during warrantless search justified.
- It was reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. Searches (Cont’d) 2. Warrantless Searches (Cont’d) IV for a police officer to lift the cushions of a couch where the defendant juvenile had been laying when the police entered the defendant’s house during an investigation of an armed robbery and related offenses as the circumstances of the criminal conduct involved a weapon and violence, and the police were acting reasonably by searching the area immediately around the defendant for weapons; the cash that was seized from under the couch cushions accordingly did not need to be suppressed. Gray v. State, 296 Ga. App. 878, 676 S.E.2d 36, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 374 (2009), cert. dismissed, No. S09C1309, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 802 (Ga. Sept. 28, 2009).
- Cell phones are electronic containers.
- For purposes of a search incident to arrest, a cell phone may be treated in the same manner as a traditional physical container. The potential volume of information contained in a cell phone does not change the cell phone’s character; a cell phone is an object that can store considerable evidence of the crime for which the suspect has been arrested, and that evidence may be transitory in nature. The mere fact that there is a potentially high volume of information stored in the cell phone should not control the question of whether that electronic container may be searched. Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga. 785, 723 S.E.2d 924, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 336 (2012). Search of a cell phone incident to arrest must be limited as much as is reasonably practicable by the object of the search. That will usually mean that an officer may not conduct a fishing expedition and sift through all of the data stored in the cell phone. Thus, when the object of the search is to discover certain text messages, for instance, there is no need for the officer to sift through photos or audio files or Internet browsing history data stored in the phone. Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga. 785, 723 S.E.2d 924, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 336 (2012). Although the U.S. Supreme Court later determined that a warrant was required for certain cell phone data, at the time of law enforcement’s request for the defendant’s cell phone records law enforcement had a good faith belief that the voluntary disclosure of the requested records due to exigent circumstances was authorized under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., and binding Georgia precedent. Swinson v. State, 311 Ga. 48, 855 S.E.2d 629, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 73, overruled in part, Outlaw v. State, 311 Ga. 396, 858 S.E.2d 63, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 197 (2021). Particularity of dates in search
- warrants.
- Trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because the date ranges in the two warrants, 45 days and 30 days, were sufficiently particular under the circumstances, as at the time the warrants were issued, the facts of the investigation indicated that the shooter had used the cell phone number to call the victim to communicate about purchasing drugs, met with the victim, and shot and killed him. At that time, investigators had not yet identified or apprehended any of the assailants, uncovered their motive for killing him, or knew the exact time period during which the unidentified assailants communicated with each other or the victim. Perez v. State, 316 Ga. 433, 888 S.E.2d 526, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 118 (2023).
- Search of residence.
- Trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his house pursuant to a search warrant because the magistrate was authorized to conclude that there was a fair probability that evidence related to the shooting would be found there, as the facts in the affidavit showed that defendant or an accomplice used his cell phone to contact the victim shortly before defendant shot and killed the victim, and the affidavit connected defendant and the cell phone to the house. Perez v. State, 316 Ga. 433, 888 S.E.2d 526, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 118 (2023).
- Search of cell phone.
- Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his cell phone pursuant to a search warrant because from the affidavit the magistrate could have reasonably concluded that defendant or one of his accomplices used defendant’s cell phone to call the victim about purchasing drugs and that defendant or an accomplice shot the victim. The warrant was sufficiently particular because the warrant made clear that it authorized the search and seizure of only those classes of applications and data that could have been used to communicate with the victim or other suspects. Perez v. State, 316 Ga. 433, 888 S.E.2d 526, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 118 (2023). Breath test as search incident to
- arrest.
- Implied consent statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(b), was not unconstitutional under the fourth amendment or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII because, even if the statute were coercive, police could obtain a breath test without a warrant as a search incident to arrest. Fazio v. State, 302 Ga. 295, 806 S.E.2d 544, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 887 (2017). 3. Voluntariness
- Visitor’s belongings.
- Personal belongings brought by their owner on a visit to a friend’s house retain their constitutional protection until their owner meaningfully abdicates control or responsibility. State v. Browning, 209 Ga. App. 197, 433 S.E.2d 119, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 817 (1993).
- Conduct not unreasonable.
- The conduct of the detective in entering onto private land through a gate and driving on a dirt road located along a power line easement to investigate the self-confirmed complaint of loud noise and the suspected fighting, was a legitimate intrusion and not unreasonable conduct within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 948 (1992). A court’s decision to admit evidence obtained in a warrantless search was affirmed where it was based on a police officer’s fear that the defendant had a gun and was getting it when defendant retrieved a box and reached inside it, since this was a reasonable belief under the circumstances of the police having received a complaint about drugs, the limited entry to see whether this was a gun was therefore justified, and the drugs which were then seen in plain view were properly seized. Owens v. State, 236 Ga. App. 534, 512 S.E.2d 394, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 231 (1999). There was no search in violation of the fourth amendment since: (1) police officers had a right to be in the defendant’s yard in order to investigate; (2) the use of flashlights by the officers was not improper; and (3) the act of bending down by the officers to see contraband under a car did not violate any legitimate expectation of privacy. Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 119, 547 S.E.2d 679, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 421 (2001).
- Apartment where crime was committed.
- Because the police arrived at the crime scene, discovered the victim of a shooting, and observed evidence of an apparent burglary that had taken place at the apartment, the police were authorized in making a prompt warrantless search of the defendant’s entire apartment in order to secure the crime scene. Isbell v. State, 179 Ga. App. 363, 346 S.E.2d 857, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2630 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1319, 94 L. Ed. 2d 172, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 836 (1987).
- Hot pursuit is grounds for warrantless entry.
- A warrantless entry of a home is justified if the police are in hot pursuit of a fugitive. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). Discretionary, warrantless
- searches of businesses unconstitutional.
- City ordinance which permitted discretionary searches of businesses after closing hours without a warrant and did not provide a reasonable deterrence against forced entries was unconstitutional because it failed to meet the ultimate fourth amendment standard of reasonableness. Yingsum Au v. State, 258 Ga. 419, 369 S.E.2d 905, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 321 (1988). Finding of drugs pursuant to
- search following burglary.
- Where warehouse manager had searched defendant’s compartment after observing evidence of a break-in and discovered illegal drugs in the compartment, police officer’s subsequent search of compartment and seizure of drugs without a warrant was valid. State v. Johnston, 171 Ga. App. 224, 319 S.E.2d 83, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2964 (1984).
- Consent of housing authority director invalid.
- City housing authority director’s consent to the search of a hous-Searches (Cont’d) 3. Voluntariness (Cont’d) ing unit was not valid; therefore, an officer’s warrantless entry into the premises and seizure of marijuana therein was also invalid. The state failed to show that the terms of the housing unit lease authorized the director to enter the premises under certain circumstances. Bowden v. State, 304 Ga. App. 896, 698 S.E.2d 372, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 667 (2010).
- Warrantless entry into a warehouse.
- Agents could not have reasonably believed that lessee had authority over premises to consent to warrantless search, where lessee did not purport to possess any authority over the premises, but instead informed the agents that lessee had no key or other means of access and that lessee had never been inside the warehouse or seen its contents. Indeed the fact that the agents had to cut the padlock to enter the warehouse belied any claim that they reasonably believed lessee had authority to enter it. State v. Stewart, 203 Ga. App. 829, 418 S.E.2d 110, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 559 (1992). Belief that article concealed in
- dwelling.
- Belief, however well founded, that article sought is concealed in dwelling house furnishes no justification for search of that place without a warrant. Such searches are unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828, 1961 U.S. LEXIS 1396 (1961). Reasonable belief that person needs immediate aid as grounds for
- entry and search.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 873 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982). Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied under the fourth amendment as it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that a person inside the mobile home was seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury because they received a tip about a possible dead body inside a mobile home; and, after knocking on the front door and receiving no response, officers noticed that the front door was unsecure and that there were pry marks near the door handle. Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga. 459, 863 S.E.2d 127, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 621 (2021). When police come upon scene of homicide they may make prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises and they may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 873 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982).
- Effect of defective warrant in warrantless search.
- If the police officers having sufficient probable cause to stop and search a moving vehicle choose not to search it immediately but to do so later, the fact that a defective warrant has issued between the time of the seizure and the search will not destroy the validity of that search as a reasonable warrantless search. State v. Bradley, 138 Ga. App. 800, 227 S.E.2d 776, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2325 (1976). After accessing a defendant’s residence from a person who was not authorized to allow access and making no attempt to question anyone’s authority to allow access by use of an automatic door opener, the subsequent warrantless search of the defendant’s residence was unjustified and, likewise, the subsequent search by warrant was illegal. State v. Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 645 S.E.2d 598, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 431 (2007). Warrantless search absent cause
- for arrest under ordinance.
- If there is no cause for arrest within the purview of a city ordinance, then a warrantless search and seizure are not legally supportable. Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 219 S.E.2d 636, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1877 (1975). Warrantless search of purse is valid
- where exigent circumstances exist.
- Exigent circumstances, including the fact that officers spied a gun on the console of the defendants’ car, authorized them to search a purse carried by one of the defendants to eliminate the possibility of its containing a weapon dangerous to themselves. Burroughs v. State, 190 Ga. App. 467, 379 S.E.2d 175, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 261 (1989). O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-133 and 44-12-137, authorizing a warrantless inspection of pawn shop records, do not violate the fourth amendment. Howell v. Roberts, 656 F. Supp. 1150, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3919 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
- “Plain view” doctrine permits warrantless search and seizure.
- The “plain view” doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer only if the officer’s access to the object itself has some prior fourth amendment justification. State v. David, 269 Ga. 533, 501 S.E.2d 494, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 660 (1998). Items in plain view used to obtain
- search warrant.
- Bloody shirt and knife found in plain view during a permissible “protective sweep” were permissibly used in obtaining a search warrant. Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 807 S.E.2d 350, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 922 (2017). Violation negated by consent to
- search.
- Although a police officer should not have leaned into defendant’s apartment to look for stolen items when a person in the apartment answered the door, the police lawfully seized items the officer saw because defendant subsequently gave them consent to conduct a search. Smith v. State, 262 Ga. App. 614, 585 S.E.2d 888, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 949 (2003), cert. dismissed, No. S03C1831, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 1015 (Ga. Nov. 17, 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Caldwell v. State, No. S03C1733, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 1042 (Ga. Nov. 17, 2003).
- Suppression of evidence held erroneous.
- The trial court erred in granting a motion to suppress drugs discovered in an authorized nonconsensual warrantless search of an automobile. State v. Dopson, 204 Ga. App. 51, 418 S.E.2d 623, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 673 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C1026, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 684 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1992). There was no violation of the defendant’s fourth amendment rights where (1) officers went to the defendant’s automobile paint shop on the basis of information that drugs were being sold and used at that location; (2) as the officers approached the shop, which was located just behind the defendant’s residence, the defendant and another individual fled from a side entrance, carrying something in their hands; and (3) the officers pursued, and after detaining the defendant, found a plastic container containing methamphetamines and weighing scales which the defendant, after being informed of Miranda rights, admitted were the defendant’s property; the defendant’s rights were not violated when the officers pursued the defendant onto the curtilage of the defendant’s property once the defendant started running away from them. Stewart v. State, 236 Ga. App. 888, 513 S.E.2d 778, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 350 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C0980, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 599 (Ga. June 11, 1999). 4. Vehicles Rationale for warrantless searches
- of cars.
- For the purposes of U.S. Const., amend. 4, there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars. This constitutional difference stems both from the ambulatory character of the latter and from the fact that extensive, and often noncriminal, contact with automobiles will bring local officials in “plain view” of evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime, or contraband. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8522 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2145 (1980).
- State rule same as federal rule.
- For purposes of searching a vehicle contemporaneously with the lawful arrest of an individual, the state rule is the same as the federal rule. Such a search, legal under federal law, is legal under state law. Daniel v. State, 199 Ga. App. 180, 404 S.E.2d 466, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 402 (1991). Warrantless search of automobile,
- in the absence of exigent circumstances, violates U.S. Const., amend.
- 4. United States v. Michael, 622 F.2d 744, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15331 (5th Cir. 1980). Phrase “automobile exception” connotes a legitimate warrantless Searches (Cont’d) 4. Vehicles (Cont’d) ally protected area whenever: (1) probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime conjoins with (2) exigent circumstances making the warrant procedure impractical and causing the resort to an immediate warrantless search to be reasonable and necessary. McDonald v. State, 156 Ga. App. 143, 273 S.E.2d 881, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2915 (1980). Search of shirt pocket incident to
- search of this otherwise constitutionarrest.
- After stopping the defendant for a tag violation and smelling marijuana, a deputy searched the car and found two empty bottles that smelled of marijuana; when the deputy returned to speak to the defendant, the smell of marijuana became significantly stronger; at this point, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of marijuana, and the defendant’s search of the defendant’s shirt pocket was authorized under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Caffee v. State, 303 Ga. 557, 814 S.E.2d 386, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 303 (2018). Test of legality of warrantless
- search of automobile.
- If a search of an automobile is made by a police officer without a warrant, the test of its legality is whether the search was reasonable. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1696 (1974). A warrantless automobile search is constitutional if the officers, acting as a result of their combined knowledge, have probable cause to make the search and if exigent circumstances justify the failure to secure a warrant. The ultimate test is that the search must be reasonable under the circumstances, as viewed objectively. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8522 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2145 (1980).
- Probable cause.
- Automobiles and other conveyances may be searched without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or an office, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize. United States v. Hill, 442 F.2d 259, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10367 (5th Cir. 1971). Search of a movable vehicle is authorized without a search warrant, provided there is sufficient probable cause for such search. Satterfield v. State, 127 Ga. App. 528, 194 S.E.2d 295, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 940 (1972). Avehicle that has the capacity to convey its occupants and possible contraband contents to a place of refuge from a warranted search, may be searched without a warrant provided there is probable cause to suspect the commission of a crime or the possession of contraband. United States v. Summerville, 477 F.2d 393, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 10474 (5th Cir. 1973). Although the search of a dwelling is not authorized without a proper search warrant, when the officers have ample time to procure one, a search of a movable vehicle is an exception, provided there is sufficient probable cause for such search. Walker v. State, 130 Ga. App. 860, 205 S.E.2d 49, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1286 (1974). In order for police authorities to search automobiles on highway, there must be probable cause for the search where no consent has been granted. The officer in making a limited protective search during a reasonable investigatory stop of a vehicle must have specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Nix v. State, 138 Ga. App. 122, 225 S.E.2d 714, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2076 (1976). A police officer was authorized to open a trunk to insure that no one was in the trunk who might pose a threat to the safety of the officers, where the car matched an armed robbery “Be on the lookout” and its unlocked trunk was moving after the car had stopped. Williams v. State, 236 Ga. App. 102, 511 S.E.2d 216, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 60 (1999). Where an officer knew that the defendant had sold cocaine to a confidential informant on other occasions and the officer was on surveillance when the defendant arrived to make another sale to the same informant, the officer had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained illegal drugs and a warrantless search was lawful under the automobile exception. Benton v. State, 240 Ga. App. 243, 522 S.E.2d 726, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1258 (1999), cert. denied, No. S00C0182, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 279 (Ga. Mar. 10, 2000). Since the officer initially stopped defendant when defendant hastily pulled over near an intersection in a high drug traffic area, defendant’s subsequent out-of-context and inconsistent responses to the officer’s questions, nervousness, and reports that the person leaning in defendant’s window sold drugs all combined to support the officer’s suspicion that defendant may have been purchasing illegal drugs. Almond v. State, 242 Ga. App. 650, 530 S.E.2d 750, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 299 (2000).
- Totality of circumstances.
- Search of defendant’s car was supported by probable cause independent of defendant’s arrest as the officer saw defendant attempting to secret something under the seats of the car, and the officer saw defendant in an area known for drug activity; although these factors alone did not constitute probable cause to search defendant’s car, together they did. Sanders v. State, 259 Ga. App. 422, 577 S.E.2d 94, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 121 (2003). A violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-33 did not justify defendant’s continued detention by the police and the officer’s decision to detain the defendant while the officer waited for another officer to bring a written warning book was unreasonable; thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer did not have specific, articulable facts that could constitute a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in any criminal activity thereby making the search unreasonable under the fourth amendment and requiring suppression of the evidence seized from the vehicle. Bennett v. State, 285 Ga. App. 796, 648 S.E.2d 126, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 648 (2007). If vehicle is not moving or readily movable, probable cause must be determined by magistrate and a warrant must issue. State v. Bradley, 138 Ga. App. 800, 227 S.E.2d 776, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2325 (1976).
- Vehicle stopped on highway “movable”.
- Where car was stopped on highway, it remained readily mobile, thus justifying a warrantless search of a loose panel where probable cause existed due to the driver’s previous drug conviction and claim that driver had borrowed the car. United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 91 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1219, 117 S. Ct. 1712, 137 L. Ed. 2d 836, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 3000 (1997).
- Impoundment of vehicle.
- If an effective search is to be made at any time, either the search must be made immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search. United States v. McDonald, 317 F. Supp. 879, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10059 (N.D. Ga. 1970). For constitutional purposes, there is no difference between, on the one hand, seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and, on the other hand, carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. McDonald, 317 F. Supp. 879, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10059 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Whitlock v. State, 124 Ga. App. 599, 185 S.E.2d 90, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1040 (1971), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 230 Ga. 700, 198 S.E.2d 865, 1973 Ga. LEXIS 1037 (1973); State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2391 (1980). If the vehicle of one arrested might be searched on the spot, there is a choice between leaving it guarded while someone goes for a warrant or taking it in custody while the warrant is being obtained, and, if the latter, a search of the vehicle at the time the vehicle is brought in or during the same morning will not be held unreasonable if it would not be unreasonable if performed on the spot; but it cannot be held for several days and then searched without a warrant. Hunter v. State, 127 Ga. App. 664, 194 S.E.2d 680, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 991 (1972). Searches (Cont’d) 4. Vehicles (Cont’d) Vehicle stopped upon probable cause may be searched without warrant even though vehicle is no longer mobile, and a warrantless search is permitted even after the vehicle has been moved to police headquarters. United States v. Ramey, 464 F.2d 1240, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8045 (5th Cir. 1972). Where U.S. Const., amend. 4 permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured, there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is obtained. Caito v. State, 130 Ga. App. 831, 204 S.E.2d 765, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1277 (1974). There is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between immediate search without warrant and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is obtained. Davis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 931, 219 S.E.2d 598, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1879 (1975). When officers have probable cause to search and seize a moving vehicle, they may either seize and hold it until the probable cause issue can be presented to a magistrate or they may carry out an immediate warrantless search. If a vehicle is moving, probable cause can be determined by a police officer, and the vehicle can be seized and searched without a warrant either immediately or later even though a search warrant might have been obtained between the seizure and the search. State v. Bradley, 138 Ga. App. 800, 227 S.E.2d 776, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2325 (1976). Police officers with probable cause to search an auto on the scene where it was stopped may constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant. Glover v. State, 139 Ga. App. 162, 227 S.E.2d 921, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1719 (1976). The impoundment of a vehicle prior to the issuance of a warrant to search it is not permissible when the driver of the motor vehicle is arrested and a reliable friend is present, authorized, and capable to remove the vehicle which is capable of being safely removed. Whisnant v. State, 185 Ga. App. 51, 363 S.E.2d 341, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2846 (1987). The impoundment and inventory search of a car were proper, where each of the persons in the vehicle appeared to be intoxicated, and no one present was capable of safely removing the vehicle. Stotts v. State, 199 Ga. App. 316, 404 S.E.2d 635, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 425 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C0998, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 763 (Ga. May 15, 1991). Because defendant was arrested for the misdemeanor offense of obstructing a police officer, and the violation was in no way related to defendant’s vehicle which was legally parked in a safe and secure place on private property, impoundment and the subsequent search of the vehicle were pretextual and improper. State v. Lowe, 224 Ga. App. 228, 480 S.E.2d 611, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 19 (1997). Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during the inventory of defendant’s car, which was parked on private property, as: (1) defendant was arrested, at night, for carrying a concealed weapon while walking away from a motel after a clerk had reported defendant to the police as a suspicious person; (2) the motel clerk testified that the motel’s policy was to tow unclaimed cars parked in their lot; (3) a detective testified that it was the police department’s policy to impound a suspect’s car so that it would not be stolen or towed by the motel; (4) it was the police department’s policy to inventory the contents of the car before impounding it, to protect the department from a suspect later claiming that valuable items were missing from the suspect’s car; and (5) the detective’s decision to impound the car was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Johnson v. State, 263 Ga. App. 443, 587 S.E.2d 775, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1138 (2003). Impound search of defendant’s car was reasonably necessary to protect the car and its contents where defendant, who was arrested for driving under the influence, was the lone occupant of defendant’s car, the car was parked at the side of the road at 4 a.m., defendant did not ask for an alternative disposition to impoundment, and absent a reasonable request, officers were not obligated to offer impound alternatives to those they placed under arrest. Evans v. State, 267 Ga. App. 706, 600 S.E.2d 671, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 720 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1683, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 883 (Ga. Sept. 27, 2004). It was reasonable under the fourth amendment for police to impound the victim’s truck in order to prevent tampering before they obtained the search warrant pursuant to which the truck was later searched; the truck’s owner was a murder victim, the most recent user was the prime suspect and was still at large, and the truck was not secure. Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 647 S.E.2d 15, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 480 (2007).
- Right to search automobile not dependent on right to arrest.
- When the search and seizure is made under the automobile exception, the right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest, but rather are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. McDonald v. State, 156 Ga. App. 143, 273 S.E.2d 881, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2915 (1980).
- Search incident to arrest.
- Where a driver was lawfully arrested for operating a car without a license and for not having proof of insurance, a police officer did not exceed the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest when officer searched the car. Vega v. State, 236 Ga. App. 319, 512 S.E.2d 65, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 157 (1999). Defendant had standing to raise a challenge to a search of a vehicle, in which defendant was riding as a passenger, because defendant could challenge the prolonged detention and the subsequent vehicle search; however, the taint of the illegal detention was thereafter purged by the intervening arrest of defendant on outstanding warrants, which then justified the officer’s lawful search incident to an arrest and accordingly, marijuana found in the passenger compartment of the car was not subject to suppression under the principles established by U.S. Const., amend. 4, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, and under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1. State v. Cooper, 260 Ga. App. 333, 579 S.E.2d 754, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 302 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C1074, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 671 (Ga. July 14, 2003). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress as the officers could lawfully search the interior of the defendant’s car. A sergeant who had received a report of a speeding car had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity having occurred, and after the defendant fled and disobeyed an order to stop, a second officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction following which the car interior could be lawfully searched under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1. Spence v. State, 295 Ga. App. 583, 672 S.E.2d 538, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 47 (2009).
- Consented search.
- Post-stop contact evolved into a consensual encounter where defendant had a clear understanding that defendant was free to go and was not under any compulsion to remain to obey the officer’s request. Daniel v. State, 277 Ga. 840, 597 S.E.2d 116, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 415 (2004), overruled in part, Matthews v. State, 294 Ga. App. 836, 670 S.E.2d 520, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1329 (2008), overruled in part, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 683, 859 S.E.2d 891, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 360 (2021). A trial court did not err in denying either defendant’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized during the consensual search of defendant’s vehicle or a motion to suppress defendant’s voluntary custodial statement as the testimony of the arresting and investigating officers established that defendant did not display any problems with the understanding of the English language as did videotapes of the vehicle search and the in custody interview, which likewise showed defendant having no problems with the English language. Therefore, defendant’s consent to the search of the vehicle nor defendant’s waiver of defendant’s Miranda rights were invalidated. Serrano v. State, 291 Ga. App. 500, 662 S.E.2d 280, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 549 (2008). Suppression motion filed by a defendant was properly denied because a state trooper who initiated a traffic stop obtained the defendant’s consent to search Searches (Cont’d) 4. Vehicles (Cont’d) the defendant’s vehicle, whereupon drugs were found, virtually contemporaneously with the issuance of a warning ticket; there was no prolonged detention in violation of the fourth amendment. Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. App. 724, 665 S.E.2d 422, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 853 (2008). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine that was discovered during a search of the rental vehicle the defendant was driving based on evidence from the officer that the defendant consented to the search, although the defendant testified that the defendant did not consent and that the officer just announced that the officer was going to search. Morgan v. State, 311 Ga. App. 740, 716 S.E.2d 821, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 836 (2011). Search of a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger did not violate the fourth amendment as the officer did not unreasonably prolong the detention before obtaining the driver’s consent to search the car. Crider v. State, 336 Ga. App. 83, 783 S.E.2d 682, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (2016), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Trial court to address whether search of vehicle was authorized as an incident of a lawful detention. State v. Jarrells, 207 Ga. App. 192, 427 S.E.2d 568, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 127 (1993). It is not unreasonable to search car which is validly held for use as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Scope of search of lawfully stopped
- vehicle.
- If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, then it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. United States v. Grillo, 705 F. Supp. 576, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1133 (M.D. Ga. 1989). The broad scope of authority granted to police officers in conducting searches of automobiles pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception extends to the entire passenger compartment of the automobile and any closed containers therein. Bagwell v. State, 214 Ga. App. 15, 446 S.E.2d 739, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 799 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1692, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1093 (Ga. Nov. 3, 1994). Officer’s act in approaching
- stopped vehicle.
- Trial court did not err in denying the first juvenile and second juvenile’s motion to suppress, as the police officer did not illegally stop their vehicle; rather, the officer followed them until they stopped the vehicle in a driveway. The officer’s acts in stopping the officer’s vehicle and approaching their stopped vehicle was a consensual encounter that did not involve an unreasonable search and seizure, and when the officer smelled alcohol and noticed the first juvenile’s bloodshot eyes, it was then that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the juveniles in order to investigate the situation further. In the Interest of A.A., 265 Ga. App. 369, 593 S.E.2d 891, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 120 (2004), cert. dismissed, No. S04C1099, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 494 (Ga. June 7, 2004).
- Determining identification number.
- Inspections of vehicles by police officers, who are entitled to be on the property where the vehicle is located, which in no way damage the vehicle, and which are limited to determining the correct identification numbers of the vehicle, are not searches within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Jones, 432 F.2d 773, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7278 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Wood, 500 F.2d 681, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6812 (5th Cir. 1974). Opening an automobile door to obtain the identification number does not constitute a “search.” United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Inspection of vehicle identification numbers was not a search prohibited by U.S. Const., amend. 4 because police officers were on the defendant’s business premises pursuant to a valid search warrant and the vehicle identification numbers were on the dashboards, readily visible through the windshields. State v. Shaw, 170 Ga. App. 404, 317 S.E.2d 298, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2887, aff’d, 253 Ga. 382, 320 S.E.2d 371, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 936 (1984). The fact that police officers are required to open a car’s door in order to locate the vehicle identification number does not make the viewing an unreasonable search under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Nothing in U.S. Const., amend. 4 prohibits such an inspection or an investigatory registration check which follows. United States v. Kitowski, 729 F.2d 1418, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 23507 (11th Cir. 1984). Merely looking into the window of an automobile is not a search. United States v. Gazaway, 297 F. Supp. 67, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12759 (N.D. Ga. 1969); State v. Key, 164 Ga. App. 411, 296 S.E.2d 60, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3309 (1982), cert. denied, 250 Ga. 477, 299 S.E.2d 529, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 992 (1983).
- Reasonable expectation of privacy.
- — Pickup truck passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy so as to enable the passenger to challenge the seizure of contraband in a closed bag “laying on the seat in the middle of the driver’s seat” of the truck. State v. Corley, 201 Ga. App. 320, 411 S.E.2d 324, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1352 (1991).
- Rental cars.
- The driver of a rental car, whose name was on the rental agreement, had standing to challenge an automobile search; however, the passenger did not have standing. United States v. Gonzalez, 952 F. Supp. 813, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 735 (M.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 189 F.3d 483, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 27168 (11th Cir. 1999).
- Search of abandoned car valid.
- When following a high speed chase legally initiated by the police, the defendant fled the defendant’s car on foot, a police officer’s search of the automobile’s trunk was not an unreasonable search prohibited by U.S. Const., amend. 4, since the defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to an automobile which the defendant abandoned to the police. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Search of car abandoned by fleeing
- defendant.
- Because a fleeing defendant, pursued by the police, abandoned the defendant’s car on a public street and started running, the defendant lost the constitutional protection against the search and seizure of the car. Whitlock v. State, 124 Ga. App. 599, 185 S.E.2d 90, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1040 (1971), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 230 Ga. 700, 198 S.E.2d 865, 1973 Ga. LEXIS 1037 (1973).
- Search of automobile for contraband.
- If a search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. United States v. Blackwell, 430 F.2d 1270, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7722 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Rodgers, 442 F.2d 902, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10440 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ramey, 464 F.2d 1240, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8045 (5th Cir. 1972). Where regulations prohibit the transportation of certain dangerous drugs in the possession of a driver, inspection of vehicles would encompass what is actually a search for these drugs. Trucks can be searched by inspectors without a warrant and without any necessity for consent further than that which exists by virtue of its operation under the public permit. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 933 (1972). An automobile in which contraband goods are concealed and transported may be searched without a warrant provided the police have probable cause for believing that the automobile contains contraband. The reason for this rule is obvious. An automobile, unlike a home or place of business, is mobile and can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction; therefore, a search without a warrant is allowed where it is impractical to obtain a warrant. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1696 (1974). Where a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle (as opposed to a particular container within the vehicle), while in transit, contains contraband; i.e., where the objective facts known to the officer would justify issuance Searches (Cont’d) 4. Vehicles (Cont’d) of a search warrant authorizing that the vehicle be searched, the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment applies and a warrantless search of the entire vehicle, including all containers and packages that may contain contraband, is not unconstitutional. Love v. State, 254 Ga. 697, 334 S.E.2d 173, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 829 (1985). As an exception to the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment, police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile when such facts and circumstances exist as would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the automobile contained contraband. Durden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 397, 405 S.E.2d 50, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 492 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1019, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 756 (Ga. May 15, 1991). Evidence in the record, which consisted of testimony provided by the officers involved in a surveillance, regarding their observations, surveillance techniques, and experience with drug sales, as well as the general modes of operation of persons involved in drug sales, was sufficient to support the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, when the evidence was coupled with the fact that the detention of defendant lasted, at most, fifteen minutes and did not amount to an unreasonable and impermissible seizure of defendant’s person. Further, the officers were authorized to stop defendant’s vehicle as one involved in a drug sale, while acting in concert with another vehicle and showing an obvious interest in the endeavor. Hickman v. State, 279 Ga. App. 558, 631 S.E.2d 778, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 640 (2006). Denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence was proper because the evidence at the suppression hearing showed that an officer’s suspicions were aroused during a traffic stop due to the defendant’s erratic behavior and the fact that, on the floorboard behind the driver’s seat of the defendant’s car, the officer observed a bag similar to others the officer had seen used to transport illegal drugs; after the officer filled out the citation and returned it to the defendant to sign, the officer asked the defendant for consent to search the car which the defendant gave. Dowd v. State, 280 Ga. App. 563, 634 S.E.2d 509, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 886 (2006). Search of backpack in automobile
- for contraband.
- Driver consented to a full-blown search, which included closed packages and containers, and the officer explicitly inquired about the presence of drugs. Therefore, oxycodone found in a closed book bag in the back seat was not subject to a motion to suppress by a frontseat passenger, despite the defendant’s claimed expectation of privacy in the book bag. Varriano v. State, 312 Ga. App. 266, 718 S.E.2d 14, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 830 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0410, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 250 (Ga. Feb. 27, 2012). juana smoke coming from within automobile, together with totality of circumstances, was sufficient to provide probable cause to search automobile for marijuana. Holmes v. State, 163 Ga. App. 753, 294 S.E.2d 719, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3247 (1982). Scope of search of lawfully stopped
- Trooper’s detection of odor of marivehicle after smelling marijuana.
- A trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of drugs and a handgun found during the warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle as the arrest of the defendant’s passenger on an outstanding warrant authorized the stop of the defendant’s vehicle and the mobility of the car, coupled with the existence of probable cause to believe the car contained marijuana, based on the officer smelling the marijuana upon approaching the vehicle, authorized the search. Somesso v. State, 288 Ga. App. 291, 653 S.E.2d 855, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1189 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0505, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 281 (Ga. Mar. 10, 2008). Approaching defendant and asking
- for consent to search.
- Defendant did not contradict a police officer’s testimony that the officer and the officer’s partner stopped their car, approached the defendant and another person, and asked for consent to search them. Thus, the contact between police and the defendant before the discovery of marijuana was a consensual encounter that involved no coercion or detention and did not have to be supported by reasonable suspicion under the fourth amendment. In the Interest of D.H., 285 Ga. 51, 673 S.E.2d 191, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 3 (2009). Request for consent to search a ve-
- hicle after telling defendant that defendant was free to go.
- State trooper’s request to search a defendant’s vehicle after telling the defendant that defendant was free to go did not unreasonably prolong the detention and did not violate the defendant’s fourth amendment rights. Therefore, the four pounds of marijuana found during the search was not subject to suppression. Davis v. State, 303 Ga. App. 785, 694 S.E.2d 696, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 336 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1405, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 716 (Ga. Sept. 20, 2010). censed driver in vicinity of burglary
- Detention of automobile with unlivalid.
- Detention of an automobile and its occupants was lawful, where police officers were aware that the driver was not properly licensed and the officers, who were responding to a burglary call, saw the automobile enter the street from the driveway of a house where a burglary was reported to have occurred. Clarington v. State, 178 Ga. App. 663, 344 S.E.2d 485, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2554 (1986). Evidence may be seized from car
- fleeing robbery and found obstructing traffic.
- Where car suspected by police to have been used in a robbery is followed, eludes police, and is found obstructing traffic with its windows open and the doors unlocked, a finding that defendant did not retain a legitimate expectation of privacy in the automobile was authorized and defendant was not entitled to grant of motion to suppress evidence subsequently seized from the car. Gardner v. State, 172 Ga. App. 677, 324 S.E.2d 535, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3080 (1984). clude an otherwise permissible
- Movement of vehicle does not presearch.
- The fact that a vehicle is first moved to another location does not render the search of its trunk impermissible if the bailee-defendant is placed under lawful arrest and the vehicle could have been legally searched at the time of such arrest. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3186 (1981). Viewing and photographing of
- ashes in automobile justified.
- The police officer’s viewing of ashes in the defendant’s car through the windshield did not constitute a search and to the extent that the opening of the car door and photographing of the ashes constituted a warrantless search and/or seizure, this was justified by the exigencies of the case because the officer had reasonable cause to believe that the officer would find evidence pertaining to an arson under investigation. Catchings v. State, 256 Ga. 241, 347 S.E.2d 572, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 809 (1986).
- Search of prison employee’s vehicle.
- Where a sign was posted at the entry of a prison, giving notice that all vehicles passing the guard line of the prison were subject to search, prison officials had authority to search the vehicle of an employee parked inside the guard line. By driving the automobile onto the premises, defendant consented to such a search. Howard v. State, 185 Ga. App. 465, 364 S.E.2d 600, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 6 (1988). Trial court properly denied a motion to suppress filed by the defendant, a corrections officer, whose car was searched after a drug-detecting dog alerted in the parking lot of the prison where the defendant worked. Signs posted outside the prison informed those entering that they would be subject to search once inside the guard line; by driving onto the premises, the defendant consented to such a search. Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. App. 737, 665 S.E.2d 428, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 850 (2008). Police officer, entitled to be on property where car is located, may search a vehicle to determine the identity of its owner. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Traffic stop for failing to wear seat-
- belt.
- A motorist arrested following a traffic stop for failing to wear a seatbelt Searches (Cont’d) 4. Vehicles (Cont’d) and after consenting to a search of the car, had not been unlawfully detained in violation of the fourth amendment, given the trooper’s reasonable articulable suspicion of drug possession and the trooper’s reasonable inquiry. Evans v. State, 262 Ga. App. 712, 586 S.E.2d 400, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 993 (2003). Even though automobile could not be quickly removed from the scene of an accident under its own propulsion, it was clearly “movable” for purposes of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in that it would have to be towed from the intersection to prevent its obstruction of traffic. Fluker v. State, 171 Ga. App. 415, 319 S.E.2d 884, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2980 (1984).
- Search of motor vehicle improper.
- — Because the defendant was arrested on a violation of a municipal ordinance unconnected with the defendant’s car, and the car was legally and safely parked on private property, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that a search of the car was not a lawful search incident to arrest; further, the trial court was authorized to find that the impoundment of the vehicle was not reasonably necessary and to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the car. State v. Bell, 259 Ga. App. 328, 577 S.E.2d 39, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 88 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C0806, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 523 (Ga. May 5, 2003). Because the trial court had ample evidence to support its conclusion that the reason police officers supplied as the basis to stop the defendant’s vehicle, specifically, an alleged computer insurance inquiry, was “suspect and insufficient,” it did not clearly err in disbelieving the evidence; hence, the court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle as a result of the stop. State v. Starks, 281 Ga. App. 15, 635 S.E.2d 327, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 985 (2006). A trial court properly granted a defendant’s motion to suppress a firearm — a hunting rifle that was in the cab of the defendant’s pick-up truck — that was seized from the vehicle after a traffic stop, because no evidence was presented of any danger to justify the warrantless search of the vehicle for weapons, and the officer acknowledged the search was conducted merely to see if the firearm was stolen, with no basis shown that criminal activity existed. State v. Jones, 289 Ga. App. 176, 657 S.E.2d 253, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 30 (2008). Trial court erred by denying two defendants’ motion to suppress the drug evidence found in the vehicle in which one defendant was driving, and the other defendant was a passenger, because the search of the vehicle was conducted after the defendants were illegally detained after a traffic stop. The officers were justified in stopping the vehicle upon observing the vehicle speeding but by only observing nervousness and an expandable baton, the officers exceeded the scope of a permissible search by continuing to detain the defendants without any cause to believe the defendants were dangerous; thus, the search was not justified. Bell v. State, 295 Ga. App. 607, 672 S.E.2d 675, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 50 (2009). Automobile exception to warrant
- requirement did not apply.
- Evidence that was found during a warrantless search of defendant’s automobile after the police hauled it away for the later search should have been suppressed because the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply since: (1) defendant’s car was legally parked in defendant’s residential parking space; (2) defendant and any alleged cohorts did not have access to the vehicle; and (3) the police lacked probable cause to search the car because their claim of probable cause was based on information from an informant and on a “controlled” telephone call, but there was no indication of the informant’s reliability and no testimony regarding what was said during the telephone call. State v. Lejeune, 276 Ga. 179, 576 S.E.2d 888, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 125 (2003). No prolonged detention by drug
- dog sniff.
- Denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of contraband found during a search of the defendant’s vehicle was proper where there was no prolonged detention in violation of the fourth amendment by a deputy’s retrieval of a drug detection dog from the deputy’s cruiser and use of the dog for a drug sniff around the vehicle; the dog sniff did not cause more than minimal delay. Wilson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 136, 666 S.E.2d 573, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 855 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C2063, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 1013 (Ga. Nov. 17, 2008). Eight minute delay while waiting
- on license verification not unreasonable.
- Officer did not prolong a traffic stop unreasonably to search a vehicle in which a defendant was a passenger pursuant to the driver’s consent. The eight minutes between the beginning of the traffic stop and the time the officer requested the search was not inherently unreasonable, and the officer was waiting to receive verification of the driver’s license. Hall v. State, 306 Ga. App. 484, 702 S.E.2d 483, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 972 (2010). Seizures Test of lawful seizure is whether it was made incident to a lawful arrest or pursuant to a lawful search warrant. Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1020 (1972). Finding of “seizure” as threshold
- inquiry.
- In determining whether a given contact between a police officer and a citizen violated a defendant’s fourth amendment rights, the court must first determine whether the encounter was a “seizure” within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Moran v. State, 170 Ga. App. 837, 318 S.E.2d 716, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2931 (1984).
- No definitive standard for determining whether seizure has occurred.
- The Supreme Court has not yet provided a definitive standard for determining when a seizure under U.S. Const., amend. 4 has occurred. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 18185 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 457, 74 L. Ed. 2d 609, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4528 (1982). Test for determining when seizure
- has occurred.
- Whenever police officer accosts an individual and restrains the freedom to walk away, the officer has “seized” that person. United States v. Gazaway, 297 F. Supp. 67, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12759 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 211 S.E.2d 294, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 758 (1974); Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 899 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 1657 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in Godfrey v. Francis, 251 Ga. 652, 308 S.E.2d 806, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 938 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 727 S.E.2d 670, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 338 (2012); Franklin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 3, 237 S.E.2d 425, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2170 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 55 L. Ed. 2d 799, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 1347 (1978); Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 640 (1981). It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains that individual’s freedom to walk away, the officer has “seized” that person, and a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is a “search.” Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747, 188 S.E.2d 879, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1460 (1972). When an encounter is effected at gunpoint or when there is physical restraint, there can be little question that a seizure has occurred; any restraint of movement will do. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14504 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 2998, 64 L. Ed. 2d 861, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2398 (1980). A person has been seized within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4 only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that there was no freedom to leave. United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15158 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414 (5th Cir. 1980); State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 736 (1981); Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 277 S.E.2d 18, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 753 (1981); United States v. Berd, Seizures (Cont’d) 634 F.2d 979, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Bryant, 203 Ga. App. 69, 416 S.E.2d 368, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 371 (1992). Any restraint on movement is sufficient to constitute a seizure. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may the court conclude that a seizure has occurred. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414 (5th Cir. 1980). The proper standard for determining when a seizure has occurred is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have thought there was no freedom to leave. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (5th Cir. 1980). A person is seized only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, freedom of movement is restrained. State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 736 (1981). A person is not “seized” unless an officer applies physical force, however slight, or the person submits to the officer’s show of authority; where defendant was in a state of flight when cocaine was discarded, it was not the fruit of an illegal arrest. Hunt v. State, 205 Ga. App. 490, 423 S.E.2d 24, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1224 (1992). Arrestee who was not subjected to physical force and who did not yield or submit when the deputies commanded the arrestee to come out of the bathroom was not seized. Wilson v. Northcutt, 987 F.2d 719, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6662 (11th Cir. 1993); Smith v. State, 217 Ga. App. 680, 458 S.E.2d 704, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 563 (1995). When a seizure exceeds the limited intrusion of an investigative stop, it must be justified by the probable cause standard or be based on consent. Such a seizure occurs when, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that there was no freedom to leave. McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13851 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Under U.S. Const., amend. 4 the determination of the reasonableness of a seizure is a conclusion of law. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786 (5th Cir. 1981). Determination of reasonableness of
- seizure.
- Where the seizure under U.S. Const., amend. 4 is less intrusive than traditional arrest, determination of the reasonableness of that seizure involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414 (5th Cir. 1980). Whether a given contact between the police and citizens constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4 — and, if so, is “reasonable” — is determined by balancing the government interest involved against the nature of the intrusion on the individual. Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1012, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3545, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1393, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 781 (1983). Seizures reasonable under certain
- circumstances.
- Seizures under circumstances where the object is open to view or seizures contemporaneous with the commission of the crime and the arrest fall into categories held not to constitute an unreasonable search under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Roach v. Mauldin, 277 F. Supp. 54, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11017 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff’d, 391 F.2d 907, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 7669 (5th Cir. 1968). lar seizure, court must ascertain facts known by police officer at the moment of the seizure. United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786 (5th Cir. 1981). Necessity of actual knowledge of
- In determining legality of particurestraint.
- Actual knowledge that one has been restrained is an essential element of a fourth amendment seizure claim. Thompson v. Spikes, 663 F. Supp. 627, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541 (S.D. Ga. 1987). Being chased is not tantamount to being seized, since seizure requires the application of physical force by the officer or submission by the defendant to the officer’s show of authority. Watson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 498, 544 S.E.2d 469, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 10 (2001). Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen or use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. Aguero v. State, 169 Ga. App. 462, 313 S.E.2d 735, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2778 (1984). Seizures have been found when an encounter is precipitated by a show of authority, such as when a siren was used to pull a motorist over; when a motorist stepped out of camper, with hands up, in response to an officer’s knock on the camper door; or when under other circumstances it was apparent that the individual was not free to ignore the officer and proceed on the individual’s way. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14504 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 2998, 64 L. Ed. 2d 861, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2398 (1980).
- Merely approaching does not constitute seizure.
- Merely approaching an individual and requesting that individual give consent for a search does not constitute a seizure and need not be supported by an articulable suspicion. State v. Westmoreland, 204 Ga. App. 312, 418 S.E.2d 822, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 777 (1992). Effect of initial approach without
- suspicion.
- No reasonable suspicion was required for an officer’s approach to a car, where the officer approached the vehicle to tell the defendant to park correctly and thus was lawfully in the presence of defendant so as to invoke the plain view doctrine. Consequently, the marijuana seeds and leaves seized by the officer were admissible. State v. Bryant, 203 Ga. App. 69, 416 S.E.2d 368, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 371 (1992). Offering a ride home to defendant, who had just been issued a speeding ticket and had a suspended license, was not a fourth amendment seizure of defendant. Disharoon v. State, 263 Ga. App. 787, 589 S.E.2d 339, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1323 (2003). No “seizure” where person may
- walk away.
- As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no “seizure,” i.e., no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the constitution require some particularized and objective justification. Smith v. State, 187 Ga. App. 14, 369 S.E.2d 307, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 578 (1988); State v. Bryant, 203 Ga. App. 69, 416 S.E.2d 368, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 371 (1992). Three encounters between the defendant and the police officers were noncoercive communications that did not rise to the level of a seizure where the officers generally asked questions of the defendant, where defendant was not under any police compulsion to remain and answer the officers’ questions, where the officers were in uniform, but did not reach for the defendant or have their hands near their weapons, and where they did not arrest defendant prior to defendant’s flight and capture. Copeland v. State, 213 Ga. App. 39, 443 S.E.2d 869, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 (1994). No “seizure” where officers identify
- themselves and suspect not blocked.
- — Where suspect believed to be concealing illegal drugs on the suspect’s person was approached by law enforcement agents who were casually dressed and did not display weapons, where the officers identified themselves, spoke in a deferential and conversational tone, and stood at suspect’s side in order not to block the suspect’s path, there was no “seizure” of the suspect during the encounter. Allen v. State, 172 Ga. App. 663, 324 S.E.2d 521, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3078 (1984). No “seizure” occurs when citizen
- elects to cooperate with police.
- When an individual is free to choose whether to enter or continue an encounter with police and elects to do so, there is no seizure. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d Seizures (Cont’d) 1036, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14504 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 2998, 64 L. Ed. 2d 861, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2398 (1980). Not all police-citizen contacts are seizures subject to the proscriptions of the fourth amendment. United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 11833 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S. Ct. 1521, 75 L. Ed. 2d 945, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 3774 (1983). Not all personal intercourse between police officers and citizens involves seizures of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may it be said that a seizure has occurred. State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 736 (1981). Not all personal intercourse between police officers and citizens involves seizures of persons. United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786 (5th Cir. 1981). Not every contact between citizen and police is a “seizure” within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Williams, 647 F.2d 588, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12349 (5th Cir. 1981). The central consideration in determining whether a police-citizen contact falls within the purview of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is whether in the view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that there was no freedom to leave. United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 11833 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S. Ct. 1521, 75 L. Ed. 2d 945, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 3774 (1983). Only when the officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may one conclude that a “seizure” has occurred. Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1012, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3545, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1393, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 781 (1983); State v. Bryant, 203 Ga. App. 69, 416 S.E.2d 368, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 371 (1992). So long as a citizen is not restrained in any way or so long as his or her cooperation is not obtained by coercion, force, or other use of authority, a mere police-citizen contact is generally not within the protections of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Thus, neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion is required to justify such a stop. United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13480 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097, 102 S. Ct. 669, 70 L. Ed. 2d 638, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 2844 (1981). The fourth amendment in no way prohibits voluntary interaction between citizens and police, and it is only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen that a “seizure” has occurred. Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1012, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3545, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1393, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 781 (1983); Hudgins v. State, 188 Ga. App. 798, 374 S.E.2d 566, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1216 (1988). Defendant was not seized where a police officer stopped to question defendant in an “extremely high crime, high drugs” area and used a conversational tone of voice, did not draw a weapon, and did not get out of the car until defendant told the officer that defendant had a shooter in defendant’s pocket. Whisenant v. State, 239 Ga. App. 259, 521 S.E.2d 204, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 994 (1999).
- Three tiers of police-citizen encounters.
- There are three tiers of police-citizen encounters: (1) communication between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and therefore without the compass of the fourth amendment; (2) brief “seizures” that must be supported by reasonable suspicion; and (3) full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause. State v. Bryant, 203 Ga. App. 69, 416 S.E.2d 368, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 371 (1992).
- Request for identification not seizure.
- Where a federal agent stopped a suspect in a public concourse, identified self as a federal agent, and requested but did not demand the suspect’s identification, no “seizure” occurred. Voight v. State, 169 Ga. App. 653, 314 S.E.2d 487, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2795 (1984). Approaching individual and asking
- questions not “seizure”.
- A law enforcement officer’s act of merely approaching an individual, asking to see the individual’s identification, and posing to the individual a few questions is not a “seizure” and need not be justified by the existence of an articulable suspicion. State v. Akinsonwon, 200 Ga. App. 287, 407 S.E.2d 434, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 979 (1991). Trial court properly refused to suppress evidence based on defendant’s initial seizure as a deputy initiated a first-level police-citizen encounter when the deputy approached defendant’s stopped car and asked defendant to get out; it was only after the deputy smelled alcohol on defendant and noticed defendant’s bloodshot eyes that the deputy acted upon a reasonable suspicion that defendant might be intoxicated. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 426, 602 S.E.2d 177, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 940 (2004). Request for information in a public
- place not a “seizure”.
- Defendant was not “seized” where there was no evidence that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed there was no freedom to leave at the time the defendant was asked by a police officer in a parking lot if the defendant had any drugs in the defendant’s possession. Ward v. State, 193 Ga. App. 137, 387 S.E.2d 150, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1311 (1989). The initial approach of the arresting officer to the defendant’s vehicle, and the officer’s subsequent inquiry as to defendant’s well-being, did not constitute a fourth amendment seizure. At most there was a police-citizen verbal encounter involving no coercion or detention within the meaning of Verhoeff v. State, 184 Ga. App. 501, 362 S.E.2d 85 (1987). O’Donnell v. State, 200 Ga. App. 829, 409 S.E.2d 579, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1154 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1573, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. Sept. 6, 1991); Stokes v. State, 238 Ga. App. 230, 518 S.E.2d 447, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 773 (1999) Given the lack of apparent purpose for defendant’s actions, the consistencies such actions had with drug sale activity, the fact that such actions occurred in a known drug crime area, and the fact that such actions occurred at what had been reported as a frequent drug crime locale, officers had sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to support a brief detention of defendant in order to determine what was going on. State v. Ledford, 247 Ga. App. 412, 543 S.E.2d 107, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1421 (2000), cert. denied, No. S01C0596, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 504 (Ga. June 12, 2001). Crack cocaine found on the defendant was admissible into evidence because the defendant’s fourth amendment rights were not violated by police officers, responding to a telephone tip from an informant about drug sales, approached the defendant and two other individuals, whom the officers knew to be underage, and asked them about their drinking alcohol. When the defendant and one of the other individuals attempted to flee, but were apprehended, the crack cocaine found on the defendant and the crack cocaine and money found on the other individual were admissible against defendant at trial for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Smith v. State, 264 Ga. App. 533, 591 S.E.2d 443, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1503 (2003). Defendant held seized when
- stopped and questioned by police.
- When police officers alighted from their car, stopped the defendant and a companion, questioned them, and demanded to see the contents of a paper bag, the youths were at the time seized or arrested within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747, 188 S.E.2d 879, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1460 (1972).
- Inarticulate hunches are insufficient to justify seizure.
- Feelings that something is “wrong” or “amiss,” like inarticulate hunches, are not sufficient to justify a seizure under the fourth amendment. State v. Combs, 191 Ga. App. 625, 382 S.E.2d 691, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 701 (1989). Articulable suspicion for seizure
- not found.
- Discovery of a large, unexplained sum of money, standing alone, does not constitute articulable suspicion of criminal activity which would justify seizure of an individual. Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 485 S.E.2d 483, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 434 (1997). Seizures (Cont’d) Legality of seizure of contraband
- whiskey.
- Untaxed whiskey is contraband, the very possession of which is illegal, so that the law enforcement authorities are entitled to seize and not return it, wherever found, regardless of constitutional requirements. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Validity of warrantless seizure of car where police know of present il-
- legal use.
- Warrantless seizure of a car parked on private property, because the car had been used for illegal purposes, violates fourth amendment rights where the police know that it is presently being used for illegal purposes and a warrant could have been readily obtained. United States v. Pruett, 551 F.2d 1365, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 13399 (5th Cir. 1977).
- Validity of officer’s seizure of luggage from third party.
- Where an officer requested and seized defendant’s luggage, as a protective custody action, from an individual in whose automobile the luggage had been placed prior to the defendant’s arrest, the officer’s acts were not improper and issues of probable cause and time to obtain a warrant did not arise. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979).
- Tapping on shoulder.
- In view of all the circumstances, the physical contact of merely tapping the defendant on the shoulder from the outset to get the defendant’s attention alone does not constitute a seizure such that a reasonable person would believe one was not free to leave. State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 736 (1981).
- Unspecified notes and papers.
- Authorization in four warrants for the seizure of unspecified notes and papers and for the seizure of “any other evidence” of the crimes named in the warrants complied with the Fourth Amendment’s mandate that items to be seized through a warrant must be described with particularity. Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 236, 664 S.E.2d 207, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 620 (2008). Hearing required prior to seizure
- of film.
- A prior adversary judicial hearing designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity must be held before the state may seize any motion picture film. Any seizure of an allegedly obscene film should be preceded by a state court finding of obscenity in an adversary judicial hearing. Central Agency, Inc. v. Brown, 306 F. Supp. 502, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8799 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1020 (1972). After some years of confusion in the law, it now appears that a prior adversarial hearing to determine obscenity is not a constitutional prerequisite for seizure of materials as evidence in a criminal prosecution. Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1020 (1972) (but see Central Agency, Inc. v. Brown, 306 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ga. 1969). Placement of driver in police car
- and taking of driver’s license constituted seizure.
- When a police officer takes possession of a driver’s license and suggests that the owner sit in the backseat of the patrol car (from which the driver cannot alight without outside assistance), the driver has effectively been “seized,” and the protection of the fourth amendment comes into play. Alexander v. State, 166 Ga. App. 233, 303 S.E.2d 773, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3220 (1983). Requirement of certain vehicle
- documents not illegal seizure.
- Requiring a person to send the revenue commissioner the certificate of title and the manufacturer’s serial plate of a motor vehicle disposed of as wreckage or salvage does not constitute an illegal seizure of private property without just compensation in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4, since the only purportedly valuable property involved is the title certificate and the serial plate, and such quasi-public documents do not constitute property within the protection of the constitutional provision. McDonald v. State, 222 Ga. 596, 151 S.E.2d 121, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 570 (1966). ployees of defendant’s condominium
- Seizure of package opened by emcomplex.
- Police officer, who had seen the contents of an unsealed package which had been opened by employees of defendant’s condominium complex and who had probable cause to believe that what the officer saw was cocaine, was authorized to seize the package without resort to a warrant. Ehrlich v. State, 189 Ga. App. 294, 375 S.E.2d 272, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1365 (1988). Seizure of a pawn ticket from defendant’s pocket did not violate the defendant’s fourth amendment rights, where there was probable cause for the defendant’s arrest on a charge of “loitering or prowling” in a high-crime area at 1:30 A.M. Pinkston v. State, 189 Ga. App. 851, 377 S.E.2d 864, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 45 (1989). Requiring traffic violator to drive
- car to correctional center.
- Requiring a motorist cited for a traffic violation to drive the car to a correctional center, in accordance with standard procedure for booking out-of-state motorists and requiring them to post bond, did not constitute an unlawful detention of the motorist or the automobile. O’Keefe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 519, 376 S.E.2d 406, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1462 (1988).
- Seizure of suicidal individual.
- Visibly intoxicated decedent who wielded a gun and threatened to commit suicide was not seized in violation of the decedent’s constitutional rights, as the officer’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Merideth v. Grogan, 812 F. Supp. 1223, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20601 (N.D. Ga. 1992), aff’d, 985 F.2d 579, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1424 (11th Cir. 1993).
- Detention of weapons.
- Police officers who were executing a search warrant for certain documents came upon a weapon and, in the interest of safety, removed the weapon from the premises for the duration of the search. Then, in the course of running a computer check on the occupants, which was permitted, the officers obtained information which led them to believe that the fact that the defendant had had possession of the weapon made the weapon evidence of a crime, since the information obtained related to the defendant’s prior criminal record, which might have included a felony conviction. The detention of the weapon after that point without a warrant, therefore, did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. United States v. Burke, 613 F. Supp. 576, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19407 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev’d, 784 F.2d 1090, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 23122 (11th Cir. 1986). Use of improperly seized evidence
- in forfeiture proceedings.
- An object illegally seized cannot in any way be used either as evidence or as a basis for jurisdiction; accordingly, evidence derived because of a violation of the fourth amendment cannot be used in a forfeiture proceeding. An improper seizure, however, does not jeopardize the government’s right to secure forfeiture if the probable cause to seize the vehicle can be supported with untainted evidence. United States v. $80,080.00 in United States Currency, 779 F. Supp. 169, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18737 (N.D. Ga. 1991). Temporary detention of individuals
- leaving searchable area.
- It was reasonable under the fourth and fourteenth amendments for a police officer, knowing that certain persons and premises were the subject of an immediately executable search warrant, to detain temporarily a vehicle containing occupants who just departed the premises to see if one of them was a person named in the warrant. Fritzius v. State, 225 Ga. App. 642, 484 S.E.2d 743, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 464 (1997). Defendant was not seized under the fourth amendment when the officers first entered the motel room where defendant’s companion invited the officers into the room and agreed to talk with them, and defendant and defendant’s companion had a “normal conversation” with the officers about drug problems at the motel; this encounter was a first-tier encounter. Keilholtz v. State, 261 Ga. App. 1, 581 S.E.2d 660, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 511 (2003). Arrests 1. In General
- Purpose of arrest warrant.
- An arrest warrant is issued by magistrate upon a showing that probable cause exists to believe that the subject of the warrant has committed an offense. Thus, it primarily serves to protect an individual Arrests (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) from an unreasonable seizure. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). Arrest does not require formal words or stationhouse booking. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Time of arrest is a question of fact which depends upon evaluation of testimony by the trial judge. Franklin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 3, 237 S.E.2d 425, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2170 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 55 L. Ed. 2d 799, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 1347 (1978). It is not when the officer formally proclaims a person to be in custody but when one is effectively restrained and is cognizant thereof that an arrest is considered to have taken place. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). To constitute an arrest there must be actual or constructive detention with intention to do so and so understood by the person restrained. Whether a defendant is in custody is determined both by the defendant’s subjective feeling as to arrest and the nature of police intentions and actions in light of the surrounding circumstances. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). If there is significant interference with the defendant’s liberty, fact that the police did not intend to make a formal arrest or did not think that their actions constituted an arrest is irrelevant to compliance with the standards of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Arrest is accomplished whenever liberty of another to come and go as one pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be. The defendant may voluntarily submit to being considered under arrest without any actual touching or show of force, and the arrest is complete. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2421 (1979). Arrest is accomplished whenever liberty of another to come and go as the individual pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 640 (1981). Because defendant’s car was hemmed in by police vehicles, the keys had been removed from the vehicle, and the defendant was sitting in the back of a marked patrol car, defendant was arrested (though maybe not formally) the instant the defendant’s car was stopped on the street. United States v. Brown, 822 F. Supp. 750, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7666 (M.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d, 50 F.3d 1037, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5462 (11th Cir. 1995).
- Intent to detain.
- The subjective intention of the law enforcement officer to detain the respondent, had the respondent attempted to leave, is irrelevant except insofar as that may have been conveyed to the respondent. Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 277 S.E.2d 18, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 753 (1981). Arrest which meets standards of
- probable cause described in Beck v.
- Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964), is valid whether or not former Code 1933, § 27-207 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20) is violated. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 640 (1981). ing arrest on less than probable
- Effect of Miranda warnings followcause.
- There is no per se rule that Miranda warnings in and of themselves suffice to cure violation involved in obtaining inculpatory statements during custodial interrogation following a formal arrest on less than probable cause. Little v. State, 153 Ga. App. 574, 266 S.E.2d 265, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1906, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861, 101 S. Ct. 164, 66 L. Ed. 2d 77, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 3106 (1980). Person is arrested or seized when officer stops and questions person and runs national crime check on person. To justify it, the state must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which, together with rational inferences drawn therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976). fully operating outside member’s
- Arrest by task force member lawown county.
- Defendant’s fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures clearly was not violated merely because the defendant’s arrest was effected by a county law enforcement officer who, though a member of a duly constituted task force lawfully operating in another county, had not been sworn as a deputy in that other county. State v. Giangregorio, 181 Ga. App. 324, 352 S.E.2d 193, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2400 (1986). Validity of arrest where one of two
- officers outside the officer’s jurisdiction.
- If an arrest is effected by two officers, one of whom is a deputy sheriff of the county in which the arrest takes place, and the other is outside jurisdiction, the arrest is made under lawful authority as long as all other constitutional standards are met. Coley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 810, 219 S.E.2d 35, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1834 (1975). Proof that arrest was legal is not made by statement of witness that
- arrest was made under warrant.
- Marshall v. State, 130 Ga. App. 572, 203 S.E.2d 885, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1180 (1974). Defendant not under arrest prior to
- search of car and home.
- A person who came into police station to pay traffic ticket and was questioned after being given Miranda rights because that person fit the description of a suspect, and who was then transported to the county police department to take a lie detector test, was not under arrest because that person went voluntarily. Defendant was not arrested until after a search of the defendant’s car, with the defendant’s permission and a search of the defendant’s home with a warrant and with the defendant’s wife’s cooperation, turned up incriminating evidence. This finding was made even though one of the initial detaining officers did not regard the suspect as free to leave. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 640 (1981).
- Evidence insufficient to find defendant was under arrest.
- Because the only evidence of any restraint upon appellant prior to giving a statement was the appellant’s testimony at the end of trial and after the admission of the confession, where the appellant testified that the appellant did not understand that the appellant was free to leave, and where there was ample testimony by law enforcement officers that appellant was free to leave at any time, the appellant was not under arrest. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 640 (1981); Blanchard v. Blanchard, 261 Ga. 11, 401 S.E.2d 714, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 132 (1991). Illegal detention (without a valid
- probable cause hearing) does not preclude indictment by grand jury.
- Illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction, and the failure to provide counsel at a probable cause hearing may not be raised after conviction by petitioners for writ of habeas corpus. State v. Houston, 234 Ga. 721, 218 S.E.2d 13, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1239 (1975).
- Basis for stopping occupants of vehicle insufficient.
- A person’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 are infringed when they are stopped only on the basis that it was after midnight and that they turned off the main road onto a side road and were then arrested after the discovery of marijuana. Brooks v. State, 129 Ga. App. 109, 198 S.E.2d 892, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 902 (1973). An arrest may be made upon hearsay evidence; and indeed, the reasonable cause necessary to support an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused’s guilt upon a trial, unless the powers of peace officers are to be so cut down that they cannot possibly perform their duties. Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 899 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 1657 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in Godfrey v. Francis, 251 Ga. 652, 308 S.E.2d 806, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 938 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 727 S.E.2d 670, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 338 (2012). Arrests (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d)
- Arrest based on unfounded assumption unauthorized.
- Neither the law of Georgia nor the Constitution authorize an arrest on account of an unfounded assumption that a private citizen has already effected an arrest for shoplifting. Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15367 (M.D. Ga. 1980). Where suspect voluntarily exits
- home, arrest outside home constitutional.
- Where a suspect is telephonically requested to exit the suspect’s home and voluntarily does so, the suspect’s arrest, outside the suspect’s home, by officers who have probable cause to believe that the suspect has participated in a felony is constitutionally valid. Mincey v. State, 251 Ga. 255, 304 S.E.2d 882, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 768, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S. Ct. 414, 78 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1983). The defendant’s arrest occurred on the front porch of the defendant’s house, after the defendant had complied with the request of a police officer to step outside. An arrest under such circumstances did not constitute an arrest that was made inside the defendant’s home. Keyser v. State, 187 Ga. App. 95, 369 S.E.2d 309, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 582 (1988). Where defendant willingly agreed to accompany police to the police station, was not under arrest when defendant did so, was not handcuffed, was advised defendant was free to go at any time, and rode to the police station in an unmarked car without a “cage,” no fourth amendment violation occurred when the detectives entered the defendant’s workplace or when the defendant accompanied the officers to the police station. Singleton v. State, 195 Ga. App. 119, 393 S.E.2d 6, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 440 (1990). Apprehension of suspect in public
- place.
- If probable cause exists, no warrant is required to apprehend a suspected felon in a public place. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981).
- Emergency arrest at scene of homicide.
- When the police come upon the scene of a homicide, they may make a prompt warrantless search to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency, and the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Delay v. State, 258 Ga. 229, 367 S.E.2d 806, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 206, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850, 109 S. Ct. 132, 102 L. Ed. 2d 105, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 4092 (1988). dant, and in detaining companion,
- Police justified in arresting defenbefore defendant’s identity confirmed.
- See United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 30815 (11th Cir. 1985).
- Mistaken arrest of wrong person.
- When the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest. Garcia v. State, 200 Ga. App. 741, 409 S.E.2d 683, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1149 (1991).
- No wrongful arrest under circumstances.
- A prudent person could have suspected that a driver of an automobile stopped by a police officer was a rapist, based on the victim’s description of the assailant, despite discrepancies between the alleged rapist and the driver, and based on the victim’s personal identification of the driver as the assailant. There was therefore no wrongful arrest. Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 30709 (11th Cir. 1985). Protection of interests of persons
- not named in warrant.
- An arrest warrant is not adequate to protect interests under U.S. Const., amend. 4 of persons not named in the warrant when their homes are searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances. United States v. Gaultney, 656 F.2d 109, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 18082 (5th Cir. 1981). Booking for “investigation” did not render arrests invalid as a matter of law, there being a valid basis for the arrests. Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28922 (11th Cir. 1985), overruled, United States v. Gonzalez, 107 F.4th 1304, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 (11th Cir. 2024). Arrest made pursuant to an invalid bench warrant was illegal, where records clearly showed that the warrant had been recalled several months prior to the arrest. State v. Stringer, 258 Ga. 605, 372 S.E.2d 426, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 400 (1988). Lawful to arrest and search suspect
- fleeing from an unlawful initial arrest.
- Even assuming that the initial arrest of a defendant in a police-citizen airport encounter was unlawful, the defendant had no right to flee and to strike the law enforcement officer in an effort to escape; probable cause existed for a second arrest for resisting arrest, and a search of the defendant incident to the second arrest was lawful. United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23945 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933, 103 S. Ct. 2098, 77 L. Ed. 2d 306, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 4647 (1983). Arrest under valid warrant proper even with knowledge of expiration of
- limitations period.
- Where deputies arrested a jail visitor after a computer search revealed outstanding arrest warrants on bad check charges, even if the deputies knew the statute of limitations had expired at the time they served the warrants, they were entitled to qualified immunity in a civil rights action; the deputies had no responsibility to determine the viability of a statute of limitations defense when executing a valid arrest warrant. Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 20222 (11th Cir. 1995).
- Bulge in clothing.
- Officer’s observation of an odd-sized and shaped bulge in a suspect’s sock and the suspect’s false response to an inquiry about the object in the sock provided probable cause for the suspect’s warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search incident to that arrest was not violative of U.S. Const., amend. 4 or the fourteenth amendment. Reid v. State, 179 Ga. App. 144, 345 S.E.2d 635, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2592 (1986). Because police officers properly detained defendant on the basis of a telephone tip regarding suspected drug activity, observation of a bulge at the defendant’s waist authorized a limited search for weapons, and the defendant’s arrest was justified when the bulge turned out to be apparent contraband. Roberts v. State, 193 Ga. App. 96, 386 S.E.2d 921, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1313 (1989).
- Arrest following withdrawal of consent to search.
- The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the contraband on which the conviction was based, where the cocaine was seized during a search of the defendant conducted following the defendant’s arrest at the Atlanta airport for giving a false name to a law enforcement officer, although the agent had not arrested defendant for giving a false name at the time that offense had allegedly occurred but waited until defendant had withdrawn defendant’s consent to the search, since there was probable cause to arrest defendant for the offense of giving a false name to a law enforcement officer and consequently the subsequent search of defendant’s person was permissible as a search incident to a valid arrest. Taylor v. State, 181 Ga. App. 703, 353 S.E.2d 619, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1559 (1987). Reasonable to place arrestee in “body chains.” — A policy requiring that every person taken into custody by the federal marshals service be placed in “body chains” without regard to the nature of the crime charged reasonably balanced the government’s legitimate interest in protecting the safety of the marshals, innocent bystanders, and the arrestee, as well as the government’s interest in preventing the escape of an arrestee, against the arrestee’s liberty interest. King v. Thornburg, 762 F. Supp. 336, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5202 (S.D. Ga. 1991).
- Exculpatory evidence.
- Detectives had no affirmative duty to make the district attorney aware of an exculpatory lab report, where there was no evidence two of the detectives ever saw the report, or had a clearly established duty to ferret it out, and where the third detective did receive the report, but it was not clearly established that the detective was required to turn over exculpatory evidence to a prosecutor since the detective had reason to Arrests (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) believe that the prosecutor already had the evidence. Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14292 (11th Cir. 1994). Misleading or pressuring grand
- jury.
- An arrest pursuant to a grand jury indictment may violate the fourth amendment if the grand jury was misled or experienced undue pressure. Mastroianni v. Bowers, 160 F.3d 671, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28454 (11th Cir. 1998). Warrant supported by probable
- cause.
- Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as to an arrest warrant as the warrant was supported by probable cause since a witness identified the defendant and stated that the defendant was present at the murder scene and another witness confirmed the identification through a photo lineup and testified to observing the defendant carry out the actual crime; even if the affidavit contained allegedly misleading information that one witness was the victim’s cousin and that the defendant was identified by witnesses via a six-photo lineup was redacted, the remaining information was still sufficient to support the probable cause finding. Waters v. State, 281 Ga. 119, 636 S.E.2d 538, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 843 (2006). 2. Warrantless Arrest
- Validity of warrantless arrest.
- The constitutional validity of arrest without a warrant depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it — whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. Lynn v. State, 130 Ga. App. 646, 204 S.E.2d 346, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1216 (1974); Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 899 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 1657 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in Godfrey v. Francis, 251 Ga. 652, 308 S.E.2d 806, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 938 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 727 S.E.2d 670, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 338 (2012); Duffy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 847, 275 S.E.2d 658, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3221 (1980); Timmons v. State, 166 Ga. App. 489, 304 S.E.2d 453, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2220 (1983); State v. Grant, 257 Ga. 123, 355 S.E.2d 646, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 744 (1987). Former Code 1933, § 27-207 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20) provides for three exceptions to requirement that warrant be obtained prior to arrest. These exceptions are: (1) the offense is committed in the officer’s presence; (2) the offender is endeavoring to escape; (3) for some other cause there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant. The federal constitutional standard, on the other hand, is not as stringent. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 640 (1981). Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied as: (1) the police personally heard an individual say to the informant on the telephone that the individual had a kilogram of cocaine in the individual’s hotel room that the individual intended to sell to the informant if the informant would come to that certain hotel at a certain time, where that individual would be waiting on the third-floor balcony to throw the informant a key; (2) when the informant arrived at the designated hotel at the designated time, the police observed the defendant standing on the third-floor balcony and further observed the defendant respond favorably to the informant’s request not to throw down the key and instead to come to the back door to let the informant in; (3) the police did not arrest the defendant until the defendant appeared at that back door; and (4) the information received from an untested informant might have been helpful and corroborating, but the personal observations and perceptions of the police alone more than sufficed to supply the probable cause needed for a warrantless arrest. Fleming v. State, 282 Ga. App. 373, 638 S.E.2d 769, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1282 (2006).
- Reasonableness of warrantless arrests.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures and from the issuance of warrants without probable cause; it does not prohibit an arrest without a warrant, when there is reasonable or probable cause for the arrest. Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 3369 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 969, 79 S. Ct. 881, 3 L. Ed. 2d 836, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1174 (1959).
- Attenuation of arrest.
- Assuming, without deciding, that defendant was subjected to a warrantless arrest without probable cause at the time defendant was handcuffed and placed in the police vehicle, it was clear that any taint arising therefrom became attenuated; therefore, the trial court did not err by overruling defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of defendant’s confession. Paradise v. State, 212 Ga. App. 166, 441 S.E.2d 497, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 198 (1994). Where arrest is without warrant, crime must be committed in presence of officer and the officer must have evidence of the same obtained through the use of the officer’s senses. Barron v. State, 109 Ga. App. 786, 137 S.E.2d 690, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 547 (1962). meanor case is lawful where offense is committed in arresting officer’s presence and where the officer has probable cause to believe that it is being committed. Stephens v. Lindsey, 304 F. Supp. 203, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13167 (S.D. Ga. 1969). U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not promeanors committed outside presence of the arresting state officer. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Matters of warrantless detentions and arrests must be handled on case-by-case basis looking at the totality of circumstances to determine if a reasonable and articulable suspicion or some exigent circumstance existed to authorize the intrusion. Frankum v. State, 174 Ga. App. 660, 331 S.E.2d 52, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2738 (1985). Information that accused charged
- Arrest without warrant in misdehibit warrantless arrests for misdewith serious crime.
- O.C.G.A. § 17-13-34, which authorizes a warrantless arrest of a person by officers in this state upon reasonable information that the accused is charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than a year, is justified under the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments, in that it is based upon a standard which comports with the constitutional standard of probable cause as set forth in Beck v. Ohio, 1964 U.S. LEXIS 151, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 3 Ohio Misc. 71, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 80 (1964); Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 797 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 975, 79 L. Ed. 2d 213, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 771 (1984). Facts sufficient to support probable
- cause for arrest.
- Probable cause authorized defendant’s arrest for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, despite no illegal drugs being found on defendant, based on the similarities between the descriptions broadcasted in a be-on-the-look-out dispatch matched defendant’s truck and passengers, the items found in the truck coincided with the manufacturing, and the opinion of one of the arresting officers, who had experience as a narcotics agent. Kohlmeier v. State, 289 Ga. App. 709, 658 S.E.2d 261, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 191 (2008).
- Facts insufficient to support probable cause for arrest.
- Under the Tate standard, defendant’s breath test results, obtained while defendant was in custody, were properly suppressed as the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence where: (1) defendant had a single-car accident; (2) defendant had two clues for intoxication in the HGN test, while the other four clues were inconclusive or indicated no intoxication; (3) defendant’s alco-sensor test results were positive for alcohol; (4) the trial court found that all of the alleged indicia of impairment were caused by the accident or lacked credibility; and (5) defendant adequately explained the accident to the officer. State v. Gray, 267 Ga. App. 753, 600 S.E.2d 626, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 682 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1743, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 664 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2004), overruled in part, Hughes v. Arrests (Cont’d) 2. Warrantless Arrest (Cont’d) State, 296 Ga. 744, 770 S.E.2d 636, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 185 (2015). Arrest without warrant is lawful where arresting officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been or is being committed. Cook v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 90, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10272 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff’d, 427 F.2d 1172, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8649 (5th Cir. 1970). Warrantless arrests based on probable cause and made in a public place are permissible under U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Costa, 691 F.2d 1358, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23916 (11th Cir. 1982).
- Warrantless arrest in home.
- Officers need not always have warrant to enter house for arrest of felon. If they have probable cause to arrest for a felony and the exigencies of the situation make it imperative that they proceed without waiting to obtain a warrant, the arrest is not constitutionally invalid. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8522 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2145 (1980). Arrest clearly violates U.S. Const., amend. 4 where it takes place in home without warrant and without either exigent circumstances or consent. Thompson v. State, 248 Ga. 343, 285 S.E.2d 685, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 1012 (1981). Warrantless arrest inside home allowable only with suspect’s consent or under exigent circumstances. Mincey v. State, 251 Ga. 255, 304 S.E.2d 882, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 768, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S. Ct. 414, 78 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1983). A warrantless seizure that occurred in a defendant’s home did not violate the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, where the evidence showed that the defendant committed the violation of driving with defective equipment in the officer’s presence and, when the officer first tried to issue a citation for the offense in the yard, the defendant ignored the officer and retreated toward the defendant’s house, where the officer caught the defendant in the doorway. Brock v. State, 196 Ga. App. 605, 396 S.E.2d 785, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1001 (1990), cert. denied, No. S90C1568, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 614 (Ga. Sept. 26, 1990). Pending danger of injury to an infant being held by the defendant provided exigency authorizing the warrantless arrest of the defendant in the defendant’s home. McCauley v. State, 222 Ga. App. 600, 475 S.E.2d 669, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 927 (1996). An officer who entered a home in hot pursuit of defendant who had committed a traffic violation in the officer’s presence was authorized to make a warrantless arrest. State v. Nichols, 225 Ga. App. 609, 484 S.E.2d 507, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 302 (1997), cert. denied, No. S97C1027, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 537 (Ga. June 6, 1997). Where police entry into defendant’s residence was without probable cause or exigent circumstances, a statement taken from defendant at the time was not admissible at trial. State v. Sims, 240 Ga. App. 391, 523 S.E.2d 619, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1360 (1999). Statements made by the defendant outside the defendant’s home during custodial interrogation were admissible regardless of whether the defendant’s arrest inside the home without a warrant was illegal. Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 128 (2007). Where an individual commits an offense in his or her home and that offense is committed in the presence of a law enforcement officer, the officer is authorized to arrest the individual in the home without a warrant only where the officer’s entry into the home is by consent or where there are exigent circumstances. Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263, 467 S.E.2d 315, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 1162 (1996). cious circumstances will sometimes authorize a warrantless arrest even though the officers do not at the time know that the particular crime for which the arrestee is brought to trial has been committed. Morton v. State, 132 Ga.App. 329, 208 S.E.2d 134, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1683 (1974). Flight in connection with other circumstances sufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest without a warrant. Green v. State, 127 Ga. App. 713, 194 S.E.2d 678, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1006 (1972); State v. Smalls, 203 Ga. App. 283, 416 S.E.2d 531, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 501 (1992). Where persons in the suspected group fled as the police approached, and others, including defendant, attempted to leave the scene more slowly, circumstances gave rise to an articulable suspicion that a criminal act may have been occurring so as to authorize a brief investigatory stop. State v. Smalls, 203 Ga. App. 283, 416 S.E.2d 531, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 501 (1992). Entry of house not justified by “hot
- Flight accompanied by other suspipursuit” of vehicle.
- Where police officers had chased a speeding yellow motorcycle and subsequently found the motorcycle leaning against the side of defendant’s house, the “hot pursuit” doctrine did not justify entry of the house in order to effect an arrest. Hamrick v. State, 198 Ga. App. 124, 401 S.E.2d 25, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1581 (1990). Because of mobility of automobiles, officers not always required to delay their arrest in order to obtain warrants, especially if there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape resulting in a failure of justice if the suspect is not arrested that moment. Coley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 810, 219 S.E.2d 35, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1834 (1975). No distinction between felonies
- and misdemeanors.
- Under federal constitutional standards as to warrantless arrests, no distinction exists between felony and misdemeanor in respect to probable cause and good faith belief. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Using results of unlawful search to
- justify warrantless arrest.
- Where the defendant has committed no crime in the presence of the arresting officer, and the latter has no valid warrant, the arrest without a warrant will not justify the search, the result of which forms the basis of the charge. Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 219 S.E.2d 636, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1877 (1975).
- Alleged arrest warrant.
- State violated defendant’s rights by serving and arresting defendant on an alleged bench warrant in the defendant’s home, and thereafter obtaining a search warrant for a suspected controlled substance spotted during the arrest, because this arrest warrant was never physically produced in the criminal proceedings nor its existence otherwise confirmed by the record. Baez v. State, 206 Ga. App. 462, 425 S.E.2d 882, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1676 (1992), cert. denied, No. S93C0450, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 429 (Ga. Feb. 18, 1993). lice officers not required to predict how courts will interpret or how they will decide as to the validity of a law. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975).
- In making a warrantless arrest, po-Judicial determination of reasonableness of warrantless arrest.
- Where the constitutional validity of a warrantless arrest is challenged in a criminal case, it is the function of the court to determine whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of arrest would warrant a person of reasonable caution in a belief that an offense had been committed. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Corroboration of an individual’s mere presence at a designated public location is not corroboration of otherwise unreliable rumors of criminal activity so as to authorize an immediate warrantless arrest. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 508 (1992).
- Warrantless arrest based on informer’s hearsay.
- An informer’s hearsay forms the basis for the warrantless arrest if the reliability of the informant is shown and the evidence establishes that the informant had obtained the information in a reliable manner so as to give the arresting officer probable cause to believe the defendant was committing a crime. Crowley v. State, 140 Ga. App. 208, 230 S.E.2d 358, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1412 (1976).
- Belief that felony committed.
- Without warrant police officer may arrest one believed by officer on reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony. United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 348, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 11066 (5th Cir. 1978). Arrests (Cont’d) 2. Warrantless Arrest (Cont’d) City shoplifting policy eliminated constitutionally derived right of all persons to be free from arrest without a warrant by a police officer except in those instances in which the police officer has probable cause to believe the person had committed or was committing a crime. Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15367 (M.D. Ga. 1980). Facts insufficient to warrant arrest
- for shoplifting.
- Assuming that a police officer is constitutionally authorized to arrest without a warrant on a misdemeanor — a proposition which is extremely doubtful — in light of obviously used condition of the allegedly new $3.99 shoes that individual was accused of taking and that officer looked at, the officer as a matter of common sense could not have believed accused had committed the offense of shoplifting and did not have good faith probable cause to arrest individual for shoplifting. Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15367 (M.D. Ga. 1980). Possession of large sums of money certainly may be suspicious, but it is not itself a crime and does not constitute probable cause for an immediate warrantless arrest for possession of contraband. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 508 (1992).
- Initial investigative search was authorized.
- When the arresting officer stopped defendant, officer had reasonable articulable grounds for suspicion, based on the description given by both the victim and a man who was using a pay telephone at the scene of the crime, that defendant was the person who assaulted the victim, and the officer was authorized to make a protective patdown search to maintain the status quo while questioning appellant. Dorsey v. State, 203 Ga. App. 397, 416 S.E.2d 879, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 433 (1992). Excessive force not found in arrest
- of restaurant invitee without warrant.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a police officer and a city on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim brought by a restaurant invitee who was arrested following an altercation at the restaurant. Although the invitee claimed that the officer used excessive force by handcuffing the invitee too tightly in violation of the fourth amendment, the invitee never complained or showed signs that the handcuffs were causing pain or injury; thus, it was reasonable for the officer to complete the short drive to the detention facility and then remove the handcuffs, and there was no fourth amendment violation. Kline v. KDB, Inc., 295 Ga. App. 789, 673 S.E.2d 516, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (2009). Warrants 1. In General Purpose of warrant is to allow a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). A search warrant is issued upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular place. Therefore, it safeguards an individual’s interest in the privacy of the home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). The warrant traditionally has represented independent assurance that search and arrest will not proceed without probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person or place named in the warrant is involved in the crime. State v. Guhl, 140 Ga. App. 23, 230 S.E.2d 22, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1336 (1976), rev’d, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 791 (1977).
- Presumption of validity.
- A search warrant, regular and proper on its face, is presumptively valid, and the burden is on the person who moves to suppress evidence to show that the affiant engaged in misconduct in executing the affidavit or that material misrepresentations were knowingly or recklessly included in the affidavit. Hunter v. State, 198 Ga. App. 41, 400 S.E.2d 641, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1532 (1990), cert. denied, No. S91C0434, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 478 (Ga. Jan. 31, 1991). Standards for warrant under
- fourth and fourteenth amendments.
- — Proscriptions of U.S. Const., amend. 4 are enforced against states through U.S. Const., amend. 14, and the standard for obtaining a search warrant is the same under the two amendments. Carson v. State ex rel. Price, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384, 1965 Ga. LEXIS 441 (1965). stances of victim’s disappearance and
- Warrant application set out circumdeath.
- Defendant’s motion to suppress items seized during the search of the defendant’s Georgia residence was properly denied because the warrant application plainly set out the circumstances surrounding the victim’s disappearance and death, and detailed that the house was equipped with surveillance equipment and that the cars were equipped with GPS devices; and the magistrate was authorized to make the determination that the surveillance cameras and GPS-tracking equipment might have captured evidence of the relevant crimes and that any such evidence would have been stored on electronic devices. Leili v. State, 307 Ga. 339, 834 S.E.2d 847, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 795 (2019). Authority to issue warrant not
- specified.
- This constitutional guaranty does not specify who has authority or jurisdiction to issue search warrant. Pruitt v. State, 123 Ga. App. 659, 182 S.E.2d 142, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1336 (1971). The city court would have had jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for any part of the City of Atlanta, whether in Fulton or DeKalb County; however, no part of the City of Atlanta extends to Coweta County and thus city court did not have jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for a house located there. State v. Kirkland, 212 Ga. App. 672, 442 S.E.2d 491, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 327 (1994). Practicality of procuring a search warrant is not a sine qua non to reasonableness of a search. Some flexibility will be accorded law officers. Thomas v. State, 118 Ga. App. 359, 163 S.E.2d 850, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1396 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943, 89 S. Ct. 1273, 22 L. Ed. 2d 477, 1969 U.S. LEXIS 2071 (1969).
- Arrest warrants and search warrants compared.
- While an arrest warrant and a search warrant both serve to subject the probable cause determination of the police to judicial review, the interests protected by the two warrants differ. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). Requirement of warrant for search
- of private property.
- Except in certain classes of cases, a search of private property is unreasonable if it is not conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. Romano v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 191, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11526 (N.D. Ga. 1980). No reasonable grounds for issuing
- warrant.
- The Supreme Court enunciated four instances when an officer cannot be said to have reasonable grounds for believing a warrant was properly issued: (1) The warrant is facially defective; (2) the judge who issued the warrant has wholly abandoned the judicial role; (3) the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render a belief that it was valid to be unreasonable; and (4) the magistrate was misled by information the affiant either knew or reasonably should have known to be false. Bell v. State, 204 Ga. App. 528, 419 S.E.2d 729, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 901 (1992). Judicial preference is accorded searches under a warrant. United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13471 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff’d, 647 F.2d 568, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12398 (5th Cir. 1981). “Anticipatory” search warrants are not per se illegal. State v. Baker, 216 Ga. App. 66, 453 S.E.2d 115, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 22 (1995).
- Totality of the circumstances.
- Affidavit for the search warrant established probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant as required by the fourth amendment because considering the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate was authorized to infer that the defendant was involved in his wife’s murder, that evidence of his location and communica-Warrants (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) tions in the time surrounding the murder might be found in his cell phone records, and that the target phone number belonged to defendant. Pugh v. State, 318 Ga. 706, 899 S.E.2d 653, 2024 Ga. LEXIS 80 (2024).
- Warrant required to enter home absent consent or exigency.
- In the absence of consent or exigent circumstances, entry into a home to conduct a search or make an arrest is unreasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4 unless done pursuant to a warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981).
- Searches by private individuals.
- The warrant requirement of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is intended solely as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and a search conducted by a private individual for purely private reasons does not fall within the protective ambit of U.S. Const., amend. 4. If, under the circumstances of the case, the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the government, the ostensibly private search must meet the amendment’s standards; the decisive factor is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means. United States v. Robinson, 504 F. Supp. 425, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15636 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- “Staleness” of warrant.
- The requirement for timely execution of a search warrant under former Code 1933, § 27-306 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-25) indicates the legislative intent, as well as constitutional demand, that probable cause relate to current and not stale information. Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 172 S.E.2d 447, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1082 (1970). An unreasonable delay before securing a search warrant, after receiving information from an informant, where the probable cause must be based solely on the information given, will cause the invalidity of the warrant because it is based on “stale” information. Logan v. State, 135 Ga. App. 879, 219 S.E.2d 615, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1857 (1975). Time alone is inadequate to resolve questions of staleness of information in warrants because the ultimate question is whether, under the facts and circumstances of a particular case, information about evidence is so fresh that there is probable cause to believe the evidence still exists in the same place or is so stale that such a conclusion of probable cause is unreasonable. McDade v. State, 175 Ga. App. 204, 332 S.E.2d 672, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2788 (1985). Five years after an alleged murder, police searching defendant’s parents’ home found a vice (in which defendant had allegedly placed the victim’s head) with blood evidence on it; the trial court erred in finding that information in the search warrant affidavit was stale, as the vise was not perishable, and it was reasonable to expect it to still be there. State v. Lejeune, 277 Ga. 749, 594 S.E.2d 637, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 270, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 861, 125 S. Ct. 187, 160 L. Ed. 2d 103, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6458 (2004). Search cannot exceed warrant’s
- scope.
- A search in execution of a warrant may not exceed in scope the particular article or things to be seized. Lockhart v. State, 166 Ga. App. 555, 305 S.E.2d 22, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3249 (1983). A search in execution of a warrant may not exceed in scope the particular article or things to be seized, so, where a warrant authorized seizure of the following: “Cruelly treated animals who are sick and are not being treated medically, animals in overcrowded and diseased environment, business records which document condition of animals, euthanizing drugs,” there was no judicial authorization for seizure of drugs other than euthanizing drugs, business records which did not document the condition of animals, and any animal which was not in perfect health. Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc. v. State, 181 Ga. App. 657, 353 S.E.2d 555, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2571, rev’d, 257 Ga. 388, 360 S.E.2d 248, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 896 (1987), vacated in part, 184 Ga. App. 805, 363 S.E.2d 360, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2392 (1987). Officer cannot use a warrant as pretext for launching full scale investigation as to the origins of an item which is not incriminating on its face. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1610 (1976). Objects on premises named in
- search warrant.
- Without notice of some sort of the ownership of a belonging, police are entitled to assume that all objects within premises lawfully subject to search under a warrant are part of those premises for the purpose of executing the warrant. Hayes v. State, 141 Ga. App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2737 (1977). Where the facts are consistent with the searching officer’s belief that a suitcase that turned out to belong to defendant, a visitor, was part of the premises lawfully subject to search under the warrant, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress as to the cocaine found in the luggage. Brown v. State, 181 Ga. App. 768, 353 S.E.2d 572, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2573 (1987). Search of containers within larger
- container.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not require additional search warrant for each container within a larger container when the warrant covers the search of the larger for a specified item. United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13471 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff’d, 647 F.2d 568, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12398 (5th Cir. 1981). Items not named in search warrant, but seized in connection with crime under investigation, are proper. Dudley v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 456, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13346 (N.D. Ga. 1970). Seizure of item not named in search warrant is permissible when article itself relates to another crime being committed in the presence of officers at time of search. When possession of an article itself constitutes a crime and is, therefore, tantamount to the commission of a crime in the presence of the searching officers, it may be seized, although not mentioned in the search warrant. Dudley v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 456, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13346 (N.D. Ga. 1970). If the searching officers have probable cause to believe that an article not named in the warrant, but found in an otherwise lawful search, will aid in apprehension or conviction of a specific and particular offense, it may be seized. Dudley v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 456, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13346 (N.D. Ga. 1970). There must be a bona fide search for the item sought to be found, as it is listed on the search warrant, but if, in the course of an authorized search, another contraband is found on the party or premises searched, the officer is authorized to seize it, for the search, though not productive of that which was sought, was legal. Bostwick v. State, 124 Ga. App. 113, 182 S.E.2d 925, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 834 (1971). Where probable cause exists, seizure of items other than those described in search warrant is authorized. State v. Causey, 132 Ga. App. 17, 207 S.E.2d 225, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1588 (1974). Evidence obtained from premises
- not named in warrant inadmissible.
- — Where a search warrant has no description of the premises to be searched other than the street address, and the street or number is incorrectly given, it is error for a trial judge to overrule a motion to suppress the evidence produced, even where the officers who conducted the search went to the correct address because of personal observation of the premises prior to the search. Bell v. State, 124 Ga. App. 139, 182 S.E.2d 901, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 845 (1971). Person with unknown status to
- premises searched under warrant.
- Although a search warrant carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted, that authority does not extend to a person whose status with respect to the premises is unknown, who has already left the premises, and who the police know is not named in the warrant. Emery v. State, 249 Ga. App. 114, 548 S.E.2d 23, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 454 (2001). Search of persons arriving on
- premises being searched.
- The right to search those coming in while a search of the premises is going on, not being expressly authorized by the warrant, must be shown by the grounds of probable cause or must have been authorized under the provisions of former Code 1933, § 27-309 Warrants (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-28). Logan v. State, 135 Ga. App. 879, 219 S.E.2d 615, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1857 (1975). Searches of persons not named in search warrant but found on premises to be searched are illegal absent independent justification for a personal search. Hayes v. State, 141 Ga. App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2737 (1977). Use of properly seized item in an-
- other prosecution.
- Item named in warrant, and therefore properly seized, may be basis for prosecution of another offense. Dudley v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 456, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13346 (N.D. Ga. 1970). ter suspect’s own residence to effect suspect’s arrest. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). It is the general rule that a warrant is required to search the curtilage, and the yard immediately surrounding one’s dwelling is well within the curtilage. Black v. State, 119 Ga. App. 855, 168 S.E.2d 916, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1279 (1969). Warrant to search house extended to driveway and vehicle within the
- Arrest warrant alone suffices to endriveway.
- When a search warrant was issued allowing a search of defendant’s house, this extended by implication to areas within the curtilage of the dwelling, and to a vehicle parked within that curtilage. Solis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 493, 602 S.E.2d 166, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 914 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1966, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 1069 (Ga. Nov. 22, 2004). Invoking warrant as authority to
- enter homes of third parties.
- An arrest warrant, to the extent that it is invoked as authority to enter the homes of third parties, suffers from the same constitutional infirmity pertinent to the general warrants that occurred in England and the writs of assistance used in the American colonies. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). Arrest warrant authorizes invasion of privacy of own home, but not that
- of third party.
- Because an arrest warrant authorizes the police to deprive a person of the person’s liberty, it necessarily also authorizes a limited invasion of that person’s privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest the person in the person’s home. However, when the police seek to use an arrest warrant as legal authority to enter the home of a third party to conduct a search, this reasoning is inapplicable. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). An arrest warrant, as opposed to a search warrant, is inadequate to protect the fourth amendment interests of persons not named in the warrant, when their homes are searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances. Otwell v. State, 201 Ga. App. 71, 410 S.E.2d 178, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1204 (1991). Lack of signature on copy of search
- warrant.
- Where one of three copies of a search warrant was not signed but at least one copy was signed at the time it was issued, the warrant is not invalid if the magistrate did make a judicial finding of the existence of probable cause prior to issuing the warrant. Braden v. State, 135 Ga. App. 827, 219 S.E.2d 479, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1842 (1975). Conclusion of witness that paper is warrant allowing legal arrest not
- proper proof.
- The conclusion of a witness that a given paper is a warrant under which an arrest may legally be made is not proper proof that such a paper is in fact a warrant by virtue of which a legal arrest has been made, so as to authorize the admission of evidence obtained by means of an arrest under such paper or alleged warrant. Marshall v. State, 130 Ga. App. 572, 203 S.E.2d 885, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1180 (1974). Production of photocopy of search warrant was sufficient to evidence valid search where issuing magistrate testified that the magistrate had searched the files and had not found the original warrant, and the police officer who executed the warrant similarly found only the photocopy in the officer’s file. Early v. State, 170 Ga. App. 158, 316 S.E.2d 527, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2860 (1984).
- Affidavit alone insufficient to support search warrant.
- A warrant affidavit complying with § 17-4-41 is not alone sufficient to demonstrate the validity of an arrest warrant, because probable cause must still be shown to the issuing magistrate. Devier v. State, 253 Ga. 604, 323 S.E.2d 150, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 1049 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 105 S. Ct. 1877, 85 L. Ed. 2d 169, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 280 (1985). Trial court properly found that the supporting affidavit for the search warrant for a search of defendant’s apartment was insufficient to establish probable cause, as the affidavit contained mainly unsupported hearsay from an informant with no information corroborating the informant’s veracity; accordingly, the trial court properly suppressed evidence that was seized from defendant’s apartment pursuant to the search warrant. State v. Lejeune, 276 Ga. 179, 576 S.E.2d 888, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 125 (2003). Search warrant may not be granted simply because police officer states police officer has received reliable information from a credible person. There must be some evidence of reliability other than the conclusory statement of the police officer that the informer is reliable, to justify the grant of a search warrant. Davis v. Smith, 430 F.2d 1256, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7842 (5th Cir. 1970). Arrest warrant based on victim’s
- statement.
- Although the magistrate did not have an exculpatory witness’s statement, the magistrate did have the victim’s statement and other evidence offered by law enforcement which was sufficiently reliably trustworthy to find that probable cause existed to justify arrest. Rock v. Lowe, 893 F. Supp. 1573, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16088 (S.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1161, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4579 (11th Cir. 1996). Magistrate may issue warrant based on police officer’s knowledge of
- suspect’s reputation.
- A police officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s reputation is a practical consideration of everyday life upon which a magistrate may properly rely in issuing a search warrant. Law v. State, 165 Ga. App. 687, 302 S.E.2d 570, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3189, aff’d, 251 Ga. 525, 307 S.E.2d 904, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 899 (1983).
- Conclusory allegations of police insufficient.
- Warrants authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1 may not issue based solely on the conclusory allegations of a police officer that the sought-after materials are obscene, but instead must be supported by affidavits setting forth specific facts in order that the issuing magistrate may focus searchingly on the question of obscenity. State v. Kramer, 260 Ga. App. 546, 580 S.E.2d 314, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 418 (2003). Hearsay can be basis for issuance of warrant so long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1313 (1975). An affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information as long as there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Deal v. State, 199 Ga. App. 184, 404 S.E.2d 343, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 408 (1991). ability of current violation of lottery
- Validity of warrant based on problaw.
- If occurrences are such as to indicate the probability of the violation of the lottery law at a current date, a warrant is valid. Logan v. State, 135 Ga. App. 879, 219 S.E.2d 615, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1857 (1975).
- Mere threat to obtain search warrant does not amount to coercion.
- United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8522 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2145 (1980).
- Valid warrants require determinations only of matters of fact.
- If the warrant calls for the search and seizure of intoxicating liquors at a described location, the executing officer may be required to determine as a matter of fact which of several different containers found on the premises searched contain intoxicating liquors or which contain other beverages of a nonintoxicating character. In the very nature of things, the officer cannot be relieved of making this determination, and so long as the determination that the Warrants (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) officer is required to make is a determination of a matter of fact as distinguished from a determination of a matter of opinion, the warrant is valid. Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859, 165 S.E.2d 302, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 977 (1968).
- Geofencing.
- Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the search warrants authorizing police to access location history data and identifying information from Google were supported by probable cause as the applications explained that the suspect was caught on video using a cell phone near the victim’s home, that many cell phones generate Google location history data, and, later, that the movements of a specific cell phone “matched up” with what was known of the suspect’s movements. Jones v. State, 321 Ga. 137, 913 S.E.2d 700, 2025 Ga. LEXIS 39 (2025). Trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress because the search warrants authorizing police to access location history data and identifying information from Google sufficiently particularized the information police could access by specifying the location, time frame, and types of data that could be obtained. The warrants provided sufficient guidance by specifying the location, time frame, and types of data that could be accessed, avoiding an unconstitutional general search. Jones v. State, 321 Ga. 137, 913 S.E.2d 700, 2025 Ga. LEXIS 39 (2025). Failure of the police to knock and give verbal notice of their authority and purpose in the execution of a search warrant may be excused where the police have reasonable grounds to believe that forewarning would either greatly increase their peril or lead to the immediate destruction of the evidence. Scull v. State, 122 Ga. App. 696, 178 S.E.2d 720, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1005 (1970); Martin v. State, 165 Ga. App. 760, 302 S.E.2d 614, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2008 (1983). Unannounced entry by Georgia Bureau of Investigation agents is authorized where evidence can be otherwise easily destroyed and where agents request the judge who issued the search warrant to include a no-knock provision. Cox v. State, 160 Ga. App. 199, 286 S.E.2d 482, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2952 (1981). 2. Who May Issue Neutral and detached magistrate
- required.
- Magistrate who issues warrant must be neutral and detached, and must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search. State v. Guhl, 140 Ga. App. 23, 230 S.E.2d 22, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1336 (1976), rev’d, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 791 (1977); Vaughn v. State, 160 Ga. App. 283, 287 S.E.2d 277, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 3212 (1981). Rule under U.S. Const., amend. 4 that warrant be issued by neutral and detached magistrate requires severance and disengagement from activities of law enforcement. Thomason v. State, 148 Ga. App. 513, 251 S.E.2d 598, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 3204 (1978); Vaughn v. State, 160 Ga. App. 283, 287 S.E.2d 277, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 3212 (1981). A justice of the peace or anyone else issuing a warrant should not participate in the searches so as to avoid giving the appearance of not being a detached and neutral magistrate. McAllister v. State, 157 Ga. App. 158, 276 S.E.2d 669, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1751 (1981). Validity of search warrants issued
- by justice of peace.
- Although the United States Supreme Court has held that the issuance of a search warrant by a justice of the peace violates the protections of U.S. Const., amend. 4, that holding will not be applied retroactively so as to exclude evidence obtained under such a warrant where the warrant was issued according to law and in complete good faith. State v. Patterson, 143 Ga. App. 225, 237 S.E.2d 707, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2261 (1977). Magistrate not disqualified because
- of possible additional compensation.
- — The argument that a magistrate who, in the event a search warrant is issued, might possibly receive additional compensation in the form of a fee for holding a subsequent committal hearing is not “neutral and detached” in the initial decision to issue the warrant is without merit. Anderson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 459, 304 S.E.2d 550, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3242 (1983). qualification as judge in committal
- Mayor’s financial interest not discourt.
- The rule which forbids a “trial” before a mayor who is responsible for that city’s finances and whose court, through fines, forfeitures, and fees, provides a substantial portion of the mayor’s city’s revenue does not extend to a committal court which deals only with probable cause to bind a defendant over for trial. McLarty v. State, 176 Ga. App. 433, 336 S.E.2d 273, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2885 (1985). Judge who also serves as county coroner is not per se disqualified from issuing a search warrant in the capacity as ex officio justice of the peace. Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 297 S.E.2d 227, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1235 (1982). Judge who had not served as deputy sheriff for approximately eight years at the time the search warrant in question was issued was not disqualified to issue warrant. Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 297 S.E.2d 227, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1235 (1982). Mere personal associations with police officers, without more, do not disqualify a magistrate from issuing a search warrant. Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 297 S.E.2d 227, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1235 (1982).
- Prior issuance of blank warrants.
- — Where defendant contended the search warrant was invalid because the executing magistrate was not neutral and detached, because the magistrate admitted, after first having denied, that at sometime in the past in an unrelated incident or incidents, the magistrate had signed blank warrants to accommodate an officer when the magistrate was to be at a family dinner, it was held that the incident suggested by defendant was an isolated incident or incidents in the past and that there was no evidence except remote speculation that the magistrate’s posture in issuing the search warrant in this case was not neutral and detached. Lang v. State, 168 Ga. App. 693, 310 S.E.2d 276, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3434 (1983).
- Right to alter warrant.
- Since only a judicial officer may issue a search warrant, the right to alter, modify, or correct that warrant is necessarily vested only in that authority. Delaney v. State, 135 Ga. App. 612, 218 S.E.2d 318, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1756 (1975).
- When new or modified warrant required.
- Once officers concluded the defendant was to be searched at a later time for a different batch of drugs, they were bound to return to a judicial officer to seek a new or modified warrant. Delaney v. State, 135 Ga. App. 612, 218 S.E.2d 318, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1756 (1975). 3. Particularity of Description
- General warrant is void.
- General warrant, one which does not sufficiently specify place or person to be searched, is void. Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 900 (1970). Particularity being the sine qua non of valid warrant, general warrant is void. State v. Cochran, 135 Ga. App. 47, 217 S.E.2d 181, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1552 (1975). General exploratory warrants are void. By definition, a general warrant is one which does not sufficiently specify the person, place, or thing to be searched. Lockhart v. State, 166 Ga. App. 555, 305 S.E.2d 22, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3249 (1983). Test for determining sufficiency of
- description in warrant.
- To be valid, a search warrant must contain a description of the person and premises to be searched with such particularity as would enable a prudent person executing the warrant to locate the person and premises definitely and with reasonable certainty. Mercer v. State, 146 Ga. App. 143, 245 S.E.2d 492, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2233 (1978); State v. Blews, 148 Ga. App. 73, 251 S.E.2d 10, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 3022 (1978); Anderson v. State, 155 Ga.App. 25, 270 S.E.2d 263, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2440 (1980). United States Const., amend. 14 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, requiring that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause . . . particularly describing the place, or places to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” is met if the description Warrants (Cont’d) 3. Particularity of Description (Cont’d) sufficiently permits a prudent officer with a search warrant to be able to locate the person and place definitely and with reasonable certainty. Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2658 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1251 (1980). A search warrant is not invalid for want of description of the premises to be searched if the description sufficiently permits a prudent officer executing the warrant to locate the place definitely and with reasonable certainty, and without depending upon the officer’s discretion. Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3129 (1983). Description indefinite if officer can
- exercise selective discretion.
- A search warrant is constitutionally inadequate if the description of the premises to be searched is so indefinite that under the authority of the warrant an officer can exercise a selective discretion in determining where the officer will search. State v. Blews, 148 Ga. App. 73, 251 S.E.2d 10, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 3022 (1978). Writ should not leave executing officer in doubt or require officer to exercise personal discretion. It will be deemed sufficient if the information permits the officer to locate the premises without the aid of other information. Mercer v. State, 146 Ga. App. 143, 245 S.E.2d 492, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2233 (1978). Description which is exclusive is
- sufficient.
- If a search warrant, read as a whole, points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, it meets the description requirement. Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3129 (1983). Elaborate specificity in a warrant is
- not necessary.
- A description is sufficiently particular when it enables a searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the items authorized to be seized. United States v. Moody, 763 F. Supp. 589, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5969 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff’d, 977 F.2d 1420, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25576 (11th Cir. 1992). Affidavit which described how one of defendant’s rape victim’s identified defendant, gave the description of defendant that all the rape victims gave of defendant, described the car that defendant was driving, described the gun replica that defendant used, under the totality of the circumstances, was sufficient to support a search warrant and it was not error for the trial court to admit the evidence obtained in the execution of the warrant. Collins v. State, 267 Ga. App. 784, 600 S.E.2d 802, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 813 (2004). Effect of practical necessities of
- search milieu on particularity of description.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 describes the maximum extent to which U.S. Const., amend. 4 permits the particularity of description in a search warrant to be encroached by the practical necessities of the search environment. Wallace v. State, 131 Ga. App. 204, 205 S.E.2d 523, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1373 (1974).
- Cell phone evidence seized pursuant to search warrant.
- Trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress cell phone evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant because the affidavit offered a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that there was a fair probability that evidence related to the attempted drug sale would be found on defendant’s cell phone. According to the affidavit, defendant said defendant and the drug dealer began exchanging phone calls and eventually set up a drug transaction, at the meeting, the victim attempted to rob them, and the drug dealer shot the victim in the head; this information supported the common-sense inference that evidence related to the attempted drug sale and shooting could be located on defendant’s phone. State v. Ledbetter, 318 Ga. 457, 899 S.E.2d 222, 2024 Ga. LEXIS 58 (2024).
- Particularity of warrant held sufficient.
- Search warrant satisfied the particularity requirement since the warrant listed classes of items that, as a practical matter, were likely to be found relevant to the shooting death of the victim and the removal of the body to the location where the body was found. The warrant limited the classes of items to those relevant to the crime of murder. Palmer v. State, 310 Ga. 668, 853 S.E.2d 650, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 3 (2021).
- “Buy money” need not be attached.
- — Failure to attach a photocopy of “buy money” to an affidavit did not violate the particularity requirement, where the warrant specified “monies derived from the sale of controlled substances.” Smith v. State, 207 Ga. App. 463, 428 S.E.2d 403, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 249 (1993).
- Exploratory rummaging prohibited.
- The fourth amendment requires that a warrant particularly describe the place to be searched and the items or persons to be seized; exploratory rummaging is prohibited. United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8165 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 901, 111 S. Ct. 259, 112 L. Ed. 2d 216, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 5157 (1990). Description of contraband may be given in less detail than other articles. State v. Causey, 132 Ga. App. 17, 207 S.E.2d 225, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1588 (1974).
- Mere statement of affiant’s conclusion.
- A warrant is clearly insufficient on its face to show probable cause if it merely states the bold conclusion of the affiant district attorney that the defendant had exhibited two named films which were obscene material. Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1020 (1972). Search warrant is “general” as to particular defendant when the defendant is neither listed by name specifically nor described generally, and no additional indicia of probable cause are provided at the scene of the search. State v. Cochran, 135 Ga. App. 47, 217 S.E.2d 181, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1552 (1975). son to be arrested on arrest warrant constitutes a sufficient description to satisfy the requirement of U.S. Const., amend. 4 that the person to be seized be described with particularity. Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15755 (5th Cir. 1980). Failure to name a person in a
- Generally, inclusion of name of persearch warrant is not fatal.
- Search warrants are not directed at persons; they authorize the search of “places” and the seizure of “things,” and as a constitutional matter they need not even name the person from whom the things will be seized. Bing v. State, 178 Ga. App. 288, 342 S.E.2d 762, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2518 (1986).
- Search of unnamed persons involved in crime on named premises.
- — A search warrant to search designated premises will not authorize the search of every individual who happens to be on the premises, but a warrant which identifies the premises and its owners or occupants is not void as a general warrant because it authorizes the search of other persons found there who may reasonably be involved in the commission of the crime for which the warrant is issued. Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 900 (1970). Warrant’s description of place searched is not required to meet technical requirements or have the specificity sought by conveyancers; the warrant need only describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity to direct the searcher, to confine the searcher’s examination to the place described, and to advise those being searched of the searcher’s authority. United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 23122 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106 S. Ct. 2901, 90 L. Ed. 2d 987, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 1692 (1986).
- Omission of county from description in copy of warrant.
- Where a copy of a warrant which omits the name of the county is used to be directed to the executing officers, and where the affidavit included the name of the county along with the other description, the omission of the name of the county does not affect the substantial rights of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2658 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1251 (1980).
- Adequacy of designation or description known to locality.
- Asearch warrant should be read as a whole, and any designation or description known to Warrants (Cont’d) 3. Particularity of Description (Cont’d) the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. State v. Blews, 148 Ga. App. 73, 251 S.E.2d 10, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 3022 (1978).
- Incorrect street number.
- Even though a street number is incorrect, where there are other elements of description sufficiently particular, the search warrant may be valid. Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3129 (1983). Where a search warrant fails to name an individual and describes incorrectly the street number, county and city, naming only the street name correctly, it is defective. State v. Hatch, 160 Ga. App. 384, 287 S.E.2d 98, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 3079 (1981). Failure to specify residential units
- within dwelling.
- Trial court should not have granted a motion to suppress on the ground that the warrant was invalid for failure to specify which of two residential units in the dwelling was to be searched, where a pre-warrant inspection of the exterior of the premises revealed a single entrance and street address and only one mailbox on the front porch, and a pre-warrant search of a city directory indicated no residents in the building other than defendants. State v. Capps, 256 Ga. 14, 342 S.E.2d 676, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 683 (1986). If neither the affiant nor investigating officers nor executing officers knew of or had reason to know of a structure’s actual multiple occupancy character until execution of the warrant was under way, and the outward appearance of the building reflects a single-occupancy structure, the warrant is not invalid for failure to specify a subunit within the building. Bing v. State, 178 Ga. App. 288, 342 S.E.2d 762, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2518 (1986). Warrant that did not specify the subunits of a house subsequently alleged to be a “boarding house” was properly executed for the entire dwelling, because the circumstances showed that multi-family occupancy would not have been obvious to a reasonably diligent law enforcement officer. Davis v. State, 198 Ga. App. 310, 401 S.E.2d 326, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 22 (1991).
- Sufficient identification of apartment.
- When an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant for defendant’s apartment falsely stated that an informant told the affiant that the informant had purchased drugs at a particular apartment, the affidavit still supported issuance of the search warrant because law enforcement agents observing defendant’s apartment were able to establish that the informant had gone to and come from defendant’s apartment immediately prior to being arrested for possession of a quantity of drugs. Defendant’s argument that an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant for defendant’s apartment did not state a correct address was without merit as the address stated in the affidavit was sufficient because there was no probability that it identified another apartment. Evans v. State, 263 Ga. App. 572, 588 S.E.2d 764, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1197 (2003), cert. denied, No. S04C0348, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 166 (Ga. Feb. 16, 2004). Warrant held invalid for search of two motel rooms not registered in
- proper name.
- A search warrant directed to a room in either one or another of two motels at different addresses in the same city and identified only by the statement that they will be registered in the name of a specified person will not authorize a search of two motel rooms in one of the motels registered in the name of another person not identified in the warrant. Garner v. State, 124 Ga. App. 33, 182 S.E.2d 902, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 800 (1971).
- Illegal, warrantless entry into motel room tainted subsequent consent.
- — Trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence found in a motel room that defendant was occupying with another as the warrantless entry into the hotel room by the police violated the fourth amendment and the illegal entry tainted defendant’s consent to search and rendered the consent invalid. The state also failed to carry the state’s burden to show that a third party’s subsequent consent to search the room was untainted by the illegal entry. Snider v. State, 292 Ga. App. 180, 663 S.E.2d 805, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 727 (2008). thorizes search of “other persons” or “any motor vehicle.” — A search warrant is not impermissibly overbroad and general where it authorizes the agents to search “any other person found on said premises who reasonably might be involved in the commission of the aforesaid violation of the laws” as well as “any motor vehicle found on said premises” and both clauses appear in the preprinted portion of the search warrant form, since a warrant which identifies the premises and its owners or occupants is not void as a general warrant because it authorizes the search of other persons found there who may reasonably be involved in the commission of the crime for which the warrant is issued, and the scope of the search is sufficiently limited by the specific language typed in the blank spaces of the form, describing the vehicles by color, make, type, and license plate number and stating they are at the premises described. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817, 305 S.E.2d 629, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3279 (1983). Substantial basis for issuance of
- Warrant not overbroad where it auwarrant.
- Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as a substantial basis existed for issuance of a warrant because the victim’s body was discovered near the defendant’s apartment as well as bloodstained items and cigarette butts wrapped in a towel; and, when the defendant belatedly disclosed that the defendant had disposed of bloodstained women’s clothing before the discovery of the victim, and that the defendant smoked the brand of cigarettes found in the bloody towel, that evidence provided a substantial basis for the conclusion that the clothing belonged to the victim, that the defendant had a connection both to the clothing and cigarettes, and that the defendant’s apartment had a fair probability of containing evidence of the crime. Mizell v. State, 304 Ga. 723, 822 S.E.2d 211, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 795 (2018). Warrant sufficient with “person, premises or property.” — Search warrant that authorized the search and seizure of “the person, premises or property” was sufficiently particular; the use of the word “or” did not give the officers unbridled discretion in what to search. Minter v. State, 206 Ga. App. 692, 426 S.E.2d 169, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1748 (1992).
- Search warrant based on anonymous tips and other information allowed.
- When law enforcement received two anonymous tips that defendant would be traveling from another state with cocaine in a certain model car licensed in the other state, would be taking a certain route, and would be staying in a certain hotel, the tips’ range of details relating to future acts not easily predicted, combined with information obtained while defendant was lawfully detained that $150,000.00 was seized from a concealed compartment in defendant’s vehicle and defendant was deceptive during a conversation with a police officer, allowed the issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s house. Solis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 493, 602 S.E.2d 166, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 914 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1966, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 1069 (Ga. Nov. 22, 2004).
- Type and color description of clothing sufficient.
- There was no merit in the contention that a search warrant did not properly describe certain clothing identified by the victim and similarly described in the warrant, where the victim described clothing worn by the assailant as to type and color, the type and color description being sufficient to meet the “generic description” required by the law of this state. Johnson v. State, 179 Ga. App. 467, 346 S.E.2d 903, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2624 (1986).
- Exact caliber of pistol not required.
- — Requirement of U.S. Const., amend. 4 to describe particularly the article to be seized does not intend exclusion of pistol as evidence because the victim assaulted could not tell the exact caliber of the pistol. Young v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 653, 193 S.E.2d 854, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 721 (1972).
- Description of pornographic material and marijuana sufficient.
- Search warrant description that authorized search for pornographic materials and marijuana was sufficient to enable Warrants (Cont’d) 3. Particularity of Description (Cont’d) the searching officer to seize the described items with “reasonable certainty.” Tyler v. State, 176 Ga. App. 96, 335 S.E.2d 691, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2856 (1985).
- Description of pornographic materials insufficient.
- A search warrant’s description was so open-ended that the warrant violated both the United States and Georgia Constitutions. As a result, use of the warrant to seize pornographic video tapes was invalid, and the tapes should have been suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search. Dobbins v. State, 262 Ga. 161, 415 S.E.2d 168, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 213 (1992).
- Particularity of warrant held insufficient.
- Trial court properly suppressed videotapes that were seized from defendant’s home during the execution of a search warrant, as the description in the warrant that the items sought were videotapes that were instruments used in the crimes of molesting and sexually exploiting children did not meet the particularity requirements of U.S. Const., amend. 4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, especially in light of the fact that videotapes involved activity protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1, where there was no evidence of any videotape activity involving the victim, and the warrant did not elaborate on what types of videotapes were to be seized, leaving that determination solely to the discretion of the officers, which amounted to an impermissible general warrant; circumstances may make an exact search warrant description of instrumentalities a virtual impossibility and, in those circumstances, the searching officer can only be expected to describe the generic class of items sought, but a warrant authorizing the seizure of “videotapes” with nothing more does not pass constitutional muster. State v. Kramer, 260 Ga. App. 546, 580 S.E.2d 314, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 418 (2003). Trial court did not err by finding that the search warrant was overly broad and authorized a general search of defendant’s personal effects without probable cause in violation of the fourth amendment and O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21, and therefore it properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress, because the warrant broadly authorized the seizure of “any and all stored electronic information” on the cell phones, “including but not limited to” various kinds of electronic information. The warrant contained no limiting language and authorized a limitless search for and seizure of any and all data on defendant’s cell phones. State v. Wilson, 315 Ga. 613, 884 S.E.2d 298, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 36 (2023). Effect of discrepancy as to time of issuance and time of execution of
- warrant.
- An entry on a warrant showing it to have been issued at 12:55 P.M. on a particular day is certainly in conflict with that showing the warrant to have been executed at 12:00 Noon of the same date, but a court is authorized to find this to have been error either as to the time of issuance or as to the time of execution, and such a finding is implicit in an order overruling the motion to suppress. Bostwick v. State, 124 Ga. App. 113, 182 S.E.2d 925, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 834 (1971).
- Evidence as pathway to incriminating evidence.
- Police did not exceed the scope of a search warrant where the warrant specified “receipts” and a furniture receipt was found in defendant’s car leading to defendant’s paramour’s home, where police, in a consented-to search, found incriminating evidence; the police were not required to overlook relevant evidence where they knew defendant’s paramour’s name and the receipt was a pathway to evidence. Brown v. State, 260 Ga. App. 627, 580 S.E.2d 348, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 442 (2003), overruled in part, George v. State, 312 Ga. 801, 865 S.E.2d 127, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 679 (2021). Investigative Stops 1. In General zures under U.S. Const., amends. 4 and 14, not supported by some objective justification, governs all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 148 (1980); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786 (5th Cir. 1981).
- Prohibition of searches and sei-Probable cause not always required for police intrusion.
- Circumstances short of probable cause for arrest may justify stopping of pedestrian or motorist for limited questioning. Merrill v. State, 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1248 (1974). Constitution does not always require standard as strict as probable cause to justify some degree of police intrusion. United States v. Gonzalez-Vargas, 496 F. Supp. 1296, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13823 (N.D. Ga. 1980). That police receive information which does not amount to probable cause does not require them to shrug their shoulders and make no inquiry, but rather the circumstances may justify investigation. State v. Smalls, 203 Ga. App. 283, 416 S.E.2d 531, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 501 (1992). An anonymous phone call, while not amounting to probable cause, was sufficient to warrant a visual inspection of the public premises for investigation based on the police officers’ common experience as to drug activity in such residential areas. State v. Smalls, 203 Ga. App. 283, 416 S.E.2d 531, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 501 (1992). Test of reasonableness of detention
- without arrest.
- A court, in assessing reasonableness of a detention where no actual arrest has been made, should look to: (1) whether the officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the plaintiff of criminal activity; (2) whether the methods used were the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officers’ suspicions in a short period of time; (3) whether the length of the detention was “significant” or otherwise longer than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop; and (4) whether the officers diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicion quickly. Thompson v. Spikes, 663 F. Supp. 627, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541 (S.D. Ga. 1987). Reasonableness of suspicion of
- criminal activity.
- The question of whether a seizure was supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity requires an evaluation of the articulable facts known to the police officer at the moment of the seizure. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (5th Cir. 1980). A police officer may stop an individual where there is a “reasonable, articulable ground” for detention which can be less than probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search, but must be more than a mere caprice or arbitrary harassment. Hambright v. State, 161 Ga. App. 877, 289 S.E.2d 24, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 1994 (1982). Investigative stops of vehicles are analogous to Terry stops, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and are invalid if based upon only an unparticularized suspicion or hunch. An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. This specific, articulable suspicion must be based on the totality of the circumstances — e.g., objective observations, information from police reports, the modes or patterns of certain kinds of lawbreakers, and the inferences drawn and deductions made by a trained law enforcement officer. Cheatham v. State, 204 Ga. App. 483, 419 S.E.2d 920, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 884 (1992). In determining whether a stop was justified by reasonable suspicion, the court takes into account the totality of the circumstances including consideration of objective observations, patterns of operations of certain kinds of lawbreakers, and information from police reports because a trained police officer draws inferences and makes deductions from this type of data. Gonzalez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 253, 509 S.E.2d 144, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1484 (1998). After a store cashier reported conduct arguably amounting to disorderly conduct and then when the police arrived at the closed store minutes after the cashier’s complaint, they found only a black pickup as mentioned by the cashier, with no other Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) vehicles in sight, this provided the basis for an articulable suspicion justifying the stop. Morris v. State, 239 Ga. App. 100, 520 S.E.2d 485, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 952 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C1649, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 926 (Ga. Oct. 29, 1999). Initial stop and detention of defendant was not solely dependent upon the restricted power of police to detain occupants of a premises while a warranted search is conducted, but was an authorized Terry stop. Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 524 S.E.2d 211, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1999). Civil forfeiture order was affirmed and suppression motion was properly denied as drugs were found in defendant’s possession after an arrest following a Terry stop as the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity since the officer had been advised of defendant’s banishment, which defendant acknowledged to be violating; the officer was charged with enforcing court orders and, although the banishment was illegal, the order had not been challenged at the time of the Terry stop. Sanders v. State, 259 Ga. App. 422, 577 S.E.2d 94, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 121 (2003). Officer’s pat-down of defendant, during which the officer seized credit cards from defendant’s person, was lawful as defendant had been seen in a stolen car, had previously fled police, knew the officer was investigating a crime, put defendant’s hands in defendant’s pockets, the officer knew defendant had lied about two items in defendant’s pockets that could be used as weapons, and the objects the officer felt in defendant’s pocket were ones that, in the officer’s experience, had been known to have been fashioned into weapons by attaching razor blades to them. Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 583 S.E.2d 9, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 604 (2003). Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant in a parking lot at 3:00 a.m. because the defendant matched the description of a man seen hiding behind the restaurant dumpster, prompting restaurant employees to call police. The defendant’s subsequent consent to a search of the defendant’s person was valid. Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 137, 720 S.E.2d 654, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1085 (2011).
- “Totality-of-circumstances” test.
- Where police informant had previously supplied information that led to drug arrests and in the instant case accurately predicted that the defendant would proceed to a specific location after first going to his residence, such circumstances combined with informant’s statement that defendant would be in possession of cocaine satisfied “totality- of-the-circumstances” test justifying brief investigative detention. State v. Watson, 205 Ga. App. 313, 422 S.E.2d 202, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1143 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C1465, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 861 (Ga. Oct. 8, 1992). State’s interests balanced against
- momentary inconvenience of detention.
- In cases where there are some reasonable articulable grounds for suspicion, the state’s interest in the maintenance of community peace and security outweigh the momentary inconvenience and indignity of investigatory detention. Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 211 S.E.2d 294, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 758 (1974). U.S. Const., amend. 4 applies to all zures that involve only brief detention short of traditional arrest. Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains the freedom to walk away, the police officer has seized that person. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2421 (1979). Police officer has a limited right to an investigative stop of a person or vehicle. Circumstances short of probable cause for arrest may justify the stopping of a pedestrian or motorist for limited questioning. Bailey v. State, 158 Ga. App. 96, 279 S.E.2d 334, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2092 (1981). The fourth amendment does not require a police officer who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug the officer’s shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. Howell v. State, 160 Ga. App. 479, 287 S.E.2d 294, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 3236 (1981); Holley v. State, 157 Ga. App. 863, 278 S.E.2d 738, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2038 (1981); Williams v. State, 163 Ga. App. 866, 295 S.E.2d 361, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3265 (1982). Momentary detention and questioning are permissible if based upon specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, justify a reasonable scope of inquiry not based on mere inclination, caprice or harassment. An authorized officer may stop an automobile and conduct a limited investigative inquiry of its occupants, without probable cause, if the officer has reasonable grounds for such action, a founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing. Holley v. State, 157 Ga. App. 863, 278 S.E.2d 738, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2038 (1981). Momentary detention and questioning are permissible if based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, justify a reasonable course of inquiry not based on mere inclination, caprice, or harassment. Bailey v. State, 202 Ga. App. 427, 414 S.E.2d 330, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 18 (1992). If there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing based on specific and articulable facts from which it can be determined that the police officer’s action is not arbitrary and harassing, the officer may make a brief, investigatory detention of the individual to determine identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information. Gonzalez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 253, 509 S.E.2d 144, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1484 (1998).
- seizures of the person, including sei-Elements of a Terry stop.
- A Terry stop is a brief stop, limited in time to that minimally necessary to investigate the allegation invoking suspicion, and limited in scope to identification, licensing of a driver and a vehicle if appropriate, a protective “patdown” of the outer surface of clothing for weapons if the officer has reasonable apprehension that the person is armed or dangerous, and limited questioning reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the initiation of the momentary stop. State v. Avret, 156 Ga. App. 527, 275 S.E.2d 113, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3109 (1980).
- Legality of scope of “Terry stop”.
- Once a “Terry stop” has been made, the legality of its scope is determined in each case by balancing the extent of the intrusion against the immediacy and importance of the interest in crime prevention or law enforcement which is sought to be advanced. Vanloo v. State, 187 Ga. App. 290, 370 S.E.2d 44, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 641 (1988).
- Weapons search not limited to pat-down.
- Terry v. Ohio does not limit a weapons search to a so-called pat-down search. Any limited intrusion designed to discover guns, knives, clubs or other instruments of assault is permissible. Under the circumstances, the officer’s act of reaching into the defendant’s left-hand pocket was not overly intrusive. The defendant’s conduct in pushing the officer’s hand away when officer attempted to pat down the pocket, and defendant’s subsequent conduct in turning defendant’s body sideways, coupled with the fact that the officer had seen the defendant, a suspected drug violator, reach into the console before stepping from the vehicle, would create a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed. Hayes v. State, 202 Ga. App. 204, 414 S.E.2d 321, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1729 (1991). Where officers acted lawfully in stopping defendant to ask what defendant was doing and defendant attempted to avoid the officers and then nervously reached for defendant’s pocket, the officers had a right to stop defendant from going into the pocket and to make a limited search because they reasonably believed that their safety had been compromised. Pace v. State, 219 Ga. App. 583, 466 S.E.2d 254, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 1103 (1995), cert. denied, No. S96C0625, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 767 (Ga. June 28, 1996). Probable cause not required for
- “stop and frisk”.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not require a police officer who Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug one’s shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. A brief stop of a suspicious individual in order to determine identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. United States v. Robinson, 535 F.2d 881, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7916 (5th Cir. 1976); Reese v. State, 145 Ga. App. 453, 243 S.E.2d 650, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2012 (1978); State v. Purdy, 147 Ga. App. 340, 248 S.E.2d 683, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2683 (1978); Jackson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 386, 271 S.E.2d 32, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2591 (1980). A police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. State v. Purdy, 147 Ga. App. 340, 248 S.E.2d 683, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2683 (1978); Jackson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 386, 271 S.E.2d 32, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2591 (1980). Probable cause is not required for police officer to make investigative stop of individual if the officer reasonably suspects that the individual is involved in criminal activity. United States v. Allison, 616 F.2d 779, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 17856 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 857, 101 S. Ct. 156, 66 L. Ed. 2d 72, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 3062 (1980). Since the intrusion involved in a “stop and frisk” is so much less severe than that involved in traditional “arrests,” the general rule requiring probable cause to make arrests reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not cover such intrusions. United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13723 (5th Cir. 1980). Momentary detention and questioning do not have to be based on probable cause to believe there has been criminal wrongdoing. Bailey v. State, 202 Ga. App. 427, 414 S.E.2d 330, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 18 (1992).
- Specific and articulable facts required.
- What is demanded of police officer, as agent of state, is a founded suspicion, some necessary basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing. Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 211 S.E.2d 294, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 758 (1974). Where investigatory detentions made without probable cause have been approved, the police have had some reason to suspect that criminal activity had either taken place, was in progress, or was about to take place at the time of the detention. Brooks v. State, 144 Ga. App. 97, 240 S.E.2d 593, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2595 (1977). In some circumstances, officer may detain suspect briefly for questioning although the officer does not have probable cause to believe that the suspect is involved in criminal activity as is required for a traditional arrest. However, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2421 (1979). Initial investigative stop, in order to be lawful, must be based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. United States v. Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14215 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871, 100 S. Ct. 149, 62 L. Ed. 2d 96, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3095 (1979), overruled in part, United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 20874 (5th Cir. 1982); State v. Misuraca, 157 Ga. App. 361, 276 S.E.2d 679, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1821, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 846, 102 S. Ct. 163, 70 L. Ed. 2d 133, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3444 (1981); Howell v. State, 160 Ga. App. 479, 287 S.E.2d 294, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 3236 (1981). Reasonable suspicion must be based upon specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts known at the time of the stop to the officers effecting the stop. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Articulable suspicion for mere verbal encounter not required.
- State is not required to show an articulable suspicion to justify initiation of a mere verbal encounter with suspect. State v. Willis, 207 Ga. App. 76, 427 S.E.2d 306, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 72 (1993). Officer is entitled to assess the facts
- in light of the officer’s experience.
- United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Requirement of reasonable suspicion prior to detention.
- While in some circumstances a person may be detained briefly, without probable cause to arrest the person, any curtailment of a person’s liberty by the police must be supported at least by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 148 (1980). “Random stop” is impermissible and evidence derived from such a seizure and/or search is inadmissible. United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13009 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988, 101 S. Ct. 2325, 68 L. Ed. 2d 847, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 2108 (1981). Officer need not indicate subjective fear of defendant or that the officer personally suspected that defendant was armed to justify decision to stop and search defendant. Graves v. State, 138 Ga. App. 327, 226 S.E.2d 131, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2147 (1976). Mere unlikelihood insufficient to
- authorize invasion of privacy.
- The mere fact that an officer feels it is unlikely that an individual has regular business where the individual is found is not sufficient alone to authorize an intrusion to an individual’s right of privacy. The state must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, together with rational inferences drawn therefrom, reasonably warrant an intrusion. Howard v. State, 150 Ga. App. 847, 258 S.E.2d 652, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2397 (1979). Intrusions into areas of privacy based on exigencies as they appear to
- officers involved.
- Even though acts of peace officers in detaining and questioning a citizen are necessarily a curtailment of the citizen’s right to go about one’s business unmolested (i.e., a seizure of the person) and because investigation and questioning are necessary elements of crime prevention and detection, the exigencies of the situation as they reasonably appear at the time to the officer involved must dictate the extent of intrusion into constitutionally protected areas. State v. Misuraca, 157 Ga. App. 361, 276 S.E.2d 679, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1821, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 846, 102 S. Ct. 163, 70 L. Ed. 2d 133, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3444 (1981). Justification of officer’s restraining
- individual’s freedom.
- To justify a police officer’s action in accosting an individual and restraining the individual’s freedom to walk away, the state must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which, together with rational inferences drawn therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion. If no circumstances at all appear that might give rise to an articulable suspicion (less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice) that the law has been violated, the act of following and detaining a vehicle and its occupants must be judged as an impermissible intrusion on the rights of the citizen. Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 211 S.E.2d 294, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 758 (1974). There was no violation of a defendant juvenile’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 by the officers’ conduct in handcuffing the defendant upon entering the defendant’s house during an investigation of an armed robbery of a house next door as the handcuffing was done as part of an investigatory detention for purposes of the officers’ safety while a weapon search was undertaken; the circumstances of the armed robbery were extremely violent, and the officers had followed tracks in the grass from the victim’s home to the defendant’s home, such that the means of detention employed by the officers was reasonable in the circumstances. Gray v. State, 296 Ga. App. 878, 676 S.E.2d 36, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 374 (2009), cert. dismissed, No. S09C1309, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 802 (Ga. Sept. 28, 2009). Defendants were not unlawfully detained, where their encounter with Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) plain-clothed police officers was not drawn out or prolonged and defendants were not addressed in a harsh or threatening manner or subjected to physical duress or threat of physical injury. State v. Jackson, 201 Ga. App. 810, 412 S.E.2d 593, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1612 (1991). Profile characteristics alone will not give rise to requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to justify investigatory stop. United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 14501 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851, 102 S. Ct. 292, 70 L. Ed. 2d 141, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3506 (1981).
- Suspicious looking defendants.
- Officer’s stop of defendant was not justified on the basis that defendant “looked suspicious” and “like [defendant] was getting ready to run.” Barnes v. State, 228 Ga. App. 44, 491 S.E.2d 116, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1037 (1997). Information sufficiently reliable to
- justify “stop and frisk” and subsequent admission.
- Where an informant’s unverified tip may have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant, the information nevertheless carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer’s forcible stop and frisk of the defendant, and the fruits of the search were admissible evidence. Graves v. State, 138 Ga. App. 327, 226 S.E.2d 131, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2147 (1976).
- Communication of information between officers.
- Reasonable suspicion required to make investigative stop may exist on collective knowledge of police when there is reliable communication between the officer supplying the information and the officer acting on that information. United States v. Allison, 616 F.2d 779, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 17856 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 857, 101 S. Ct. 156, 66 L. Ed. 2d 72, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 3062 (1980).
- Communication by citizen to officer.
- An investigatory stop of defendant was not justified by the fact that defendant was riding a bicycle in an area where drug use was known to occur, and approached police officers stating, “I believe that you all are looking for me.” State v. Taylor, 226 Ga. App. 690, 487 S.E.2d 454, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 740 (1997). Officer answering official call has not only a right but a duty to investigate suspicious circumstances. A police officer need not have probable cause before officer can begin investigating persons or circumstances which to the officer appear suspicious. United States v. Allen, 472 F.2d 145, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 12292 (5th Cir. 1973).
- Arrests based on reports of witnesses.
- When the police received a call to be on the lookout for a car which had been involved in a shooting and the car in question roughly fit the description given for the lookout, this provided the basis for an articulable suspicion justifying the stop. McGhee v. State, 253 Ga. 278, 319 S.E.2d 836, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 901 (1984). Informant’s tip as probable cause to
- stop suspect.
- While an unverified tip from an unknown informant may not supply probable cause for a search or a warrant, if the information carries enough indicia of reliability, it will authorize a forcible stop of a suspect to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information. State v. Rhule, 197 Ga. App. 47, 397 S.E.2d 556, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1153 (1990), cert. denied, No. S91C0068, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 481 (Ga. Oct. 31, 1990). An unsupported anonymous tip leading to police officer’s stop of defendant solely on the basis that defendant was arguably in the company of another person who fit the description provided in the tip, was insufficient to support a search of the defendant. Archer v. State, 217 Ga. App. 257, 456 S.E.2d 754, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 402 (1995).
- Observation of drinking driver.
- Merely observing a can of beer in the hand of one who is otherwise driving a car or operating a boat in a safe manner constitutes an articulable suspicion that a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 or O.C.G.A. § 52-7-12 may be occurring so as to authorize a brief investigatory stop. State v. Baker, 197 Ga. App. 1, 397 S.E.2d 554, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1180 (1990), cert. denied, No. S91C0035, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 499 (Ga. Oct. 24, 1990). Police officer, who was responding to a store burglar alarm, had sufficient “articulable suspicions” to stop defendants’ car, where it was after midnight on a snowy evening, no businesses were open in the area, and the car was nearly identical to one described in a police “lookout.” Evans v. State, 183 Ga. App. 436, 359 S.E.2d 174, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2716 (1987). Once a stop becomes a seizure, it can be constitutional only if based upon reasonable suspicion. Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1012, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3545, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1393, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 781 (1983).
- Request for ticket and identification at airport.
- Where a federal narcotics agent, who was dressed casually and did not display a weapon, requested, but did not demand, defendant’s ticket and identification at an airport, the agent’s approach was not a seizure. Rolle v. State, 198 Ga. App. 507, 402 S.E.2d 106, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 151 (1991). Officers’ approach and questioning of defendant was not a seizure where they asked to see the defendant’s airplane ticket and identification and promptly returned the materials before asking if they could make a patdown search of the defendant’s outer clothing. Aranda v. State, 226 Ga. App. 157, 486 S.E.2d 379, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 545 (1997). fendant became a seizure for fourth amendment purposes because the officer retained defendant’s license and registration and probed into arrested person’s possession of contraband or weapons, and defendant was in a remote area off an interstate highway, hundreds of miles from home, with only the defendant’s van for transportation. Defendant was immobilized without a driver’s license and so the encounter matured from a routine traffic inquiry into an investigative stop. Rogers v. State, 206 Ga. App. 654, 426 S.E.2d 209, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1735 (1992), cert. denied, No. S93C0519, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 290 (Ga. Mar. 4, 1993).
- Police officer’s encounter with de-Request to move to lighted area.
- Police officer’s request that defendant move into a better-lighted area was a reasonable protective measure and did not become an illegal arrest. Chaney v. State, 207 Ga. App. 72, 427 S.E.2d 63, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 69 (1993).
- Drawing of weapons by police.
- Fact that a police officer had weapon drawn at the time defendant was stopped was reasonable and did not, in and of itself, transform the stop and search into an illegal arrest where upon approaching the defendant the officer believed that a concealed weapon was seen under defendant’s shirt. Edwards v. State, 165 Ga. App. 527, 301 S.E.2d 693, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3167 (1983). Where police officers had seen the defendant remove a shiny silver object from the waistband of the defendant’s pants, the mere fact that at least one of the officers had drawn a weapon prior to the actual confrontation with the defendant did not, in and of itself, transform the officers’ authorized investigatory reactions to the defendant’s suspicious activity into an illegal arrest. State v. Grimes, 195 Ga. App. 773, 395 S.E.2d 42, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 727 (1990). cally an arrest simply because officer is armed with shotgun. Franklin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 3, 237 S.E.2d 425, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2170 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 55 L. Ed. 2d 799, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 1347 (1978).
- Investigatory stop is not automati-Questioning suspect despite insufficient probable cause for warrant.
- If an officer reasonably concludes that there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant because of an incomplete auto license number, and lack of certainty of the time and place of an intercept, this does not require the officer to turn one’s back and walk away and permit a crime to occur. While an unverified tip from an unknown informant may not supply probable cause for a search or a warrant, if the information carries enough indicia of reliability, it will authorize a forcible stop of a suspect to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information. State v. Bassford, 183 Ga. App. 694, 359 S.E.2d 752, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2730 (1987). tive stop cannot be justified by any need Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of a crime. State v. Stephens, 167 Ga. App. 707, 307 S.E.2d 518, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3345 (1983).
- Search incidental to an investiga-Investigatory stop does not automatically justify search.
- An informant’s tip, which provided a police officer with sufficient articulable facts to make an investigatory stop of defendant, did not justify a search where, once the defendant was stopped, the officer conducted no investigation or questioning of the suspect but immediately commenced the search. Rucker v. State, 199 Ga. App. 854, 406 S.E.2d 277, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 724 (1991).
- Officer’s authority after valid stop.
- — Having effected a valid traffic stop, the officer was authorized to request the defendant’s name and date of birth since the defendant did not have the defendant’s driver’s license even though the defendant could provide the officer with the vehicle registration and proof of insurance. Darby v. State, 239 Ga. App. 492, 521 S.E.2d 438, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1042 (1999).
- Brief pat-down of automobile passenger permissible.
- A brief pat-down search of an automobile passenger for weapons prior to a search of the automobile was permissible, where the time required to complete the automobile search, and thereby determine whether or not there was probable cause to make an arrest, was probably a matter of minutes. Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15768 (11th Cir. 1991).
- Traveler’s luggage containing narcotics.
- If an officer’s observations lead the officer reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage which contains narcotics, the officer may detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that initially aroused the officer’s suspicion, provided that the detention is properly limited in scope. United States v. Armstrong, 722 F.2d 681, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 26625 (11th Cir. 1984).
- Initial stop held valid.
- Under the facts known to the police officer and the physical observations available to the officer at the time of the stop, and considering officer’s limited response and actions, the initial stop was not an abuse of state action and not in violation of any rights protected by U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Misuraca, 157 Ga. App. 361, 276 S.E.2d 679, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1821, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 846, 102 S. Ct. 163, 70 L. Ed. 2d 133, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3444 (1981). Police officer was authorized to conduct a brief on-the-scene investigative detention, where officer observed defendant and two companions sitting for no apparent reason in a parked automobile in a remote part of a motel parking lot located in a “high crime area” at 4:45 a.m. Bozeman v. State, 196 Ga. App. 743, 397 S.E.2d 30, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1029 (1990). An investigatory stop by GBI agents was proper because (1) the agents were suspicious that the defendant was carrying drugs because they had information that defendant’s cousin flew to Fort Lau-derdale, a known drug-source city, to get drugs and bring them back to Atlanta, that cousin was traveling with the defendant, and that the drugs were likely strapped to the defendant’s body; (2) the agents observed the defendant and the cousin deplane and then wait in and leave the baggage claim area with no checked baggage; and (3) the agents observed the men go to the taxicab stand and prepare to take a taxicab, as predicted by the informant. Solomon v. State, 237 Ga. App. 655, 513 S.E.2d 520 (1999). The defendant’s known history of selling drugs within two blocks of the area in question, i.e. defendant’s home, defendant’s presence from 4:00 P.M. to 1:08 A.M. alone in a chair in defendant’s driveway beside a car on a street corner known for heavy drug sales, the presence of a large amount of cash in defendant’s pocket, defendant’s extreme nervousness at the approach of the officers, and defendant’s abruptly volunteered assertions that “What did I do? I ain’t got nothing on me.” were sufficient to provide reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant might have been engaged in drug sales so as to permit an investigative detention and questioning. Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 119, 547 S.E.2d 679, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 421 (2001).
- Second investigatory stop supported by articulable suspicion.
- Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied, even though an officer lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support a first investigatory stop, as defendant’s flight after the officer’s general questions, defendant’s suspicious claim that defendant was biking home from a job 10 miles away, and defendant’s proximity to a car with flashing lights consistent with a triggered car alarm, supported a second investigatory stop; the evidence defendant sought to suppress was obtained after the second investigatory stop. Crowley v. State, 267 Ga. App. 718, 601 S.E.2d 154, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 773 (2004).
- Observation of attempt to hide objects.
- Police officers had articulable suspicion to justify investigative detention of two youths in a parked car in an empty lot where the youths attempted to hide objects under the car seat when the officers’ presence was noted. State v. Hodges, 184 Ga. App. 21, 360 S.E.2d 903, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2747 (1987).
- Blocking suspect’s path.
- A police officer’s action in blocking a suspect’s path to ascertain identity and the purpose for being in an area known for drug transactions constituted a brief seizure that had to be supported by reasonable suspicion. Gonzalez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 253, 509 S.E.2d 144, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1484 (1998).
- Pat-down search not justified.
- Officer’s mere hunch that defendant was involved with drugs and that drugs were linked to violence did not justify a Terry pat-down for weapons. State v. King, 227 Ga. App. 466, 489 S.E.2d 361, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 914 (1997). Investigative stop of defendant
- walking down street in domestic dispute investigation.
- When the defendant, who told an officer that the defendant was walking to another location at 4:00 A.M. because the defendant was “mad with” the defendant’s lover, fled upon hearing an officer mention the name of the defendant’s street in a dispatch call, this justified a brief investigatory stop under the fourth amendment, authorizing the officer to chase and briefly detain the defendant in order to complete an investigation into a suspected domestic dispute. McClary v. State, 292 Ga. App. 184, 663 S.E.2d 809, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 725 (2008). 2. Vehicle Stops
- When stop authorized.
- Authorized officer may stop automobile and conduct a limited investigative inquiry of its occupants, without probable cause, if the officer has reasonable grounds for such action. A founded suspicion is all that is necessary. There must be some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing. State v. Misuraca, 157 Ga. App. 361, 276 S.E.2d 679, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1821, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 846, 102 S. Ct. 163, 70 L. Ed. 2d 133, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3444 (1981). Test to be used in determining whether a particular vehicular stop passes constitutional muster is whether a reasonable officer, who is presented with the same facts available to the arresting officer, would have made the stop in the absence of an illegitimate motive. United States v. Harris, 716 F. Supp. 1470, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8136 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 923 F.2d 795 (11th Cir. 1991). The two possible justifications for stopping an automobile are when the police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver is committing a traffic violation and when an investigatory stop is supported by articulable suspicion of criminal conduct. United States v. Skinner, 957 F. Supp. 228, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2439 (M.D. Ga. 1997). When a police officer sees a traffic offense occur, a resulting traffic stop does not violate the fourth amendment, even if the officer has ulterior motives in making the stop. State v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 525, 513 S.E.2d 1, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 90 (Feb. 1, 1999). Because it was undisputed that the defendant was driving on a suspended license, it was error for the trial court to hold that the stop was pretextual and therefore invalid. State v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 525, 513 S.E.2d 1, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 90 (Feb. 1, 1999). A traffic stop was not “pretextual” when an officer saw a traffic offense occur, even if the officer had ulterior motives in initi-Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 2. Vehicle Stops (Cont’d) ating the stop, and even if a reasonable officer would not have made the stop under the same circumstances. Clark v. State, 243 Ga. App. 362, 532 S.E.2d 481, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 400 (2000), cert. denied, No. S01C0479, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 400 (Ga. May 7, 2001). Behavior giving rise to an officer’s reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop need not be a violation of the law; even if the driver’s actions do not amount to a per se traffic violation, an officer may have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a traffic offense was being committed. The question to be decided in reviewing traffic stops is whether the officer’s motives and actions at the time of the traffic stop and under all the circumstances, including the nature of the officer’s mistake, if any, were reasonable and not arbitrary or harassing. State v. Keddington, 264 Ga. App. 912, 592 S.E.2d 532, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1608 (2003). After an officer observed defendant’s vehicle parked at a baseball park where there was no activity, saw a wide-eyed, scared look on the face of defendant’s passenger, approached the passenger’s side of the car, asked the passenger to roll down the passenger’s window, and defendant and the passenger gave conflicting reasons for why they were there, the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity which allowed the officer to ask the passenger to exit the vehicle. Akins v. State, 266 Ga. App. 214, 596 S.E.2d 719, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 343 (2004). Since the defendant ignored the officers’ commands during an investigatory stop based on a tipster’s report of illegal drug activity, fled from the scene, and led the officers on a chase in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(a), any taint arising from the allegedly illegal stop was purged and the defendant’s flight provided a legitimate basis for discovery of evidence in the defendant’s car. Prather v. State, 279 Ga. App. 873, 633 S.E.2d 46, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 709 (2006). An officer in an unmarked car who had been following the defendant based on a tip that the defendant was transporting methamphetamine was authorized to stop the defendant under the fourth amendment and the Georgia Constitution after the officer saw the defendant illegally cross the center line. Sapp v. State, 297 Ga. App. 218, 676 S.E.2d 867, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 406 (2009).
- Stop held invalid.
- Defendant was subjected to an improper Terry stop when the defendant was stopped and ordered to exit the vehicle as the police did not have specific articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal conduct since the defendant was not a subject of a search warrant the officers were executing, the defendant had not committed any traffic violations, and the defendant’s vehicle was not within the curtilage of the home subject to the search warrant. Reynolds v. State, 280 Ga. App. 712, 634 S.E.2d 842, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 931 (2006). When the only evidence to support a traffic stop was that defendant’s car was in front of a residence that had been previously raided by the police, this did not constitute an objective manifestation that defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity sufficient to warrant the intrusion of a traffic stop. Pritchard v. State, 300 Ga. App. 14, 684 S.E.2d 88, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1024 (2009). Oxycodone found in the glove box of a car was inadmissible because the oxycodone was discovered pursuant to a consent search that was the product of an unauthorized traffic stop. The officer had no reasonable suspicion to justify stopping the defendants other than that the defendants’ car was “out of place” at an empty truck stop parking lot. Groves v. State, 306 Ga. App. 779, 703 S.E.2d 371, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1052 (2010). Authority to make routine traffic
- stop.
- The fact that the state trooper who spotted a traffic violation by defendants was trained to be vigilant for drug traffickers would not alter the trooper’s authority to make a routine traffic stop. Coop v. State, 186 Ga. App. 578, 367 S.E.2d 836, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 413 (1988). Where an arresting officer witnessed a driver breaking even a relatively minor traffic law, denial of a motion to suppress, based on the argument that the stop was pretextual, was required. State v. Reddy, 236 Ga. App. 106, 511 S.E.2d 530, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 28 (1999). Defendant was not illegally stopped under U.S. Const., amend. 4 because the deputy observed that the defendant improperly change lanes. Tri Huynh v. State, 239 Ga. App. 62, 518 S.E.2d 920, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 838 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C1644, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 930 (Ga. Oct. 29, 1999). Reposing an unfettered discretion in a field officer to stop and start a roadblock at will (randomly), based on a vague and undocumented articulation of public safety, rendered the roadblock unreasonable. State v. Manos, 237 Ga. App. 699, 516 S.E.2d 548, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 538 (1999). When an officer sees a traffic offense occur, a resulting traffic stop does not violate the fourth amendment even if the officer has ulterior motives in initiating the stop, and even if a reasonable officer would not have made the stop under the same circumstances. Maxwell v. State, 249 Ga. App. 747, 549 S.E.2d 534, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 620 (2001). Stop of a vehicle that was being operated with a dealer’s drive-out tag that appeared faded or weathered was authorized for the purpose of investigating compliance with the state’s registration law. Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 549 S.E.2d 503, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 595 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C1454, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 885 (Ga. Nov. 5, 2001). Stop based on obstructed license
- plate proper.
- A police officer properly stopped the defendant’s vehicle after noticing that the vehicle had a black plate that bordered and partially concealed its license tag. Nelson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 455, 544 S.E.2d 189, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 3 (2001). Although defendant’s car had license plates from South Carolina, a state trooper was still justified in making a stop of defendant’s car because the visibility and display portions of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-41 were applicable to all vehicles, and defendant’s license plate had a bracket around it that blocked view of the registration expiration date. Furthermore, detention of defendant following the stop was justified as the trooper had a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity due to defendant’s nervousness, the conflicting version of events between defendant and defendant’s passenger, and the overly strong smell of air freshener emanating from the car; the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged, and the officer’s questioning did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. Wilson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 286, 702 S.E.2d 2, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 853 (2010). Stop of vehicle that fit description
- of vehicle used in recent robbery.
- Alabama police were justified in stopping a car that fit the description of a vehicle that two robbers entered after they robbed a victim in Georgia and detaining the occupants until Georgia police arrived with the victim, and the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence which police found in the car and the victim’s testimony identifying two defendants who were in the car as the persons who robbed the victim. Garlington v. State, 268 Ga. App. 264, 601 S.E.2d 793, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 887 (2004), cert. denied sub nom. Harrison v. State, No. S04C1874, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 864 (Ga. Sept. 27, 2004). Officers had the requisite articulable suspicion to stop a Camry shortly after it was seen running a stop sign and speeding away from an abandoned getaway car, left with its engine running and doors open, not far from the site of an armed robbery of a jewelry store. Additionally, the officer’s description of the Camry included the fact that it had shiny wheels, which the stopped Camry also had. Harper v. State, 300 Ga. App. 757, 686 S.E.2d 375, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1263 (2009).
- Car abandoned by fleeing defendant.
- Since during the course of the defendant’s flight from officers during an investigatory stop, the defendant abandoned the vehicle and ran on foot, the officers were authorized to search the vehicle; the protection of the fourth amendment did not apply to property which had been abandoned. Prather v. State, 279 Ga. Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 2. Vehicle Stops (Cont’d) App. 873, 633 S.E.2d 46, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 709 (2006). Stop based on unknown insurance
- status not authorized.
- Computer’s return of “unknown” in response to a query regarding the insured status of a vehicle did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; thus, an officer’s stop of the defendant’s car solely on the basis of an “unknown” insurance status was improper, the later search of the car was tainted, and the trial court properly suppressed its results. State v. Dixson, 280 Ga. App. 260, 633 S.E.2d 636, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 824 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1953, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 787 (Ga. Oct. 2, 2006). Probable cause was not necessary to justify brief investigative stop of automobile. State v. Watson, 205 Ga. App. 313, 422 S.E.2d 202, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1143 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C1465, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 861 (Ga. Oct. 8, 1992).
- Duration of stop as affecting reasonableness.
- Investigative stop of defendants and their automobile, which lasted approximately 50 minutes, was not impermissible, where officers acted with propriety, particularly in avoiding any questioning of defendants while waiting for the arrival of a narcotics dog. United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 12815 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1019, 109 S. Ct. 1137, 103 L. Ed. 2d 198, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 725 (1989). Defendant’s detention for 30 minutes while a state trooper waited for the arrival of a drug dog and magistrate constituted an arrest which was supported by probable cause, where the trooper was warranted, under the circumstances, in believing that defendant was transporting contraband in the trunk of a rental automobile. Schmidt v. State, 188 Ga. App. 85, 372 S.E.2d 440, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 884 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1014, 109 S. Ct. 1126, 103 L. Ed. 2d 188, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 891 (1989). When an officer who had initially detained the defendant because of suspected seat belt and tag violations and who smelled marijuana in the defendant’s car asked questions related to the marijuana, checked whether the defendant had a valid license, and then asked the defendant to consent to a search while completing a warning citation for the seat belt and tag violations, the defendant did not show that the detention was prolonged so as to become unreasonable merely because, during the course of this lawful investigation, the officer asked the defendant several unrelated questions. Macias v. State, 292 Ga. App. 225, 664 S.E.2d 265, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 746 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1816, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 881 (Ga. Oct. 6, 2008). Scope and duration of stop not im-
- permissibly expanded.
- Trial court erred in suppressing evidence found in a consensual search of a car in which defendant was a passenger as the police officer did not impermissibly expand the scope or the duration of a valid traffic stop for an improperly displayed tag in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-41 by determining the status of the driver’s license and whether the driver or defendant had outstanding warrants against them; even though 26 minutes into the stop the officer had not yet written the driver a ticket for the improperly displayed tag, the officer was not required to write the ticket and conclude the stop prior to diligently completing the background checks, which were delayed by the driver’s admission that the driver might have had an outstanding warrant in another county that the officer had not discovered, and investigating the officer’s reasonable suspicions regarding alcohol and open containers arising out of the officer’s knowledge of another officer’s encounter with the individuals earlier in the evening. State v. Williams, 264 Ga. App. 199, 590 S.E.2d 151, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1342 (2003), cert. denied, No. S04C0516, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 176 (Ga. Feb. 16, 2004). Officer’s request to search defendant’s car while a check of defendant’s driver’s license was in progress was not intrusive, lengthy, or extraneous, and did not unreasonably expand the scope or duration of the valid traffic stop. State v. Mauerberger, 270 Ga. App. 794, 608 S.E.2d 234, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1449 (2004). After stopping the defendant and asking for the defendant’s name and driver’s license, an officer asked if the defendant had anything illegal on the defendant’s person or in the defendant’s truck, and the defendant responded that there was an illegal substance in the truck and then consented to a search. Thus, the trial court was authorized to find that the officers diligently and swiftly confirmed their suspicions and that the detention and questioning of the defendant were not unreasonably lengthy. Furthermore, while the officers were questioning the defendant, one officer saw a drug pipe in plain view on a seat, which gave the officers probable cause to arrest the defendant, search the truck, and seize the items found inside the truck. Sapp v. State, 297 Ga. App. 218, 676 S.E.2d 867, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 406 (2009).
- License and registration checks.
- Because the driver and passenger were making some movements on the back seat as if to cover up something, an officer had articulable grounds for suspicion, particularly in an area in which recent burglaries had occurred, sufficient to justify a stop for license check and identification. State v. Purdy, 147 Ga. App. 340, 248 S.E.2d 683, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2683 (1978). Officer’s inspection of driver’s operator’s license and identification, incidental to stopping the vehicle based on an articulable suspicion of possible criminal behavior, did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. Jackson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 386, 271 S.E.2d 32, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2591 (1980). Because a police officer was justified in placing the defendant in the patrol car for the duration of the license check after observing the defendant trying to hide something under the seat of the car, the officer’s conduct obviously was undertaken to maintain the status quo during the course of a reasonable investigative stop, and thus did not constitute a de facto arrest. Thomas v. Newsome, 821 F.2d 1550, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 9637 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 967, 108 S. Ct. 461, 98 L. Ed. 2d 401, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 4983 (1987). Where defendants argued that a state trooper had the right pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-5-29 to ask a driver to display the driver’s license but that the state trooper did not have the right to demand the vehicle’s registration or its rental documents because of the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-90(b)(2), so that detention was unreasonable, it was held that by its terms, § 40-2-90(b)(2) gives visitors to the state the right to use and operate motor vehicles on the public streets and highways for pleasure purposes only for 90 days without registering the vehicle, but this did not restrict a law enforcement officer from performing the officer’s duty when stopping a visiting motorist for a traffic violation. Coop v. State, 186 Ga. App. 578, 367 S.E.2d 836, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 413 (1988). An officer appropriately stopped defendant because, based on officer’s prior experience with defendant and officer’s knowledge that defendant’s license had been suspended, it would not have been unreasonable for the officer to suspect that the license suspension remained in effect and that defendant was violating the law by driving. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 197, 540 S.E.2d 212, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1194 (2000). After defendant showed defendant’s registration to an officer who had stopped defendant’s vehicle on suspicion that it was not registered, the investigation for which the officer had originally stopped defendant concluded; as the officer’s subsequent request to see defendant’s driver’s license was not based on any reasonable suspicion that defendant lacked one, this request exceeded the scope of the initial detention and evidence that defendant did not have a license was properly suppressed. State v. Joyner, 270 Ga. App. 533, 607 S.E.2d 184, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1517 (2004).
- Roadblocks used to identify licenses, insurance, and sobriety.
- When the defendant was convicted of lesssafe DUI under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of breath and blood tests because the daylight roadblock was well-identified as a police checkpoint for the stated and authorized purpose of checking driver’s Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 2. Vehicle Stops (Cont’d) licenses, insurance, and driver sobriety. The court of appeals found no authority for the proposition that the fourth amendment required that roadblocks be identified with orange cones or that officers working there wear reflective hats. Clark v. State, 318 Ga. App. 873, 734 S.E.2d 839, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 1004 (2012).
- High-speed pursuit.
- In an arrestee’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit that alleged that the arrestee’s fourth amendment right against the use of excessive force was violated when a sheriff’s deputy crashed a cruiser into the car during a high-speed pursuit, rendering the arrestee a quadriplegic, the arrestee’s deliberate indifference claim against the county was dismissed on summary judgment because the county’s official policy of permitting deputies to use their own judgment in deciding when to make high-speed stops was not unconstitutional. Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01-CV-148-WBH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27348 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003), rev’d in part, aff’d, 406 F.3d 1307, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 6721 (11th Cir. 2005). Detention to investigate car rental
- status.
- Reasonable suspicion supported the detention of the defendant following the stop of the defendant’s vehicle because neither the defendant driver nor the defendant’s passenger were wearing seatbelts since a car rental agreement displayed by the defendant had expired, and the officer contacted the car rental agency to ensure that the defendant had not converted the vehicle. Crenshaw v. State, 248 Ga. App. 505, 546 S.E.2d 890, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 330 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0978, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 672 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2001). Use of a trained drug detection dog. — Using a dog to sniff for evidence of narcotics is not a search, and may, under proper circumstances, be utilized as part of the investigation conducted within the limited scope of a Terry stop. State v. Foster, 209 Ga. App. 143, 433 S.E.2d 109, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 791 (1993). Record supported the trial court’s judgment that a vehicle checkpoint that was established to check drivers’ licenses, registrations, and proof of insurance was established for a legitimate purpose, that a police officer did not violate defendant’s rights when the officer walked a drug detection dog around defendant’s car while another officer was checking the validity of defendant’s driver’s license, and that police had probable cause to search defendant’s car after the dog alerted on it. McCray v. State, 268 Ga. App. 84, 601 S.E.2d 452, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 851 (2004). Even though a defendant refused to consent to a search of the defendant’s car, because the defendant was validly detained for less than ten minutes while an officer checked the defendant’s license, a sergeant’s use of a drug dog to walk around the defendant’s car was not an unreasonable search and did not require a reasonable suspicion. Becoats v. State, 301 Ga. App. 768, 688 S.E.2d 686, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1442 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0805, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 434 (Ga. June 1, 2010).
- Use of drug dog during stop.
- After the defendant was validly detained following a traffic stop, the arresting officer was free to have a dog handler walk a drug detection dog around the car, as use of a trained drug detection dog, in a location where it is entitled to be, to sniff the exterior of a car, is not an unreasonable search. Crenshaw v. State, 248 Ga. App. 505, 546 S.E.2d 890, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 330 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0978, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 672 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2001).
- Canine sniff of vehicle improper.
- A canine sniff of the defendant’s vehicle, which occurred after the conclusion of the arresting officer’s investigation into the dealer’s drive-out license tag on the vehicle, was improper as the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and conducted the canine sniff based on merely a hunch that drugs might be found in a garbage bag seen in the car. Berry v. State, 248 Ga. App. 874, 547 S.E.2d 651, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 418 (2001).
- Terry search of auto passenger.
- A Terry pat-down search is authorized when the officer reasonably believes that it is necessary to protect the officer from attack, including the search of passengers in vehicles omitted from the original police notifications. Dowdy v. State, 209 Ga. App. 311, 433 S.E.2d 293, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 859 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1590, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 896 (Ga. Oct. 5, 1993).
- Pat-down of operator justified.
- An officer was justified in conducting a pat-down search of the defendant and defendant’s jacket for the officer’s safety because: (1) after stopping defendant for operation of a motorcycle without a headlight, the defendant took off the jacket, laid it on the motorcycle and walked over to the officer’s car door before the officer had stopped the officer’s own vehicle; (2) after telling defendant to step back, take off the helmet and produce a license, the defendant moved back to the motorcycle; and (3) the officer noticed that the defendant’s pupils were constricted which, based on the officer’s training, meant that the defendant might be under the influence of drugs. Sikes v. State, 247 Ga. App. 855, 545 S.E.2d 73, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 80 (2001). A trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the contraband found on the defendant’s person as a result of a traffic stop that came to fruition after an officer observed the defendant making a U-turn in front of a recently robbed bank because the defendant admitted to having a knife in the defendant’s pocket but refused to remove the defendant’s hand therefrom. As a result, the police were justified in frisking the defendant for safety reasons and the contraband was, therefore, legally obtained from the defendant. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 27, 656 S.E.2d 161, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1315 (2007).
- Roadblocks.
- The trial court improperly suppressed evidence found as a result of a roadblock when it incorrectly relied upon non-binding provisions in a county employee handbook relating to roadblocks in determining the propriety of the roadblock. State v. Dymond, 248 Ga. App. 582, 546 S.E.2d 69, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 263 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0996, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 650 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2001). A license and insurance check roadblock was properly set up and operated, and evidence found as a result of the roadblock was not subject to suppression since, because it was drizzling rain and the road was slick, a determination was made that it was unsafe to allow any cars to back up on the roadway, and cars were allowed to proceed through the roadblock when all the officers on duty were busy with other cars. Hodges v. State, 248 Ga. App. 295, 546 S.E.2d 54, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 251 (2001). Driving under the influence roadblock was proper where the decision to set up the roadblock was made by a supervisory officer, where the roadblock served a legitimate purpose, where all vehicles were stopped at the roadblock, where the screening officer had prior training and experience with respect to driving under the influence arrests, where the delay to motorists was minimal, and where the roadblock was well identified by reflective signs with flashing strobe lights, several police cars, and officers dressed in reflective gear; therefore, the police had every right to stop defendant at the roadblock, and a stop of defendant’s vehicle after defendant avoided the roadblock was authorized. Dale v. State, 267 Ga. App. 897, 600 S.E.2d 763, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 763 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1773, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 879 (Ga. Sept. 27, 2004). General investigative roadblock to question people regarding a murder in the area served a “legitimate primary purpose,” and was legal; a trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from defendant after defendant stopped before reaching the roadblock was proper. Strickland v. State, 270 Ga. App. 187, 605 S.E.2d 890, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1388 (2004), cert. dismissed, No. S06C1049, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 416 (Ga. June 12, 2006). Despite the defendant’s claim on appeal that evidence was obtained by police conducting an illegal roadblock and that an arbitrary desire to keep officers busy was not a sufficient purpose to justify the roadblock, the trial court properly denied a motion to suppress evidence seized from the roadblock, as its primary purpose was to check for drivers’ licenses, seat belts, and vehicle registrations, and not general law enforcement. Cater v. State, 280 Ga. Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 2. Vehicle Stops (Cont’d) App. 891, 635 S.E.2d 246, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 973 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C2148, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 910 (Ga. Oct. 30, 2006). Stop of the defendant’s vehicle was not consensual since the state trooper positioned the trooper’s patrol car to prevent any vehicle from leaving the parking lot and there was no evidence that the trooper reasonably suspected that the defendant was committing a crime; without evidence that the defendant was trying to avoid the roadblock, the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 727 S.E.2d 456, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 435 (2012). Roadblock based on anonymous tip
- or hearsay.
- Roadblock was not unreasonable or an invasion of fourth amendment rights, even though the reasons for setting it up were founded upon an anonymous tip or hearsay. Brimer v. State, 201 Ga. App. 401, 411 S.E.2d 128, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1370 (1991). Proper training of screening officer
- at roadblock.
- A screening officer at a roadblock had sufficient training since the officer: (1) was a ten-year veteran of the police department; (2) had received training in DUI detection at the police academy when the officer first became a police officer and at several of the annual inservice training sessions the officer attended over ten years; and (3) had “on-the-job training” dealing with intoxicated people, making, on average, one DUI arrest per month which the officer calculated to be over one hundred arrests over ten years. Wrigley v. State, 248 Ga. App. 387, 546 S.E.2d 794, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 271 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0955, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 607 (Ga. July 16, 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129, 122 S. Ct. 1068, 151 L. Ed. 2d 971, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 675 (2002).
- Roadblock purpose was proper.
- A roadblock conducted only by the motorcycle squad, backed up by the DUI countermeasures team, was conducted for a proper purpose, notwithstanding that the roadblock was part of a larger operation aimed at general crime control. Wrigley v. State, 248 Ga. App. 387, 546 S.E.2d 794, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 271 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0955, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 607 (Ga. July 16, 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129, 122 S. Ct. 1068, 151 L. Ed. 2d 971, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 675 (2002). Defendant’s detention and search at a police roadblock was not an unconstitutional search and seizure because the roadblock was implemented as a safety checkpoint based on a number of citizen complaints about drunken and reckless drivers in the area. Hardin v. State, 277 Ga. 242, 587 S.E.2d 634, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 889 (2003). When an officer’s trial testimony was taken as a whole, the trial court properly found that the primary purpose of a roadblock was related to roadway safety and checking for things such as licenses, insurance, tags, and seat belt violations; the record indicated that the officer was concerned with crime suppression only in the sense that the officer believed that conducting a roadblock would raise the profile of police in the particular area. Thus, the roadblock did not violate the fourth amendment. Sutton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 865, 678 S.E.2d 564, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 597 (2009).
- Roadblock purpose was improper.
- — Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion in limine to suppress evidence gathered from defendant at a roadblock as a substantial basis existed for the trial court’s decision that the roadblock violated the fourth amendment since a police officer admitted at the suppression hearing that the roadblock was set up with a primary purpose of general law enforcement, which was a constitutionally impermissible reason for a roadblock since the individualized suspicion of wrongdoing was absent. State v. Ayers, 257 Ga. App. 117, 570 S.E.2d 603, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1068 (2002). Roadblock lacked the necessary supervisory approval where a written authorization showed that the roadblock was only authorized for one day, the day after the car occupied by defendant was stopped; a trial court’s finding that the roadblock was unauthorized was not clearly erroneous, and without supervisory approval, the roadblock violated the fourth amendment. State v. Morgan, 267 Ga. App. 728, 600 S.E.2d 767, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 771 (2004).
- Alleged avoidance of roadblock.
- Officer’s mere intuition that defendant was avoiding a roadblock by turning into a residential complex was not sufficient to justify a stop. Jorgensen v. State, 207 Ga. App. 545, 428 S.E.2d 440, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 263 (1993). Officer had the authority to approach a driver exiting a stopped vehicle and ask for the driver’s license after the driver turned off the road into a gas station prior to encountering a roadblock. Once the officer smelled alcohol on the driver’s breath, the officer was authorized to detain the driver further. Therefore, the driver’s motion to suppress evidence from the stop was properly denied. Bacallao v. State, 307 Ga. App. 539, 705 S.E.2d 307, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 5 (2011).
- Failure to signal.
- Stop of defendant for failure to signal when defendant pulled into the left turn lane was authorized and, following the stop, the officer was entitled to execute a pat-down search for weapons. Buffington v. State, 229 Ga. App. 450, 494 S.E.2d 272, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1428 (1997). Erratic driving where the vehicle was impeding the flow of traffic and was weaving within its lane. Gabbidon v. State, 184 Ga. App. 475, 361 S.E.2d 861, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2795 (1987). Stop of defendant’s vehicle was not unconstitutional, where defendant weaved into the emergency lane on two separate occasions during a one-mile stretch on an interstate highway, and the officer who stopped the defendant did not make the stop until the defendant weaved the second time. United States v. Harris, 716 F. Supp. 1470, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8136 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 923 F.2d 795 (11th Cir. 1991). Where a state trooper stopped defendant’s vehicle after observing it weave two or three times across the yellow line setting off the shoulder from the travelled portion of the highway, there was adequate support for concluding that the stop was based on an objective violation of a statute for which the state highway patrol regularly made stops, with or without suspicion of drug-related activity. United States v. Pollock, 926 F.2d 1044, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4087 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 985, 112 S. Ct. 593, 116 L. Ed. 2d 617, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 6851 (1991). Although an anonymous informant’s reliability was not established, defendant’s traffic violations, including driving at speeds in excess of 65 mph and a subsequent collision with a telephone pole as well as the vehicle driven by agents, all of which occurred in the presence of the agents, were sufficient to authorize an investigatory stop; indeed, they had a duty to stop defendant’s vehicle. Weaver v. State, 208 Ga. App. 105, 430 S.E.2d 60, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 411 (1993). Information provided by a concerned citizen who witnessed defendant’s erratic driving behavior, along with the officer’s observations when the officer arrived at the scene, gave the officer reasonable grounds to block defendant’s truck. Sayers v. State, 226 Ga. App. 645, 487 S.E.2d 437, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 723 (1997). Police officer who witnessed driver weaving from the driver’s lane to the curb lane had reasonable information to believe that a criminal offense was being committed, and therefore had probable cause to stop the automobile. State v. Bowen, 231 Ga. App. 95, 498 S.E.2d 570, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 343 (1998). Defendant’s act of making a sudden and abrupt change in speed followed by a quick unsafe turn and backing maneuver was a sufficiently suspicious and furtive response to a police road check to warrant further investigation. Castillo v. State, 232 Ga. App. 354, 502 S.E.2d 261, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 625 (1998), cert. denied, No. S98C1416, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 958 (Ga. Oct. 2, 1998). Officer had a reasonably articulable suspicion to stop defendant where officer saw defendant cross completely to the right lane marker and then drift to the left to partially cross the center line. State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga. App. 474, 502 S.E.2d 314, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 718 (1998), overruled in part, State v. Turnquest, 305 Ga. 758, 827 S.E.2d 865, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 320 (2019). An officer properly stopped the defendant’s vehicle because the defendant dis-Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 2. Vehicle Stops (Cont’d) played two instances of weaving within the lane and also acted furtively by abruptly changing the course of travel as though to avoid encountering the police, who were visibly present. Semich v. State, 234 Ga. App. 89, 506 S.E.2d 216, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1149 (1998), cert. denied, No. S98C1980, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 69 (Ga. Jan. 15, 1999).
- Lane changes without signaling.
- The stop of the defendant’s vehicle was proper since the arresting officer testified to observing the defendant abruptly change lanes three times without signaling, and that, including the officer’s car, there were three or four cars on the roadway when the officer made the observations. Johnson v. State, 249 Ga. App. 29, 546 S.E.2d 922, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 380 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C1109, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 716 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2001). Detention pending computer check
- and arrival of backup.
- State trooper’s detention of defendant for approximately 33 minutes from time of a vehicle stop to time of signing of a consent to search and for a total period of approximately one and one-half hours from time of stop until defendant was turned over to local police authorities was not unreasonable, where the trooper was awaiting a response to a computer check and the arrival of a backup officer. Mallarino v. State, 190 Ga. App. 398, 379 S.E.2d 210, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 268 (1989). Asking identity of passenger who resembled escaped prisoner or the
- prisoner’s sibling.
- Where, based upon the personal knowledge concerning the escape of a prisoner and the recognition of the passenger in an automobile as being either the prisoner or the prisoner’s sibling, an officer had an “articulable suspicion” that the passenger might be an escaped convict and asking the passenger the passenger’s name was clearly a “reasonable” action for the officer to take in making an authorized-but-limited investigation concerning the identity of the passenger of the vehicle. State v. Roberson, 165 Ga. App. 727, 302 S.E.2d 591, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3181 (1983). Officers may initially stop vehicle
- for inoperative brake lights.
- The observation that the brake stop lights of a vehicle do not operate when stopping for a traffic light is sufficient basis for police officers to make an initial stop of a vehicle. Wilson v. State, 167 Ga. App. 148, 306 S.E.2d 16, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3303 (1983).
- Investigatory stop authorized.
- Investigatory stop was authorized given officer’s receipt of a police radio dispatch about suspicious behavior and the officer’s own personal observation of such behavior involving the prolonged examination of automobiles by two individuals. Hopkins v. State, 209 Ga. App. 337, 433 S.E.2d 423, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 856 (1993). When law enforcement received two anonymous tips that defendant would be traveling from another state with cocaine in a certain model car licensed in the other state, would be taking a certain route, and would be staying in a certain hotel, the tips’ range of details relating to future acts not easily predicted allowed police to conduct an investigatory stop of defendant. Solis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 493, 602 S.E.2d 166, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 914 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1966, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 1069 (Ga. Nov. 22, 2004). Inconsistencies in the defendant’s answers during a valid traffic stop raised an articulable suspicion that the defendant was involved in another crime, and thus deputies were authorized to detain and question the defendant; the vehicle’s condition also led the deputies to believe that contraband was hidden in its roof; finally, the defendant consented to a search of the vehicle, so the defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine which was found in a compartment of the roof of the defendant’s vehicle was properly denied. Perez v. State, 280 Ga. App. 241, 633 S.E.2d 572, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 705 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1816, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 692 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2006). In a driving under the influence case, there was no merit to the defendant’s argument that an officer lacked articulable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle. Testimony that the defendant was swerving showed that the defendant was not stopped because of mere inclination, caprice, or harassment, and the trial court accepted the officer’s testimony that the full extent of the defendant’s actions was not reflected on a video shown to the jury. Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 665 S.E.2d 731, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 851 (2008). An officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle, which matched the description of one the officer had been told to be on the lookout for, as it was connected with previous suspicious activity and with a suspect who was wanted by police, and it was described with great particularity. Furthermore, as the officer was justified in detaining the defendant long enough to determine whether an outstanding warrant was valid, the extent of the stop did not exceed the permissible scope of the investigation; having already effected a valid stop, the officer could request consent to search the vehicle. Edmond v. State, 297 Ga. App. 238, 676 S.E.2d 877, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 405 (2009). There was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant was the only person who had been in physical contact with a drug dealer whom police were watching; the defendant took a package from the dealer; and a search of the dealer’s car indicated that the dealer no longer had the drugs, giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant did. Garza v. State, 298 Ga. App. 332, 680 S.E.2d 175, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 662 (2009). Police officer entitled to stop driver
- in need of assistance.
- A police officer does not need “probable cause” to stop a person where that person is driving at a very low rate of speed, stops on the road and the officer thinks that person needs assistance. Hightower v. State, 166 Ga. App. 177, 303 S.E.2d 515, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2090 (1983).
- Furtive driving actions.
- It was error to grant defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of an armed robbery which was found in defendant’s car, where the defendant was driving too closely behind a suspected vehicle being followed by police and was apparently attempting to frustrate the approaching officer’s identification efforts. Such deliberately furtive actions, at the approach of law officers were strong indicia of mens rea, and gave the officers at least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to warrant further investigation. State v. Chambers, 194 Ga. App. 609, 391 S.E.2d 657, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 266 (1990). Where officer testified that, as the officer approached defendant, the officer saw “the headlights of the defendant’s truck bounce up and down like [the defendant] either hit a curb real hard or hit the railroad ties real hard,” this conduct, combined with the proximity of a roadblock, was sufficiently abnormal or unusual to justify a Terry-type (i.e., second-tier) stop. Taylor v. State, 249 Ga. App. 733, 549 S.E.2d 536, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 614 (2001).
- Speeding.
- In view of the testimony that defendant was driving in excess of the speed limit, the stop of the defendant’s vehicle was justified and the contention that it was pretextual, fails. Partridge v. State, 187 Ga. App. 325, 370 S.E.2d 173, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 687 (1988). When two officers stopped defendant and one officer (the driver) was unable to testify, there was reliable communication between the officer driving, who explained that defendant was speeding, and the testifying officer, as both officers acted jointly to conduct the stop and although the testifying officer could not testify on actual speed, the officers were acting in concert when stopping defendant. Thus, reasonable suspicion was established, and the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress evidence. State v. Pennyman, 248 Ga. App. 446, 545 S.E.2d 365, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 136 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0962, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 669 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2001). Officer’s mistake as to offense for
- which vehicle was stopped.
- Even though defendant’s behavior did not technically violate the “laying drags” statute (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-251), the specific offense for which the officer stopped the defendant, the fact that defendant was driving in such a manner as to endanger others reasonably justified an investigative stop. State v. Armstrong, 223 Ga. App. 350, 477 S.E.2d 635, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1160 (1996). Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 2. Vehicle Stops (Cont’d) Where an officer stopped defendant for driving through an intersection without the vehicle’s headlights on, because the officer acted in good faith believing that an unlawful act had been committed, the officer’s actions were not rendered improper by a later legal determination that defendant’s actions were not a crime according to a technical legal definition or distinction determined to exist in the penal statute. State v. Hammang, 249 Ga. App. 811, 549 S.E.2d 440, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 573 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C1423, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 890 (Ga. Nov. 5, 2001).
- Intoxicated driver.
- Police officer was authorized to stop a driver to determine if the driver was intoxicated, but while a reasonable investigative stop does not offend against the fourth amendment, such a stop must be a brief stop, limited in time to that minimally necessary to investigate the allegation invoking suspicion, and limited in scope to identification and limited questioning reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the initiation of the momentary stop. Raney v. State, 186 Ga. App. 758, 368 S.E.2d 528, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 470 (1988).
- Citizen’s report of drunk driver.
- The report of a “concerned citizen” driver that the citizen believed the driver of the car behind the citizen was drunk was a reasonable and articulable basis for suspicion by a police officer that the second driver might be driving under the influence of alcohol authorizing the officer to detain the driver briefly for the limited purpose of determining whether the driver in fact exhibited perceptible manifestations of intoxication. State v. Noble, 179 Ga. App. 785, 347 S.E.2d 722, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2665 (1986). Anonymous tip sufficient to justify
- stop.
- The reliability of an anonymous tip sufficient to justify an investigatory stop was established where: verified aspects of the tip predicted the time and location in which defendant would drive a described truck; it was indicated that the information was acquired by the personal observations of the caller; and aspects of the tip were corroborated by prior information the police had acquired about defendant. Britton v. State, 220 Ga. App. 120, 469 S.E.2d 272, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 107 (1996), cert. denied, No. S96C0897, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 574 (Ga. May 3, 1996). Information obtained by an officer from lookout heard on a broadcast, without more, was not sufficient to justify an investigatory stop of defendants’ vehicle. McSwain v. State, 240 Ga. App. 60, 522 S.E.2d 553, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1214 (1999).
- Stop of vehicle with dealer’s drive-out license tag improper.
- The initial stop of the defendant’s vehicle was improper since the arresting officer stopped the vehicle because it had a dealer’s drive-out license tag rather than a state-issued tag. Berry v. State, 248 Ga. App. 874, 547 S.E.2d 651, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 418 (2001). tomobile was justified, where the evidence showed that defendant was seen in the driveway of a house where several burglaries had occurred and that the defendant and a passenger acted in a suspicious manner when they saw a police cruiser. Dillard v. State, 177 Ga. App. 805, 341 S.E.2d 310, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2468 (1986). Officer’s waving a car to a stop was not a Terry stop requiring reasonable
- “Terry-type” stop of defendant’s aususpicion.
- Trial court did not err in denying a DUI defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized after the defendant was waved to a stop by a police officer because the encounter was a first-tier encounter not requiring a reasonable suspicion. The defendant was free to leave at any time during the encounter, and the defendant agreed to accompany the officer back to a house the defendant had just left. Butler v. State, 303 Ga. App. 564, 694 S.E.2d 168, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 373 (2010). Stop of defendant’s motor home was authorized based on the existence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that it was being used to transport marijuana, where officers who were present when the vehicle was stopped knew that it was traveling north after the driver had met with a known marijuana smuggler, and they had observed that it was so heavily loaded that it rode low on its axles and swayed from side to side. Eisenberger v. State, 177 Ga. App. 673, 340 S.E.2d 232, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2454, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818, 107 S. Ct. 77, 93 L. Ed. 2d 33, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 3388 (1986). Three persons driving along dirt road late at night in high crime area may give rise to an articulable ground for suspicion. State v. Purdy, 147 Ga. App. 340, 248 S.E.2d 683, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2683 (1978). Defendant’s act of pulling into a parking lot did not furnish any additional reason sufficient to create an articulable suspicion justifying an investigative stop. State v. Canidate, 220 Ga. App. 276, 469 S.E.2d 710, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 157 (1996). On facts, articulable ground for
- suspicion existed.
- Where police officers observed a truck traveling along a dirt road after midnight in an area where several recent burglaries had taken place, it cannot be said that an articulable ground for suspicion does not exist. Allen v. State, 140 Ga. App. 828, 232 S.E.2d 250, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1643 (1976). Where the officers received a tip which did not furnish probable cause to stop appellant and search, but led them to the location specified and to find appellant, who fit the description given, attempting to leave the area in the car described by the informant, the officers had an articulable suspicion warranting the stop of the vehicle to investigate the circumstances. Stiggers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 546, 260 S.E.2d 413, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2630 (1979). The brief investigatory stop of defendant was permissible even though the officers did not personally observe defendant commit a traffic violation or any other criminal act before they made the stop, where there was a report of recent unlawful discharge of a firearm, with the appearance of only the defendant’s truck, coming from the direction where the shots were fired, and the presence of fresh mud on that truck, which suggested defendant had been in the wooded area where the shots were fired. Cheatham v. State, 204 Ga. App. 483, 419 S.E.2d 920, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 884 (1992). Investigatory stop was authorized where police had witnessed or had knowledge of at least five indicia which contributed to an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Lewis v. State, 233 Ga. App. 560, 504 S.E.2d 732, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 996 (1998). Where a police officer detained the defendant because the defendant failed to give straight answers regarding the defendant’s plans, this gave rise to an articulable suspicion justifying additional investigation and was not unconstitutionally intrusive in light of the problem of interstate drug traffic. State v. Hall, 235 Ga. App. 412, 509 S.E.2d 701, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1516 (1998). Where an officer manning a checkpoint saw defendant suddenly brake and turn the vehicle into a driveway short of the checkpoint and that, prior to the abrupt turn, defendant had not used a turn signal and defendant’s vehicle lacked two rear lights, and because the officer knew that the defendant had been identified as a supplier of methamphetamines, collectively, these facts formed a sufficient, reasonable basis for the officer to believe defendant was transporting illegal drugs or was otherwise engaged in criminal conduct. Gary v. State, 249 Ga. App. 879, 549 S.E.2d 826, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 656 (2001). Denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress physical and testimonial evidence that arose from a stop of a vehicle that the defendant was riding in as a passenger was proper and not violative of U.S. Const., amend. 4 because the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion to make the stop upon seeing the vehicle near the vicinity of a burglary; the vehicle was driving on a road that led to a closed business, the defendant and the vehicle driver appeared startled to see the police at the apartment that had been burglarized, and there were no other vehicles in the vicinity at the time. Taylor v. State, 296 Ga. App. 481, 675 S.E.2d 504, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 243 (2009). No unconstitutional seizure occurred, where patrol units without flasher lights on followed defendant for several blocks observing that defendant committed multiple traffic offenses then Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 2. Vehicle Stops (Cont’d) stopped defendant and made an arrest for DUI. State v. Wright, 221 Ga. App. 202, 470 S.E.2d 916, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 431 (1996).
- Seizure of evidence during investigatory stop of automobile upheld.
- An investigative stop of defendant’s automobile which resulted in seizure of narcotics and defendant’s arrest did not violate the fourth amendment where the anonymous tip that formed the basis for the stop had been sufficiently corroborated by the arresting officer’s recognition of defendant as having been involved in an earlier drug investigation to furnish reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. State v. Ball, 207 Ga. App. 729, 429 S.E.2d 258, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 320 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C0921, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 566 (Ga. Apr. 15, 1993).
- Stop held valid.
- State trooper’s conduct fell within the permissible scope of a noncustodial traffic stop, where the initial stop of an automobile was valid and officer then asked the Spanish-speaking driver to step out of the car, sought information about the car’s ownership, asked for a driver’s license and questioned driver and driver’s bilingual spouse generally regarding their destination before obtaining consent to search the vehicle. United States v. Suarez, 694 F. Supp. 926, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9753 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff’d, 885 F.2d 1574, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 15791 (11th Cir. 1989). Where, after being stopped at a properly configured New Year’s eve roadblock, the defendant was diverted to the side of the road, this was not a “second detention,” but a continuation of the original investigative stop, and no added proof was required to make the brief prolonging of the stop valid. Workman v. State, 235 Ga. App. 800, 510 S.E.2d 109, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1569 (1998), cert. denied, No. S99C0525, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 350 (Ga. Apr. 9, 1999). The stop of the defendant’s vehicle was authorized by a trooper’s observation of the traffic offense of following too close, even though the trooper acknowledged that the trooper would not have stopped the defendant but for the tip that the defendant had been smoking a joint; an officer’s ulterior motive for a stop is of no consequence where the stop is made for a valid reason. Cotton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 18, 513 S.E.2d 763, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 337 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C0985, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 598 (Ga. June 11, 1999). Police officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing; hence the stop of an automobile was justified since: (1) officers received several reports of youths driving by in a car and shooting darts at people with a blow gun; (2) based on information from the victims and witnesses, police issued a “be on the lookout” notice for a small compact teal green vehicle with a white male driver with a crew cut and a black male passenger; (3) officers investigating the attacks drove around in the general area described in the notice and spotted two juveniles driving a small teal green car with a white male driver with a crew cut and a black male in the passenger seat; (4) the officers stopped the car; and (5) the car’s driver did not have a valid driver’s license and there were illegal fireworks in plain view on the backseat. In the Interest of B.K.M., 247 Ga. App. 588, 544 S.E.2d 504, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 46 (2001). Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress items that were found in the trunk of defendant’s car after defendant was apprehended on suspicion of shoplifting despite defendant’s claim that defendant did not consent to the search of the car, as the trial court weighed the credibility of the testimony and the record supported the trial court’s finding that defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the search; moreover, even if defendant did not consent to the search, the search was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which allows a warrantless search of a vehicle where there is probable cause, because the police had probable cause to search the vehicle in light of information from a store manager who saw defendant place store items in defendant’s trunk without paying for them and in light of defendant’s subsequent conduct of shoplifting at another store down the road 30 minutes later. Horne v. State, 260 Ga. App. 640, 580 S.E.2d 644, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 447 (2003). Where, after being stopped at a properly configured New Year’s eve roadblock, the defendant was diverted to the side of the road, this was not a “second detention,” but a continuation of the original investigative stop, and no added proof was required to make the brief prolonging of the stop valid. Slocum v. State, 267 Ga. App. 337, 599 S.E.2d 299, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 626 (2004). Officer’s be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) bulletin provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to authorize the stop of defendant’s vehicle. The BOLO provided particularized information describing the color, manufacturer, and model of the vehicle, the number and race of its occupants, and its location and direction of travel. Faulkner v. State, 277 Ga. App. 702, 627 S.E.2d 423, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 187 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1112, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 423 (Ga. June 12, 2006). Because an officer was authorized to stop vehicles for traffic violations under both the Fourth Amendment and the Georgia Constitution, it was proper for the officer to stop the defendant, whose vehicle bore the license plate of another vehicle in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-6. Thompson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 661, 658 S.E.2d 122, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1326 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C1053, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 652 (Ga. June 30, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence because the stop of defendant’s vehicle was justified based on the police having observed defendant at a residence under surveillance for suspected drug activity: (1) defendant went in and out of the residence under surveillance in under five minutes; (2) defendant had a drug seller as a passenger in defendant’s vehicle; and (3) defendant drove to the passenger’s residence. The stop was a second-tier encounter that required reasonable suspicion, and the collective knowledge of the officers involved, based on the officers’ observations, justified defendant’s stop. Satterfield v. State, 289 Ga. App. 886, 658 S.E.2d 379, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 158 (2008).
- Stop held invalid.
- Stop of the defendant’s car by an officer was held invalid as inarticulate hunch of illegal activity where the officer was patrolling the apartment complex at 4 A.M. and observed the defendant pull into the complex parking lot at a “rapid speed”, then quickly enter the apartment building and emerge a short time later, re-enter the defendant’s vehicle and drive away at a “rapid speed.” United States v. Momodu, 909 F. Supp. 1571, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19111 (N.D. Ga. 1995). Because the only arguably suspicious behavior by the defendant was driving around a subdivision several times late at night, because there was no evidence introduced that such activity violated any local ordinances or other applicable law, or that there was any other basis for a stop, and because the police had received no information that the defendant had committed any acts of vandalism in the area, there was no particularized and objective basis to justify an investigatory stop, and the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Attaway v. State, 236 Ga. App. 307, 511 S.E.2d 635, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 154 (1999). The mere fact that an older model yellow car of a particular kind was seen three days after the issuance of an alert was not sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that it was the same car involved in a purse snatching three days earlier at a location two miles away. State v. Burns, 238 Ga. App. 683, 520 S.E.2d 39, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 904 (1999). The mere fact that past incidents of vandalism had occurred in the area of the stop did not indicate that the driver was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal conduct in the absence of some information linking the driver to the vandalism. In re M.J.H., 239 Ga. App. 894, 522 S.E.2d 491, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1190 (1999). The officer lacked reasonable suspicion for stopping the vehicle where defendant merely pulled into a parking lot and then began to drive away, and at the time the officer made the stop, the officer had no “particularized and objective” reason for believing that the occupants of the truck were engaged in criminal activity. State v. Winnie, 242 Ga. App. 228, 529 S.E.2d 215, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 134 (2000). Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 2. Vehicle Stops (Cont’d) An investigative stop of the defendant’s van was improper since: (1) the patrol officers who stopped the defendant did not see any traffic violations or other suspicious conduct justifying the stop and, instead, stopped the defendant based solely on a lookout broadcast by undercover officers; (2) the only facts known by the undercover officers were that the defendant stopped defendant’s van at an apartment complex parking lot where they were watching a particular apartment, went down the stairs, came back up the stairs, and left in the van. Duke v. State, 247 Ga. App. 512, 544 S.E.2d 201, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 16 (2001). Grant of defendant’s motion to suppress was not clearly erroneous as the officer stopping defendant’s automobile for an investigatory stop provided no factual basis for believing that defendant’s older model automobile violated the taillight specifications in O.C.G.A. § 40-8-23(e) simply because newer models violated the statute; further, the trial court could have found that the officer’s testimony that the officer had conducted research into the newer models’ taillights was less than credible. State v. Keddington, 264 Ga. App. 912, 592 S.E.2d 532, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1608 (2003). Because the police officer pulled defendant over based only on the fact that defendant’s car was parked in a truck fueling area of a travel center for a long time, the stop was not supported by a reasonable suspicion, and it was, therefore, in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Moore v. State, 265 Ga. App. 108, 592 S.E.2d 892, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 23 (2004). Where a 911 call from an unidentified informant did not provide the police with reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle, the stop unreasonably intruded upon defendant’s fourth amendment rights; as a result, the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Slocum v. State, 267 Ga. App. 337, 599 S.E.2d 299, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 626 (2004). Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop was granted because the arresting officer had no articulable suspicion for making the stop based on defendant’s driving 10 miles under the speed limit in the left lane of a highway. State v. Whelchel, 269 Ga. App. 314, 604 S.E.2d 200, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 993 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0102, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 101 (Ga. Jan. 24, 2005). On facts, articulable ground for
- suspicion did not exist.
- Trial court properly suppressed evidence obtained in a traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle as the police officers who initiated the stop, in reliance on information they obtained from a tipster that they had just arrested, did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion for stopping defendant’s vehicle at the time of the stop. Furthermore, the fact that an officer saw defendant pass a bag to the passenger in defendant’s car did not support the state’s argument that articulable suspicion existed to initiate the stop, because the stop had already been initiated before the officer saw anything being passed between defendant and the passenger. State v. Davenport, 268 Ga. App. 704, 603 S.E.2d 324, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 997 (2004). Information that car operator
- wanted for felony.
- Where an arresting officer has adequate reason to stop a car, obtain the license of the operator during that momentary detention, and verify that the operator is not drunk or under the influence of intoxicants, subsequently obtained information that the operator is wanted for a felony warrant justifies the arrest and a subsequent search of the vehicle without a warrant. Graves v. State, 167 Ga. App. 246, 305 S.E.2d 913, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2487 (1983). Informant’s identification of defendant as supplier of marijuana and the defendant’s presence in the parking lot of the informant’s apartment justified an investigatory stop. Burdette v. State, 210 Ga. App. 471, 436 S.E.2d 502, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1206 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0120, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 188 (Ga. Jan. 7, 1994).
- Evidence obtained after investigatory stop of car admissible.
- Where an officer was authorized to make a limited investigation of the defendant’s identity and when the officer asked for the defendant’s name, a response known to the officer to be false was given, this authorized the arrest of the defendant for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25, and the fruits of a search of the defendant and the car in which the defendant was a passenger conducted pursuant to this legal arrest would be admissible at the defendant’s trial. State v. Roberson, 165 Ga. App. 727, 302 S.E.2d 591, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3181 (1983). Reasonable, articulable suspicion
- justified prolonged traffic stop.
- Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after a traffic stop because the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s traffic violation, possible impairment, providing false information, and the passenger’s tip about the drugs, gave the officer reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal drug activity, justifying the prolonged detention to investigate further. Reece v. State, 374 Ga. App. 376, 912 S.E.2d 747, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 57 (2025). After traffic stop had concluded and consent to search was refused, officers could not legally detain defendants based only on their nervous behavior. Parker v. State, 233 Ga. App. 616, 504 S.E.2d 774, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1027 (1998). Testimony as to illegally arrested
- defendants.
- A police officer who had the authority to stop a car and ask the occupants to identify themselves could testify to seeing the defendants in the car, even though the defendants were then illegally arrested. United States v. Kelly, 749 F.2d 1541, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 27493 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1029, 105 S. Ct. 3506, 87 L. Ed. 2d 636, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 2316 (1985). taining its occupants constitute a seizure, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2421 (1979). Suspected occupants of home in
- Stopping an automobile and demotor vehicle.
- Where police had probable cause to believe the law was being violated by the occupants of an apartment, police properly approached and briefly detained the occupants of a car that had just come to a stop at the residence to determine whether any of them lived there. Claffey v. State, 209 Ga. App. 455, 433 S.E.2d 441, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 913 (1993). Request for information unrelated to traffic stop and for consent to
- search for drugs.
- An officer does not necessarily illegally exceed the scope of a valid traffic stop by asking for information unrelated to the traffic stop and for consent to search for drugs while the person is still being detained and without articulable suspicion of a crime. State v. Sims, 248 Ga. App. 277, 546 S.E.2d 47, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 242 (2001). The trial court did not err in suppressing evidence obtained in a search of the defendant’s vehicle since the defendant was detained without justification when an officer began to interrogate defendant about the contents of defendant’s car following a traffic stop, and the defendant’s subsequent consent to search was the product of this impermissible seizure. State v. Sims, 248 Ga. App. 277, 546 S.E.2d 47, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 242 (2001). Scope of search following stop
- based on seatbelt violation.
- The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress marijuana and a handgun found in defendant’s car following a traffic stop which was conducted because neither the defendant nor the passenger were wearing seatbelts since: (1) the officer asked for defendant’s license to establish defendant’s identity and asked questions reasonably related to the traffic violation; (2) the defendant’s license showed a Macon address, so the officer asked defendant about still living in Macon and then, based on the defendant’s voluntary comments about what defendant was doing in Atlanta, asked defendant a follow-up question about a friend; (3) the defendant then refused to answer the officer’s question and kept looking around while the passenger attempted to get out of the car and then refused to fully comply with the officer’s request to close the door; and (4) the officer noticed large bags located on the Investigative Stops (Cont’d) 2. Vehicle Stops (Cont’d) car’s back seat. Bell v. State, 248 Ga. App. 254, 546 S.E.2d 34, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 238 (2001).
- Seatbelt violation.
- Reasonable suspicion supported the stop of the defendant’s vehicle since the arresting officer stopped the vehicle after noticing that neither the defendant driver nor the passenger were wearing seatbelts. Crenshaw v. State, 248 Ga. App. 505, 546 S.E.2d 890, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 330 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0978, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 672 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2001). Improper expansion of scope of
- traffic investigation.
- A state trooper impermissibly expanded the scope of a traffic investigation following a stop of the defendant’s car because neither the defendant nor the passenger were wearing seatbelts since the trooper asked the defendant numerous questions that were unrelated to the reason for the stop then asked for permission to search the defendant’s pockets and found a vial with cocaine residue. State v. Gibbons, 248 Ga. App. 859, 547 S.E.2d 679, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 422 (2001). Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress marijuana and cocaine that was found lying in plain site on the floorboard of the truck that defendant used by an officer who approached the truck, identified himself as a police officer, and asked defendant if the officer could speak with defendant, as the officer’s approach to the vehicle was not a stop requiring reasonable suspicion, but rather was a first tier police-citizen encounter. Marion v. State, 268 Ga. App. 699, 603 S.E.2d 321, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 989 (2004). Police officers impermissibly expanded the traffic stop without reasonable, articulable suspicion, resulting in an illegal detention of both the driver of the vehicle and the passenger and the defendant’s consent to search the vehicle was the product of this illegal detention; thus, the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search was rightfully suppressed. Specifically, the police officer requested permission to search the car “before you guys take off” after returning defendant’s license and giving a warning, but while continuing to detain and question the defendants; thus, it was doubtful that any reasonable person in these circumstances would have felt free to disregard the police officer and go. State v. Conner, 288 Ga. App. 517, 654 S.E.2d 461, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1248 (2007).
- Stop for playing loud music.
- In a case in which the defendant appealed a conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the district court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the defendant’s automobile after being stopped by a police officer for violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14(a). The officer testified at the suppression hearing that the officer heard a loud thumping sound coming from the radio in defendant’s automobile when the officer was located one block away from the defendant and that the officer heard the automobile before seeing the automobile; a reasonable officer in the officer’s position could have believed that the music was audible more than one-hundred feet away on the basis of those observations, and any mistake of fact by the officer in evaluating the distance from the defendant’s car was a reasonable one, and the officer did not violate the fourth amendment by stopping the defendant for violation of the noise statute. United States v. Smalls, 458 Fed. Appx. 788, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1203 (11th Cir. 2012). ful Arrest
- Search and Seizure Incident to Law-Purpose.
- Searches incident to lawful custodial arrests comprise one of the narrow exceptions to the general principle that searches are unconstitutional unless authorized by a prior judicial warrant. The exception serves two purposes: (1) it allows the arresting officer to disarm the suspect, thus protecting the officer’s safety and foreclosing the possibility of escape; and (2) the exception permits the officer to prevent the suspect from destroying evidence. A lawful incident search cannot extend beyond the perimeters established by these goals. United States v. Edwards, 554 F.2d 1331, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 11854 (5th Cir. 1977).
- Lawful arrest authorizes searches.
- — U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects against an unreasonable search all those suspected or known to be offenders as well as the innocent, and unquestionably extends to the premises where the search was made, but a search in connection with a lawful arrest is valid, although without a warrant. Barron v. State, 109 Ga. App. 786, 137 S.E.2d 690, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 547 (1962). Legal search may be made incident to lawful arrest or by consent of the owner of the premises or property. Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443, 1967 Ga. LEXIS 471 (1967). As general rule, search and seizure incident to arrest is reasonable if the arrest is lawful and the search is incident to the arrest in purpose, time, scope, and place. United States v. Ryan, 415 F.2d 847, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10885 (5th Cir. 1969). A search without a warrant but incident to a lawful arrest may be lawful. Black v. State, 119 Ga. App. 855, 168 S.E.2d 916, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1279 (1969). Where no contention is made that the arrest was not lawful, the search of the motor vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger for things connected with the crime for which the defendant was arrested was not unlawful. Lindsey v. State, 227 Ga. 48, 178 S.E.2d 848, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 395 (1970). When, in the eyes of the law, a person is in detention, a search of the person and seizure of effects of a suspect in detention is incidental to such arrest and is reasonable. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Lawful arrest will authorize a search. United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13009 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988, 101 S. Ct. 2325, 68 L. Ed. 2d 847, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 2108 (1981). Search of defendant was authorized as incident to a lawful arrest, after the defendant and another person were observed by the arresting officer displaying crack cocaine as they were walking very closely together in a “well-known drug area.” Jackson v. State, 197 Ga. App. 154, 397 S.E.2d 737, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1213 (1990). Evidence that the defendant stalked and threatened to kill the victim on numerous occasions, and that, shortly before the victim was fatally stabbed, the defendant was seen in the victim’s front yard, gave police probable cause to arrest the defendant. Therefore, seizure of the boots the defendant was wearing at the time of the arrest did not violate the fourth amendment and the impressions the officers made at the crime scene were properly admitted into evidence. Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 304, 667 S.E.2d 65, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 753 (2008). Standing to contest validity of
- search.
- Defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress the gun and knitted caps found in the car, as defendant, a passenger, lacked standing to contest the search of the car; further, the caps were found in a search of the car incident to a lawful arrest. Patterson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 630, 577 S.E.2d 850, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 210 (2003).
- Validity of search depends on validity of arrest.
- In order for the warrantless search to have been valid the arrest must have been legal. Where no reasonable cause for the defendant’s arrest existed when the search was made and it was not made in connection with or incident to a lawful arrest without a warrant, then the search was unlawful. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976). Federal constitutionality of search incident to arrest depends upon the constitutional validity of the arrest. Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it — whether at the moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 640 (1981). Search and Seizure Incident to Lawful Arrest (Cont’d)
- “Fruit of poisoned tree” doctrine.
- Under the “fruit of the poisoned tree” doctrine, the search must fall, if the original arrest was invalid. Marshall v. State, 130 Ga. App. 572, 203 S.E.2d 885, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1180 (1974). Incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its justification. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976). Once the defendant is in custody, a search at another place is not incident to the arrest but must be treated as though it is in the defendant’s or the defendant’s agent’s own possession, safe from intrusion. Hunter v. State, 127 Ga. App. 664, 194 S.E.2d 680, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 991 (1972). Search must be contemporaneous
- with arrest.
- Search is not permissible as incident to the arrest without warrant when it is not contemporaneous with it and conducted in an area within the immediate control of the prisoner, that is, an area so contiguous that the prisoner might gain control of a weapon, destroy evidence, and so on. Hunter v. State, 127 Ga. App. 664, 194 S.E.2d 680, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 991 (1972). Search held contemporaneous to
- arrest.
- Where defendant’s arrest was lawful, the fact that the arresting officer took the time to write out two traffic tickets before searching defendant’s vehicle did not render the search noncontemporaneous to the arrest. Oswell v. State, 181 Ga. App. 35, 351 S.E.2d 221, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2803 (1986).
- Scope of search.
- Except under exigent and unusual circumstances, a search incident to arrest can be held reasonable only for the purposes of preventing the defendant from access to a weapon or evidence which defendant may be desirous of destroying, and this usually limits the search to the defendant’s person and clothing, and that very narrow area surrounding defendant where defendant might reach even though under restraint. Scott v. State, 122 Ga. App. 204, 176 S.E.2d 481, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 834 (1970). Nature of offense for which accused is arrested has important bearing upon what objects may be seized as incidental to arrest. Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443, 1967 Ga. LEXIS 471 (1967); Scott v. State, 122 Ga. App. 204, 176 S.E.2d 481, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 834 (1970). Areas subject to warrantless search
- at time of lawful arrest.
- An officer at the time of lawful custodial arrest may, without a warrant, make a full search of the person of the accused, a limited area within the control of the person arrested, and of an automobile in the arrested person’s possession at the scene of the arrest for the discovery and preservation of criminal evidence. Glover v. State, 139 Ga. App. 162, 227 S.E.2d 921, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1719 (1976).
- Search of person.
- Having lawfully placed the suspect under arrest, officers are authorized to search the suspect’s person for the purpose of protecting themselves from attack or preventing the suspect from escaping. Coley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 810, 219 S.E.2d 35, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1834 (1975). Once defendant has been placed under custodial arrest, police may search the defendant’s person, incident to that arrest, for weapons or contraband. Graves v. State, 138 Ga. App. 327, 226 S.E.2d 131, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2147 (1976). The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. It is the fact of the lawful arrest that establishes the authority to search, and in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement amendment, but is also a reasonable search under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Graves v. State, 138 Ga. App. 327, 226 S.E.2d 131, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2147 (1976). Officer at time of lawful custodial arrest may, without warrant, make full search of the person of the accused, a limited area within the control of the person arrested, and of an automobile in the defendant’s possession at the scene of the arrest for the discovery and preservation of criminal evidence. Williams v. State, 150 Ga. App. 852, 258 S.E.2d 659, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2399 (1979). Where a police officer was going to issue a citation to defendant for violating the local open container ordinance, and defendant became nervous after the officer noticed a bulge in defendant’s pocket, the officer was fully authorized to conduct a pat-down search of defendant prior to placing defendant in the back of a patrol car, and once a .32 caliber revolver was discovered in defendant’s rear pocket, probable cause existed for defendant’s arrest, and the subsequent search which yielded the illegal contraband was permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Mashburn v. State, 186 Ga. App. 488, 367 S.E.2d 881, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 401 (1988). Search incident to arrest was proper, where the circumstances surrounding the arresting officer’s response to a report of a drug sale were sufficient to establish probable cause for the arresting officer to believe that defendant possessed a controlled substance. Scott v. State, 201 Ga. App. 162, 410 S.E.2d 362, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1217 (1991).
- Heimlich maneuver.
- Use of a “Heimlich Maneuver” to remove suspected contraband from defendant’s mouth did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. Merriweather v. State, 228 Ga. App. 246, 491 S.E.2d 467, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1097 (1997). Officer hearing defendant state
- place for illegal activity.
- Because officer actually heard the defendant state that the defendant would be at “Silver Creek” early the next morning with cocaine and law enforcement officers observed the defendant appear at “Silver Creek” early the next day, probable cause existed for the defendant’s arrest, and the search of the defendant which resulted in the discovery of cocaine was lawfully conducted pursuant to a lawful warrantless arrest. State v. Hancock, 203 Ga. App. 577, 417 S.E.2d 381, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 536 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0864, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 588 (Ga. June 25, 1992).
- Search of surrounding area.
- A search may extend beyond the person arrested to the place where the person is arrested in order to find and seize things connected with the crime, as its fruits, or as means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect escape from custody; and a dwelling place where arrest is made may be subjected to search going beyond the room where the arrest was made. Cash v. State, 222 Ga. 55, 148 S.E.2d 420, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 396 (1966). It is reasonable for officer to search area surrounding arrest area into which a suspect might reach to obtain a weapon. Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 178, 269 S.E.2d 450, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1034 (1980). Where there was probative evidence that defendant was driving in excess of the lawful speed limit, there was evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that the police officer did not overstep officer’s bounds in stopping the defendant, arresting defendant for a traffic violation and conducting a protective search of the immediate vicinity of defendant’s automobile. Kilgore v. State, 158 Ga. App. 55, 279 S.E.2d 239, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2069 (1981). Where necessary, police arresting a suspect may conduct a protective sweep of the area to check for other persons who might pose a threat to the safety of the officers or the public. If the officers spot evidence during a protective sweep, they may seize it. United States v. Standridge, 810 F.2d 1034, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 2311 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072, 107 S. Ct. 2468, 95 L. Ed. 2d 877, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2341 (1987). Possessing an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe suspect was in the suspect’s home, the officers were entitled to enter and to search anywhere in the apartment in which the suspect might be found. Until the suspect was found, the search for the suspect was not over, and there was still that particular justification for entering any place that had not yet been searched. State v. Wright, 204 Ga. App. 382, 419 S.E.2d 334, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 834 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C1148, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 688 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1992). Search and Seizure Incident to Lawful Arrest (Cont’d) Search of defendant’s apartment could not be justified as a protective sweep since defendant was arrested just outside the front door and the evidence did not establish that the officers had reason to believe that any other person was present in the apartment at the time of the arrest. United States v. Sunkett, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10514 (N.D. Ga. 2000). Because the police were entitled to conduct a limited sweep of a residence to ensure their safety prior to obtaining consent to search and because the contraband was not discovered during the “protective sweep,” the search did not violate the fourth amendment; consequently, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Nelson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 658, 610 S.E.2d 627, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (2005). Search of an automobile incident to a lawful arrest is proper. Cook v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 90, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10272 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff’d, 427 F.2d 1172, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8649 (5th Cir. 1970); Stephens v. Lindsey, 304 F. Supp. 203, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13167 (S.D. Ga. 1969). If a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. Coley v. State, 177 Ga. App. 669, 341 S.E.2d 9, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2551 (1986); Fortson v. State, 201 Ga. App. 272, 410 S.E.2d 774, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1332 (1991), aff’d, 262 Ga. 3, 412 S.E.2d 833, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 78 (1992). Because defendant was arrested on speeding and driving without a license or proof of insurance charges before the passenger compartment of the defendant’s automobile was searched, the warrantless search was therefore legal so long as the arrest itself was legal. Dixon v. State, 180 Ga. App. 222, 348 S.E.2d 742, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2685 (1986). Search of the defendant’s automobile after the defendant had been handcuffed and was no longer in the car was valid, where the defendant was the subject of a lawful custodial arrest, and the search of the defendant’s vehicle immediately followed the arrest. Sims v. State, 197 Ga. App. 214, 398 S.E.2d 244, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1254 (1990). Where police officers had reasonable grounds to detain defendant and the defendant’s companion briefly for the limited purpose of ascertaining their identity and conducting a driver’s license and vehicle registration check, a search of their vehicle was authorized as a search incident to arrest. State v. Miller, 197 Ga. App. 99, 397 S.E.2d 508, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1177 (1990). The search of the defendant’s vehicle, after the defendant had been arrested for a traffic violation, resulting in the discovery of a .38 caliber revolver “stuffed down” between the front seat and the console, was justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Daniel v. State, 199 Ga. App. 180, 404 S.E.2d 466, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 402 (1991). The contemporaneous, warrantless search of the interior of an automobile recently occupied by an arrestee is justified in order to secure any weapons that might be available to the arrestee and to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. Fortson v. State, 262 Ga. 3, 412 S.E.2d 833, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 78 (1992). As the arresting officer had made a lawful custodial arrest of the defendant, the officer had authority to conduct, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, a warrantless search of the vehicle compartment of the automobile which defendant had just been operating. Barnett v. State, 204 Ga. App. 491, 420 S.E.2d 43, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 888 (1992). The police had probable cause to make an immediate, warrantless search of the automobile seat back for cocaine whether exigency existed and regardless of whether the vehicle was then impounded, where defendant’s voluntary admission against penal interest regarding the precise location of and nature of the drugs was corroborated adequately by the officer’s observation of defendant’s location and vantage point within the car. Barnett v. State, 204 Ga. App. 491, 420 S.E.2d 43, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 888 (1992). The search of the defendant’s car after defendant fled from a traffic stop and then attempted to flee on foot was permissible as a search incident to arrest. Scoggins v. State, 248 Ga. App. 1, 545 S.E.2d 19, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 44 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0828, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 596 (Ga. July 16, 2001). A search of an automobile was valid as an incident to a lawful custodial arrest although the defendant had been handcuffed and placed in a patrol car while the search was conducted. The decisive factor is whether the arrestee was, at the time of arrest, a recent occupant of the automobile, not whether the automobile and its contents were in the arrestee’s immediate control at the time of the search. Scoggins v. State, 248 Ga. App. 1, 545 S.E.2d 19, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 44 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0828, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 596 (Ga. July 16, 2001). Once the passenger was placed under arrest, the officer could lawfully search the entire passenger compartment of the defendant’s vehicle as a search incident to arrest. Tutu v. State, 252 Ga. App. 12, 555 S.E.2d 241, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 1174 (2001). Even if the police search of a vehicle following a defendant’s arrest after a high speed chase was improper because there was no reason to suspect there would be evidence of a traffic violation in the vehicle, the evidence would have been discovered during an inventory search after the impoundment of the vehicle, which was lawful because all the tires were damaged. Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 227 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1046, 131 S. Ct. 599, 178 L. Ed. 2d 438, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 8958 (2010), overruled in part, Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 820 S.E.2d 640, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (2018). State failed to prove that the state’s search of a vehicle’s center console after the arrest and handcuffing of the car’s occupant was proper because the state failed to establish the defendant’s location in relation to the vehicle, when the defendant was already in handcuffs, at the time of the search or to otherwise show that the console was within the defendant’s arm’s reach. Boykins v. State, 290 Ga. 71, 717 S.E.2d 474, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 871 (2011). Trial court correctly concluded that the arresting officer had probable cause to search the defendant’s vehicle based on smelling marijuana, and that the search inevitably would have led to the discovery of the contraband in the defendant’s purse. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress or for a new trial. Foster v. State, 321 Ga. App. 118, 741 S.E.2d 240, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 325 (2013). senger compartment of car in which appellant had been a passenger just before being arrested was not violative of fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. State v. Hopkins, 163 Ga. App. 141, 293 S.E.2d 529, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3190 (1982). Search of defendant’s briefcase was permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Wade v. State, 184 Ga. App. 289, 361 S.E.2d 266, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2773 (1987). sion of crime may be seized at time of arrest without search warrant. Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443, 1967 Ga. LEXIS 471 (1967). Where evidence showed that the defendant’s cell phone was an instrumentality of the crime of cocaine trafficking and that the details of the drug transaction were arranged by telephone, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the search of the defendant’s cell phone because the defendant’s cell phone was confiscated during a lawful search incident to defendant’s arrest and because it was an instrumentality of the crime that was probative of criminal conduct. Lopez v. State, 267 Ga. App. 532, 601 S.E.2d 116, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 719 (2004).
- Seizure of gun located inside pas-Instrumentalities used in commis-Removal of weapons.
- It is reasonable that when lawful arrest is made the arresting officer may remove any weapons that the suspect might seek to use to try to resist arrest or to escape. Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 178, 269 S.E.2d 450, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1034 (1980). Evidence found in search incident to lawful arrest is admissible. Evans v. State, 235 Ga. 396, 219 S.E.2d 725, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 892 (1975). A search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is valid although made without Search and Seizure Incident to Lawful Arrest (Cont’d) a warrant and evidence thus obtained is admissible at trial. Cook v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 90, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10272 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff’d, 427 F.2d 1172, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8649 (5th Cir. 1970); Stephens v. Lindsey, 304 F. Supp. 203, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13167 (S.D. Ga. 1969); United States v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 299, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10031 (S.D. Ga. 1969). While it has been held by standards of U.S. Const., amend. 4 that the search of premises under circumstances where the defendant is under lawful arrest is limited by its propinquity to the defendant, and may thus be unreasonable where geographically removed, and while a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate U.S. Const., amend. 4 by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope yet no one questions the right, without a search warrant, to search the person after a valid arrest. Yet, to be admissible, the evidence must have been obtained by means of a search and seizure reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation. Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747, 188 S.E.2d 879, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1460 (1972).
- Cocaine obtained during lawful arrest.
- The fact that Drug Enforcement Administration agents suspected appellant of criminal conduct other than that for which the appellant was lawfully arrested is irrelevant to the legality of the arrest, and the cocaine discovered during a search pursuant to a lawful arrest was not an unlawful seizure within the proscription of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 12467 (5th Cir. 1980). Cocaine was seized in a valid search incident to arrest, where police officers noticed a bulge in the defendant’s clothing that appeared not to be caused by the defendant’s body and, in response to the officers’ questions, the defendant began to perspire and pull the defendant’s jacket together in front of the bulge. United States v. Tomaszewski, 833 F.2d 1532, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16394 (11th Cir. 1987). Marijuana obtained by warrantless search incident to warrantless arrest
- inadmissible.
- Defendant may not be lawfully convicted of possessing marijuana obtained by a search without warrant that the defendant verbally protested, justified by an arrest without warrant and justified by a different crime discovered only by the defendant’s “voluntary” statement after being stopped, seized, or detained without any probable cause whatever. Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747, 188 S.E.2d 879, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1460 (1972). Burden on state to show evidence
- obtained by illegal search was incident to lawful arrest.
- Evidence obtained by illegal seizure and search of the defendant’s person, by which the defendant is compelled to incriminate self, being inadmissible against a defendant accused of crime, the burden devolves upon the state to show that evidence obtained by search was procured after a legal arrest. Marshall v. State, 130 Ga. App. 572, 203 S.E.2d 885, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1180 (1974). Inventory Searches
- Purposes.
- An inventory search serves three distinct purposes: the protection of personal property which may be in the automobile, the protection of the police against claims arising from property allegedly lost or stolen while the automobile is in police custody, and the protection of the police from possible danger. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 9854 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968, 99 S. Ct. 458, 58 L. Ed. 2d 427, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 3851 (1978).
- Goals of inventory searches.
- Inventory searches have two purposes: to protect the vehicle and the property in it; and to safeguard the police or other officers from claims of lost possessions. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2411 (1980). An inventory search serves three distinct purposes: the protection of personal property; the protection of the police against claims arising from property allegedly lost or stolen; and the protection of the police from possible danger. To prevent escape, self-injury, or harm to others, the police have a legitimate interest in separating the accused from the property found in the accused’s possession. An inventory is then necessary both to preserve the property of the accused while the accused is in jail and to forestall the possibility that the accused may later claim that some item has not been returned to the accused. However, the inventory must not be done with an investigative intent, but it should be incident to the caretaking function of the police. Gaston v. State, 155 Ga. App. 337, 270 S.E.2d 877, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2571 (1980). Inventory searches are valid only because they may attain three goals: (1) they may protect the car owner’s property while it remains in police custody; (2) they may protect the police against disputes over lost or stolen property; and (3) they may protect the police from danger. To be constitutionally permissible, an inventory search must be no more intrusive than necessary to respond to these goals alone. United States v. Edwards, 554 F.2d 1331, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 11854 (5th Cir. 1977). Consent not required for inventory
- search.
- An inventory is not for the exclusive protection of the owner, but also serves to protect the police, and, therefore, it is not necessary that police ask a prisoner whether the prisoner wants the items to be inventoried. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979). U.S. Const., amend. 4 is not violated when police take custody of property of persons they arrest to store that property for safekeeping. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979). ing inventory searches are reasonable. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979).
- Custodial seizures and accompany-Reasonableness of mere inventorial search.
- Merely because the police are not searching with the express purpose of finding evidence of crime, they are not exempt from the requirements of reasonableness set down in U.S. Const., amend. 4. However, the real purpose of the inspection must be inventorial and nonpretextuous with an unexpected result insofar as turning up evidence is concerned. Lowe v. Hopper, 400 F. Supp. 970, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13332 (S.D. Ga.), aff’d, 520 F.2d 1405, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 12642 (5th Cir. 1975). Inventory searches that follow standard police procedure are reasonable. United States v. Wade, 564 F.2d 676, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 5692 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Roberson, 897 F.2d 1092, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 4639 (11th Cir. 1990). Inventory searches are reasonable if conducted in accordance with standard police practice. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 9854 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968, 99 S. Ct. 458, 58 L. Ed. 2d 427, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 3851 (1978); Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979); Gaston v. State, 155 Ga. App. 337, 270 S.E.2d 877, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2571 (1980).
- Unauthorized search based on informant’s tip.
- Inventory search of defendant’s vehicle was not authorized, because the search was based on the tip of an informant who did not reveal the source of the information, nor was the information the informant provided sufficiently detailed to suggest that it was based on anything more substantial than mere rumor. Salter v. State, 198 Ga. App. 242, 401 S.E.2d 541, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1595 (1990); Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 508 (1992). Evidence obtained under guise of
- inventory search.
- Because a bag was placed in custody of another individual by defendant after the defendant’s involvement in traffic accident (such individual putting it in the individual’s apartment) and, additionally, because the defendant’s Inventory Searches (Cont’d) friend was willing and able to take custody of the bag, the state could not premise seizure of the bag on necessity to protect it from being lost or stolen or to protect themselves; consequently, police conducted a warrantless investigatory search (without probable cause) under the guise of an inventory search, and the defendants’ motion to suppress should have been granted. Gaston v. State, 155 Ga. App. 337, 270 S.E.2d 877, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2571 (1980). If it is clear that police officers are conducting a warrantless investigatory search without probable cause under the guise of an inventory search, courts should refuse to allow such apparent subterfuges to erode the strictures of U.S. Const., amend. 4. The same is true of an “impulse” search that is not, at the time it occurs, a proper caretaking function of the police. Williams v. State, 157 Ga.App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3186 (1981). Because a patrol officer briefly detained the unlicensed driver of a van to make an investigation of suspicious circumstances, and the trial record showed that a licensed passenger was allowed to drive the van from the location where the unlicensed driver was arrested to the sheriff’s office and that a computer check gave the officer no reason to believe the van had been stolen, the subsequent impoundment and inventory of the van was not reasonably necessary, so that evidence discovered and seized as a result of the inventory was not admissible at trial. Reed v. State, 195 Ga. App. 821, 395 S.E.2d 294, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 725 (1990). The absence of an impound inventory sheet should not have impacted a trial court’s determination as to the admissibility of the evidence found during the search of the defendant’s vehicle or whether the search violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, and therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. Haddock, 235 Ga. App. 726, 510 S.E.2d 561, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1599 (1998). Inventory rationale is one which may be abused and stretched to cover unnecessary searches; but even some suspicion that contraband will be found will not void an otherwise valid inventory search. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979). Where a police officer in good faith, conducts an inventory search without any investigative intent, such search is not violative of defendant’s constitutional rights and it is not error to deny defendant’s motion to suppress. Carl v. State, 160 Ga. App. 464, 287 S.E.2d 379, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 3235 (1981). Mere expectation of uncovering evidence will not vitiate an otherwise valid inventory search. United States v. Roberson, 897 F.2d 1092, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 4639 (11th Cir. 1990). Officers immune from damages for
- improper inventory search.
- Where the law as to inventory searches was not “clearly established” at the time FBI agents opened plaintiff’s luggage, the agents were shielded from liability for damages as a matter of law. Sellers v. United States, 709 F.2d 1469, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 25626 (11th Cir. 1983).
- Interests to be protected by reasonable inventory.
- Only so long as the scope of the search is reasonable, taking into consideration the three interests to be protected by the inventory (the protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody; the protection of police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and the protection of the police from potential danger), will it be held to be a constitutionally permissible intrusion. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979). Inventory-type search in executing
- writ of possession reasonable.
- It was reasonable for state officials to conduct an inventory-type search in executing a writ of possession and to remove weapons, drugs, or other items that might endanger the public from the defendant’s personal property before placing it on a public street. United States v. Reynolds, 726 F.2d 1536, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 24623 (11th Cir. 1984).
- Search held for inventory, not investigative purposes.
- Because the evidence demanded a finding that an impoundment and an inventory of defendant’s wrecked and deserted automobile were authorized and the trial court apparently so found and the impounding officer found a carrying case in the trunk which the officer opened, the trial court was not authorized to find that the actions of the officer who discovered the evidence constituted an unwarranted investigative search, rather than a valid inventory search, of the automobile, and the grant of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence contained in the case was reversed. State v. Evans, 181 Ga. App. 422, 352 S.E.2d 599, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2833 (1986). An inventory must not be done with an investigative intent, but it should be incident to the caretaking function of the police. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979).
- Probable cause not required for inventory searches.
- In circumstances involving noncriminal inventory searches, where probable cause to search is irrelevant, search warrants are not required, linked as the warrant requirement textually is to the probable cause concept. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2411 (1980).
- Validity of warrant based on inventory search.
- Where an automobile inventory search is not illegal, a later search warrant, based upon this information, is not invalid. Anglin v. State, 244 Ga. 1, 257 S.E.2d 513, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1080 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Welch v. State, 254 Ga. 603, 331 S.E.2d 573, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 781 (1985). Warrant which authorized the seizure of “all items contained within a specified room and motel at the time of the fire on February 17, 2001, and which remain therein which is evidence of the crime of Insurance Fraud” was not impermissibly vague because the warrant included detailed information about the removal of cats and a dog from defendant’s home and the taking of those animals to the motel room prior to a fire at the home allegedly started by defendant’s son with the knowledge and consent of defendant in the warrant application, an investigator testified that CD’s, tapes, stereo equipment, and other electronics were witnessed being taken to the specified motel and room number and were noticeably absent from the fire scene, and an insurance investigator further testified that in a recorded statement, defendant said that there were no items removed from the house prior to the fire. Maddox v. State, 272 Ga. App. 440, 612 S.E.2d 484, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 107 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1238, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 616 (Ga. Sept. 19, 2005), overruled in part, Able v. State, 312 Ga. App. 252, 718 S.E.2d 96, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 936 (2011).
- Criteria as to legality of impoundment of vehicle.
- Where a defendant was arrested pursuant to a valid bench warrant while driving in Georgia with the defendant’s spouse, where the federal agents impounded the car the defendant was driving and where the defendant challenged the motives of the arresting officers in impounding the defendant’s vehicle when it was not impeding traffic or otherwise presenting a hazard to the public and when the defendant specifically but unsuccessfully requested to be allowed to make arrangements for its disposition, the critical question was not whether the police needed to impound the vehicle in some absolute sense, or could have effected an impoundment more solicitously, but whether the decision to impound and the method chosen for implementing that decision were, under all the circumstances, within the realm of reason. Sammons v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1533, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18033 (11th Cir. 1992).
- Impounded vehicle.
- No search warrant is necessary to inspect an impounded vehicle because such inspections are reasonable and do not violate the rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects. United States v. Jones, 432 F.2d 773, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7278 (5th Cir. 1970). Warrantless search of automobile at police station after arrest elsewhere is con-Inventory Searches (Cont’d) stitutionally permissible, although the persons under arrest were in custody at the time and there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Automobiles coming into lawful custody of police may be searched without warrant for purpose of inventorying the contents and providing for their safekeeping, without having probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be discovered. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Police procedure in conducting an inventory upon impounded motor vehicles is not an unreasonable search in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Hall v. State, 143 Ga. App. 706, 240 S.E.2d 125, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2472 (1977). When vehicles are impounded, police routinely follow caretaking procedures by securing and inventorying the cars’ contents. These procedures have been widely sustained as reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Martasin v. State, 155 Ga. App. 396, 271 S.E.2d 2, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2599 (1980). After the lawful initial stop and arrest of defendant, a subsequent inventory search of a defendant’s automobile, which revealed additional contraband, is proper where defendant makes no request to retrieve the vehicle but, instead, voluntarily acquiesces to an officer’s driving the automobile to the police station to be impounded. Kilgore v. State, 158 Ga. App. 55, 279 S.E.2d 239, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2069 (1981). Inventory search authorized both as search of properly impounded vehicle and as search incident to lawful arrest. See State v. Gilchrist, 174 Ga. App. 499, 330 S.E.2d 430, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2720 (1985). A police officer’s decision to impound a car and to conduct an inventory search was upheld where the car was involved in a parking lot collision; the defendant was arrested after driving with a suspended driver’s license and a license tag issued to another vehicle and driving without insurance; the officer was unable to reach anyone locally who could take custody of the car; and other alternatives to impoundment would have incurred the risk of theft or damage to the car or its contents. State v. Gilchrist, 174 Ga. App. 499, 330 S.E.2d 430, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2720 (1985). Inventory search was lawful after defendant was arrested and the defendant’s car was impounded for improper tag registration. Dillard v. State, 177 Ga. App. 805, 341 S.E.2d 310, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2468 (1986). An inventory search is appropriate whenever the police department selects the towing vehicle rather than the defendant in order to protect the police against claims of lost or stolen property. Fortson v. State, 201 Ga. App. 272, 410 S.E.2d 774, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1332 (1991), aff’d, 262 Ga. 3, 412 S.E.2d 833, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 78 (1992). Because police officers decided that it was unsafe to leave the defendant’s vehicle at the place where the defendant was arrested because it would cause a road hazard the next morning since it would be blocking the driveway of a bank, the action of the officers in impounding and inventorying the vehicle was reasonable when measured against the Fourth Amendment’s interest in protecting the individual’s right to privacy. Martin v. State, 201 Ga. App. 716, 411 S.E.2d 910, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1544 (1991). A police officer had the legal right to impound a parked vehicle occupied by the defendant at the time the officer learned of an improper license plate, and an ensuing search was justified either as an onsite inventory search or under the inevitable discovery doctrine. United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16650 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1119, 112 S. Ct. 1239, 117 L. Ed. 2d 472, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1161 (1992), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912, 112 S. Ct. 1279, 117 L. Ed. 2d 504, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1509 (1992). Where there were no passengers in defendant’s car and defendant was ineligible to further drive the car because of lack of a valid driver’s license, and the car was in a dangerous position on the roadway, it had to be moved for safety’s sake. Choosing impoundment was reasonably necessary to safeguard defendant’s property, protect the public by removing the roadway obstruction, and prevent exposure of the officer to potential danger. Williams v. State, 204 Ga. App. 372, 419 S.E.2d 351, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 809 (1992). Where a vehicle was lawfully impounded following the defendant’s arrest and the tools in question were included in the inventory of the items contained in the car, the seizure of these particular items was authorized although the warrant on which the search was based neither mentioned them nor contained any information suggesting that they had been used in the commission of a crime. Day v. State, 203 Ga. App. 186, 416 S.E.2d 548, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 465 (1992). Where at the time of the defendant’s arrest, the defendant was living on leased premises in a remote mountain location, and the defendant’s lessor actually requested and assisted in the vehicle’s removal, the action of the officers in impounding and inventorying the vehicle was lawful. Moulder v. State, 207 Ga. App. 335, 427 S.E.2d 793, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 179 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C0804, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 571 (Ga. Apr. 15, 1993). An inventory search of defendant’s truck following impoundment was not illegal since the police department had a long standing policy that all parts of a vehicle were to be inventoried, including all containers. Staley v. State, 224 Ga. App. 806, 482 S.E.2d 459, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 240 (1997). The validity of an inventory search hinges on the legality of the decision to impound a car, which must be made according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity; therefore, because the officer’s decision to impound an automobile was not made in accordance with police guidelines but was motivated by a desire to find incriminating evidence, the inventory search of the car was invalid. United States v. Skinner, 957 F. Supp. 228, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2439 (M.D. Ga. 1997). Even though a vehicle did not pose a hazard to other drivers since it was parked off the road and on private property, the vehicle and its contents were exposed to a risk of theft or damage and impoundment was reasonably necessary. Scott v. State, 232 Ga. App. 337, 501 S.E.2d 255, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 558 (1998). Contents of an impounded vehicle are routinely inventoried to protect the property of the owner, protect the officers against claims for lost or stolen property, and protect the police from potential danger, and the validity of such conduct is not dependent upon the absolute necessity for the police to take charge of property to preserve it, but depends instead on whether the police conduct was reasonable under the fourth amendment in light of the circumstances confronting the police at the time; thus, police were authorized to impound and later perform a routine inventory of defendant’s car where defendant was arrested at the home of a friend in connection with a murder and the disappearance of defendant’s spouse, defendant’s car was at the home of the friend, and police knew that defendant had been planning to leave the state with the friend and that defendant’s car was wanted in an investigation in another county, because, under the circumstances, the police had reason to believe that defendants detention would be lengthy and the officers were not required to trust that the car would remain untouched if they left it at the friend’s home. Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 454, 579 S.E.2d 214, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 319 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106, 124 S. Ct. 1059, 157 L. Ed. 2d 892, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 79 (2004).
- Time limit for removal of vehicle.
- Impoundment and inventory search of defendant’s vehicle, pursuant to a police department policy requiring an arrestee’s vehicle to be removed within 15 minutes, was not unreasonable as a matter of law. Gooden v. State, 196 Ga. App. 295, 395 S.E.2d 634, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 881 (1990), cert. denied, No. S90C1431, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 645 (Ga. Sept. 4, 1990). Unreasonable impoundment and
- inventory.
- Because the defendant’s car was being towed away by a wrecking service of the defendant’s choice to a destination of the defendant’s choice and the Inventory Searches (Cont’d) defendant was present and physically capable of making arrangements for the safekeeping of the defendant’s belongings, there was no justification for police intrusion in the form of an inventory search. Such a search was unreasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Travitz, 140 Ga. App. 351, 231 S.E.2d 127, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1469 (1976). Unless the rationale for an inventory search inheres in the decision to seize and inventory, the impoundment itself may be unreasonable and the resulting inventory search invalid. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2411 (1980). After an automobile owner has been arrested and the police allow a private party to drive the car home, any subsequent search and impoundment of the vehicle without a warrant constitutes an illegal search and seizure. Phillips v. State, 167 Ga. App. 260, 305 S.E.2d 918, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3320 (1983). Where a driver was arrested and a reliable friend was present who was authorized and capable of removing the vehicle, the rationale for impoundment did not exist, making the impoundment unreasonable and resulting inventory search invalid. Strobhert v. State, 165 Ga. App. 515, 301 S.E.2d 681, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3165 (1983).
- Areas of automobile subject to inventory search.
- In conducting an inventory search pursuant to standard police practice, an officer may search those places within an automobile where, under the facts of the particular case, the officer can reasonably conclude that personal property may be located. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 9854 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968, 99 S. Ct. 458, 58 L. Ed. 2d 427, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 3851 (1978). Police, in conducting an inventory search, may ordinarily inspect the glove compartment, the trunk, on top of the seats as well as under the front seats, and the floor of the automobile. An inspection of these areas is reasonable because these are common locations in or on which it is reasonably to be expected that the owner or occupant of an automobile may place items of personalty. The intrusion, although serious, is justified by the need to protect the property of the owner, and to protect the police from claims. This is to say no more than in the typical case it is not unreasonable for the police to search such places while conducting an inventory. Arnold v. State, 155 Ga. App. 581, 271 S.E.2d 714, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2686 (1980). When police take custody of any sort of container, such as automobile, it is reasonable to search the container to itemize the property to be held by the police. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2411 (1980).
- Circumstances not justifying inventory search.
- When the driver of a motor vehicle is arrested and a reliable friend is present, authorized, and capable to remove an owner’s vehicle which is capable of being safely removed, it is unnecessary for the police to impound the car and the rationale for an inventory search does not exist. Therefore, impoundment and search under these circumstances would be a serious intrusion upon rights provided by U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Lubvicek, 147 Ga. App. 784, 250 S.E.2d 503, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2947 (1978); Fortson v. State, 262 Ga. 3, 412 S.E.2d 833, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 78 (1992). Where the driver of a motor vehicle is arrested and a reliable friend is present, authorized, and capable to remove an owner’s vehicle which is capable of being safely removed; or where the arrestee expresses a preference as to towing service and designates an appropriate carrier and destination for the vehicle, it is unnecessary for the police to impound it. In either of these instances, the rationale for an inventory search does not exist. Mulling v. State, 156 Ga. App. 404, 274 S.E.2d 770, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3043 (1980). Even though police, rather than the arrestee had selected the towing service, an inventory search was not appropriate in order to protect the police against claims of lost or stolen property. Fortson v. State, 262 Ga. 3, 412 S.E.2d 833, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 78 (1992). Circumstances under which police
- may take charge of property.
- Police seizure and inventory are not dependent for their validity upon the absolute necessity for the police to take charge of property to preserve it. They are permitted to take charge of property under broader circumstances than that. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2411 (1980). Validity of seizure and inventory not dependent on necessity to take
- charge of property.
- A police seizure and inventory is not dependent for its validity upon the absolute necessity for the police to take charge of property to preserve it. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979). criminal inventory searches, search warrants are not required, linked as the warrant requirement textually is to the probable cause concept. This is so because the salutary functions of a warrant simply have no application in that context; the constitutional reasonableness of inventory searches must be determined on other bases. Carl v. State, 160 Ga. App. 464, 287 S.E.2d 379, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 3235 (1981). Civil seizure of house does not jus-
- In circumstances involving nontify inventory search.
- The government’s lawful seizure of a house in connection with pending civil forfeiture proceedings did not entitle the government to conduct an inventory search of the house’s contents over the objection of the tenant occupying the house. United States v. Ladson, 774 F.2d 436, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 23776 (11th Cir. 1985). cers are authorized to make a search of the entire house for the limited purpose of securing it, i.e., discovering the presence of all occupants and eliminating the possibility of harm to the officers and the destruction of evidence. State v. Camp, 175 Ga. App. 591, 333 S.E.2d 896, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2820 (1985). Evidence adduced from inventory
- Once lawfully within a house, offiof property reported stolen admissible.
- Where police recovered property defendant reported stolen and conducted a routine inventory to determine whether the property was in fact defendant’s, incriminating evidence found during the inventory was properly admitted at trial against the defendant because the inventory was conducted in good faith and was a reasonable search and seizure. Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 885, 311 S.E.2d 427, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 549, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241, 104 S. Ct. 3510, 82 L. Ed. 2d 819, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 2565 (1984). Subsequent reading of documents found in inventory search justified
- under “second glance doctrine”.
- Where one officer pursuant to a valid and proper inventory had read and called attention to a death note found in defendant’s possessions and where the discovery and disclosure of the note were appropriate police actions, the subsequent acts of other officers, in rereading and perusing the documents in question were plainly justified under the “second glance doctrine.” Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979).
- Inventory of shopping bag was reasonable.
- Where police officers acting in good faith and while carrying out an inventory procedure without investigative intent, discovered and read “death note” contained in defendant’s open ended shopping bag, the search was deemed reasonable and, therefore, was not violative of the defendant’s rights. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979). Heroin obtained during inventory
- search admissible.
- Heroin discovered by police officers conducting an inventory of the contents of an automobile in order to remove the valuables for safekeeping while the owner was under arrest was admissible and was not obtained as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure. Denson v. State, 128 Ga. App. 456, 197 S.E.2d 156, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1513 (1973). Search valid as items inevitably
- discovered.
- Even though exigent circumstances did not require a search of defendant’s locked briefcase, the contents thereof would have been inevitably discov-Inventory Searches (Cont’d) ered in an inventory search, and therefore, defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied. Taylor v. State, 228 Ga. App. 325, 491 S.E.2d 417, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1055 (1997), cert. denied, No. S98C0073, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 208 (Ga. Jan. 30, 1998). Consent Searches 1. In General Facts of every case must be examined in light of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. Only after it is determined that the aggrieved party did not have such expectations do the more traditional consent tests come back into play. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 933 (1972).
- Probable cause and warrant not required.
- Search conducted with one’s consent need not meet the probable cause and warrant requirements of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 10910 (5th Cir. 1977); Curry v. State, 144 Ga. App. 129, 240 S.E.2d 280, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2607 (1977); Green v. State, 242 Ga. 261, 249 S.E.2d 1, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1169 (1978), rev’d, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 120 (1979); Williams v. State, 151 Ga. App. 833, 261 S.E.2d 720, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2700 (1979); Murphy v. State, 155 Ga. App. 128, 270 S.E.2d 335, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2487 (1980); Witt v. State, 157 Ga. App. 564, 278 S.E.2d 145, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1913 (1981); Crews v. State, 170 Ga. App. 104, 316 S.E.2d 549, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2857 (1984); Weaver v. State, 178 Ga. App. 91, 341 S.E.2d 921, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2484 (1986); Allen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 623, 382 S.E.2d 690, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 700 (1989); Ramirez v. State, 192 Ga. App. 255, 384 S.E.2d 279, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 993 (1989); Calixte v. State, 197 Ga. App. 723, 399 S.E.2d 490, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1453 (1990). A valid consent eliminates the need for either probable cause or a search warrant, and only if the issue of consent is decided adversely to the state need the trial court consider the issue of probable cause. State v. Bassford, 183 Ga. App. 694, 359 S.E.2d 752, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2730 (1987). Even though a state police officer had no probable cause and nothing more than a general suspicion that there might be contraband in the car, one of the exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause is a search conducted pursuant to consent, and even if the defendant was detained beyond the time minimally necessary to investigate the circumstances that caused the initial stop, the defendant’s consent authorized the search of the car the defendant was driving. Raney v. State, 186 Ga. App. 758, 368 S.E.2d 528, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 470 (1988); Hunter v. State, 190 Ga. App. 52, 378 S.E.2d 338, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 133 (1989). Consensual search upon a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation supported the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, as the search conducted pursuant to the defendant’s consent was not a search based solely on the defendant’s failure to wear a seatbelt; thus, the trial court did not err by ruling that law enforcement did not violate the fourth amendment during an officer’s traffic stop for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1. Blitch v. State, 281 Ga. 125, 636 S.E.2d 545, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 824 (2006). Search must be within scope of con-
- sent.
- Consensual searches are reasonable only if kept within the bounds of the actual consent given. Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12019 (5th Cir. 1977). Search of defendant’s shoes did not exceed the scope of the consent given to search because defendant responded to a permissible police inquiry by voluntarily consenting to a search of defendant’s person and bags and the agents were still within the scope of consent given when the police found evidence amounting to probable cause to search defendant’s shoes. Perez v. State, 249 Ga. App. 399, 547 S.E.2d 699, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 435 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C1229, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 729 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2001). In a drug case, a court erred by suppressing evidence found on defendant, a passenger in a validly stopped car, where pursuant to a valid request to search for drugs after drugs were seen in the car, defendant voluntarily consented to the search of defendant’s person. State v. Gooch, 266 Ga. App. 746, 598 S.E.2d 341, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 388 (2004). Scope of search may be limited by
- individual consenting to search.
- If an individual gives consent to a search of the individual’s vehicle, then that individual may limit the scope of the search. In those cases in which no limitation is placed on the consent, a police officer is allowed the discretion to conduct a complete search, including closed containers. United States v. Harris, 716 F. Supp. 1470, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8136 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 923 F.2d 795 (11th Cir. 1991).
- Scope of search proper.
- A police officer did not exceed the proper scope of a search to which the defendant consented since: (1) officers asked the defendant and others whether they had any weapons, including needles; (2) the defendant was then asked individually if defendant could be searched for weapons or similar objects; (3) the defendant agreed and gave no indication that the officer could not empty defendant’s pockets in conducting the search. McNeil v. State, 248 Ga. App. 70, 545 S.E.2d 130, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 116 (2001).
- Search of curtilage.
- Defendant’s consent to search the defendant’s house impliedly included consent to search the curtilage, in which a “hobo,” or garbage can, was located. Woods v. State, 258 Ga. 540, 371 S.E.2d 865, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 382 (1988).
- Continuing nature of consent.
- Legally obtained consent for search continues throughout the duration of the search unless revoked. Conley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 662, 350 S.E.2d 45, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2251 (1986); Miller v. State, 183 Ga. App. 55, 357 S.E.2d 876, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873 (1987); Beguiristain v. State, 187 Ga. App. 164, 369 S.E.2d 774, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 651 (1988). Defendant’s failure to limit scope of
- search.
- Police officer did not exceed the scope of the defendant’s consent by searching luggage in the trunk of the defendant’s car, where the defendant was physically present while the officer searched the car and had ample opportunity to limit the scope of the search or request that it be discontinued. United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1695 (11th Cir. 1991). Evidence supported court’s determination that search of defendant’s vehicle following consent at police roadblock did not exceed scope of consent. See Kan v. State, 199 Ga. App. 170, 404 S.E.2d 281, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 409 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C0924, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 785 (Ga. June 7, 1991).
- Consent may have retroactive effect.
- Although a police officer entered a suspect’s premises before consent to search was given but discovered stolen items on the premises after the consent was given, the officer’s presence was authorized at the time of discovery, and the discovered items could not be suppressed. Atkins v. State, 173 Ga. App. 9, 325 S.E.2d 388, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3098 (1984), aff’d in part, 254 Ga. 641, 331 S.E.2d 597, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 784 (1985). Manifestation of consent can be by word or deed. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414 (5th Cir. 1980). Mere submission to claim of lawful
- authority is not consent.
- The state’s burden of proving that the necessary consent was freely and voluntarily given is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority. Garcia v. State, 200 Ga. App. 741, 409 S.E.2d 683, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1149 (1991). Because a passenger in a car was not informed of the right to refuse to consent of a search of the passenger’s purse and did not give any express consent but merely remained silent, the trial court did not err in finding that the cocaine found in the passenger’s purse was the product of a non-consensual search. State v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 525, 513 S.E.2d 1, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 90 (Feb. 1, 1999).
- Sufficient evidence to support nonverbal consent to patdown.
- See Borda v. State, 187 Ga. App. 49, 369 S.E.2d 327, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 589 (1988). Because there was no evidence contesting the police officers’ testimony that de-Consent Searches (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) fendant consented to a search by gestures, the totality of the circumstances supported the trial court’s determination that defendant consented to the search; consequently, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Galvan v. State, 270 Ga. App. 282, 605 S.E.2d 919, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1405 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0506, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 257 (Ga. Mar. 28, 2005). A voluntary consent to search does not remove the taint of an illegal seizure; rather, voluntariness is merely a threshold requirement. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Consent cannot be product of illegal detention.
- In order to eliminate any taint from an involuntary seizure or arrest preceding a consent to search, there must be proof both that the consent was voluntary and that it was not the product of illegal detention. Proof of a voluntary consent alone is not sufficient. The relevant factors include the temporal proximity of an illegal seizure and consent, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown v. State, 188 Ga. App. 184, 372 S.E.2d 514, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 919 (1988). Consent search of a bag in defendant’s possession and consent search of defendant’s residence was tainted by illegality of stop of defendant where defendant’s consent to the search came within fifteen minutes of the illegal stop, there were no intervening circumstances between the initiation of the illegal detention and the consent, the stop of defendant was not based on suspicious behavior, and the defendant was not informed of the right to refuse consent to the search nor given any appreciable time to decide whether to give consent to the search. United States v. Momodu, 909 F. Supp. 1571, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19111 (N.D. Ga. 1995). Trial court did not impose an unjustifiably lengthy sentence merely because a defendant chose to require the prosecution to prove the defendant’s guilt at trial rather than to enter a plea of guilty because the trial court sentenced defendant to the maximum term of 20 years in prison for kidnapping and on each of the aggravated assault counts, the trial court also exercised the court’s discretion to run all of the counts concurrently instead of consecutively; the defendant’s claim that the trial court punished the defendant for exercising the defendant’s right to a jury trial was not supported by the transcript, which revealed that the sentence imposed by the trial court was based on the defendant’s lack of remorse. Walker v. State, 299 Ga. App. 788, 683 S.E.2d 867, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 973 (2009).
- Withdrawal of consent not shown.
- — An investigator’s testimony that the defendant “got kind of upset a little bit” upon being questioned regarding the things which had been found at the defendant’s trailer did not demonstrate that the defendant withdrew consent to a search. Boone v. State, 293 Ga. App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1041 (2008).
- Coercive question by officer.
- Because a police officer approached the appellee and asked if the officer could search appellee, the officer stated that the officer did not need a search warrant, and because the appellee’s testimony demonstrated that the appellee had construed the officer’s statement in the coercive sense (the appellee had acquiesced only because the officer stated that the officer didn’t need a warrant to search), the cocaine was the inadmissible product of a nonconsensual “seizure” by the officer rather than the admissible product of appellee’s consent to be searched. State v. Westmoreland, 204 Ga. App. 312, 418 S.E.2d 822, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 777 (1992).
- Inviting officer into home.
- There was no fourth amendment violation where defendant implicitly consented to police officer’s presence on the defendant’s property by inviting officer into the defendant’s home and even if the officer technically trespassed on defendant’s property this of itself did not constitute an illegal search. Ball v. Georgia, 733 F.2d 1557, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 21683 (11th Cir. 1984). Although police officer’s initial entry into defendant’s residence to discuss information the officer had with defendant regarding defendant’s allegedly having drugs around defendant’s residence was illegal because the officer’s entry was not authorized, the officer’s subsequent act in leaving and in being invited to enter again after defendant got out of the bathroom was sufficiently attenuated from the officer’s initial illegal entry that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress after defendant consented to a search of defendant’s property and defendant showed police where drugs were hidden, as the officer’s second entry into the residence was at defendant’s request. Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 351, 582 S.E.2d 516, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 627 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C1357, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 885 (Ga. Oct. 6, 2003). dant’s permission to enter apartment, defendant could not possibly have consented to the intrusion. The notion of “implied consent” advanced in support of this type of search has no basis within the context of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Clare v. State, 135 Ga. App. 281, 217 S.E.2d 638, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1648 (1975). Permission to search car obtained
- Where officer never sought defenafter arrest.
- Where the evidence showed that after defendant was stopped for speeding and found to be without a driver’s license, the defendant followed the trooper to the sheriff ’s office in order to post a cash bond, and while that process was taking place, the trooper decided to seek defendant’s consent to search the defendant’s car, and when defendant was about to leave after posting bond, the trooper asked the defendant to sign a written permission and defendant complied, defendant failed to show the consent was illegally obtained. Partridge v. State, 187 Ga. App. 325, 370 S.E.2d 173, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 687 (1988). Consent to search from passenger
- who was not detained and voluntarily drove vehicle to police station.
- — Trial court erred in granting a motion to suppress on the grounds that there was no reasonable suspicion to search a vehicle. Reasonable suspicion was not required in order for police to ask for consent to search from a passenger, who was not detained, who had voluntarily driven the vehicle to the police station following the driver’s arrest; however, there were factual questions regarding the voluntariness of the consent that the trial court was required to resolve. State v. Hogans, 301 Ga. App. 261, 687 S.E.2d 230, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1352 (2009). lenging legality of consent search of the motorist’s vehicle, because, not only did the motorist fail to manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in suitcases containing marijuana, the motorist affirmatively disavowed any such expectation. United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 1570, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 17591 (11th Cir. 1988). Implied consent from acceptance of
- Motorist was precluded from chalcontinued employment.
- Under circumstances in which one voluntarily accepts and continues employment which subjects the person to search on a routine basis, such search is made with the person’s consent. United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 10910 (5th Cir. 1977). Seizure of a robbery weapon pursuant to a consent search is proper. Cantrell v. State, 237 Ga. 851, 230 S.E.2d 287, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1420 (1976). Proof of consent when subject of
- search not in custody.
- When the subject of a search is not in custody and the state attempts to justify a search on the basis of the person’s consent, U.S. Const., Amends. 4 and 14 require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Brand v. State, 129 Ga. App. 747, 201 S.E.2d 180, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1135 (1973). Effect of laws of property and
- agency.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects people, not places; only the aggrieved person or expressly authorized agent may waive the person’s rights; any power to consent to a search derived from traditional and subtle distinctions in the law of property or agency cannot override that expectation of privacy upon which an individual justifiably relies. With no reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises, however, the consent of another with equal or superior possessory or Consent Searches (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) property interests is then sufficient to validate the search. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 933 (1972). Observing evidence of crime prior
- to consent.
- The fruits of a search of the defendant’s premises, by a conservation ranger looking for deer carcasses, conducted with the defendant’s consent, were admissible. The legality of such a search was not vitiated because, prior to obtaining consent, the ranger had observed the evidence of the crime by walking around the side of the house. State v. Sutton, 258 Ga. 382, 369 S.E.2d 249, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 334 (1988).
- Evidence admissible where obtained from consensual, though otherwise illegal, search.
- When the defendant grants permission to an otherwise illegal search (whether the defendant “gives up” and admits guilt, or whether the defendant feels that by expressing unconcern defendant may yet escape detection) and on request defendant personally unlocks the automobile, gives the keys to the officers, or expresses verbal permission for the search to be made, a waiver results, and evidence gained therefrom is admissible. Young v. State, 113 Ga. App. 497, 148 S.E.2d 461, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 1108 (1966). Warrant issued based on searches
- voluntarily given is valid.
- If a defendant’s consent to the first two searches was freely and voluntarily given, the subsequent search warrant, the issuance of which was based on the evidence obtained from the first two searches, was valid. Kosal v. State, 204 Ga. App. 708, 420 S.E.2d 621, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 972 (1992). pellant was in fact underlying, if mistaken, basis for officers’ request for permission to search, such circumstances do not demonstrate that the appellant’s consent was obtained by officers’ deceit. Suddeth v. State, 162 Ga. App. 460, 291 S.E.2d 430, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2230 (1982). Denial of motion not error where
- Where information imparted to apsearch consented to.
- Where defendant consents to a search of defendant’s car at the time of the defendant’s arrest and later signs a consent to search, the trial court does not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the defendant’s car inasmuch as the defendant voluntarily consented to the search. Thompson v. State, 157 Ga. App. 600, 278 S.E.2d 62, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1927, aff’d, 248 Ga. 343, 285 S.E.2d 685, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 1012 (1981). Reason on consent form other than
- reason for investigatory stop.
- Because there was no evidence that the defendant was misled about the purpose of the search or that the evidence seized was used for any purpose other than that to which the defendant consented, the fact that the officer indicated on the consent form that the search was in connection with an investigation of a drug crime when the traffic stop was purportedly for a license violation did not invalidate the consent. State v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 525, 513 S.E.2d 1, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 90 (Feb. 1, 1999).
- Traffic stop.
- Where defendant was free to go after a valid traffic stop, was not unreasonably detained or asked numerous questions unrelated to the traffic stop, defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated when a police officer requested consent to search a car and defendant was subsequently convicted of trafficking in cocaine. Daniel v. State, 260 Ga. App. 732, 580 S.E.2d 682, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 471 (2003), aff’d, 277 Ga. 840, 597 S.E.2d 116, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 415 (2004). Summary judgment was denied to a pursuing deputy sheriff and the supervisor in an arrestee’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit because ramming the arrestee’s car during a high-speed chase, causing an accident that left the arrestee a quadriplegic, constituted a fourth amendment seizure; the pair did not have qualified immunity because the supervisor authorized the deputy to use excessive force without knowing the minor nature of the arrestee’s traffic offense. Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01-CV-148-WBH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27348 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003), rev’d in part, aff’d, 406 F.3d 1307, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 6721 (11th Cir. 2005). There was no fourth amendment violation under circumstances in which, during the course of a traffic stop, the officer asked the defendant to get out of the car for safety reasons and asked the defendant for consent to search the car before completing the traffic citation and obtaining information on the status of the defendant’s license, which consent was given by the defendant. Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 475 (2006).
- Consent not valid.
- Trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of cocaine found during a search incident to a traffic stop because defendant’s consent to search was not valid where defendant was under arrest for loud music; the fact that defendant was nervous after being stopped by a state trooper was not in and of itself sufficient articulable suspicion which would result in probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle. State v. McCloud, 261 Ga. App. 37, 581 S.E.2d 679, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 527 (2003).
- Consent to search.
- Suppression motion was properly denied after defendant voluntarily consented to police officers searching defendant’s bedroom and the officers found a firearm in plain view; moreover, the officers did not threaten defendant into giving defendant’s consent merely by telling defendant that they could obtain a warrant based on their earlier seizure of marijuana in another part of the house. Butler v. State, 272 Ga. App. 557, 612 S.E.2d 865, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 330 (2005). Search of the defendant’s motel room did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII or U.S. Const., amend. 4; comparing the officers’ testimony, that the defendant gave them permission to enter the motel room and to search the pants that were lying on the floor, with the defendant’s girlfriend’s uncertain testimony, the trial court did not err in crediting the officers’ testimony, and since the officers searched defendant’s wallet after they arrested defendant for possession of methamphetamine, the search of the wallet was authorized as a search incident to an arrest. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 7, 635 S.E.2d 278, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 983 (2006). Trial court did not err in failing to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress a pistol because the search of a residence was properly conducted when the police obtained the consent of the homeowner; the defendant, who was a visitor at the residence, was physically present but failed to express any refusal of consent or any objection to a police search. Rockholt v. State, 291 Ga. 85, 727 S.E.2d 492, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 446 (2012). 2. Who May Consent
- Consent of head of household.
- It is the general rule that the voluntary consent of the head of a household to the search of premises owned or controlled by the head of the household is sufficient to authorize a search of the premises without a search warrant, and such search does not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Tolbert v. State, 224 Ga. 291, 161 S.E.2d 279, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 745, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1005, 89 S. Ct. 493, 21 L. Ed. 2d 468, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 54 (1968); Montgomery v. State, 155 Ga. App. 423, 270 S.E.2d 825, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2610 (1980); Crawford v. State, 181 Ga. App. 454, 352 S.E.2d 635, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1437 (1987). Where the defendant’s spouse, the sole lessee of an apartment, called the police because their children had been stabbed, invited them into the home, and then left, entrusting it to the police, and later gave written consents to search, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during searches of the apartment. Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 260 (1990). dant lives may consent to search of area not specifically set aside for such occupant. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973).
- Owner of house with whom defen-Consent of spouse.
- When a wife reported a domestic disturbance at the marital residence, and told responding officers that her husband used cocaine, after which the husband refused the officers’ request for consent to search the Consent Searches (Cont’d) 2. Who May Consent (Cont’d) residence, the wife’s subsequent grant of such consent did not authorize a search, and the officers were required to obtain a warrant, as the husband was reasonably entitled to expect that his wife would honor his refusal, and the “common authority” allowing her to consent to a search also allowed him to assert a right to be free from a search on behalf of all occupants of the residence. Randolph v. State, 264 Ga. App. 396, 590 S.E.2d 834, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1499 (2003), aff’d, 278 Ga. 614, 604 S.E.2d 835, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 991 (2004). Where a divorce decree gave the defendant’s ex-spouse the right to unobstructed access to the defendant’s house to remove the ex-spouse’s property, the warrantless entry into the basement by a police officer accompanying the ex-spouse, based on the ex-spouse’s consent, was authorized and not in violation of the defendant’s fourth amendment rights. Despite the fact that the defendant had padlocked the basement door and that the defendant was not present, the trial court properly refused to suppress evidence found by the officer in plain view in the basement. Bray v. State, 265 Ga. App. 886, 595 S.E.2d 687, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 284 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1327, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 758 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2004).
- Sibling’s consent to search of defendant’s bedroom in sibling’s apartment.
- Defendant’s sibling, who was the lessee of an apartment, could consent to a search of the entire apartment, including the bedroom where the defendant was staying; lessee did not give up control and authority of the apartment merely by allowing the defendant to stay in one of its bedrooms and accepting money from the defendant and the lessee did not give up the right to object to the defendant’s use of the lessee’s home for illegal purposes. Ford v. State, 214 Ga. App. 284, 447 S.E.2d 334, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 861 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1830, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1178 (Ga. Dec. 2, 1994).
- Former roommate and landlord unable to consent to search.
- Neither a roommate who had moved out of apartment prior to search nor landlord before the defendant/tenant had abandoned the apartment, could, absent certain exigent circumstances, consent to a warrantless search of the defendant’s apartment. Browning v. State, 176 Ga. App. 420, 336 S.E.2d 41, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2880 (1985).
- Consent by roommate did not authorize search.
- Defendant was entitled to suppression of a gun, money, and drugs seized from the defendant’s residence because the search was unreasonable under the fourth amendment as the defendant was not informed when the police came to the residence and arrested the defendant on an outstanding warrant that the defendant’s roommate had consented to the search of the residence; the defendant could have erroneously believed that the search was incident to the arrest on a driving violation. Preston v. State, 296 Ga. App. 655, 675 S.E.2d 553, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 299 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1189, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 745 (Ga. May 18, 2009). Defendant’s consent to search shared residence not required when
- co-occupant consented.
- Defendant’s motion to suppress a firearm taken from the defendant’s residence should have been denied because consent to enter the residence was given by a co-occupant, and the firearm was in plain view in the residence’s shared space; although the defendant had been arrested and was being detained in a patrol car outside, the defendant’s consent was not required. State v. Lee, 349 Ga. App. 181, 825 S.E.2d 575, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 131 (2019). Ten-year-old child did not have sufficient authority to validly consent to the search of child’s parents’ home. Davis v. State, 262 Ga. 578, 422 S.E.2d 546, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 947 (1992).
- Validity of consent.
- A warrantless search based on consent that would not satisfy the test set out in U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974), could nonetheless be upheld if the law enforcement officer conducting the search reasonably (albeit erroneously) believed the consent given was valid. Resolution of this issue requires a determination by the factfinder, applying an objective standard, that the facts available to the officer at the time of the search would warrant one of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises. State v. Stewart, 203 Ga. App. 829, 418 S.E.2d 110, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 559 (1992). Officer’s warrantless entry into the defendant’s home and bedroom was a search requiring a valid consent, but the trial court did not consider the relevant factors in deciding if the defendant’s 14-year-old child gave a valid consent to such a search; the trial court’s order suppressing evidence seized during the search was vacated, and the case was remanded with directions to consider the relevant factors. State v. McKinney, 268 Ga. App. 296, 601 S.E.2d 777, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 894 (2004).
- Consent by co-inhabitant insufficient.
- Since defendant was present and refused to consent to a warrantless search of defendant’s residence, the search was invalid even though defendant’s co-inhabitant consented to the search. State v. Randolph, 278 Ga. 614, 604 S.E.2d 835, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 991 (2004), aff’d, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 2498 (2006). Resident cannot consent to search
- of travel bag of temporary guest.
- As a resident of a house, who voluntarily consented to a search by law enforcement personnel, did not have “common authority” over a travel bag of a temporary guest, the resident’s consent was ineffective to authorize a search of it, and the agent conducting the search, who deduced that the bag belonged to one of two guests, should have sought consent of the believed owners, both of whom were on the scene. United States v. Gilley, 608 F. Supp. 1065, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20241 (S.D. Ga. 1985).
- Search of another’s premises.
- Since U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects persons, not places, one cannot object to the searching of another’s premises or property if the latter consents to the search, even though property is found for the possession of which defendant is subsequently prosecuted. Cook v. State, 134 Ga. App. 712, 215 S.E.2d 728, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 2138 (1975).
- Third-party consent.
- The state may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. Park v. State, 154 Ga. App. 348, 268 S.E.2d 401, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2159 (1980). Consent may be given by a third party, if the third party has a sufficient relationship to the premises. Witt v. State, 157 Ga. App. 564, 278 S.E.2d 145, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1913 (1981). A warrantless search is justified when permission is obtained from a third party who possesses common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to, the premises sought to be inspected. Rucker v. State, 250 Ga. 371, 297 S.E.2d 481, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1257 (1982). When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained by a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 340 S.E.2d 891, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 616 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S. Ct. 1328, 94 L. Ed. 2d 180, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 887 (1987), overruled in part, Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557, 651 S.E.2d 661, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 591 (2007), overruled in part, Jacobs v. State, 299 Ga. App. 368, 683 S.E.2d 64, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 885 (2009); Pupo v. State, 187 Ga. App. 765, 371 S.E.2d 219, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 799 (1988). An officer’s belief that a third party has authority to consent to the search of another person’s property should not only be based on information previously obtained in the officer’s investigation, but should also be based on the facts and circumstances existent at the time of the search. State v. Oliver, 183 Ga. App. 92, 357 S.E.2d 889, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2675 (1987). The authority that justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property but rests rather on mutual use Consent Searches (Cont’d) 2. Who May Consent (Cont’d) of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. State v. Oliver, 183 Ga. App. 92, 357 S.E.2d 889, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2675 (1987). Consent of defendant’s stepchild to enter and search the stepchild’s apartment, and of defendant’s spouse to search a suitcase over which the spouse had common authority with the defendant, was sufficient authorization to police to search the suitcase. Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 140, 464 S.E.2d 806, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 12 (1996). Sharer of defendant’s bedroom may
- consent.
- The rape and child molestation victim’s parent could consent to a search of the bedroom which the defendant and the parent shared. Calloway v. State, 199 Ga. App. 272, 404 S.E.2d 811, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 444 (1991), overruled in part, State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (2019). Effect of relinquishing possession
- of automobile to third party.
- Where the owner or lessee of an automobile relinquishes actual possession to a third party, the owner or lessee thereby abandons any expectation of privacy in the automobile, and the owner or lessee therefore lacks standing to contest the legality of the search and seizure of the vehicle. Reinhardt v. State, 197 Ga. App. 825, 399 S.E.2d 729, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1470 (1990). The defendant had sufficient authority to consent to the search of a car, where the evidence showed the car was leased in the name of an individual who was not in the car and a check conducted by the patrol officer who had stopped the vehicle for a traffic offense revealed the return of the car was overdue. Gossett v. State, 199 Ga. App. 286, 404 S.E.2d 595, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 424 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C0965, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 521 (Ga. Sept. 6, 1991). der age of majority, not necessarily
- Consent given by third person, uninvalid.
- Where consent to search a suspect’s residence is given by another person, which person is under the age of majority, the fact of minority alone will not render the consent invalid; rather, each case will be considered in light of the minor’s age, address, right of access to the premises, and right to invite others onto the premises. Atkins v. State, 173 Ga. App. 9, 325 S.E.2d 388, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3098 (1984), aff’d in part, 254 Ga. 641, 331 S.E.2d 597, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 784 (1985). A child under the age of 18 can give a valid consent to search the child’s mother’s house. Atkins v. State, 254 Ga. 641, 331 S.E.2d 597, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 784 (1985). A minor child’s age, address, right of access, and right of invitation determine whether that child can give a valid consent to search the child’s mother’s house. Atkins v. State, 254 Ga. 641, 331 S.E.2d 597, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 784 (1985). Validity of third-party consent
- where defendant absent.
- Where the absent target of the search and the consenting third party do not have common authority over and mutual use of premises, the third party has the right to permit inspection in the third party’s own right and the absent target has assumed the risk that the third party may grant this permission to others. Fears v. State, 152 Ga. App. 817, 264 S.E.2d 284, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 3093 (1979). Consent by third party to turn over
- luggage to police.
- Where an individual, in whose car defendant’s luggage was placed prior to the defendant’s arrest, was torn between two unattractive alternatives — keeping the unwanted luggage or turning it over — and finally decided to take a police receipt and gave it to the police, the individual’s consent was voluntary and effective. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979).
- Consent by apartment complex employees.
- Because there was evidence that would authorize the trial court to find that, at the time that the entries by the police officer occurred, the defendant had neither leased nor was residing in the apartment, and that the defendant had no contractual rights in the premises which were in any way superior to those of the apartment complex employees, the evidence seized was the product of lawful searches conducted pursuant to the valid consent of the apartment complex employees. Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 370 S.E.2d 348, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 675 (1988).
- Parent’s consent to take defendant’s gun.
- Because the record showed that defendant’s parent voluntarily consented to allow a police officer to take the defendant’s gun and even asked that the officer not return it, the fact that the parent’s consent may have occurred after the officer seized the gun did not render the search and seizure invalid. State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 401 S.E.2d 484, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 79 (1991), overruled in part, Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 883 S.E.2d 317, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 13 (2023). Consent to search of rental car by renting party and rent payor valid as
- to renter.
- Because the defendant did not own the car searched but had rented it on behalf of another person, the other person made the rental payments, the other person maintained possession of the car and used it, while the defendant rode in it only occasionally, and there was both an implied consent to open the car from the other person who may have had a legitimate expectation of privacy in its contents, as well as an express authority in the agent of the vehicle’s owner to re-take possession of it under the contract of rental, the argument that the warrantless search without the defendant’s permission violated the defendant’s interest in the privacy of the vehicle and was thus illegal was without merit. Little v. State, 180 Ga. App. 359, 349 S.E.2d 248, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2731 (1986).
- Bus passengers.
- Bus passenger freely consented to detectives’ search after they boarded the bus, explained that they were attempting to stem the flow of illicit drugs and firearms, and then asked passengers if they would consent to a random search of their baggage. United States v. Fields, 909 F.2d 470, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 14318 (11th Cir. 1990). Where a party to communication consents to another’s listening to and recording the party’s conversation, no search or seizure is involved. U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not protect a wrongdoer from the risk that the party’s companions may be reporting to the police. Ansley v. Stynchcombe, 480 F.2d 437, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9450 (5th Cir. 1973). Requiring consent to such a search as a condition of parole is not unreasonable. Dean v. State, 151 Ga. App. 847, 261 S.E.2d 759, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2707 (1979). 3. Voluntariness
- Consent waives objection to evidence.
- Free and voluntary consent that one’s belongings be searched is a waiver of objection to the evidence produced as a result of the search. Young v. State, 113 Ga. App. 497, 148 S.E.2d 461, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 1108 (1966). If undisputed evidence shows that a person freely and voluntarily authorized a search of that person’s automobile, the person cannot complain of an illegal search and seizure. Hightower v. State, 228 Ga. 301, 185 S.E.2d 82, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 549 (1971).
- Consent must be voluntary.
- Consent to search without a warrant must be given unequivocally, specifically, and intelligently. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). The defendant’s acquiescence to a repeated order to show officers the contents of the defendant’s watch pocket could not be construed as voluntary consent, since acquiescence is not a substitute for free consent. Corley v. State, 236 Ga. App. 302, 512 S.E.2d 41, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 152 (1999). Defendant’s spouse was coerced into giving consent to a police search of the residence, and the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to suppress; the notion of “implied consent” advanced in support of the search had no basis within the context of fourth amendment rights. State v. Fulghum, 261 Ga. App. 594, 583 S.E.2d 278, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 724 (2003). Consent to search must be the product of an essentially free and unre-Consent Searches (Cont’d) 3. Voluntariness (Cont’d) strained choice by its maker. Williams v. State, 151 Ga. App. 833, 261 S.E.2d 720, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2700 (1979). taken with knowledge and without objection by accused. Consent, once legally obtained, ought to continue until revoked or otherwise withdrawn. Ferguson v. Caldwell, 233 Ga. 887, 213 S.E.2d 855, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1474 (1975). Knowledge that consent may be
- Search with consent is one underwithheld.
- Waiver of fourth amendment rights is invalid unless person consenting knows that permission may be freely withheld. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Constitution does not require proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414 (5th Cir. 1980). Although a warning that a party was free to decline to consent to a search is not required in order to validate consent to a search, knowledge is highly relevant in the voluntariness determination. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (5th Cir. 1980). Specific advice as to constitutional guaranty against unreasonable search need not precede a request that a suspect consent to search. While the search is not invalidated thereby as a matter of law, consent is not lightly assumed in the case of search and seizure. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Fact that appellant was not advised of the appellant’s right to refuse permission to conduct a search does not require finding that the appellant’s consent was coerced. Suddeth v. State, 162 Ga. App. 460, 291 S.E.2d 430, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2230 (1982). It is not essential to the validity of a consent search that the individual be informed of the individual’s right to refuse. Mann v. State, 196 Ga. App. 730, 397 S.E.2d 17, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1066 (1990). It is not essential to validity of consent to search automobile that owner be told that the owner has the right to refuse. Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840, 213 S.E.2d 689, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1460 (1975).
- Factors as to voluntariness.
- There are three factors to be considered in determining whether voluntary consent was obtained by exploitation of an illegal seizure: the temporal proximity of the seizure and the consent; the presence of intervening circumstances; and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (5th Cir. 1980). Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. Brand v. State, 129 Ga. App. 747, 201 S.E.2d 180, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1135 (1973). Test as to whether consent to search was freely given is the “totality of the circumstances” under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973) and United States v. Scott, 578 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870, 99 S. Ct. 201, 58 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1978). Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 12467 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 647 F.2d 588, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12349 (5th Cir. 1981). Voluntariness of consent to search is question of fact to be determined from totality of the circumstances, and an appellate court should not overturn a trial court’s holding on this question unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16554 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Norrington, 203 Ga. App. 574, 417 S.E.2d 203, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 534 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0871, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 529 (Ga. May 21, 1992). If defendant voluntarily consented to the police search, then the search was valid. Voluntariness is a question to be determined from the totality of the circumstances, and the Court of Appeals will not disturb the trial court’s determination on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 11833 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S. Ct. 1521, 75 L. Ed. 2d 945, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 3774 (1983). Voluntariness of consent to search is determined by looking to the totality of the circumstances, including such factors as the age of the accused, the accused’s education, the accused’s intelligence, length of detention, whether the accused was advised of the accused’s constitutional rights, prolonged nature of questioning, use of physical punishment, and psychological impact of all these factors on the accused. Dean v. State, 250 Ga. 77, 295 S.E.2d 306, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1212 (1982); Noland v. State, 178 Ga. App. 486, 343 S.E.2d 763, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2540 (1986); State v. Norrington, 203 Ga. App. 574, 417 S.E.2d 203, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 534 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0871, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 529 (Ga. May 21, 1992). Whether there was a valid consent to search is a matter exclusively within the province of the factfinder, the trial court, and where, after a full exposure of the facts, the trial court finds consent for a search, that finding must be accepted by the court of appeals unless clearly erroneous. Conley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 662, 350 S.E.2d 45, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2251 (1986). Whether there is a valid consent to search is a matter exclusively within the province of the factfinder, the trial court. Unless clearly erroneous, the trial court’s ruling on disputed facts and credibility at a suppression hearing must be accepted on appeal. Allen v. State, 200 Ga. App. 326, 408 S.E.2d 127, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 999 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1379, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 547 (Ga. Sept. 6, 1991). Burden is on prosecution to show voluntariness of consent to warrantless search by clear and convincing evidence. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Whether consent to search was freely given is issue on which state must carry burden of proof. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 910, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3232 (1979). Where the state seeks to justify a warrantless search on grounds of consent, it has the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. State v. Norrington, 203 Ga. App. 574, 417 S.E.2d 203, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 534 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0871, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 529 (Ga. May 21, 1992). Burden when consent given after
- illegal stop.
- When trying to establish that there was a voluntary consent to carry out a search after an illegal stop, the government has a much heavier burden to carry than when the consent is given after a permissible stop. United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16554 (5th Cir. 1979).
- Proof of voluntary consent.
- The consent which opens the doors of a private home to official search and seizure cannot be deemed voluntary unless it be made clearly to appear that it was freely and intelligently given, not expressly or impliedly coerced. Ray v. United States, 84 F.2d 654, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 4570 (5th Cir. 1936). Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to suppress two videotapes seized from the defendant’s residence that displayed the defendant engaging in sexual acts with two minors because the defendant had consented to the deputies playing the first videotape, thereby obviating the need for a search warrant, and a third party had spontaneously and voluntarily handed the videotape to the depu-Consent Searches (Cont’d) 3. Voluntariness (Cont’d) ties. Mitchell v. State, 289 Ga. App. 55, 656 S.E.2d 145, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1260 (2007), cert. dismissed, No. S08C0770, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 499 (Ga. May 19, 2008). As the evidence supported a finding that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to a special condition in a bond, allowing a warrantless search of the defendant’s residence, denial of suppression with respect to drugs and a handgun seized during the search was proper as was the finding that the defendant had waived rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4; the special condition form was considered along with the bond order as the documents had been executed contemporaneously pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-3(a) (see O.C.G.A. § 24-3-3). Curry v. State, 309 Ga. App. 338, 711 S.E.2d 314, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 316 (2011). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel because, considering the totality of the circumstances, including the lack of evidence that the defendant appeared intoxicated at the time the defendant executed the consent forms to search the defendant’s person and the defendant’s home, the record supported the trial court’s implicit finding that the defendant freely and voluntarily gave consent to the searches. Evans v. State, 308 Ga. 582, 842 S.E.2d 837, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 339 (2020). Voluntary consent and plain view
- doctrine.
- Whatever is observed by a police officer in a legally correct location as a person voluntarily complies with a request for owner’s registration papers confirming an oral statement of ownership falls within the plain view doctrine. An officer’s limited use of a flashlight to illuminate the interior of a glove compartment as a person voluntarily complies with a request for owner’s registration papers does not prevent the application of the plain view doctrine. Caito v. State, 130 Ga. App. 831, 204 S.E.2d 765, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1277 (1974). Effect of preliminary refusal in
- later decision to consent.
- Appellant’s refusal to give consent to a search prior to arrest, while a factor to be considered in evaluating the voluntariness of the appellant’s later decision to give consent, was not determinative. Because the defendant consented to search of suitcase after being read the defendant’s Miranda rights for the second time and after being advised that the defendant could refuse consent, and because the defendant considered the options for two to three minutes before giving consent, and because there was no suggestion that threats, promises, or coercion were used to obtain the defendant’s consent to the search, there was no search and seizure within the proscription of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 12467 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Voluntariness of consent to accompany agents.
- The question whether a party’s consent to accompany agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances, and is a matter which the government has the burden of proving. United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15158 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Voluntariness of consent by prisoner in police custody.
- A prisoner in police custody by reason of an illegal arrest is in no position to refuse to comply with the demands of the officer in whose custody the prisoner is placed, whether such demand is couched in the language of a police request or a direct order. Consent to a search in such a situation is not truly voluntary and the search is illegal. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976). The mere fact that defendant was under arrest at the time the defendant gave consent to the search of the defendant’s garment bag did not establish that the consent was made involuntarily or by coercion. Mann v. State, 196 Ga. App. 730, 397 S.E.2d 17, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1066 (1990). der arrest is not per se void as being coerced. Mitchell v. State, 178 Ga. App. 244, 342 S.E.2d 738, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1642 (1986). Coercion not established by mere
- Consent to search given while unfact of arrest.
- The mere fact that an accused is under legal arrest when the consent to a search is given does not establish the consent was made involuntarily or by coercion. Wright v. State, 189 Ga. App. 441, 375 S.E.2d 895, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1438 (1988). son’s possibly vulnerable state affect
- Subtly coercive questions and pervoluntariness.
- Voluntary consent to a search is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances and, in evaluating the circumstances, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents. Jonas v. City of Atlanta, 647 F.2d 580, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12348 (5th Cir. 1981). Consent obtained after expression
- of desire for counsel.
- Even accepting the fact that the consent to search was obtained after the defendant indicated a desire to have counsel before questioning, that alone was not enough to mandate a finding of coercion where the defendant had declined the invitation to use the phone and had said that there was nothing to hide. Hill v. State, 183 Ga. App. 654, 360 S.E.2d 4, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2733 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Curtis v. State, 275 Ga. 576, 571 S.E.2d 376, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 918 (2002). Belief that there is no alternative to
- consent.
- A detention does not escape the strictures of the fourth amendment merely because an individual who reasonably felt that the individual had no alternative to compliance mouthed some pro forma words of consent. United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 20518 (11th Cir. 1982). Consent to search was invalid and drugs found in the course of the search were suppressed, where police officer requested permission to search the defendants’ car after their traffic stop had been fully concluded; under the circumstances, the owner would not have imagined being free to refuse permission. Gonzales v. State, 255 Ga. App. 149, 564 S.E.2d 552, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 538 (2002). formed police officer’s request that suspect accompany officer may exert pressure on the individual to acquiesce. Such acquiescence cannot, of course, substitute for free consent. McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13851 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Although house was surrounded by police, this does not ipso facto require a finding of coercion. Suddeth v. State, 162 Ga. App. 460, 291 S.E.2d 430, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2230 (1982).
- Implicitly coercive nature of a uni-Consent not voluntary where forcible entry threatened.
- The testimony of the defendant’s parent that the parent gave a house key to the police only because they threatened forcible entry if the parent did not do so supported the court’s ruling that the parent’s consent to search the house was not freely and voluntarily given. State v. Davis, 261 Ga. 225, 404 S.E.2d 100, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 218 (1991). Taxpayer’s consent to examination
- of financial affairs.
- Internal revenue service agent’s alleged characterization of taxpayer’s examination as “routine audit” did not vitiate taxpayer’s consent to provide information, where the examination of the taxpayer’s financial affairs did not have its genesis in a secret criminal investigation. United States v. Piper, 681 F. Supp. 833, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1690 (M.D. Ga. 1988).
- Surrender of bag upon request.
- Because the police officer asked the defendant what was in the defendant’s bag, upon which the defendant voluntarily surrendered the bag to the officer, there is no possible interpretation of the evidence except that the defendant tacitly consented to inspection of the bag and there was no illegal search or seizure. State v. Turntime, 170 Ga. App. 740, 318 S.E.2d 157, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2021 (1984). Trial court did not err in determining that the consent to the search of the defendant’s automobile was voluntary and evidence obtained not excludable as the product of duress or coercion where the arresting officer testified that officer was requested to look out for a green and white Thunderbird automobile occupied by two black individuals armed with shotguns and believed to be dangerous, the vehicle was located and the officer noticed a shotgun on the right-hand pas-Consent Searches (Cont’d) 3. Voluntariness (Cont’d) senger seat, the defendant was arrested and given the mandatory Miranda warnings which the defendant indicated were understood, when asked if the property in the vehicle belonged to the defendant, the defendant replied that everything in the car belonged to the defendant and gave the officer permission to search, and, on cross-examination, it was determined that the defendant fully cooperated with the officers conducting the search. Williams v. State, 165 Ga. App. 553, 301 S.E.2d 908, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1945 (1983). The defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated because the officer testified that the officer issued the defendant a warning ticket for improper lane change, explained to the defendant the effect of a warning ticket, and then told the defendant that the defendant was free to go but during the officer’s conversation with the defendant, however, certain discrepancies arose that caused the officer to suspect that the defendant might be involved with drug smuggling and after the defendant granted permission and signed a consent to search form, the officer searched the car and found cocaine under the passenger seat. Lowe v. State, 214 Ga. App. 92, 446 S.E.2d 532, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 779 (1994). Trial court properly found that a defendant’s consent to the search of the defendant’s car was voluntary. The defendant chose to pull over into the parking lot of the restaurant the defendant owned, and the defendant showed no authority for the proposition that the presence of customers in the area invalidated the consent; furthermore, the defendant had not shown that the consent was procured by threats, promises, or coercion. Macias v. State, 292 Ga. App. 225, 664 S.E.2d 265, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 746 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1816, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 881 (Ga. Oct. 6, 2008). ing system covers only the property of the licensee. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 933 (1972).
- Implied consent found in a licens-Consent by implication in operation of licensing programs.
- There is an exception to constitutional requirement for search warrant where consent is given by implication in the operation of accepted licensing programs. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 933 (1972).
- Implied consent by sublicensee.
- If one party is making profits by the interstate operation of the party’s vehicle under another’s permit, that party is, in effect, a sublicensee, and is subject to the same regulation, methods of enforcement, and principles of determination of the existence of implied consent. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 933 (1972).
- Signing of waiver form.
- When a defendant signed a consent form authorizing the search of the defendant’s apartment and did not contest the voluntariness of this consent in the trial court, this obviated the need for a search warrant. Judkins v. State, 282 Ga. 580, 652 S.E.2d 537, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 776 (2007).
- Voluntary consent held shown.
- Because the record indicated without contradiction that the defendant intelligently and voluntarily consented to the search of the defendant’s possessions after being fully informed that the defendant had a right to refuse the search, the trial court was authorized to find that valid consent had been given. McShan v. State, 155 Ga. App. 518, 271 S.E.2d 659, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2647 (1980); Lopez v. State, 184 Ga. App. 31, 360 S.E.2d 722, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2750 (1987); Smith v. State, 184 Ga. App. 304, 361 S.E.2d 215, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2225 (1987); Jones v. State, 184 Ga. App. 328, 361 S.E.2d 693, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2255 (1987); Garcia v. State, 207 Ga. App. 653, 428 S.E.2d 666, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 312 (1993). The trial court’s finding the fact of consent, and that the consent was freely and voluntarily given, was supported by the evidence. Langston v. State, 202 Ga. App. 431, 414 S.E.2d 676, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 21 (1992). The trial court was correct in finding that defendant’s consent to search was freely and voluntarily given where defendant’s initial consent combines with the fact that once the officers began talking with the defendant they learned that defendant had no driver’s license or insurance, observed that defendant appeared to have been drinking, and saw the bag of marijuana at defendant’s feet. Martin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 782, 420 S.E.2d 645, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1012 (1992). In an action for arson, the defendant’s contention that the presence of several fire department officials was so oppressive as to require a finding of coercion, was rejected because defendant testified that the defendant’s wife and a friend, who spoke excellent English were present while the defendant talked with the fire department investigator and that the defendant understood the defendant was not under arrest. Thus, defendant’s consent to the search was freely and voluntarily given. Kosal v. State, 204 Ga. App. 708, 420 S.E.2d 621, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 972 (1992). The defendant’s consent to a search of the defendant’s person was not involuntary, notwithstanding the contention that an officer represented that a warrant to search would be obtained if consent was refused but that probable cause to secure the warrant did not exist, since (1) a GBI agent’s response to the defendant’s query regarding how long the defendant would be detained — “as long as it’s going to take me to write a search warrant and to find a judge to sign the warrant” — simply did not fall within the category of last ditch ploys aimed at avoiding the requirement for a probable cause determination before a magistrate; and (2) the details of a tip from a reliable informant were corroborated by the personal observations of the investigating agents and, therefore there was probable cause for a warrantless search. Solomon v. State, 237 Ga. App. 655, 513 S.E.2d 520 (1999). When defendant, after being properly stopped for a traffic violation, was asked for consent to search defendant’s vehicle and replied, “I don’t care,” none of the circumstances surrounding the consent showed it was involuntary, as a videotape of the encounter showed no hint of fear, intimidation, coercion or deceit, there was no evidence of a lengthy detention, and defendant suffered no physical punishment; therefore, an officer’s failure to advise the defendant of the defendant’s constitutional rights did not invalidate the consent, as questioning was limited to defendant’s lack of a valid driver’s license, whether defendant had drugs in the car, and whether defendant consented to a search. Goodman v. State, 272 Ga. App. 639, 613 S.E.2d 190, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 350 (2005). Because defendant was not detained or subjected to prolonged questioning or physical punishment, the police officers were lawfully on the premises, explained the basis for their suspicion, and asked for permission to search defendant’s pants, defendant’s consent to the search was voluntary; consequently, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. Kinsey, 272 Ga. App. 723, 613 S.E.2d 232, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 371 (2005). There was no violation of the defendant juvenile’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 by the consent of the defendant’s mother to police officers to search the house as the consent was voluntary and was not the product of coercion, duress, or deceit under the circumstances. Gray v. State, 296 Ga. App. 878, 676 S.E.2d 36, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 374 (2009), cert. dismissed, No. S09C1309, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 802 (Ga. Sept. 28, 2009). Trial court’s determination that the defendant voluntarily consented to searches of the defendant’s person was supported by the evidence because the investigator who obtained the consents testified that no threats or promises were made to the defendant, that the defendant had no questions regarding the forms and never indicated a reluctance to sign them, and that at the time that the defendant signed the forms, the defendant was not under arrest and was free to leave; the investigator also testified that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs or to be overly tired, and the defendant did not allege that his age or level of intelligence rendered his consent involuntary. Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 690 (2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 853, 131 S. Ct. 112, 178 L. Ed. 2d 69, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 6037 (2010). Police officer did not coerce a juvenile’s consent to search a cigarette package dur-Consent Searches (Cont’d) 3. Voluntariness (Cont’d) ing a traffic stop for running a stop sign, despite the presence of several officers and the juvenile’s age, which was 16 years old. The officer was not required to inform the juvenile that the juvenile did not have to consent. In re A. T., 302 Ga. App. 713, 691 S.E.2d 642, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 218 (2010).
- Voluntary consent held not shown.
- — In the context of an airport stop, the government did not carry its burden of showing, by exceptionally clear evidence, that a defendant consented to accompany a Drug Enforcement Agency agent to an airport office to be searched where the agent retained the defendant’s ticket and driver’s license at least through the point at which the agent elicited the defendant’s consent and the agent’s statements about investigating for drugs easily could have induced the defendant to believe that the defendant’s refusal to go to the office would lead only to formal detention. United States v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 24448 (11th Cir. 1982). The superior court was authorized to consider the absence of any attempt by the deputy to advise the defendant of the defendant’s constitutional rights along with the defendant’s testimony that the defendant did not believe that the defendant had any right to refuse to consent to the search in determining that the state had failed to satisfy its burden of showing that the consent to search was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. State v. Norrington, 203 Ga. App. 574, 417 S.E.2d 203, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 534 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0871, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 529 (Ga. May 21, 1992). Because the defendant was in illegal detention, was never informed of the right to refuse a search of the defendant’s person, and never otherwise expressly indicated the defendant’s consent but merely said that “[the defendant] understood,” there was no valid consent to search as a matter of law. Rogers v. State, 206 Ga. App. 654, 426 S.E.2d 209, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1735 (1992), cert. denied, No. S93C0519, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 290 (Ga. Mar. 4, 1993). Trial court erred by denying defendants’ motion to suppress drug and weapon evidence found in defendants’ vehicle during a search after a routine traffic stop as the driver’s consent to search was coerced in violation of defendants’ fourth amendment rights by an officer’s intimidating, harassing, and threatening words of arrest used to convince the driver to consent. A videotape of the stop showed that the officer threatened the driver with obstruction of justice and that the officer would bring a dog to the scene if the driver did not consent to the search. Cuaresma v. State, 292 Ga. App. 43, 663 S.E.2d 396, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 695 (2008). Neither grandmother nor the defendant gave their voluntary consent to a search of the defendant’s home after the death of the baby as the grandmother merely acquiesced to the authority of the officers who, the grandmother was told, were doing what law enforcement was supposed to do, and the defendant merely acquiesced after the officers had already asked the grandmother questions and began searching the house. State v. Turner, 304 Ga. 356, 818 S.E.2d 589, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 583 (2018). Plain View
- Elements of plain view doctrine.
- Police officer free to use and seize what the officer sees in plain sight if the officer is at a place where the officer is entitled to be. Green v. State, 127 Ga. App. 713, 194 S.E.2d 678, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1006 (1972); Mahar v. State, 137 Ga. App. 116, 223 S.E.2d 204, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1217 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923, 97 S. Ct. 323, 50 L. Ed. 2d 291, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 3344 (1976). An exception to the warrant requirement of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is the “plain view” doctrine, which holds that evidence obtained in a warrantless seizure is admissible if inadvertently discovered by an officer rightfully in a position that afforded full view of the evidence. United States v. Bright, 471 F.2d 723, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 12272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921, 93 S. Ct. 2742, 37 L. Ed. 2d 148, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 2302 (1973). A police officer is free to use and seize what the police officer sees in plain sight if the police officer is at a place where the police officer is entitled to be and if exigent circumstances exist that justify a warrantless seizure. Walker v. State, 130 Ga. App. 860, 205 S.E.2d 49, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1286 (1974). What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which the officer came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with the search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Extension of the original justification is legitimate only if it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. Harp v. State, 136 Ga. App. 897, 222 S.E.2d 623, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1523 (1975). The plain view exception to U.S. Const., amend. 4’s requirement of probable cause is conditioned upon the requirement that the police officer have a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which the officer comes inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. United States v. Robinson, 535 F.2d 881, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7916 (5th Cir. 1976). Where officers received a tip that a crime was being committed, investigated but discovered appellant, who corresponded to the tip, legally stopped appellant, and discovered, in plain view, paraphernalia readily identifiable as that commonly used in the crime the informant had reported, there was probable cause to arrest and to seize the evidence. Stiggers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 546, 260 S.E.2d 413, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2630 (1979). The plain view doctrine is in reality a supplement to, or extension of, the original justification for the search, rather than a mere exception to the warrant requirement. In re S.E. Equip. Co. Search Warrant, 746 F. Supp. 1563, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11989 (S.D. Ga. 1990). In order for a plain-view seizure to be considered a valid extension of the original justification for the search, three requirements must be met. First, the searching agents must lawfully be in the position where they viewed the disputed evidence, whether that original justification arose from a valid warrant or any of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement. Second, the searching agents must inadvertently discover the disputed evidence. Third, the incriminating nature of the disputed evidence must be immediately apparent on its face. In re S.E. Equip. Co. Search Warrant, 746 F. Supp. 1563, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11989 (S.D. Ga. 1990). Contraband lawfully found in plain view need not be ignored and can be seized. Samuel v. State, 198 Ga. App. 558, 402 S.E.2d 325, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 198 (1991). The plain view doctrine will support a warrantless search and seizure if the agents are lawfully in position to obtain the view, the discovery is inadvertent, and the object viewed is immediately seen to be incriminating. Samuel v. State, 198 Ga. App. 558, 402 S.E.2d 325, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 198 (1991). To be admissible under the plain-view doctrine, the items must be seized by an officer (1) who has an independent justification for being in a position from which the items can be viewed; (2) who discovers the items inadvertently; and (3) to whom it is immediately apparent that the items are evidence. United States v. Moody, 763 F. Supp. 589, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5969 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff’d, 977 F.2d 1420, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25576 (11th Cir. 1992). Trial court’s enunciated standard for applying the plain view exception to documents seized during the execution of a search warrant, whether the police reasonably could have believed that the documents would aid in the prosecution of the crime under investigation, was more lenient than the proper standard; the proper standard was whether the documents’ evidentiary value was immediately apparent upon a mere glance or cursory inspection. The portion of the trial court’s Plain View (Cont’d) order finding “the notebook paper” and “the e-mail” admissible was therefore improper, and a remand for a new finding rendered pursuant to the proper standard was required. Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 236, 664 S.E.2d 207, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 620 (2008).
- “Plain feel” principle.
- Where experienced officer believed the object in defendant’s pocket was a clear plastic baggie containing contraband upon initially feeling it in defendant’s pocket and then visually observed a portion of the baggie protruding from the pocket, the “plain feel” corollary to the “plain view” doctrine applied, namely, that if contraband is identified through an officer’s sense of touch in the course of a lawful patdown, it may be seized. Seaman v. State, 214 Ga. App. 878, 449 S.E.2d 526, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1085 (1994). The “plain feel” doctrine was exceeded and the contraband seized should have been suppressed because an officer patted down the defendant during a traffic stop and felt an object in the defendant’s pocket that the officer could not identify, but knew was not a weapon, and then removed the object which the officer discovered was a plastic bag containing marijuana. Boatright v. State, 225 Ga. App. 181, 483 S.E.2d 659, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 357 (1997). During the execution of a search warrant at a residence where defendant was visiting, the sheriff’s deputy felt what appeared to be marijuana in a plastic bag while searching defendant for weapons which search was permissible under the “plain feel” doctrine; thus, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Kinder v. State, 269 Ga.App. 99, 603 S.E.2d 496, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1087 (2004). Expectation that evidence will be discovered does not preclude operation of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Echols, 204 Ga. App. 630, 420 S.E.2d 64, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 941 (1992). ticles in plain view and readily observable and their seizure under these circumstances does not make them the fruit of an unlawful search, since, being in plain view, no search is involved. Scott v. State, 122 Ga. App. 204, 176 S.E.2d 481, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 834 (1970). If a police officer has a right to be in the position from which an object is seen lying in plain view, the object is admissible as evidence. Dennis v. State, 166 Ga. App. 715, 305 S.E.2d 443, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3266 (1983); Phillips v. State, 167 Ga.App. 260, 305 S.E.2d 918, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3320 (1983); State v. Webb, 193 Ga.App. 2, 386 S.E.2d 891, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1317 (1989).
- Officers not required to ignore ar-No invasion of privacy.
- If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure involves any invasion of privacy. Talley v. State, 200 Ga. App. 442, 408 S.E.2d 463, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1059 (1991).
- Inadvertence of sighting.
- For the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement to be invoked, the sighting of things not specified in the warrant must have been “inadvertent.” Lockhart v. State, 166 Ga. App. 555, 305 S.E.2d 22, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3249 (1983). “Plain view” does not require inadvertence. Merriman v. State, 201 Ga. App. 817, 412 S.E.2d 598, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1594 (1991). Observation of what is observable
- by public.
- There is no protection under U.S. Const., amend. 4 against observation by public official of what is observable by the general public. Ehlers v. Bogue, 626 F.2d 1314, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13479 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909, 101 S. Ct. 1979, 68 L. Ed. 2d 298, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 1700 (1981). In a prosecution of defendant for possession of cocaine, a law enforcement officer had a legitimate reason to be on defendant’s property, because the evidence showed that the officer observed defendant smoking and smelled marijuana while walking on a path that local residents regularly traveled; defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area visible from the path, even if it passed through the defendant’s property. Smith v. State, 276 Ga. App. 677, 624 S.E.2d 272, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1358 (2005). To observe that which is open to view is not generally considered a search. Grimes v. United States, 405 F.2d 477, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 4595 (5th Cir. 1968). The officer needed no search warrant to drive down a public street in response to a report that marijuana was being grown on defendant’s property. If the marijuana was in plain view from the vantage point of the public road, the officer’s mere act of driving by and looking for the reported contraband would certainly not constitute a “search” such as would require a warrant. State v. Echols, 204 Ga. App. 630, 420 S.E.2d 64, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 941 (1992). Seizure of items under plain view doctrine where initial intrusion
- valid.
- Where the initial intrusion that brings police within plain view of an incriminating item of property is supported either by a lawful warrant or by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure of that property for use as evidence is also legitimate. United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16633 (5th Cir. 1979). A police officer who is unable to approach the front door of a residence and tries to knock upon a side door only makes a “valid intrusion” upon the property. When the officer makes such a “valid intrusion” and seizes contraband in plain view, there is in effect no search at all. State v. Zackery, 193 Ga. App. 319, 387 S.E.2d 606, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1444 (1989). Seizure of items in plain view suspected to have derived from recent area burglaries while executing search warrant for documents proving theft of services was valid, where the incriminating character of the items was immediately apparent and officer had a lawful right to visual and physical access of the objects themselves. Nichols v. State, 210 Ga. App. 134, 435 S.E.2d 502, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1101 (1993). Seizability of evidence discovered
- in plain view.
- Evidence discovered in plain view, from a place where officers are entitled to stand and where their claim to stand is not created as a pretext solely to make legitimate otherwise impermissible intrusions, is not the subject of a search within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4; seizing such evidence does not trigger the warrant requirement. United States v. Kaiser, 545 F.2d 467, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 10529 (5th Cir. 1977). No error was found in the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search because the officers knocked on the defendant’s door and the defendant voluntarily allowed the deputies to enter the defendant’s apartment, making their intrusion into the defendant’s apartment valid. Once inside the apartment, the chain saw was in plain view. Latimer v. State, 204 Ga. App. 639, 420 S.E.2d 91, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 947 (1992). Seizure of farm animals was justified after officials, entering the property to investigate a report that deprived animals were observed from the highway, immediately observed additional, clearly deprived animals in need of immediate care in plain view. Sirmans v. State, 244 Ga. App. 252, 534 S.E.2d 862, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 639 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1651, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 26 (Ga. Jan. 5, 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 831, 122 S. Ct. 76, 151 L. Ed. 2d 40, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5727 (2001). Trial court did not err when it determined that the shotgun shell was admissible under the plain view doctrine because officers were in the backyard attempting to serve an arrest warrant when they observed the shell laying in the grass and its incriminating value was immediately apparent since, inter alia, a shotgun was used to kill the victim and officers were attempting to arrest the defendant for the shooting. Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 878 S.E.2d 505, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 256 (2022). Seizure of contraband in “plain
- sight”.
- A police officer may seize what is in plain sight if the officer is in a place where the officer is constitutionally entitled to be, but it must be immediately apparent to the investigating officer that the property to be seized is contraband. Williams v. State, 165 Ga. App. 708, 302 S.E.2d 609, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1993 (1983). Although the police may seize what is in “plain sight” if they are in a place where Plain View (Cont’d) they are constitutionally entitled to be, it must be immediately apparent to the investigating officer that the property to be seized is contraband. Vincent v. State, 178 Ga. App. 199, 342 S.E.2d 382, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2504 (1986). The trial court erred in suppressing evidence on grounds of lack of probable cause, because the evidence was observed by police in plain sight in a place where police were constitutionally authorized to be and the defendant was not arrested, searched, or detained that night on the basis of discovery of the bottle containing the illegal material. The defendant was not arrested until four days later, after the independent discovery of fingerprints on the bottle containing cocaine that matched the fingerprints of the defendant already on file. State v. Smalls, 203 Ga. App. 283, 416 S.E.2d 531, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 501 (1992). A police officer who observes contraband in plain view is entitled to seize it, so long as the officer is at a place where the officer is entitled to be, i.e., so long as the officer has not violated the defendant’s fourth amendment rights in the process of establishing the officer’s vantage point. Thomas v. State, 203 Ga. App. 529, 417 S.E.2d 353, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 515 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0876, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 455 (Ga. June 4, 1992). Observation of stolen goods in
- plain view.
- There is no illegal search and seizure when officers are authorized to be where they are when they observe stolen goods in plain view. Hatcher v. State, 141 Ga. App. 756, 234 S.E.2d 388, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2066 (1977). Contraband in plain view seized
- during lawful inventory search admissible.
- If a driver is arrested and removed from the vehicle, and the vehicle is on a highway or other public property, and there is no third person present to whom it is or might properly be turned over, or for some other sufficient reason a decision to impound it is properly made, and if in connection with such impoundment an inventory search is a recognized and routine procedure, contraband that appears in plain view in the course of such inventory is properly seized, and may be introduced in evidence. Martasin v. State, 155 Ga. App. 396, 271 S.E.2d 2, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2599 (1980). Intrusive search not permitted
- merely because contraband discovered in “plain view”.
- The fact that contraband was discovered in “plain view” during a limited search of premises did not serve to permit the police to “roam freely” in an intrusive and thorough search of the entire premises, where no exigency was present which would have necessitated departure from the requirement for a warrant. State v. Scott, 176 Ga. App. 887, 339 S.E.2d 276, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2954 (1985).
- Search pursuant to warrant.
- When, in the course of performing a lawful search for an item listed on a search warrant, officers come across other articles of an incriminatory character, such articles may be seized under the “plain view” doctrine. To justify application of the plain view doctrine, the seizing officers must (1) have independent justification for being in a position to see the item; (2) must discover the items inadvertently; and (3) must immediately observe that the items are evidence. The officers must have probable cause to believe the items are evidence of the crime. United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8165 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 901, 111 S. Ct. 259, 112 L. Ed. 2d 216, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 5157 (1990). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the tennis shoes and jeans found in the defendant’s motel room with blood on them and the results of the DNA tests showing that the victims’ blood was found on them because a Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent lawfully seized the shoes and clothes under the plain view doctrine, and the agent seized the shoes and clothes during the execution of the search warrant as the agent knew at the time of the seizure, based on the agent’s training and experience, that shoes and clothes worn by the suspect could be evidence of the crimes being investigated. Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 784 S.E.2d 365, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 236 (2016). Search of a motel room, conducted pursuant to a warrant, did not violate the defendant’s rights under the fourth amendment. Crider v. State, 336 Ga. App. 83, 783 S.E.2d 682, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (2016), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Plain view doctrine extends to use
- of artificial light.
- The plain view doctrine, allowing discovery and seizure of contraband in plain sight without a warrant, extends to the use of artificial light at night to observe contraband which would be in plain sight during the day. United States v. Allen, 472 F.2d 145, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 12292 (5th Cir. 1973). Use of flashlight to look into auto-
- mobile.
- The use of a flashlight to expose to better light what would otherwise be visible to one who simply looks through a car window does not make the viewing any more of a search or any less of a plain view. State v. Hodges, 184 Ga. App. 21, 360 S.E.2d 903, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2747 (1987).
- A truly cursory inspection.
- one that involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it — is not a “search” for fourth amendment purposes, and therefore does not even require reasonable suspicion. State v. Field, 188 Ga. App. 639, 373 S.E.2d 815, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1162 (1988). “Plain view” discovery of evidence
- of other crime during search pursuant to a warrant admissible.
- Where the warrant was executed less than five hours after a shooting and was supported by sufficient facts to authorize a finding of probable cause for a more thorough search of the apartment, the scene of the crimes, the fact that the police officers discovered what appeared to be objects of an unrelated crime lying in “plain view” in the defendant’s bedroom did not require exclusion of that evidence at trial. Isbell v. State, 179 Ga. App. 363, 346 S.E.2d 857, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2630 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1319, 94 L. Ed. 2d 172, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 836 (1987). A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny, since it travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents are in plain view. Thus, what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in the person’s own home or office, is not a subject of protection under U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981). Under the “plain view” doctrine, a law officer has the right to visually search the entirety of the car from the officer’s vantage point on a street or roadside. Galloway v. State, 178 Ga. App. 31, 342 S.E.2d 473, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2488 (1986). Where police officer’s original stop of the defendant’s automobile was authorized, the subsequent seizure of contraband which was in the officer’s plain view did not violate defendant’s fourth amendment rights. Freeman v. State, 194 Ga. App. 303, 390 S.E.2d 300, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 62 (1990). Identification number visible on
- dashboard.
- The recordation of vehicle identification numbers, visible on the dashboards of vehicles, by police entering the open business premises of an automobile repair shop and looking through the windshields of parked vehicles (no vehicle being entered, no door being opened, and no physical object being seized), was authorized by the “plain view doctrine.” Shaw v. State, 253 Ga. 382, 320 S.E.2d 371, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 936 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212, 105 S. Ct. 1183, 84 L. Ed. 2d 331, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 916 (1985).
- Gun in plain view inside car.
- Because the defendant told the police chief the gun defendant had used was on the front seat of defendant’s car, and the chief looked into the car, observed a gun lying on the front seat, and seized it, what the officer saw in “plain view” from outside the defendant’s automobile corroborated what the defendant had told the officer and justified the intrusion into the automobile and the seizure of the gun. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E.2d 48, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 781, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 108 S. Ct. 467, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 5018 (1987). Where defendant was already stopped at the side of a road and a police chief, Plain View (Cont’d) lawfully wanting to question defendant about the incorrect vehicle tag number that defendant had given earlier, walked passed an open car door and saw a gun in plain sight, there was no stop and the chief had a right to retrieve the gun; consequently, the trial court did not err by refusing to suppress the evidence of the gun. Eldridge v. State, 270 Ga. App. 84, 606 S.E.2d 95, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1349 (2004). Opening of bag within automobile
- authorized under “plain view” doctrine.
- The opening of a canvas gym bag in which cocaine was discovered, during the course of a warrantless search of defendant’s automobile, was authorized, where the search of the vehicle was authorized under the “plain view” doctrine. Dimick v. State, 178 Ga. App. 60, 341 S.E.2d 914, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2481 (1986).
- Evidence in plain view seized during safety inspection of boat admissible.
- Where coast guard officers boarded a vessel pursuant to a safety and documents stop under 14 U.S.C. 89(a) and en route to pilot house discovered marijuana in plain view and subsequently seized the ship, there was no illegal search or seizure. United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22234 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006, 105 S. Ct. 1362, 84 L. Ed. 2d 383, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 1180 (1985). fendant’s residence armed with an arrest warrant and a search warrant, arrested the defendant and searched the premises, certain articles in plain view having strong evidentiary value as to the crimes charged are not subject to a motion to suppress although not specifically named in the search warrant. Scott v. State, 122 Ga. App. 204, 176 S.E.2d 481, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 834 (1970).
- Where peace officers entered a de-Holder in plain view.
- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress a holster when the admission of the holster did not violate the fourth amendment. The information in an affidavit contained sufficient information for the magistrate to come to the commonsense conclusion that evidence of contraband could be found at the defendant’s apartment, and an officer saw the holster in plain view in an area in which the officer had a right to be while searching for contraband. Cobb v. State, 283 Ga. 388, 658 S.E.2d 750, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 258 (2008). Entry into home to care for unsu-
- pervised children.
- A detective was authorized to enter a home without a warrant and items thereafter observed in plain view were properly admitted into evidence since the detective entered the home to ensure that children who were without adult supervision because of action by police officers and were being watched by two uniformed officers, were being cared for properly. State v. Peterson, 273 Ga. 657, 543 S.E.2d 692, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 192, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 955, 122 S. Ct. 356, 151 L. Ed. 2d 269, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9551 (2001). Evidence in plain view seized from duplex unit adjoining unit for which
- warrant was issued was admissible.
- — Where law enforcement officials executed a search warrant for 621-B Roadway Avenue, from the exterior, 621 Roadway appeared to be a duplex having two entrances, one marked 621-A and the other 621-B, but upon entering 621-B, police officers discovered what seemed to be a single dwelling undergoing conversion into a duplex, a dividing wall between 621-A and 621-B was only partially built, a passageway between A and B existed, and a police officer, standing in 621-B, spied bags of marijuana eight to ten feet on the other side of the partially constructed wall in 621-A, inasmuch as the facts met the requirements of the “plain view” doctrine, the denial of the motion to suppress the marijuana was not error. Williams v. State, 165 Ga. App. 708, 302 S.E.2d 609, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1993 (1983). Seizure of rolling papers in plain
- view.
- Where a stop is reasonable, the consent initially given to search the vehicle is not withdrawn, and the rolling papers are in plain view scattered across the dash, a seizure of the rolling papers after the defendants are jailed does not violate constitutional rights. Merrill v. State, 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1248 (1974). Seizure of shoes in plain view at
- committal hearing.
- Where defendant, during the defendant’s committal hearing, crossed legs, revealing the pattern of the tread on the soles of the defendant’s shoes to a law enforcement officer who was acting as bailiff at the hearing, and the officer seized the shoes upon the defendant’s return to jail based upon the officer’s earlier investigation at the scene of the crimes, which revealed a similar tread pattern having been made by one of the alleged perpetrators, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that the evidence seized was in plain view. Mitchell v. State, 181 Ga. App. 470, 352 S.E.2d 647, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2538 (1987). Observation of a “pickax handle” in plain view, in a scabbard on a motorcycle, was sufficiently provocative to a law enforcement official monitoring a gathering of motorcycle clubs to establish reasonable and articulable suspicion of the officer to question its possessor of the reason for its presence. The defendant’s subsequent voluntary admission of possession of a revolver provided for a limited intrusion under the seat of the defendant’s motorcycle. Allison v. State, 188 Ga. App. 460, 373 S.E.2d 273, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1079 (1988). Bank deposit bag found in a security guard’s home was properly seized under the plain view doctrine, where, although the bag was not listed in the warrant, the warrant described numerous bank bags, stock certificates, checks, and bills, and the officers had probable cause to believe that the bag might have been stolen. United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8165 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 901, 111 S. Ct. 259, 112 L. Ed. 2d 216, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 5157 (1990).
- View through cracks in fence.
- Defendant’s fourth amendment rights were not infringed when police officers looked through cracks in a wooden fence into defendant’s backyard and saw marijuana plants growing. Merriman v. State, 201 Ga. App. 817, 412 S.E.2d 598, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1594 (1991). Incriminating character of the item must be immediately apparent for a warrantless search under the “plain view” exception. Brown v. State, 269 Ga. 830, 504 S.E.2d 443, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 872 (1998). Because the cell phone was found in plain view during a lawful search, and the incriminating nature of the phone was immediately apparent as the phone was the same model as the one missing from the victim’s car, the officer had probable cause to believe that the cell phone had been stolen from the victim and was evidence of a crime, and had the authority to seize the phone and remove the phone’s battery to determine the serial number even though the phone was not particularized in the search warrant. Glenn v. State, 302 Ga. 276, 806 S.E.2d 564, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 874 (2017).
- Closed refrigerator.
- Marijuana contained in an operating, closed refrigerator was not in the plain view of a police officer. State v. Gallup, 236 Ga. App. 321, 512 S.E.2d 66, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 156 (1999).
- Scope of warrant held not exceeded.
- Since the search warrant authorized an officer to search for clothing with possible blood stains and the officer saw, in plain view, what the officer believed to be dried blood on a sink, the officer’s search of the sink’s underside for more blood did not exceed the scope of the warrant. Moss v. State, 275 Ga. 96, 561 S.E.2d 382, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 245 (2002).
- Photographs of items in plain view.
- — Juvenile court did not err by admitting photographs of a parent’s home during deprivation proceedings because pretermitting whether a purported violation of the fourth amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII would preclude the admission of photographs in a child deprivation action, police officers were authorized to take photographs of items observed in plain view as long as the officer was in a place where he or she was entitled to be; even assuming that the admission of the photographs was erroneous, the parent failed to show that the parent was harmed thereby in light of the remaining evidence supporting the juvenile court’s determination that the Plain View (Cont’d) children were deprived. In the Interest of R. C. H., 307 Ga.App. 774, 706 S.E.2d 686, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 71 (2011). Custodial Searches Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of person’s freedom of action in any significant way. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Whether custodial search is valid depends not on officer’s state of mind but on whether, viewed in retrospect, the objective facts were such as to justify a prudent person in believing that enough facts on which to base an arrest before a search were made. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973).
- Interrogation absent custody of defendant.
- Where a possible criminal defendant has not been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way, the custodial interrogation condemned by Miranda has not occurred. Grogins v. State, 154 Ga. App. 606, 269 S.E.2d 98, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2309 (1980). Presence of defendant’s attorney at custodial interrogation constituted “adequate protective device” making any failure to advise defendant of Miranda rights irrelevant. Baxter v. State, 254 Ga. 538, 331 S.E.2d 561, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 780, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935, 106 S. Ct. 269, 88 L. Ed. 2d 275, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 5006 (1985). Photographs of defendant’s cut leg were properly admitted at trial, and their taking was not an unlawful search and seizure even though they were taken while defendant was in custody. Deering v. State, 168 Ga. App. 835, 310 S.E.2d 720, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3445 (1983). Removal of shoes not “strip search.” — Where a defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license, and drug traces had been found in the car, the removal of the defendant’s shoes did not amount to a “strip search” as that term is generally used; the trial court correctly determined that there was no violation of the defendant’s fourth amendment rights. Bobbit v. State, 195 Ga. App. 566, 394 S.E.2d 385, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 635 (1990). Fingerprints, Blood, Urine and Other Medical Tests Implied consent provision in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55(a) is unconstitutional as violative of Ga. Const. 1983. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, and the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution of the United States because it authorizes a search and seizure, chemical testing of a suspect’s blood, without probable cause that the suspect had been driving while impaired, where the suspect was involved in an accident involving serious injuries or fatalities. Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 842 (2003), overruled in part, Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 806 S.E.2d 505, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 898 (2017).
- Consent to blood testing.
- Test results of a sample taken from a suspect may not be used for purposes for which the suspect was not advised and to which the suspect did not consent, and while it is not always essential under the fourth amendment for a person to be told that he or she may refuse to consent to a warrantless search, informing an individual of the right to refuse consent is a factor a trial court may consider in determining whether such consent was voluntary; a trial court’s suppression of blood test results obtained from a defendant without a warrant was affirmed where any consent given by defendant before the blood draw did not include testing and where defendant was not informed of defendant’s right to refuse consent and did not give a free and voluntary consent after blood was drawn. State v. Poppell, 277 Ga. 595, 592 S.E.2d 838, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 133 (2004).
- Consent form.
- Since the consent form signed by defendant stated that defendant’s blood and hair would be used against the defendant in a court of law and that defendant was a suspect in a certain murder, the form did not limit the use of the blood or hair to only the designated murder investigation or to any particular purpose. Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 1030 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 839, 121 S. Ct. 101, 148 L. Ed. 2d 60, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5369 (2000). Taking fingerprints in absence of
- counsel.
- Constitutional rights are not denied because fingerprints are taken in the absence of counsel. Ward v. United States, 486 F.2d 305, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 7462 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990, 94 S. Ct. 2398, 40 L. Ed. 2d 768, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 270 (1974). Swabbing the hands of accused to tute an unconstitutional search or seizure. Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219, 275 S.E.2d 29, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 629, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 365, 70 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1981). Search for evidence by intrusion into a person’s body against that person’s will can be reasonable only under very limited circumstances. State v. Haynie, 240 Ga. 866, 242 S.E.2d 713, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 858 (1978). Neither the presence of defendant’s counsel nor defendant’s consent is required for the execution of a warrant calling for the seizure of hair, blood, or other body fluids. Johnson v. State, 179 Ga. App. 467, 346 S.E.2d 903, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2624 (1986).
- lift gunshot residue does not consti-Compelled withdrawal of blood.
- A suspect’s fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the compelled withdrawal of blood. Welch v. State, 254 Ga. 603, 331 S.E.2d 573, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 781 (1985). Blood sample is not taken from defendant unconstitutionally because the defendant does not freely consent to the taking of the sample and because it is taken without a search warrant. Corn v. Hopper, 244 Ga. 28, 257 S.E.2d 533, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1091 (1979). Blood sample taken from defendant was voluntarily consented to by defendant who was advised of the purpose of the test, was not promised any benefits for participating in the test, and was not threatened with fear or injury for failure to cooperate. Deering v. State, 168 Ga. App. 835, 310 S.E.2d 720, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3445 (1983).
- Blood test admissible despite acquittal on initial traffic violation.
- Where a police officer stopped a driver for a traffic violation and suspicion of driving under the influence, the results of a blood alcohol test were admissible where the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, even though the defendant was acquitted of the traffic violation. Branch v. State, 175 Ga. App. 696, 334 S.E.2d 24, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2814 (1985). Blood test inadmissible if without
- probable cause.
- Georgia Supreme Court has held that O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55(a) is unconstitutional to the extent it requires chemical testing of the driver of a vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or death as it violates the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution because it authorizes a search and seizure without probable cause; thus, where testing is conducted based upon the seriousness of injuries in an accident, rather than upon probable cause that the person has violated O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391, the results are inadmissible. Buchanan v. State, 264 Ga. App. 148, 589 S.E.2d 876, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1431 (2003). Compelled administration of breath test designed to ascertain blood alcohol content undoubtedly implicates fourth amendment rights. State v. Johnston, 249 Ga. 413, 291 S.E.2d 543, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1153 (1982). Requesting multiple chemical tests
- of driver allowed.
- Nothing in the implied consent law prohibits an officer from advising a driver of the driver’s implied consent rights and requesting multiple chemical tests at one time, and such a request does not violate the fourth amendment as an unreasonable attempt to “shop” through the driver’s bodily fluids in search of evidence. McKeown v. State, 187 Ga. App. 685, 371 S.E.2d 243, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 815 (1988). A urinalysis is a search. Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16313 (11th Cir. 1987). Fingerprints, Blood, Urine and Other Medical Tests (Cont’d)
- Taking of urine specimens.
- The governmental taking of a urine specimen is a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23012 (N.D. Ga. 1986). The Applicant Drug Screening Act (O.C.G.A. § 45-20-110 et seq.), requiring applicants for state employment to submit to urine tests for the presence of illegal drugs, violates applicants’ rights to privacy under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Georgia Ass’n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14647 (N.D. Ga. 1990). Compelled urine sample requires
- reasonable suspicion.
- Considering the nature of a police department’s legitimate interests and the individual officers’ reasonable expectations of privacy, the fourth amendment allows the chief of police, the city, and city officials to demand a urine sample from an employee for chemical analysis only on the basis of a reasonable suspicion, based on specific objective facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in the light of experience, that a urinalysis will produce evidence of illegal drug use by that particular employee. Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23012 (N.D. Ga. 1986). Periodic drug testing of civilian federal employees by urinalysis, absent some form of individualized suspicion, is in almost all cases offensive to the mandates of the fourth amendment. American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17020 (S.D. Ga. 1986). Employees who may be subjected to
- urinalysis testing.
- The duties of the civilian-law-enforcement employees at an army base who will be subjected to standardless urinalysis testing for drugs must be shown to be more than remotely or conceivably related to national security, or the duties if performed under the influence of drugs must be shown to pose a potential danger to persons or property well beyond the danger inherent in ordinary police or transportation employment for the search to pass constitutional muster. American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17020 (S.D. Ga. 1986). Urinalysis tests taken by employees in electrical distribution division of city board of lights and water, ordered by the city manager and manager of the board of lights and water when employees suspected of drug usage refused to resign, were “searches” within the meaning of the fourth amendment but were not unreasonable and therefore did not violate the fourth amendment since the tests were administered in a purely employment context and were not done in connection with any criminal investigation or procedure. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23673 (N.D. Ga. 1985). Requiring city employees to submit to urinalyses did not violate their fourth amendment rights, where city officials had reasonable grounds to suspect employees were working under the influence of drugs and the urinalyses were conducted solely to further an employmentrelated objective and in a manner designed to minimize intrusion. Allen v. Marietta Bd. of Lights & Water, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1122, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13758 (N.D. Ga. 1987). dered by an employer to submit to urinalysis test but did not actually take any such test prior to termination for failure to comply with the order, there was no “search” within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Everett v. Napper, 632 F. Supp. 1481, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26570 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff’d, 825 F.2d 341, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 11321 (11th Cir. 1987). Ordering a firefighter to undergo a urinalysis did not violate the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, because city officials had reason to suspect that the firefighter was involved with the use of illegal drugs. Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16313 (11th Cir. 1987). Employees’ consent to urinalysis
- Because a city firefighter was ortesting held involuntary.
- Because the plaintiffs were informed that if they did not participate in urinalysis testing, their employment would be terminated and the plaintiffs stated they did participate only because they feared they would lose their jobs, the plaintiffs’ consent to search was obviously not voluntary, but was the result of coercion. Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23012 (N.D. Ga. 1986). Georgia’s requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test does not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches, since the state failed to show a “special need” for the intrusion sufficient enough to override the Fourth Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2505 (1997).
- Handwriting samples.
- A defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the defendant’s handwriting so as to invoke the sanctions of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Reeves v. State, 139 Ga. App. 214, 228 S.E.2d 201, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1743 (1976). The law provides that an order to furnish handwriting samples or exemplars is a lawful order, and does not violate any legal or constitutional rights. United States v. Knight, 607 F.2d 1172, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 9874 (5th Cir. 1979). Comment on refusal to provide
- handwriting exemplar permissible.
- — Handwriting exemplars fall outside the protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4 and comment on the refusal to provide an exemplar is permissible. United States v. Knight, 607 F.2d 1172, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 9874 (5th Cir. 1979).
- Voice exemplars.
- A defendant’s consent to use of the defendant’s voice in a voice lineup was not required since voice exemplars are not within the scope of fourth amendment protections. Campbell v. State, 228 Ga. App. 258, 491 S.E.2d 477. Hair samples from defendant’s person, taken pursuant to a search warrant, were properly admitted, where there was probable cause to believe that hair which the warrant affidavit stated had been found in a stocking mask abandoned at the scene of a robbery would match a sample of defendant’s hair. Ferrell v. State, 198 Ga. App. 270, 401 S.E.2d 301, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 19 (1991), overruled in part, Watts v. State, 274 Ga. 373, 552 S.E.2d 823, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 637 (2001).
- AIDS testing of convicts.
- O.C.G.A. § 17-10-15(b) does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4 because the government’s interest outweighs the individual’s and the results are kept confidential and cannot be used against the individual in a criminal prosecution; nor does § 17-10-15(b) violate the right to privacy under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment or the state or federal equal protection clauses. Adams v. State, 269 Ga. 405, 498 S.E.2d 268, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 442 (1998). Drug and alcohol testing in DUI
- case.
- Because a defendant was arrested for driving under the influence under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 based on probable cause and the state had complied with the implied consent requirements of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55, the defendant could not complain that drug and alcohol testing violated the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment or the Georgia Constitution because the implied consent statute allowed for the warrantless compelled testing of bodily fluids based on the existence of probable cause, but without proof of the existence of exigent circumstances. Cornwell v. State, 283 Ga. 247, 657 S.E.2d 195, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 27 (2008).
- DNA samples.
- Defendant’s DNA sample was not obtained in violation of the fourth amendment because a detective informed the defendant that the sample would be used for comparison with other such samples and no limits were placed on the scope of the defendant’s consent. Holmes v. State, 284 Ga. 330, 667 S.E.2d 71, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 741 (2008). Petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief because it was clear from the record that the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to develop the petitioner’s fourth amendment claim in the trial court, as well as on appeal; the fact that the petitioner disagreed with the state court’s conclusions of state law with respect to the defendant’s status at the time of the DNA distraction did not demonstrate that the defendant did not receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate the defendant’s Fingerprints, Blood, Urine and Other Medical Tests (Cont’d) fourth amendment claim, and there was nothing clearly erroneous about the state court’s factual findings that the petitioner was not a probationer at the time of the DNA extraction and that the saliva sample was taken upon petitioner being physically discharged from lawful custody. Leftwich v. Barrow, No. 1:11-CV-1015-WSD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109674 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2011). Exigent Circumstances
- Probable cause alone insufficient.
- — No amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent exigent circumstances. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1768 (1980). Whether a search is sought to be justified as incident to an arrest for possession of cocaine or whether it is sought to be justified by exigent circumstances, it cannot be upheld unless probable cause existed for a belief that the suspect was currently in unlawful possession of cocaine. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 508 (1992). Only in exigent circumstances will judgment of police as to probable cause serve as sufficient authorization for a search. One of the exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search is where there is a seizure and search of a moving vehicle. State v. Bradley, 138 Ga. App. 800, 227 S.E.2d 776, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2325 (1976). Only in exigent circumstances will judgment of police as to probable cause serve as sufficient authorization for a search. United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8488 (5th Cir. 1978).
- Exigency determined at time of seizure, not search.
- The fact that sufficient time to obtain a warrant had passed between seizure and the corresponding search of defendant’s car did not invalidate either, since exigency is to be determined at the time of the seizure of the automobile, not at the time of the search. United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16633 (5th Cir. 1979).
- Exigencies of situation as they appear to officer involved.
- Even though acts of peace officers in detaining and questioning a citizen are necessarily a curtailment of the citizen’s right to go about one’s business unmolested (i.e., a seizure of the person), but more importantly because investigation and questioning are necessary elements of crime prevention and detection, the exigencies of the situation as they reasonably appear at the time to the officer involved must dictate the extent of intrusion into constitutionally protected areas. Holley v. State, 157 Ga. App. 863, 278 S.E.2d 738, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2038 (1981). Exigent circumstances justify
- search incident to an arrest.
- In exigent circumstances, police officers are authorized, pursuant to a lawful arrest, to enter upon premises and conduct a reasonable search of the suspects’ persons and immediate presence. State v. Camp, 175 Ga. App. 591, 333 S.E.2d 896, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2820 (1985).
- “Plain view” doctrine permits warrantless search and seizure.
- Where an officer observed contraband in an apartment from the outside and saw one of the occupants attempt to conceal it, the officer’s warrantless intrusion into the apartment was justified by the exigent circumstance that the contraband was in danger of immediate destruction. State v. David, 269 Ga. 533, 501 S.E.2d 494, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 660 (1998). ception to U.S. Const., amend. 4’s requirements. The movable nature of an automobile is not enough. There must be exigent circumstances as well. United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8488 (5th Cir. 1978). Distinction has long been drawn mobile as opposed to a house or other structure due to the mobility of the car. Whitlock v. State, 124 Ga. App. 599, 185 S.E.2d 90, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1040 (1971), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 230 Ga. 700, 198 S.E.2d 865, 1973 Ga. LEXIS 1037 (1973). Likelihood of imminent departure gives rise to exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless seizure. United States v. Bryant, 580 F.2d 812, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8859 (5th Cir. 1978).
- There is no general automobile exbetween warrantless search of auto-When vehicle subject to warrantless search.
- A reasonable search may be made of vehicle which is easily and quickly movable, without a warrant and in the absence of a prior arrest, so long as there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 478, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 12455 (5th Cir. 1969). Moving vehicle is subject to warrantless search if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. United States v. Robinson, 535 F.2d 881, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7916 (5th Cir. 1976). The general rule is that one of the exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search is a situation where there is a seizure and search of a moving vehicle, and when the vehicle is indeed moving there is only the requirement that the search and seizure be based upon sufficient probable cause. State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2391 (1980). Ability of a vehicle to become mobile is sufficient to satisfy the exigency requirement for a search without a warrant. The vehicle does not have to be moving at the moment when the police obtain probable cause to search. United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 622 (11th Cir. 1988). Practicability of procuring warrant
- for search of vehicles for contraband.
- — A necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure, in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, is that the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. United States v. Ramey, 464 F.2d 1240, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8045 (5th Cir. 1972). Blocking airplane with police cars was reasonable manner of stopping it considering the possibility of flight in a highly mobile aircraft. Franklin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 3, 237 S.E.2d 425, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2170 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 55 L. Ed. 2d 799, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 1347 (1978).
- Police authorized, in exigent circumstances, to enter search premises.
- In exigent circumstances, police officers are authorized, pursuant to a lawful arrest, to enter upon the premises and conduct a reasonable search of the suspects’ persons and immediate presence, including a search under a piece of furniture where one of the suspects was observed reaching for or disposing of an unknown object, which might reasonably be thought to be either a weapon or evidence. Dennis v. State, 166 Ga. App. 715, 305 S.E.2d 443, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3266 (1983). Trial court did not err in admitting into evidence the murder weapon and photographs of the crime scene because the search of the defendant’s residence was authorized due to the exigent circumstances; officers arrived at the residence to conduct a welfare check and knocked on the door, which caused the door to open slightly, allowing the officers to see the victim lying motionless on the couch, and after the victim failed to respond to the officers’ calls, the officers were authorized to proceed into the residence immediately to come to the victim’s aid. Gibson v. State, 290 Ga. 6, 717 S.E.2d 447, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 721 (2011). Burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry reasonable. Romano v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 191, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11526 (N.D. Ga. 1980). A burning residence constitutes an exigency justifying a warrantless entry, and officials need no warrant to remain for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished. Davis v. State, 178 Ga. App. 760, 344 S.E.2d 730, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2568 (1986). Firefighters in building do not need warrant to remain for reasonable time after fire extinguished in order to investigate the cause, since the aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain either the owner’s consent or a warrant. Waters v. State, 174 Ga. App. 916, 331 Exigent Circumstances (Cont’d) S.E.2d 893, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2765 (1985).
- Warrantless arrests.
- The doctrine of “exigent circumstances,” applicable only with respect to searches, did not supply probable cause for warrantless arrests. Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28922 (11th Cir. 1985), overruled, United States v. Gonzalez, 107 F.4th 1304, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 (11th Cir. 2024). A section of a police field manual which allows arrest with a supervisor’s approval for three or more “hazardous moving violations,” does not conflict with U.S. Const., amend. 4 by providing for the physical arrest of misdemeanants under “exigent circumstances,” where probable cause exists. Young v. City of Atlanta, 631 F. Supp. 1498, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26901 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
- Exigent circumstances held to exist.
- The circumstances were sufficiently exigent to justify a warrantless arrest where the FBI had probable cause to believe that defendant had attempted to rob one bank and had actually robbed another earlier that day, there was reason to believe defendant was armed at all times, defendant’s sibling could have felt remorse and called defendant to warn the defendant, or defendant could have seen the defendant’s own photo on a television news report about the robberies, if the FBI delayed, defendant might dispose of the stolen cash or other evidence, and more importantly, any delay increased the risk that innocent members of the public might be injured if the defendant attempted to leave the motel at which the defendant was staying, so that it was safer to arrest the defendant immediately by surprise in the defendant’s motel room than to wait for a warrant, and to risk a gun battle erupting in the halls, stairs, lobby, or other public area of the fully occupied hotel should the defendant try to escape. United States v. Standridge, 810 F.2d 1034, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 2311 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072, 107 S. Ct. 2468, 95 L. Ed. 2d 877, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2341 (1987). Circumstances are exigent if a suspect is implicated in a drug conspiracy, is thought to be armed, discovers that a confederate is arrested, and discovers that the suspect has been cornered by the police and faces imminent arrest. United States v. Forker, 928 F.2d 365, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 5619 (11th Cir. 1991). Officers’ decision to enter an apartment during a taped drug buy was justified because it appeared that the operation had gone sour and that children within the apartment might be placed in danger and attempts to destroy or conceal evidence would be made. Cates v. State, 232 Ga. App. 262, 501 S.E.2d 262, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 569 (1998), cert. denied, No. S98C1204, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 848 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1998). Denial of a defendant’s suppression motion was proper as the police officers were authorized to immediately enter a residence, without announcing their presence as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-5-27, as the occupants, upon seeing the police, fled into a residence where the police had recently conducted controlled drug buys and the officers had a reasonable belief that the fleeing occupants might retrieve weapons or destroy evidence; once legally inside the residence, the police were authorized to execute a search warrant that led to the discovery of the defendant’s involvement in the drug sales. Further, suppression of evidence was not a constitutionally-required remedy for an improper entry pursuant to an otherwise valid search warrant. Jackson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 716, 634 S.E.2d 846, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 930 (2006). When two officers came to the defendant’s motel room and were let in by the motel manager after a caller reported a bound, motionless body visible through the window, their testimony about their observations upon entering the room was admissible; the fourth amendment did not bar officers from making warrantless entries into and searches of protected areas when they had an objectively reasonable basis for believing a person within was in need of immediate aid or, at the scene of a homicide, to search the area for the presence of other victims or the killer. Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 647 S.E.2d 15, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 480 (2007). Warrantless seizure of two computers in a defendant’s home was authorized by exigent circumstances, specifically, the objectively reasonable concern that the defendant threatened to destroy computer images of child pornography, images that were vulnerable to quick destruction, irreplaceable, and essential to proving that a crime had been committed. Hesrick v. State, 308 Ga. App. 363, 707 S.E.2d 574, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 189 (2011). Exigent circumstances held not to
- exist.
- No exigent circumstances supported the warrantless entry by police officers into the defendant’s house, notwithstanding their assertion that entry was justified based on their reasonable belief that the defendant was in need of immediate aid since: (1) officers arrived at the scene one hour after the defendant’s neighbor reported a motor vehicle accident and questioned the neighbor for another 20 minutes before making any inquiry as to whether the defendant was injured; (2) when the officers saw the defendant lying on the floor in the defendant’s home, they did not call an ambulance and waited while dispatch contacted the defendant’s spouse; (3) one officer testified that they were less concerned about the defendant’s safety after they inspected the defendant’s vehicle and saw no signs that the defendant’s head had struck the windshield; and (4) when the officers entered the home, they attempted to wake the defendant by inflicting pain on the defendant and yelling. State v. Shephard, 248 Ga. App. 433, 546 S.E.2d 823, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 286 (2001). Defendant’s suppression motion was properly granted because: (1) an officer executing an arrest warrant for a third person had unreasonably looked through the defendants’ window, discovering them using marijuana; (2) the officers did not identify themselves as police officers when they knocked at the defendants’ door; (3) the defendants hid the marijuana before opening the door; (4) the police confronted the defendants about the marijuana after they had determined that the third person was not in the house; and (5) the appellate court could not conclude, as a matter of law, that there were exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless seizure of the drugs, in that they were in danger of being destroyed, simply because the defendants hid the drugs before opening the door. State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742, 583 S.E.2d 573, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 759 (2003). Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized by a police officer who entered an apartment without a warrant was properly granted because a residential alarm call did not create exigent circumstances justifying the entry where the officer had no reasonable belief that an emergency situation existed given the officer’s delay in reaching the apartment, the officer’s decision to allow a parent and two children to enter the apartment, and the lack of any signs of distress once the officer reached the residence. State v. Merit, 262 Ga. App. 687, 586 S.E.2d 393, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 986 (2003). Trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to suppress marijuana seized from the defendant’s home. Because neither the defendant’s arrest for disorderly conduct under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39 nor the defendant’s arrest for a traffic violation was supported by probable cause, police officers were not justified by any exigent circumstance in going inside the home without a warrant to find a young girl who reportedly would have been left alone unsupervised because of the defendant’s arrest. Williams v. State, 305 Ga. App. 657, 700 S.E.2d 653, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 780 (2010). Administrative Inspections Administrative warrant requires
- less than search warrant.
- Courts may authorize administrative inspections on facts that would not support issuance of search warrant in a criminal case. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Marshall, 496 F. Supp. 1178, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13274 (N.D. Ga. 1980), rev’d, 689 F.2d 950, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 24659 (11th Cir. 1982). Exceptions to warrant requirement
- for administrative inspections.
- The warrant requirement for unconsented administrative inspections is negated only if the enterprise sought to be inspected is engaged in a pervasively regulated business, the inspection will pose only a minimal threat to justifiable expectations of privacy, warrantless inspection is a crucial part of a regulatory scheme designed Administrative Inspections (Cont’d) to further an urgent federal interest, and the inspection may be carefully limited as to time, place, and scope. Usery v. Centrif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17995 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
- Warrantless regulatory inspections.
- Because regulatory inspections further urgent federal interests and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed without a warrant if specifically authorized by statute. Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8850 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
- Warrantless OSHA inspections.
- Business of manufacture and sale of textile machinery is not subject to pervasive state or federal regulation; therefore, the Secretary of Labor was not entitled, pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., to conduct warrantless inspection of business premises. Usery v. Centrif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17995 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Determination of probable cause
- for search under OSHA.
- The fourth amendment requires that an administrative search warrant be obtained prior to the inspection of workplaces in carrying out the purposes of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., of 1970; the Secretary of Labor needs only to establish administrative probable cause, which is tested by a standard of reasonableness, requiring a magistrate or judge to balance the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 24659 (11th Cir. 1982).
- Routine traffic checks.
- A roadblock set up primarily as a means to perform routine traffic checks was valid. LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 497 S.E.2d 367, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 376 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 947, 119 S. Ct. 371, 142 L. Ed. 2d 307, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 6698 (1998), overruled in part, McCoy v. State, 303 Ga. 551, 814 S.E.2d 319, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 296 (2018); Boyce v. State, 240 Ga. App. 388, 523 S.E.2d 607, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1359 (1999), overruled, Baker v. State, 252 Ga. App. 695, 556 S.E.2d 892, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 1354 (2001).
- Reasonableness of road checks.
- The state can practice preventative therapy by reasonable road checks to ascertain whether man and machine meet the legislative determination of fitness. That this requires a momentary stopping of the traveling citizen is not fatal. Nor is it fatal because the inspection may produce the irrefutable proof that the law has just been violated. The purpose of the check is to determine the present, not the past: is the car, is the driver now fit for further driving? In the accommodation of society’s needs to the basic right of citizens to be free from disruption of unrestricted travel by police officers’ stopping cars in the hopes of uncovering evidence of nontraffic crimes, stopping for road checks is reasonable and, therefore, acceptable. Likewise, an arrest is proper if the check reveals a current violation which by its nature must have taken place in the immediate past. State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535, 207 S.E.2d 459, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 996 (1974). Except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check a driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623; Bobo v. State, 153 Ga. App. 679, 266 S.E.2d 247, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1942 (1980). Driver’s license check not illegal
- search.
- A routine check for a driver’s license, during which a police officer observed in the wallet of the party searched a stolen credit card, is not an illegal search. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Detention pending computer check
- and arrival of backup.
- Following a legitimate traffic stop, the officer’s inquiring about the identities of the defendant and the defendant’s passenger, inquiring about weapons in the car, and verifying their identities and checking for warrants, were activities reasonably directed toward investigation and officer safety, taking about 10 minutes, and did not unreasonably prolong the detention. Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga. 362, 761 S.E.2d 19, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 535 (2014). Sobriety checkpoint stops. are viewed differently from isolated vehicle stops because the subjective intrusion is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. Christopher v. State, 202 Ga. App. 40, 413 S.E.2d 236, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1646 (1991). In a prosecution for driving under the influence, evidence obtained at a roadblock set up to check for driver’s licenses and intoxicated drivers was admissible because the roadblock was legitimate and defendant’s detention at the roadblock did not constitute an arbitrary, random stop or an unreasonable seizure. White v. State, 233 Ga. App. 276, 503 S.E.2d 891, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 939 (1998), cert. denied, No. S98C1680, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 1115 (Ga. Nov. 5, 1998). Allowing supervisory personnel to establish one-way roadblocks at a time and place conducive to stopping potentially intoxicated drivers does not create any significantly greater potential for improper targeting of ethnic or racial minorities than empowering them to select sites for two-way roadblocks. State v. Stearns, 240 Ga. App. 806, 524 S.E.2d 554, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1450 (1999), cert. denied, No. S00C0578, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 373 (Ga. May 1, 2000). Detention of driver for further tests
- for intoxication.
- Requiring a driver who appeared to be intoxicated as viewed by police officers at a roadblock to submit to further detention so as to be subjected to field tests for intoxication did not violate the driver’s fourth amendment rights. State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2941 (1984).
- Escaped convict.
- Police officers who manned a roadblock were authorized to rely upon superior officers’ determination that circumstances required an investigative stop of the defendants’ vehicles, because there was information that an escaped convict might be traveling with the defendants, and the sighting of a revolver in one car authorized a search of the vehicle. Holbrook v. State, 177 Ga. App. 318, 339 S.E.2d 346, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2951 (1985).
- Evidence obtained during roadblock inspection of concert-goers admissible.
- On a motion to suppress evidence, the judge was authorized to find that a roadblock erected to inspect automobiles entering a rock concert was valid, and evidence resulting from routine traffic checks, or a more extensive warrantless search justified by plainly visible evidence of a nontraffic crime, was admissible. State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535, 207 S.E.2d 459, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 996 (1974).
- DNA sample collection from convicted felons.
- Former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-60 (now O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160) did not violate the fourth amendment, the search and seizure provisions of the Georgia Constitution, or a convicted felon’s rights to privacy under the United States or Georgia Constitutions. Quarterman v. State, 282 Ga. 383, 651 S.E.2d 32, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 580 (2007). Border Searches Validity of warrantless border
- searches.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless border searches, including mail searches, are reasonable without probable cause or any ground for suspicion. United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 10028 (5th Cir. 1978). There is reason and probable cause to search every person entering the United States from a foreign country, by reason of such entry alone. A search that would be unreasonable within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4, if conducted by police officers in the ordinary case, would be a reasonable search if conducted by customs officials in lawful pursuit of unlawful imports. United States v. Kayser, 322 F. Supp. 52, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12358 (S.D. Ga. 1970).
- Search may be based on unsupported suspicion.
- Authorized federal border official may, upon unsupported sus-Border Searches (Cont’d) picion, stop and search persons and their vehicles entering this country. United States v. Kayser, 322 F. Supp. 52, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12358 (S.D. Ga. 1970). Unsupported and mere suspicion alone is sufficient to justify a search for purposes of customs law enforcement. Mere suspicion of possible illegal activity within their jurisdiction is enough cause to permit a customs officer to stop and search a person. United States v. Kayser, 322 F. Supp. 52, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12358 (S.D. Ga. 1970). Reasonableness standard in border search context is less rigorous than the probable cause requirement which normally obtains under the fourth amendment. United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8488 (5th Cir. 1978). A border crossing is not the sine qua non of a valid border search. A reasonable suspicion that the vehicle has crossed the border or has been in contact with those who have done so is required. United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8488 (5th Cir. 1978). Reasonable cause required to stop and question about citizenship and
- immigration status.
- In order to conduct a stop and ask questions about citizenship and immigration status, U.S. Const., amend. 4 requires that agents must have been aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country. United States v. Gonzalez-Vargas, 496 F. Supp. 1296, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13823 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Further away from border that a stop occurs, the more that is required for the totality of the circumstances to justify a stop within the protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4. A requirement that a greater quantum of evidence should be required to justify a stop and citizenship inquiry the further away from the border or its functional equivalent that such a stop occurs is an appropriate response, in light of U.S. Const., amend. 4, to the problem of the inland movement of those who are not duly admitted to the country. United States v. Gonzalez-Vargas, 496 F. Supp. 1296, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13823 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Removal of defendant’s shoes did not go beyond a routine border search or constitute an unreasonable strip search. Segree v. State, 186 Ga. App. 489, 367 S.E.2d 882, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 394 (1988). Airports Limit on access to area of aircraft. — In the interest of general security, airport officials may limit access to the area of the aircraft, as distinguished from the more public areas of the lobby, ticket counters, and other public conveniences. Incident to limiting this access, officials may set up detection devices to screen persons approaching the more sensitive areas. State v. David, 130 Ga. App. 872, 204 S.E.2d 773, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1289 (1974). gers voluntarily produce tickets and
- No seizure where airline passenidentification.
- There is no seizure, within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4, where Drug Enforcement Administration agents employing a drug courier profile, request airline passengers to produce their tickets and some form of identification, so long as the passenger’s cooperation is voluntary and not the product of coercion, force, or other use of authority. United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 12467 (5th Cir. 1980). Because police officers initiated contact with a suspect in an airport by asking if the suspect would step aside and talk with them, no fourth amendment interests were implicated. Reid v. State, 179 Ga. App. 144, 345 S.E.2d 635, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2592 (1986). Brief questioning absent detention
- or coercion.
- The police may approach a citizen in an airport, identify themselves, request identification, and briefly question the individual without bringing into play the proscriptions of U.S. Const., amend. 4, so long as the individual is not detained against the individual’s will or otherwise coerced into cooperating. As long as the cooperation is voluntary and not the product of police coercion, a seizure has not occurred. United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 11833 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S. Ct. 1521, 75 L. Ed. 2d 945, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 3774 (1983). The conduct of police officers in approaching the defendant in an airport and identifying themselves as law enforcement officers, accompanied with their request to see the defendant’s ticket and identification, did not amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected area. Nor did the absence of an express statement to the defendant that the defendant was free to leave suggest that the defendant was “seized.” Such police-citizen encounters involving no coercion or detention are without the compass of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Brown v. State, 188 Ga. App. 417, 373 S.E.2d 99, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1059 (1988). Airport stop and investigation of the defendant did not violate fourth amendment, where the defendant was not seized or restrained until the defendant had been arrested upon probable cause to believe a bag containing cocaine was the defendant’s or that the defendant was directly connected to it. Young v. State, 187 Ga. App. 161, 369 S.E.2d 772, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 652 (1988).
- Stop by drug agent.
- Defendant was not “seized” where encounter between a drug agent and the defendant took place in public concourse of airport, the agent wore no uniform and displayed no gun, nor did the agent summon the defendant to the agent’s presence, but approached the defendant and properly identified self as a federal agent, requesting but not demanding the defendant’s identification and reason for the defendant’s trip to Florida, thus subsequent knowledge of possession of cocaine derived during the investigative stop could properly be considered as being acquired in a spot where the agent was authorized to be and where the defendant was lawfully being questioned. Berry v. State, 163 Ga. App. 705, 294 S.E.2d 562, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3242 (1982). Because a Drug Enforcement Administration agent was not in uniform; made no physical contact; did not raise the agent’s voice, and after looking at and returning appellant’s driver’s license and airline tickets, explained that the agent was a narcotics officer and asked if the appellant “would mind cooperating” with the agent and allow the agent to search the appellant for drugs, to which request the appellant stated that the appellant did not mind and had no drugs, and in fact requested that the search be carried out in “some place more private,” this result of an initial stop did not constitute a seizure that would trigger fourth amendment protections. McAdoo v. State, 164 Ga. App. 23, 295 S.E.2d 114, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3260 (1982). Airport stop of the defendant by a Drug Enforcement Administration agent did not constitute a seizure of the defendant’s person within the meaning of this section because the defendant freely consented to converse with the agent after the latter had presented the agent’s credentials, the agent made no show of force and the agent’s manner was completely noncoercive, the agent did not ask the defendant to move from where the defendant was sitting, and where after the defendant refused consent to a search of the defendant’s person and luggage, the agent terminated the conversation and walked away, leaving the defendant free to board the defendant’s connecting flight. Yocham v. State, 165 Ga. App. 650, 302 S.E.2d 390, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3176 (1983). There was no seizure because Drug Enforcement Administration officers asked a passenger to consent to a search of the passenger’s person and luggage pursuant to a public interview. United States v. Mancini, 802 F.2d 1326, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 32407 (11th Cir. 1986). Defendant was not “seized” during an encounter with plainclothes drug enforcement officers at an airport, where the officers “walked up beside” defendant, identified themselves as law enforcement officers, and spoke in a conversational tone, asking for, rather than demanding, defendant’s ticket and identification. Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 671, 385 S.E.2d 761, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1136 (1989). Detention while waiting for drug Airports (Cont’d)
- detector dog.
- Detention of defendant’s bag at an airport for over an hour while law enforcement agents obtained a drug detector dog to sniff the bag was a minimal intrusion and did not violate defendant’s fourth amendment rights. State v. Grant, 195 Ga. App. 859, 394 S.E.2d 916, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 755 (1990), cert. denied, No. S90C1288, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 655 (Ga. Sept. 4, 1990). Detention of foreign language
- speaking suspect while awaiting interpreter.
- A drug enforcement administration agent’s investigative detention of a Spanish-speaking suspect in an airport office was reasonable, where the agent, who had reasonable suspicion that the suspect was transporting drugs, acted diligently to obtain the assistance of an interpreter in order to interrogate the suspect. United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 34786 (11th Cir. 1986).
- Taking defendant to room at airport constituted seizure.
- Defendant was “seized,” within the meaning of the fourth amendment, when the defendant was taken from an airport concourse to a room to be searched. Miranda v. State, 189 Ga. App. 218, 375 S.E.2d 295, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1374 (1988). Observation of abnormal bulge in
- boots.
- A federal drug enforcement agent noticed that the defendant, an airline passenger, had abnormally large bulges in both boots. When asked about the bulges, the defendant denied there was anything in the boots, an obviously untrue answer, which, coupled with the agent’s observation and experience, provided the probable cause required for a warrantless arrest. Clark v. State, 183 Ga. App. 838, 360 S.E.2d 447, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2746 (1987).
- Consent search of passenger.
- Because a Drug Enforcement Agency agent’s stopping and questioning an airline passenger at an airport about carrying drugs were proper and did not bring the fourth amendment into play, the agent’s asking the passenger whether the passenger would consent to a search of the passenger’s person and the passenger’s suitcase did not amount to a seizure. United States v. Jensen, 689 F.2d 1361, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 24590 (11th Cir. 1982). Warrantless arrest and seizure
- where cocaine suspect exiting plane.
- — Because an agent of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration observed the defendant exit a plane from Miami, a drug source city, the defendant had an unnatural bulge on the inside of each leg, and other incriminating evidence was present, this evidence clearly authorized the trial court to find that the agent had sufficient articulable and reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry-type stop of the defendant, and while the defendant was lawfully stopped for questioning, the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to an inspection of the defendant’s legs by the agent, under the totality of these circumstances, the agent had probable cause to arrest, and, in the search incident to the arrest, the seizure of the cocaine found in the defendant’s socks was justified. Chappell v. State, 183 Ga. App. 706, 359 S.E.2d 686, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2058 (1987).
- Seizure of luggage.
- Because the fourth amendment protects people, not things, courts should concern themselves with seizures of luggage only when those seizures impair the right of the possessor to freedom of movement with possessor’s luggage. In airport luggage cases, the traveler’s possessory interest would be impaired if the seizure of traveler’s luggage were tantamount to a seizure of the traveler’s person, whether actually, because traveler could not leave without the traveler’s luggage, or constructively, where travel plans required traveler to proceed without the luggage. United States v. Puglisi, 723 F.2d 779, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 26207 (11th Cir. 1984). Brief seizure of luggage, which interferes with the owner’s freedom of movement, must be based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime is being, or soon will be, committed. United States v. Puglisi, 723 F.2d 779, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 26207 (11th Cir. 1984). Detention of defendant’s luggage at an airport was not an illegal seizure, where officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying narcotics, and a narcotic detector dog was obtained 30 minutes after the luggage was removed from defendant’s departing plane. United States v. Cooper, 873 F.2d 269, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 6697 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 837, 110 S. Ct. 118, 107 L. Ed. 2d 79, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 4368 (1989). Removal of airline luggage pending
- further investigation.
- Drug Enforcement Administration agent’s removal of defendant’s luggage from an airline baggage cart pending further investigation was not an unreasonable seizure. Yocham v. State, 165 Ga. App. 650, 302 S.E.2d 390, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3176 (1983).
- Lifting luggage to assess weight.
- Drug Enforcement Administration agent’s action in lifting defendant’s suitcase from airline baggage cart to assess its weight did not constitute an unreasonable seizure. Yocham v. State, 165 Ga. App. 650, 302 S.E.2d 390, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3176 (1983). Airports demand special fourth
- amendment considerations.
- Because of the danger posed by air piracy, airports are sui generis and, like international borders, are “critical zones” in which special fourth amendment considerations apply. McSweeney v. State, 183 Ga. App. 1, 358 S.E.2d 465, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2672 (1987). Implied consent at airport security
- checkpoints.
- Because the defendant voluntarily presented self at the airport checkpoint and placed the defendant’s handbag on the counter so that it could be scanned by x-ray, a sign at the airport security checkpoint informing all persons entering the area that they will be subject to search provided the necessary consent for the search of the defendant’s handbag. Thus, by the defendant’s conduct the defendant consented to the search of the defendant’s handbag and its contents as a matter of law, and the marijuana found in the search of the handbag was admissible in evidence. State v. Rosof, 180 Ga. App. 637, 350 S.E.2d 36, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2764 (1986). If an aircraft passenger presents self to an airport security checkpoint, the passenger has consented to the screening of the passenger’s luggage by the X-ray machine and the passenger’s person by the magnetometer. Moreover, a search need not be curtailed, even if the passenger decides not to take the flight. McSweeney v. State, 183 Ga. App. 1, 358 S.E.2d 465, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2672 (1987). Placement of magnetometer at
- loading ramp.
- There is nothing unreasonable in placement of magnetometer at entrance to loading ramp at airport or in the airport security officers’ stopping a person not carrying a ticket when the device gives an alert and asking that person to remove the person’s hand from the person’s pocket, which might have been thought to contain a weapon. State v. David, 130 Ga. App. 872, 204 S.E.2d 773, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1289 (1974). Exposure of airplane passengers to magnetometers constitutes a search under U.S. Const., amend. 4, but such search even without a warrant is not unreasonable in view of the threat of air piracy. State v. David, 130 Ga. App. 872, 204 S.E.2d 773, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1289 (1974). Drug Couriers Drug courier profile characteristics have a proper role in making the determination as to the existence of reasonable suspicion. The profile is a valuable administrative tool in guiding law-enforcement officers toward individuals on whom the officers should focus their attention in order to determine whether there is a basis for a specific and articulable suspicion that the particular individual is smuggling drugs. Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1012, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3545, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1393, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 781 (1983). Stopping of airline passenger proper where passenger matched
- drug-courier profile.
- A Drug Enforcement Agency agent’s stopping and interrogation of an airline passenger at an airport was proper and did not bring the fourth amendment into play where the agent knew that the passenger was traveling from a drug center, had an unusual flight itinerary from Phoenix to Miami one evening with a return flight the next morning, and paid for the ticket in cash; and these characteristics were part of a Drug Couriers (Cont’d) drug-courier profile for detecting possible drug smugglers. United States v. Jensen, 689 F.2d 1361, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 24590 (11th Cir. 1982). Probable cause to arrest person with characteristics of drug courier
- profile.
- Where law enforcement agent, who had past experience with narcotic searches, observed a suspect who had suspicious bulge in sweater, who was overheard saying during a telephone call, “I’m just trying to help him out, make a little extra money,” and who exhibited some of the characteristics of the drug courier profile, including attempting to conceal fact that suspect was traveling with someone, agent had probable cause to believe that the suspect was committing an offense involving concealed contraband and to place suspect under arrest. Allen v. State, 172 Ga. App. 663, 324 S.E.2d 521, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3078 (1984). Facts sufficient to authorize initial
- stop.
- Because, based on experience, a federal drug enforcement agent knew that drug couriers often transport contraband strapped to their bodies, and because the defendant’s surreptitious conduct — looking over the defendant’s shoulders and adjusting the “bulge” on the defendant’s leg without lifting up the defendant’s trousers — clearly indicated an effort to conceal the protrusion, the agent had sufficient grounds for making the initial investigative stop and for seizing the bulge. United States v. Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14215 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871, 100 S. Ct. 149, 62 L. Ed. 2d 96, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3095 (1979), overruled in part, United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 20874 (5th Cir. 1982). Evidence supported finding that initial stop of defendant’s car was not a pretextual stop based upon an impermissible “drug courier profile” but instead was based upon commission of the offense of improper lane usage. O’Keefe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 519, 376 S.E.2d 406, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1462 (1988).
- Facts sufficient to authorize arrest.
- — Because the defendant exhibited suspicious “leg bulges” when the defendant exited the plane from Miami, a known source city for the distribution of drugs, which “leg bulges” attracted the immediate attention of two agents of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration, the appellant was placed under surveillance by both agents and was subsequently confronted, questioned, arrested, and searched by one of them, the defendant’s false response to the inquiry about the objects in the defendant’s boots, coupled with the agents’ observation and experience, provided the probable cause required for the defendant’s warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search incident to that arrest was not violative of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, and the fruits of that search were properly considered by the trial court in convicting the defendant of trafficking in cocaine. Miller v. State, 183 Ga. App. 702, 359 S.E.2d 683, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2732 (1987), cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 905.
- Searches held unreasonable.
- Use of drug courier profile on passenger arriving from a city known to be a major center for narcotics traffic resulted in an unreasonable search. State v. Smith, 164 Ga. App. 142, 296 S.E.2d 141, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3284 (1982). Wiretaps U.S. Const., amend. 4 applicable to
- wiretaps.
- Fourth amendment rights apply to telephone wiretapping. Dryden v. United States, 391 F.2d 214, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 7596 (5th Cir. 1968). Wire-tapping comes within this constitutional protection. Farmer v. State, 228 Ga. 225, 184 S.E.2d 647, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 527 (1971).
- Validity of warrantless wiretap.
- Although a wiretap may not have been unlawful and not subject to prosecutions under former Code 1933, § 26-3001 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62), that cannot alter the mandate of U.S. Const., amend. 4 which makes a wiretap an unlawful search and seizure without the proper warrants. Farmer v. State, 228 Ga. 225, 184 S.E.2d 647, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 527 (1971).
- Validity of search of telephone conversations unrelated to offense.
- A general and wide ranging search through all of the telephone conversations conducted on telephone lines during a period covering approximately 20 days, and seizure and recording of matters in no way related to the crime investigated, constituted a violation of the defendant’s right to privacy guaranteed to defendant under the terms of U.S. Const., amend. 4 and by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII. Cross v. State, 225 Ga. 760, 171 S.E.2d 507, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 640 (1969). lance of telephone booth conversations violated privacy upon which defendant justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Recording conversations where
- Government’s electronic surveilone party consents.
- Admitting into evidence recorded conversations between a defendant and a consenting government informant does not violate the fourth amendment right of the accused. United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 21546 (11th Cir. 1990).
- Turning over of surveillance records to aggrieved person.
- When a person’s rights of U.S. Const., amend. 4 have been violated by means of an unlawful electronic surveillance, the surveillance records must be turned over to the aggrieved person in order that the person may prevail upon the district court to determine in an adversary proceeding whether the surveillance tainted the person’s criminal conviction. United States v. Zarzour, 432 F.2d 1, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7231 (5th Cir. 1970).
- No standing to object to wiretap.
- Where none of appellant’s fourth amendment rights were violated by initial wiretap of third party’s telephone, and where no conversations of appellant were overheard on the tap nor was the tap on appellant’s premises, appellant lacked standing to object to the wiretap. Romano v. State, 162 Ga. App. 816, 292 S.E.2d 533, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3174 (1982). Standing to challenge tapping of
- codefendant’s phone.
- Defendant had no standing to challenge the electronic surveillance of a codefendant’s telephone. Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 353 S.E.2d 19, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 599 (1987). Defendant had no standing to object to a wiretap of a codefendant’s telephone that resulted in the interception of telephone calls between the defendant and the codefendant. Rogers v. State, 182 Ga.App. 599, 356 S.E.2d 546, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2637 (1987). Standing to challenge recording of
- phone conversation.
- If there is no evidence that a person was a party to a telephone conversation, nor did the person own, possess, or control the premises or telephones used in the conversations, the person has no standing to challenge the legality of a recording of the conversation. United States v. Coley, 441 F.2d 1299, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10444 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 867, 92 S. Ct. 85, 30 L. Ed. 2d 111, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 1401 (1971). Exception to “fruit of poisonous
- tree” doctrine.
- In a prosecution of defendant spouse for solicitation of murder, because there was no state participation in an illegal tapping of initial phone conversation by the other spouse, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine did not require suppression of an undercover agent’s subsequent surreptitiously taped conversations with defendant. Jordan v. State, 211 Ga. App. 86, 438 S.E.2d 371, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1420 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0388, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 357 (Ga. Feb. 3, 1994). Electronic Surveillance
- Installation and monitoring of electronic surveillance device.
- Law enforcement officials’ reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifies the placement and monitoring of an electronic tracking device or beeper. The monitoring does not violate rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 where the actual installation of the beeper is much less intrusive than the typical stop and frisk, installation occurred in a public place, defendant was neither detained nor questioned and suffered no indignity, nothing from the interior or exterior of the automobile was seized or searched, the subsequent monitoring did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the beeper only Electronic Surveillance (Cont’d) aided the officials in the performance of their lawful surveillance, and the automobile traveled public roads and was exposed to public view. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981).
- Warrantless installation of device.
- — To constitute reasonable suspicion there must be specific and articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that a crime is afoot. Such reasonable suspicion is adequate to support warrantless installation, by law enforcement officials, of electronic tracking device or beeper on an individual’s automobile. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981). Information obtained from a pen register placed on telephone can be used as evidence in a criminal trial even if the court order authorizing its installation does not comply with statutory requirements. United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16654 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1075, 112 S. Ct. 975, 117 L. Ed. 2d 139, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 720 (1992). Inserting beeper in contraband or
- other object.
- Possessors of contraband have no legitimate expectation of privacy in substances which they have no right to possess at all. Accordingly, the insertion of a beeper signaling device into such a package is constitutionally permissible. United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 10028 (5th Cir. 1978). Mere insertion of beeper device either in contraband or in or onto an otherwise lawful object does not violate fourth amendment rights where there is no trespass involved and there exists probable cause to believe that a crime is intended. Dunivant v. State, 155 Ga. App. 884, 273 S.E.2d 621, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2827 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998, 101 S. Ct. 1703, 68 L. Ed. 2d 199, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 1357 (1981). Placement of a “bumper beeper” on defendant’s vehicle constitutes a search within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 11340 (5th Cir. 1976). Reasonable suspicion is adequate to support warrantless attachment of electronic tracking device to the exterior of defendant’s vehicle parked in a public place by Drug Enforcement Administration agents. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4165 (1981). Facts sufficient to warrant placing
- beepers in boxes of chemicals.
- Call from a drug company, discovery that address given by purchasers of chemical was not one where chemical manufacturer would operate, and nature of chemicals purchased, in light of agent’s familiarity with manufacture of controlled substances, together created sufficient basis for believing that criminal enterprise was underway and placing of electronic beepers in boxes containing chemicals to maintain continuous surveillance under such circumstances does not amount to an invasion of constitutionally protected right under U.S. Const., amend. 4 to privacy nor an impermissible intrusion upon protected property rights. Dunivant v. State, 155 Ga. App. 884, 273 S.E.2d 621, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2827 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998, 101 S. Ct. 1703, 68 L. Ed. 2d 199, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 1357 (1981).
- Installation of homing beeper excused by independent radar tracking.
- The tracking of an aircraft by radar provided an independent source for its location and, therefore, excused the claimed illegal “search” of the plane as the result of the installation and maintenance of a transponder (“beeper”). United States v. Cotton, 770 F.2d 940, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 22878 (11th Cir. 1985).
- Use of cell phone location data.
- Assuming that the trial court abused the court’s discretion in admitting the defendant’s cell site location data which was obtained without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances, the error was harmless because the cell location data was cumulative of properly admitted evidence that placed the defendant at the murder scene, including the testimony of the surviving victim and an accomplice, and the defendant’s own admitted pretrial statement. Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 850 S.E.2d 110, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 750 (2020). Confessions Fact that a confession may be voluntary for purposes of the fifth amendment is merely a threshold requirement for a fourth amendment analysis in determining whether the confession should be excluded as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. Ryals v. State, 186 Ga. App. 457, 367 S.E.2d 309, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 379 (1988).
- Holding accused pending confession as violation of fourth amendment rights.
- Defendant’s argument that police violated defendant’s “state and federal constitutional rights” by holding defendant in custody, and making it clear to defendant that defendant would not be allowed to leave the police station until defendant confessed, was sufficient to raise the contention that the confession was extracted in violation of defendant’s due process rights under the fourth as well as the fifth amendment. Ryals v. State, 186 Ga. App. 457, 367 S.E.2d 309, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 379 (1988). Confession was not tainted by an illegal arrest even though a police officer placed the defendant under arrest verbally without a warrant before the officer began the interrogation resulting in the confession, since the officer, having observed the results of the offense, knew that a felony had been committed and had probable cause to believe the defendant had committed the felony. Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 21326 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103, 105 S. Ct. 2331, 85 L. Ed. 2d 848, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 1823 (1985). State Action 1. In General State action required for fourth
- amendment violation.
- Because U.S. Const., amend. 14, through which U.S. Const., amend. 4 applies to the state, requires state action, absent some state action in a search context, there can be no fourth amendment violation. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1173, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3803 (1975); Gasaway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 653, 224 S.E.2d 772, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2561, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865, 97 S. Ct. 172, 50 L. Ed. 2d 144, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 2949 (1976). U.S. Const., amend. 4, through U.S. Const., amend. 14, applies to state induced or supported actions. Its purpose is to curtail abusive state action. In the absence of unreasonable state action to invade the privacy of a citizen or seize the citizen’s property without probable cause, there is no protection afforded as a fence against a violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Misuraca, 157 Ga. App. 361, 276 S.E.2d 679, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1821, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 846, 102 S. Ct. 163, 70 L. Ed. 2d 133, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3444 (1981). U.S. Const., amend. 4 proscribes only governmental action and is wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent to the government or with the participation of a government official. Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 788, 364 S.E.2d 569, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 63 (1988). tion by federal or state officers in
- Rule inapplicable absent participasearch.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained through a search in which there was no participation or investigation by a federal or state law enforcement officer. State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S.E.2d 51, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2475 (1976). Authority to stop and question
- hunters.
- A Department of Natural Resources officer may approach a hunter in a state-run wildlife management area to determine whether the hunter has the necessary license and permits and to ask the hunter questions about the hunt, regardless of whether the officer has reason to suspect that the hunter has broken any laws. Elzey v. State, 239 Ga. App. 47, 519 S.E.2d 751, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 897 State Action (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) (1999), cert. dismissed, No. S99C1653, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 945 (Ga. Oct. 29, 1999), cert. dismissed, No. S99C1652, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 946 (Ga. Oct. 29, 1999). Bank officers not federal agents for
- purposes of constitutional liability.
- Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971), victims of constitutional violations committed by federal officials have a right to recover damages without the need for an authorizing statute, but the regulation of the banking industry does not make bank officers federal agents for the purposes of Biven’s liability. Morast v. Lance, 631 F. Supp. 474, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27392 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff’d, 807 F.2d 926, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 1016 (11th Cir. 1987). 2. Actions by Police Seizure is not unreasonable simply because police have taken precaution to arm themselves in light of unknown danger. Franklin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 3, 237 S.E.2d 425, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2170 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 55 L. Ed. 2d 799, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 1347 (1978).
- Use of deadly force.
- As a matter of law, an officer who uses deadly force against a person who threatens the officer or others with serious harm or who the officer has probable cause to believe has already inflicted serious harm on others does not thereby commit an unreasonable seizure or deprivation of life or liberty without due process. The use of deadly force by police officers in such circumstances is not, as a matter of law, unreasonable or excessive. O’Neal v. DeKalb County, 667 F. Supp. 853, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7177 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff’d, 850 F.2d 653, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 9980 (11th Cir. 1988). Apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment. Patterson v. Fuller, 654 F. Supp. 418, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1256 (N.D. Ga. 1987). Plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right not to be seized by means of deadly force unless the police officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff posed a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others. Thompson v. Spikes, 663 F. Supp. 627, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541 (S.D. Ga. 1987). Police officer’s decision during burglary investigation to shoot unidentified assailant after advising assailant to drop assailant’s gun, without identifying self as a police officer, was not unreasonable in light of assailant’s pointing and using gun at officer. Linder v. Richmond County, 844 F. Supp. 764, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1636 (S.D. Ga.), aff’d, 38 F.3d 574, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28510 (11th Cir. 1994). Use of deadly force by officer justi-
- fied.
- City was not vicariously liable for the officer’s alleged battery because the officer’s use of deadly force was justified as the officer did not violate the fourth amendment in using deadly force against the decedent based on the decedent using the decedent’s vehicle to elude and threaten the officers. L. T. v. Owens, 808 Fed. Appx. 814, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10387 (11th Cir. 2020).
- Claims relating to excessive force.
- — Claims relating to excessive force in the course of an arrest are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. Turton v. City of Atlanta, 738 F. Supp. 1419, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7627 (N.D. Ga. 1990). Evidence that an arrestee had stopped the car in compliance with an officer’s instructions during a traffic stop for speeding and that the arrestee was then shot in the face by the officer did not entitle the officer to qualified immunity from liability for using excessive force in violation of the fourth amendment. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the officer. Porter v. Massarelli, 303 Ga. App. 91, 692 S.E.2d 722, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 279 (2010).
- Pregnant woman claiming excessive force.
- There was no excessive force sufficient to indicate an officer violated any clearly established constitutional right where a plaintiff, a woman in her eighth month of pregnancy, passed a road block without permission which provided the officer with arguable probable cause, drove away from the scene, parked and ran into a building, and the officer, catching her in the building, only firmly held her and contacted her abdomen in the process; the act of physically holding back a misdemeanor suspect who was attempting to leave the scene, even given her pregnant condition, was not disproportionate although the woman later miscarried. Moore v. Gwinnett County, 967 F.2d 1495, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17778 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081, 113 S. Ct. 1049, 122 L. Ed. 2d 357, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 917 (1993).
- Excessive force found.
- Officers were not justified in using any force to arrest plaintiffs who were not suspected of committing a serious crime, did not pose an immediate threat to anyone, and did not actively resist arrest. Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 398 (11th Cir. 1998).
- Excessive force of police not found.
- — Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force based on police officer’s “rough, rude” treatment whereby plaintiff received an injured eye was groundless, as not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates an arrestee’s constitutional rights. Newsome v. Webster, 843 F. Supp. 1460, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1285 (S.D. Ga. 1994). Police officer’s alleged “grabbing” and “dragging” away of intoxicated defendant who struck officer for preventing defendant from interfering, at the direction of the attending emergency medical technicians at the scene of defendant’s child’s car wreck, did not constitute excessive force. Hodges v. Waters, 843 F. Supp. 1470, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1281 (S.D. Ga. 1994). Because 40 law enforcement officers who provided the official personnel to check the identifications of night club patrons were the reasonable means to assist a revenue agent in conducting an administrative search, plaintiffs failed to state the violation of a constitutional right in the context of excessive force. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21641 (11th Cir. 1999).
- Shooting held not seizure.
- Where there is no evidence that a police officer intended to shoot plaintiff ’s decedent or that the officer did so volitionally, the shooting does not constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Matthews v. City of Atlanta, 699 F. Supp. 1552, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13165 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Actions of police officers who, responding to emergency call, were attacked by decedent, and, against the family’s wishes, entered the house to subdue the decedent, were fired upon and fired back, resulting in the decedent’s death, while constituting a “seizure,” were neither unreasonable nor offensive to the fourth amendment. Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 17170 (11th Cir. 1994). 3. Private Individuals U.S. Const., amend. 4 cannot be evaded by the use of a private person to do what an officer of the state cannot do. State v. Betsill, 144 Ga. App. 267, 240 S.E.2d 781, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2667 (1977).
- Search by private individual.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4’s protections against unreasonable search and seizure do not extend to a search or seizure made by a private individual, conducted without police participation. Moye v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 230, 214 S.E.2d 920, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1090 (1975).
- Search by private person not covered.
- With reference to searches by private persons, there is no prohibition under U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1173, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3803 (1975); State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S.E.2d 51, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2475 (1976). A search by a private person is not covered by U.S. Const., amend. 4. U.S. Const., amend. 4 is intended as a restriction on the activities of the government and its agents, and is not addressed to actions, illegal or legal, of private persons. Tootle v. State, 135 Ga. App. 840, 219 S.E.2d 492, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1845 (1975). U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects individuals against unlawful intrusions made by government, not against those made by private parties. Where no official State Action (Cont’d) 3. Private Individuals (Cont’d) of the federal government has any connection with a wrongful seizure, or any knowledge of it until after the fact, the evidence is admissible. United States v. Jackson, 578 F.2d 1162, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 9351 (5th Cir. 1978). U.S. Const., amend. 4, though textually not so limited, actually affords protection only against unreasonable searches and seizures made by governmental officers, so however unreasonable a search by a private person may be, absent participation by governmental agents, U.S. Const., amend. 4 is totally uninvolved. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1768 (1980). The fourth amendment proscribes only governmental action and is wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the government or with the participation of a government official. Marks v. State, 174 Ga. App. 711, 330 S.E.2d 900, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2746 (1985). With reference to searches by private persons, there is no fourth amendment prohibition and therefore no occasion for applying the exclusionary rule. Lane v. State, 180 Ga. App. 168, 348 S.E.2d 711, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2691 (1986). There is no fourth amendment violation where an individual’s privacy is initially invaded by a private act. Therefore, the discovery of illegal material by a private citizen and the verification of this evidence by an officer which leads ultimately to the issuance of an arrest warrant is reasonable and does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. Hester v. State, 187 Ga. App. 46, 369 S.E.2d 278, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 583 (1988). Evidence illegally seized by private
- citizens admissible.
- U.S. Const., amend. 4, though textually not so limited, actually affords protection only against unreasonable searches and seizures made by governmental officers. Therefore, however unreasonable a search by a private person may be, absent participation by governmental agents, U.S. Const., amend. 4 is totally uninvolved and the evidence, though illegally seized by private individuals, is admissible in a criminal prosecution. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1173, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3803 (1975). Absent participation by governmental agents, U.S. Const., amend. 4 is totally uninvolved and the evidence, though illegally seized by private individuals, is admissible in a criminal prosecution. Gasaway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 653, 224 S.E.2d 772, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2561, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865, 97 S. Ct. 172, 50 L. Ed. 2d 144, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 2949 (1976). cers of seized contraband by private
- Delivery to law enforcement offiparties.
- If the seizure was not attended by law enforcement officers, simple delivery of the seized contraband to law enforcement officers does not involve those officers in the search and seizure. State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S.E.2d 51, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2475 (1976). tained by private person as agent of
- Evidence inadmissible where obgovernment.
- Evidence obtained by private person is incompetent where governmental agents, through suggestion, order, or request made a private person their agent for the purposes of criminal investigation, or where governmental agents participate in the search and seizure. Gasaway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 653, 224 S.E.2d 772, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2561, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865, 97 S. Ct. 172, 50 L. Ed. 2d 144, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 2949 (1976). Entry or search of motel room by
- motel manager.
- It is not unauthorized search for hotel management personnel, including security personnel, to open unlocked items found on their premises in an attempt to determine ownership so that the lost or misplaced property can be returned to its proper owner. Berger v. State, 150 Ga. App. 166, 257 S.E.2d 8, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2168 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S. Ct. 1312, 63 L. Ed. 2d 759, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1125 (1980). Where the initial entry into a motel room was made by the manager, a private citizen, it was not prohibited by the fourth amendment. Smith v. State, 186 Ga. App. 303, 367 S.E.2d 573, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 376 (1988). Where upon entering a motel room on which the rent was unpaid, the manager found a grocery sack with marijuana in plain sight and thereafter opened two suitcases and discovered more marijuana and called the police and allowed them in, since it was reasonably apparent to them that the prior occupant had abandoned the premises, the manager’s invitation obviated the need for a warrant to authorize the officers’ entry. Smith v. State, 186 Ga. App. 303, 367 S.E.2d 573, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 376 (1988). Because a motel manager testified that the manager made no connection between a police call regarding room 103 and the manager’s subsequent entry into room 437, and that no rent having been paid for room 437, the manager’s search of the luggage for identification was standard procedure, this does not mandate a conclusion that the manager was the agent of the state, in searching suitcases found in room 437. Smith v. State, 186 Ga. App. 303, 367 S.E.2d 573, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 376 (1988). Because the motel room registration of the woman the defendant was staying with had run out at 11:00 A.M., neither the defendant nor the woman was a guest after that time due to their failure to pay for another night’s stay and, thus, the defendant had no legal possession or control of the room and no expectation of privacy where the drugs were found since the officers entered and searched the motel room after 11:00 A.M. Lindsey v. State, 353 Ga. App. 231, 836 S.E.2d 563, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 623 (2019).
- Seizure by apartment employees.
- The seizure of cocaine from an apartment, which seizure was accomplished by employees of the apartment complex, was not a violation of defendant’s fourth amendment rights, because the apartment complex employees were neither agents of the state nor were they acting pursuant to any police instructions. Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 370 S.E.2d 348, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 675 (1988).
- Neighbors of defendant.
- Where no law enforcement officers or other state officials were involved when defendant’s neighbors entered defendant’s trailer and obtained an article of clothing, a shirt, from defendant, the seizure of defendant’s shirt by these private parties did not implicate U.S. Const., amend. 4, and U.S. Const., amend. 4 was not violated when the shirt was later turned over to law enforcement officers. Pruitt v. State, 258 Ga. 583, 373 S.E.2d 192, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 420 (1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S. Ct. 1170, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1072, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 852 (1990).
- Resident of home.
- Even though police officers requested defendant’s spouse to search the marital home for evidence, admission of items the spouse found was not precluded because the spouse lived in the residence and had common authority over it and its contents. Johnson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 823, 499 S.E.2d 145, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 465 (1998), cert. denied, No. S98C1192, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 833 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1998).
- Residents of trailer.
- Where all objected-to evidence was either turned over to the police by the residents of a trailer, to which the police were voluntarily admitted, this amounted to a search by private individuals, which is not prohibited by U.S. Const., amend. 4 even if unreasonable. Tomlinson v. State, 188 Ga. App. 213, 373 S.E.2d 25, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 917 (1988).
- Search of suitcase by airline employee.
- Where an airline employee searched a suitcase which had opened on a conveyor belt used for loading airplanes in order to prevent loss and breakage of its contents, the search was a private one and was not covered by U.S. Const., amend. 4. Andreu v. State, 124 Ga. App. 793, 186 S.E.2d 137, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1108 (1971). Standing One must have standing to move to
- suppress evidence.
- The constitutional right violated must belong to the person seeking to suppress illegally seized evidence or the fruits thereof. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), Standing (Cont’d) aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Suppression of product of violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4 can be urged only by one whose own rights have been infringed by the search itself. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Defendants charged with crimes of possession can secure the benefits of the exclusionary rule only if their own rights have in fact been violated. United States v. Robinson, 504 F. Supp. 425, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15636 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- Rights may not be vicariously asserted.
- Rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 are personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted. Tisdol v. State, 158 Ga. App. 852, 282 S.E.2d 411, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2442 (1981); United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 14501 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851, 102 S. Ct. 292, 70 L. Ed. 2d 141, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3506 (1981); Romano v. State, 162 Ga. App. 816, 292 S.E.2d 533, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3174 (1982); Mann v. State, 196 Ga. App. 730, 397 S.E.2d 17, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1066 (1990); Bramblett v. State, 205 Ga. App. 290, 422 S.E.2d 18, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1150 (1992); Henderson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 102, 438 S.E.2d 181, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1444 (1993). That rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 are personal in nature, and that such rights cannot bestow vicarious protection on those who do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched, was recognized by the common law. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89 (1981). The fact that the defendant’s companion may have possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in a carry-on bag was of no aid to the defendant. Rights secured by the fourth amendment are personal and cannot be vicariously asserted. United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 5153 (11th Cir. 1987).
- Requirement for standing.
- In order to qualify as a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure, one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else. Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 160 S.E.2d 368, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 685 (1968). Violation under U.S. Const., amend. 4 can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. Grantling v. State, 229 Ga. 746, 194 S.E.2d 405, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 762 (1972). The rights assured by U.S. Const., amend. 4 are personal rights, and a person is aggrieved by a search and seizure only if that person’s own protection under U.S. Const., amend. 4 has been infringed. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). A defendant has standing to contest the validity of a search if a reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by the intrusion. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 9854 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968, 99 S. Ct. 458, 58 L. Ed. 2d 427, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 3851 (1978). If a defendant does not show that the defendant was on the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure, or allege a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises, and is not charged with an offense requiring possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure, the defendant cannot be heard to question the constitutionality of the search. United States v. Williams, 613 F.2d 560, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 19701 (5th Cir. 1980). In order to establish standing, one must assert either a property or possessory interest in the premises searched or the property seized. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 668, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 775 (1981). One wishing to suppress evidence obtained from one’s person and car is
- “person aggrieved”.
- Because the evidence that the defendant sought to suppress was obtained during the execution of a search warrant authorizing the search of the defendant’s person and automobile, the defendant would be a person aggrieved by the search, if it should be held to be unlawful. Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 160 S.E.2d 368, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 685 (1968). Person aggrieved by evidence
- seized from third party.
- A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of the defendant’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 infringed. Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2658 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1251 (1980); Romano v. State, 162 Ga. App. 816, 292 S.E.2d 533, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3174 (1982). It is the relationship of the person with the property searched that gives rise to the protection of the fourth amendment, and an individual who claims to be aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises has not had any of the individual’s fourth amendment rights infringed. Todd v. State, 184 Ga. App. 750, 362 S.E.2d 400, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2827 (1987); Morrill v. State, 216 Ga. App. 468, 454 S.E.2d 796, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 183 (1995), cert. denied, No. S95C0965, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 583 (Ga. May 15, 1995).
- Visitors.
- A person has no standing to object to a search of the premises, and particularly a limited one, where the person is a mere visitor (although a frequent one), since the person has no expectation of privacy in the premises of another, where the person has neither a proprietary nor a possessory interest. Dennis v. State, 166 Ga. App. 715, 305 S.E.2d 443, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3266 (1983). Defendant, who was merely a guest who came and went at irregular intervals, had neither a proprietary nor a possessory interest in the searched premises, and lacked standing to challenge the validity of the search. State v. Scott, 176 Ga. App. 887, 339 S.E.2d 276, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2954 (1985). House guest, moving to suppress items found in search of house, lacked standing, failing to prove a sufficient connection to the residency to justify a reasonable expectation of privacy. An oral agreement to move into the house had not been effectuated (i.e., the guest’s personal effects had not been moved) and the personal relationship between the guest and the resident was unsettled. United States v. Gilley, 608 F. Supp. 1065, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20241 (S.D. Ga. 1985).
- Overnight guest in rented room.
- Defendant’s claim that the defendant was a frequent “overnight guest” and “social guest” in a room rented by another was not sufficient to show the defendant had standing to challenge officers’ entry into the room. Atwater v. State, 233 Ga. App. 339, 503 S.E.2d 919, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 973 (1998).
- Standing to protest search of defendant’s sibling’s home.
- Immunity from unreasonable search and seizure is privilege personal to those whose rights have been infringed, and the accused is not such a person, if the home of the sibling be considered searched unreasonably. Marsh v. State, 223 Ga. 590, 157 S.E.2d 273, 1967 Ga. LEXIS 616 (1967). Standing of lessee to object to
- search of adjacent unleased area.
- Since law enforcement agents did not enter property belonging to or under the control of the defendant and the defendant’s family, who leased certain property from a landowner but grew marijuana in an adjacent unleased area, the defendant, who was not a caretaker of the owner’s property, had no standing to object to the search of the unleased area. Smallwood v. State, 171 Ga. App. 784, 321 S.E.2d 118, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3005 (1984). Standing to contest warrantless
- search of automobile.
- Objection that an automobile was illegally searched without a warrant is not available to one who makes no claim to the ownership or possession of the automobile or its contents and who was not present at the time of the search. Gugliotta v. State, 117 Ga. App. 212, 160 S.E.2d 266, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1035 (1968). Standing (Cont’d) Because a warrantless search of an automobile was made, which was not the property of the accused and because the accused did not show that the accused was driving the same with permission of the owner or with permission of anyone entitled to possession of the automobile, the accused has no standing to invoke constitutional guarantees to exclude evidence found in the search. Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 211 S.E.2d 294, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 758 (1974). Passenger in car owned by another has no interest in car and no standing to object to search. Autry v. State, 150 Ga. App. 584, 258 S.E.2d 268, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2216 (1979). Fact that defendant may have legitimately been on premises searched (i.e., as passenger in automobile) does not in and of itself entitle one to challenge the validity of the search and seizure. Meyer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 613, 258 S.E.2d 217, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2228 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 952, 100 S. Ct. 1602, 63 L. Ed. 2d 788, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1341 (1980). Defendant-passenger in automobile, owned by another, being driven at time of arrest does not have standing to object to claimed violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4 regarding execution of warrantless search of automobile. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 668, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 775 (1981). Passenger in rented automobile
- lacked standing.
- Defendant, who was a mere passenger in a rented automobile, had no property or possessory interest in the vehicle and lacked standing to object to the lawfulness of a search of the trunk of the vehicle. Mecale v. State, 186 Ga. App. 276, 367 S.E.2d 52, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 316 (1988). senger had equal access to use of truck owned by the passenger’s parent, each had legitimate expectation of privacy in the truck, and thus had standing to contest the admission of evidence seized in the search of the truck. Stone v. State, 162 Ga. App. 654, 292 S.E.2d 525, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3156 (1982).
- Because defendant driver and pas-Expectation of privacy in automobile owned by another.
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the car the defendant was driving because the defendant was not the owner of the car the defendant was driving; the day the defendant was arrested, the police contacted the owner of the car and obtained the owner’s consent to search the car; and, even assuming that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle, the search was proper as the defendant was not present and objecting at the time of the search of the vehicle the defendant was driving, the owner’s consent was all that was required for the search to be lawful. Gomillion v. State, 298 Ga. 505, 783 S.E.2d 103, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 166, cert. denied, 580 U.S. 921, 137 S. Ct. 302, 196 L. Ed. 2d 223, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 6184 (2016). quishes actual possession to a third party, the owner thereby abandons any expectation of privacy in the automobile, and therefore lacks standing to contest the legality of the search and seizure of the vehicle. Prothro v. State, 186 Ga. App. 836, 368 S.E.2d 793, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 490 (1988).
- If owner of an automobile relin-Standing of one permitting intoxicated driver to operate automobile.
- — The question of whether a defendant, charged with permitting an intoxicated driver to operate an automobile, has standing to urge the violation of the driver’s statutory rights as basis for excluding intoximeter evidence did not involve questions of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure, but did require consideration of the language of the statute (§ 40-6-392) itself. Munda v. State, 172 Ga. App. 857, 324 S.E.2d 799, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2690 (1984).
- No standing in stolen car.
- An accused can have no legitimate expectation of privacy in a stolen car. Sanborn v. State, 251 Ga. 169, 304 S.E.2d 377, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 760 (1983).
- No standing in abandoned or unclaimed luggage.
- Defendant has no standing to challenge the search of an abandoned briefcase or an unclaimed suitcase, and has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the abandoned or unclaimed items. United States v. Canady, 615 F.2d 694, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 18504 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862, 101 S. Ct. 165, 66 L. Ed. 2d 78, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 3116 (1980). No standing in abandoned bank
- currency bag.
- A bank currency bag which is found on a public street under the accused’s car is abandoned property, which does not fall within the ambit of the protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4, and the car’s occupant lacks standing to protest its seizure. Hawkins v. State, 146 Ga. App. 312, 246 S.E.2d 343, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2332 (1978). Ownership of seized contraband alone is not sufficient to entitle a defendant to challenge a search; the defendant bears the burden of proving not only that the search was illegal but also that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Stone v. State, 162 Ga. App. 654, 292 S.E.2d 525, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3156 (1982).
- Standing of one charged with unlawful possession.
- A defendant charged with a crime that includes, as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure does not have automatic standing to challenge the legality of the search and seizure. United States v. Odum, 625 F.2d 626, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14220 (5th Cir. 1980). Possessory interest impacting
- standing.
- Where possession is a vital element of an offense, the defendant need not prove a possessory interest in real estate in order to contest an illegal search. Dunbar v. State, 163 Ga. App. 243, 292 S.E.2d 897, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3196 (1982). When possession of seized evidence is itself an essential element of the offense with which the defendant is charged, the state is precluded from denying that the defendant has the requisite possessory interest to challenge the admission of the evidence. However, it is only where possession at the time of the contested search and seizure is an essential element of the offense charged that one is entitled to automatic standing. Meyer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 613, 258 S.E.2d 217, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2228 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 952, 100 S. Ct. 1602, 63 L. Ed. 2d 788, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1341 (1980). Because the defendant disavowed any possessory or ownership interest in the 74.8 grams of cocaine found on the codefendant’s person, the defendant had no standing to complain of its seizure. Randall v. State, 194 Ga. App. 153, 390 S.E.2d 74, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 11 (1990). Codefendants and coconspirators have no “special standing” and cannot prevent admission against them of information illegally obtained through electronic surveillance against another defendant. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Suppression as to defendant with standing requires suppression as to
- all defendants.
- If the defendant with standing does move to suppress illegally seized evidence, the motion, if granted, should require suppression as to all defendants in a joint trial. Wrongful denial of a motion to suppress illegally seized evidence prejudices both the person making such motion as well as the codefendants and the right to have such evidence excluded cannot be limited to the defendant moving to do so. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973).
- Motion to suppress sufficiently alleging standing.
- A motion by a defendant to suppress evidence because of an unlawful search and seizure sufficiently alleges that defendant had standing to challenge the legality of defendant’s arrest, the seizure of the vehicle, and the following search, if the facts alleged in the motion can be fairly construed to state that defendant was legitimately on the premises of a codefendant at the time of their arrest and of seizure of the latter’s property and, therefore, the fruits of the search and seizure were proposed to be used against defendant so that defendant would be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure. Bramblett v. State, 135 Ga. Standing (Cont’d) App. 770, 219 S.E.2d 26, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1818 (1975). Defendant failed to demonstrate requisite expectation of privacy to establish standing to challenge admission of evidence. — See United States v. Perry, 746 F.2d 713, 1984 U.S.App. LEXIS 16788 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054, 105 S. Ct. 1760, 84 L. Ed. 2d 822, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 1428 (1985). Because a defendant did not show a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room needed to establish standing under the fourth amendment, the trial court properly denied a motion to suppress items taken from the room. The defendant did not establish that the defendant was sharing the room with the registered guest or that the defendant was an overnight guest of the registered guest; there was no evidence that the defendant had a key to the room; and there was no evidence of any luggage belonging to the defendant in the room. Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 17, 663 S.E.2d 142, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 542 (2008). sionary Rule 1. In General Under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), the sanction for an unconstitutional search is exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of that search. Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 271 S.E.2d 478, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1130 (1980). Fruits of an illegal arrest are not admissible in evidence in a criminal trial. State v. Bishop, 188 Ga. App. 881, 374 S.E.2d 808, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1248 (1988). Limitation of “fruit of poisonous tree doctrine.” — The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is limited to evidence which the police cannot trace to an independent and lawful source. State v. Wright, 204 Ga. App. 382, 419 S.E.2d 334, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 834 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C1148, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 688 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1992). Illegal arrest invokes exclusion
- Admissibility of Evidence; Exclu-only where Constitution violated.
- Exclusionary sanction applies to any “fruits” of a constitutional violation and an illegal arrest does not necessarily violate the constitution. Vaughn v. State, 248 Ga. 127, 281 S.E.2d 594, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 938 (1981). Exclusionary rule does not apply absent violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4, and sometimes does not apply when such violation occurs. State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S.E.2d 51, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2475 (1976).
- Purpose of exclusionary rule.
- The purpose of U.S. Const., amend. 4 — that is, deterrence of governmental lawlessness — is served by application of the exclusionary rule regardless of the criminal or administrative nature of the proceedings involved, and regardless of the personal or corporate nature of the party aggrieved by the unlawful seizure. FTC v. Page, 378 F. Supp. 1052, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7885 (N.D. Ga. 1974). The exclusionary rule was created and has been applied primarily for the purpose of deterring police invasions of a defendant’s constitutional rights by banning evidence illegally seized from introduction at a criminal trial of that defendant. Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784, 219 S.E.2d 28, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1825 (1975), overruled in part, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 438 (2011). The primary reason for the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, whether it be negligent or intentional. State v. Stringer, 258 Ga. 605, 372 S.E.2d 426, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 400 (1988). The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of issuing magistrates, it has been modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance by an officer on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective. Bell v. State, 204 Ga. App. 528, 419 S.E.2d 729, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 901 (1992). Deterrent benefit of exclusion must
- outweigh interest in providing evidence.
- For the exclusionary rule to be applied, the deterrent benefit of exclusion must outweigh the detriment to the public interest in providing factfinders with all relevant testimony. In many cases the deterrent purpose is served by merely precluding the government’s use in its case-in-chief of any fruits of an illegal search at a criminal trial. Jonas v. City of Atlanta, 647 F.2d 580, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12348 (5th Cir. 1981).
- Independent source doctrine.
- When applying the independent source doctrine, the court was bound to follow Murray v. U.S., 487 U.S. 533, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 2881 (1988) and, therefore, must consider whether the state’s decision to seek a warrant for evidence previously obtained through unlawful means was prompted by the prior unlawful search. Tatum v. State, 319 Ga. 187, 903 S.E.2d 109, 2024 Ga. LEXIS 137 (2024).
- No “good faith” exception.
- In Georgia, a defendant’s statutory right to exclusion of evidence has no “good faith” exception, so a court must determine the validity of a search based on the facts known to the officer at the time of the search, and if it concludes from those facts that the search was not valid, it cannot uphold it on grounds that, under the facts, the officer may have drawn a good-faith legal conclusion contrary to the court’s conclusion. Randolph v. State, 264 Ga. App. 396, 590 S.E.2d 834, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1499 (2003), aff’d, 278 Ga. 614, 604 S.E.2d 835, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 991 (2004). Evidence from unlawful search or
- interrogation inadmissible.
- Evidence of guilt that the defendant, either directly or indirectly, is compelled to disclose by an unlawful search and seizure of the defendant’s person under illegal arrest, is not admissible in a criminal prosecution of the person thus illegally arrested. Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 S.E.2d 169, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 870 (1964). Evidence obtained as result of illegal search and seizure is not admissible in either federal or state courts. Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 S.E.2d 169, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 870 (1964); Cash v. State, 222 Ga. 55, 148 S.E.2d 420, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 396 (1966). Evidence obtained under illegal arrest not admissible in state courts. Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 S.E.2d 169, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 870 (1964). All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in state court. Carson v. State ex rel. Price, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384, 1965 Ga. LEXIS 441 (1965). Because a warrant was illegally issued and the search under it was unlawful, it was error to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence that was the fruit of the search. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1212 (1969). Neither evidence found in illegal search, nor knowledge acquired from such search, can be used legally in enforcing the law. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). If evidence is obtained by an unlawful search or by means of custodial interrogation in the absence of proper warnings, the knowledge acquired thereby cannot be legally used in enforcing the law. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10877 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 1402, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8371 (5th Cir. 1973). Evidence seized during unlawful search should not be admitted into evidence since the obtaining of it was tainted by the illegal arrest. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976). Evidence obtained under a void warrant is evidence illegally obtained and it has been settled once and for all that the taint of illegal procurement forbids its use as evidence. Anderson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 25, 270 S.E.2d 263, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2440 (1980). The law proscribes only unreasonable searches and seizures and prohibits the use of evidence seized as a result of lawless police activity. State v. Sanders, 155 Ga. App. 274, 270 S.E.2d 850, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2556 (1980). Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained by state or federal government officials in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4 cannot be used in a proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Romano v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 191, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11526 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Admissibility of Evidence; Exclusionary Rule (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) dence not to be used at all. — The essence of U.S. Const., amend. 4, forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way, is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all. FTC v. Page, 378 F. Supp. 1052, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7885 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Evidence illegally obtained is not excluded because it is untrustworthy or lacks credibility, but simply because it was obtained in violation of the Constitution. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Exclusionary rule has nothing to do with reliability of fact-finding process in determining guilt or innocence, but is simply a means of making effective the protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4 against unreasonable searches and seizures. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10914 (5th Cir. 1971). Reason for different treatment of
- Unconstitutionally obtained eviunconstitutional search and unconstitutional arrest.
- The difference in treatment between an unconstitutional search (suppression of the items seized) and an unconstitutional arrest (no foreclosure of prosecution) has been explained as being in the “public interest in having the guilty brought to book.” Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 271 S.E.2d 478, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1130 (1980). Sanction for an unconstitutional arrest is not suppression of the pros-
- ecution.
- The sanction for an unconstitutional arrest is exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of that arrest. Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 271 S.E.2d 478, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1130 (1980). Sanction for an unconstitutional arrest is exclusion of any evidence obtained during the arrest, but a plea in bar of prosecution is not an authorized sanction. Thus, although it is arguable that a photograph of the defendant taken after the alleged illegal arrest should have been suppressed, the purported illegal arrest would not act as a plea in bar to the prosecution, nor would it prevent the in-court identification of the defendant where such identification was based on the events surrounding the incident itself, and not on events following the purported illegal arrest. Lindsey v. State, 182 Ga. App. 10, 354 S.E.2d 650, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2593 (1987). Exclusion of evidence to enforce guaranty unrelated to fact-finding
- applicable only prospectively.
- Where concededly relevant evidence would be excluded in order to enforce a constitutional guaranty unrelated to the fact-finding process, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that any such new constitutional principle would be accorded only prospective application. State v. Patterson, 143 Ga. App. 225, 237 S.E.2d 707, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2261 (1977).
- Retroactive application of exclusionary rule not required.
- If law enforcement officers reasonably believe in good faith that evidence seized was admissible at trial, judicial integrity is not offended by the introduction into evidence of that material even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure have broadened the exclusionary rule to encompass evidence seized in that manner and, when this is shown, retroactive application of the new rule is not required. Lawson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 776, 240 S.E.2d 188, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2498 (1977). Exclusionary rule not remedial in
- nature.
- The main thrust of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal conduct on the part of public officials; it was not intended to be remedial in nature. Romano v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 191, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11526 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
- When rule must be applied.
- If there is a causal connection between an illegal arrest and a custodial statement of confession, then the exclusionary rule must be applied to ensure compliance with the fourth amendment. State v. Stringer, 258 Ga. 605, 372 S.E.2d 426, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 400 (1988). An arrest unsupported by probable cause and made solely for the purpose of investigating a crime in the hope that something will turn up as a result of the ensuing investigation, intrudes so severely on the interest protected by the fourth amendment that exclusion of the statement is mandated. State v. Stringer, 258 Ga. 605, 372 S.E.2d 426, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 400 (1988). Mere fact that action is taken by state officials is not adequate to invoke exclusionary rule even if that action violates U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1173, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3803 (1975).
- Good-faith exception.
- Evidence which is seized in good-faith reliance upon a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate will generally not be subject to the suppression on fourth amendment grounds, regardless of whether the allegations upon which the magistrate based the issuance of the warrant were sufficient to establish the probable cause for the search. Betha v. State, 192 Ga. App. 789, 386 S.E.2d 515, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1205 (1989). The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for searches conducted pursuant to warrants applied, where the warrant was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in the existence of probable cause entirely unreasonable. United States v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8778 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919, 111 S. Ct. 1307, 113 L. Ed. 2d 242, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 1678 (1991). Because the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of issuing magistrates, it has been modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance by an officer on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective. State v. Morris, 198 Ga. App. 441, 402 S.E.2d 288, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 165 (1991).
- Independent basis.
- Denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress was affirmed as the defendant’s flight from an improper Terry stop gave the police officers an independent basis to arrest the defendant; thus, the methamphetamine found in close proximity to the defendant was admissible. Reynolds v. State, 280 Ga. App. 712, 634 S.E.2d 842, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 931 (2006). Question whether evidence should
- be suppressed.
- In those cases wherein a search warrant has been sought and issued, the ultimate question of whether evidence should be suppressed is not dependent upon the magistrate’s erroneous determination that the warrant should have issued, but upon the officer’s objective good-faith reliance upon the magistrate’s determination, erroneous though that determination might have been. Debey v. State, 192 Ga. App. 512, 385 S.E.2d 694, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1090 (1989).
- Evidence not obtained by exploiting illegal arrest not suppressible.
- Even if a warrantless arrest is illegal, neither a voluntary confession nor the fruits of a consensual search are suppressible where, in the totality of surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, neither was obtained by exploitation of the illegality of the arrest, there was in fact probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant, and the behavior and purpose of the police was neither a fishing expedition nor in purposeful and flagrant bad faith. Knighton v. State, 166 Ga. App. 390, 304 S.E.2d 512, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2182 (1983). Evidence is not fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Thus, even if evidence would not have been discovered but for the illegal police conduct, if the derivative evidence has only an attenuated link to the illegality, it need not be suppressed. Ruffin v. State, 201 Ga. App. 792, 412 S.E.2d 850, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1606 (1991).
- Purging of initial illegal taint.
- Evidence is not “fruit of the poisonous tree” simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting estab-Admissibility of Evidence; Exclusionary Rule (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) lishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which an objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. McKinney v. State, 261 Ga. App. 218, 582 S.E.2d 463, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 515 (2003). Discovery of outstanding warrant
- during routine check.
- Police officer’s discovery of a valid outstanding warrant against the defendant during routine computer check attenuated the connection between the illegal stop and the search that revealed incriminating evidence. Ruffin v. State, 201 Ga. App. 792, 412 S.E.2d 850, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1606 (1991). Evidence inadvertently discovered
- in course of justified intrusion.
- On occasion where one, in the course of an intrusion for which a prior justification exists, comes inadvertently upon a piece of incriminating evidence, such evidence is admissible on the basis that no infraction of rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 was intended. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3186 (1981). Inevitable discovery exception to
- exclusionary rule.
- Under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, evidence is admissible that otherwise would be excludable if it inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means had the illegal conduct not occurred. The exception applies to inevitable lawful discoveries by private parties as well as by government agents. United States v. Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d 779, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 1277 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918, 107 S. Ct. 3194, 96 L. Ed. 2d 682, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2569 (1987).
- Statement made during illegal detention inadmissible.
- If the search and arrest are illegal, then an admission given during the illegal detention is tainted and is therefore inadmissible. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976). Exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence derived from a voluntary
- but Miranda-tainted statement.
- Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1137, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1092, 103 S. Ct. 580, 74 L. Ed. 2d 940, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4768 (1982), but see, Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 476 S.E.2d 747, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 885 (1996). Although certain evidence may be admissible under the fifth amendment, it may still be excludable under the fourth amendment, if the evidence was obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. Griffith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 255, 322 S.E.2d 921, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3044 (1984).
- Miranda warnings do not necessarily cure taint.
- Though statements by the defendant may possibly be voluntary under U.S. Const., amend. 5, it does not necessarily mean they were voluntary under U.S. Const., amend. 4 since they might be tainted by an illegal arrest and detention. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976). Miranda warnings do not, without more, dissipate the taint of an illegal seizure. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (5th Cir. 1980). Even though proper Miranda warnings may have been given prior to a defendant’s making an incriminatory statement and even though the statement may have been voluntary for U.S. Const., amend. 5 purposes, the statement is nonetheless inadmissible under U.S. Const., amend. 4 if it is the product of an illegal seizure. Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 277 S.E.2d 18, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 753 (1981). There is no per se rule that Miranda warnings in and of themselves suffice to cure a fourth amendment violation involved in obtaining inculpatory statements during custodial interrogation following a formal arrest on less than probable cause. In order to use such statements, the prosecution must show not only that the statements meet fifth amendment requirements (voluntariness), but also that the causal connection between the statements and the illegal arrest is sufficiently attenuated so as to purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest in light of the distinct policies and interests of the fourth amendment. Robinson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 741, 305 S.E.2d 381, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3272 (1983). Even though proper Miranda warnings may have been given prior to a defendant’s making an incriminatory statement and even though the statement may have been voluntary for fifth amendment purposes, the statement is nonetheless inadmissible under U.S. Const., amend. 4 if it is the product of an illegal seizure. Green v. State, 168 Ga. App. 558, 309 S.E.2d 687, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3422 (1983). For confession given after illegal seizure to be admissible in evidence, government must prove two things: that the confession was voluntary for purposes of U.S. Const., amend. 5, and that the confession was not the product of the illegal seizure. The same requirements apply where the evidence has been obtained by means of a consent to search rather than a confession. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (5th Cir. 1980).
- Burden on state to show admissibility of statements made during unlawful custody.
- Each case is to be judged individually on its facts, and the burden is on the prosecution to show the admissibility of statements made by the defendant while in unlawful custody. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976). Burden of proof on state to show
- testimony not induced to validate illegally obtained evidence.
- If a defendant’s testimony is induced in order to overcome the impact of illegally obtained evidence, then the defendant’s testimony is tainted by the illegally obtained evidence, and the state has the burden to show that its illegal action did not induce the defendant’s testimony. Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 94, 230 S.E.2d 101, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1359 (1976).
- Effect of unlawfully seized evidence on lawfully seized evidence.
- There is no requirement that where evidence has been lawfully seized it must be suppressed if officers unlawfully seized other material, unless the unlawfully seized evidence led to the discovery of the evidence which was admitted. Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 303 S.E.2d 437, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 721 (1983), rev’d, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 86 (1984). No constitutional right to suppress evidence solely on ground that others have access to it. Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 1066 (1981). Entrapment is not a rationale for suppressing evidence but is an affirmative defense to a criminal prosecution. State v. Baker, 216 Ga. App. 66, 453 S.E.2d 115, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 22 (1995). mony regarding probable cause on
- Consideration of all sworn testimotion to suppress.
- A trial judge in a hearing on a motion to suppress certain evidence on the grounds that there was no probable cause for issuing the search warrant is duty bound to consider all of the sworn testimony given to the magistrate, whether it be favorable or unfavorable to the finding of probable cause. State v. Causey, 132 Ga. App. 17, 207 S.E.2d 225, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1588 (1974).
- Evidence obtained under fatally defective affidavit inadmissible.
- An affidavit based on an informer’s tip is fatally defective as the basis for a search warrant if it recites absolutely nothing that would show the informer’s reliability nor states how the informer obtained the information, and, under former Code 1933, § 27-313(2) (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) the evidence so obtained must be suppressed. Grebe v. State, 125 Ga. App. 873, 189 S.E.2d 698, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1494 (1972).
- Admissibility of in-court identification following tainted identification.
- — When a victim has sufficient independent basis for an in-court identification, even a tainted pretrial identification process that is suggestive will not require exclusion of the in-court identification unless there was a fourth amendment violation. Rivers v. State, 225 Ga. App. 558, 484 S.E.2d 519, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 386 (1997). Admissibility of Evidence; Exclusionary Rule (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d)
- Admissibility of defendant’s pretrial testimony on motion to suppress.
- If a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on grounds under U.S. Const., amend. 4, the defendant’s testimony may not thereafter be admitted against the defendant at trial on the issue of guilt unless the defendant makes no objection. Culpepper v. State, 132 Ga. App. 733, 209 S.E.2d 18, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1801 (1974); Cervi v. State, 248 Ga. 325, 282 S.E.2d 629, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 973 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938, 102 S. Ct. 1995, 72 L. Ed. 2d 457, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 1838 (1982). ments made in support of pretrial
- Error to admit incriminating statemotion to suppress.
- It is error for a trial court to admit in evidence on the issue of guilt incriminating statements given by a defendant in support of an unsuccessful pretrial motion to suppress; such a practice would require a defendant to surrender the defendant’s right under U.S. Const., amend. 4 against unreasonable search and seizure in order to maintain the defendant’s right to remain silent under U.S. Const., amend. 5. Sharp v. United States, 410 F.2d 969, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 12517 (5th Cir. 1969). Evidence of commission of a crime other than the one charged is generally not admissible. Bixby v. State, 234 Ga. 812, 218 S.E.2d 609, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1295 (1975). Exclusionary rule not applicable to public school students aggrieved by
- seizure by school officials.
- Granting that public primary and secondary school students have minimal rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 to be free from searches and seizures by school officials, nonetheless, the exclusionary rule is not applicable to enforce those rights, and students aggrieved by the action of their officials must fall back upon such other legal remedies as applicable law may allow them. Although school officials are governmental officers subject to some limitations under U.S. Const., amend. 4 in searching their students, if they violate those limitations the exclusionary rule is not available to the students to exclude from evidence items illegally seized. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1173, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3803 (1975); Harris v. State, 199 Ga. App. 457, 405 S.E.2d 501, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 515 (1991).
- Search warrants based on information obtained from officer’s illegal entry suppressible.
- Search warrants based upon the information derived from the officer’s previous illegal entry are tainted by the prior illegality and must be suppressed. Clare v. State, 135 Ga. App. 281, 217 S.E.2d 638, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1648 (1975). rity would be impaired were the courts to sanction defiance of the Constitution by admitting illegally seized evidence into criminal trials. Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784, 219 S.E.2d 28, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1825 (1975), overruled in part, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 438 (2011). dated nor property illegally seized introduced in evidence merely because the officers were in fact reliably informed and did in fact recover contraband. Garner v. State, 124 Ga. App. 33, 182 S.E.2d 902, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 800 (1971). Evidence obtained under defective
- Exclusionary rule has also been justified on grounds that judicial integ-Void search warrant cannot be valiwarrant admissible if warrant not required.
- Evidence gained by a search conducted under authority of a defective search warrant may still be admissible if an exception to the warrant requirement is present. United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 11509 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S. Ct. 516, 54 L. Ed. 2d 457, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 4126 (1977).
- Availability of estoppel for violation of administrative rules.
- If a defendant cannot invoke the exclusionary rule based upon a violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4, a court will not compel an equivalent right based upon estoppel because of a violation of administrative rules. State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S.E.2d 51, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2475 (1976). defendants only if rights violated by
- Exclusionary rule available to cosearch of defendant.
- Where several defendants were charged with possession of the cocaine found taped to leg of a particular defendant, the former could claim the benefit of the exclusionary rule only if their rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 were in fact violated by the search of the latter. United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 14501 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851, 102 S. Ct. 292, 70 L. Ed. 2d 141, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3506 (1981). Evidence illegally obtained by state
- officers outside jurisdiction inadmissible in federal court.
- The fact that state officers, making a warrantless search, were, at the time of the search, outside of their state-granted jurisdiction does not make such officers, thereby, merely private citizens so as to enable the federal government to freely use anything that was discovered by the state officers as evidence in a federal prosecution which would otherwise have been inadmissible. United States v. Hogue, 283 F. Supp. 846, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7853 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
- Evidence legally obtained admissible against other than person arrested.
- Evidence procured by lawful search and seizure is not limited in its admissibility only against the person whose lawful arrest made the search and seizure lawful. Cash v. State, 222 Ga. 55, 148 S.E.2d 420, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 396 (1966). dence connected with another
- Evidence admissible where obtained during lawful search for evicharge.
- Evidence obtained by federal agents legally searching for evidence in connection with another charge against the accused, is not obtained in violation of the provision of U.S. Const., amend. 4 against unreasonable searches and seizures. Cash v. State, 222 Ga. 55, 148 S.E.2d 420, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 396 (1966). No jury prejudice where arguments on motion to suppress heard outside
- their presence.
- Defendants cannot argue that they have to prejudice themselves in the eyes of the jury in order to establish standing to object to the claimed violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4 where the arguments of counsel on the motion to suppress are heard outside of the presence of the jury. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 668, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 775 (1981). Use at civil trial of evidence seized
- in violation of fourth amendment.
- The seizure of evidence in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not always preclude use of the evidence at a civil trial. Indeed, whether the exclusionary rule may ever bar the introduction of evidence in a civil trial is uncertain. Jonas v. City of Atlanta, 647 F.2d 580, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12348 (5th Cir. 1981). A motion to suppress which is procedurally defective is properly overruled, and in Georgia a motion to suppress which is made orally is procedurally defective and a denial thereof is authorized. Graves v. State, 135 Ga. App. 921, 219 S.E.2d 633, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1875 (1975). necessary absent allegations of fact
- Hearing on motion to suppress unwarranting relief.
- Where a defendant in a motion to suppress fails to allege facts that if proved would require the grant of relief, the law does not require that the court hold a hearing independent of the trial to receive evidence on any issue necessary to the determination of the motion. United States v. Sneed, 732 F.2d 886, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22338 (11th Cir. 1984). If admission of tainted evidence is harmless beyond reasonable doubt conviction will stand. When the properly admitted evidence to sustain a guilty verdict is overwhelming so as to negate the possibility that the tainted evidence contributed to the verdict, the constitutional error may be harmless. Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 370 S.E.2d 348, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 675 (1988). tions made by judge at suppression hearing must be accepted by appellate courts unless such determinations are clearly erroneous. Mancil v. State, 177 Ga. App. 663, 340 S.E.2d 279, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2449 (1986). The trial court’s decision on questions of fact and credibility at a suppression hear-Admissibility of Evidence; Exclusionary Rule (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) ing must be sustained unless clearly erroneous. Jothier v. State, 177 Ga. App. 655, 340 S.E.2d 624, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2456 (1986). Motion to suppress filed three days
- Factual and credibility determinaafter verdict properly denied.
- Because the appellant filed a written motion to suppress based on alleged violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4 three days after the verdict, the motion was not timely, and the trial court did not err in denying it. Burnette v. State, 156 Ga. App. 441, 275 S.E.2d 94, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3056 (1980). tion to suppress constitutes a waiver of the constitutional guarantee with respect to the search and seizure in question. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977). But see Stewart v. State, 232 Ga. App. 565, 502 S.E.2d 502, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 747 (1998); Burnette v. State, 156 Ga. App. 441, 275 S.E.2d 94, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3056 (1980). Failure to move to suppress timely under statute constitutes waiver of
- Failure to interpose a timely moobjection.
- An oral objection to evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure is not sufficient unless preceded by suppression of the evidence pursuant to a motion to suppress in compliance with former Code 1933, § 27-313 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30). Failure to interpose a timely motion to suppress in compliance therewith amounts to a waiver of the constitutional guaranty in respect to the search and seizure in question. Graves v. State, 135 Ga. App. 921, 219 S.E.2d 633, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1875 (1975). Defendant’s failure to comply with former Code 1933, § 27-313 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) by interposing tutes waiver of the constitutional guaranty in respect to the search and seizure in question. West v. State, 120 Ga. App. 390, 170 S.E.2d 698, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 789 (1969). Exclusionary rule not applicable to evidence admitted without timely
- written motion to suppress constichallenge.
- The requirement that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is inadmissible in state courts, is only an exclusionary rule and does not affect the competence of evidence admitted without timely challenge. Graves v. State, 135 Ga. App. 921, 219 S.E.2d 633, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1875 (1975). Waiver of right to object to evidence upon failure to object before
- trial.
- If the defendant knows before the trial of the possession by the prosecution of physical evidence and the manner in which it was obtained, the defendant cannot wait until the trial to make objection thereto, but must make the objection beforehand, and failing to do so, waives the right to object to the introduction of the evidence at the trial. Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S.E. 597, 1934 Ga. LEXIS 197 (1934). The trial court did not err by refusing to consider a defendant’s motion to suppress, which was untimely filed on the day of trial, where no written extension for a late filing had been requested prior to trial. Thompson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 18, 392 S.E.2d 732, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 408 (1990). Burden of proof where arrests and
- searches conducted without warrants.
- Because arrests and searches were conducted without a warrant, the government had the burden of proving that the arrests were supported by probable cause; the burden then shifted to the defendants to establish violations of their fourth amendment interests to those items seized or searched, other than those taken from them personally. United States v. Luck, 560 F. Supp. 258, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19111 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff’d, U.S. v. Crump, 736 F.2d 1527, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 21593 (11th Cir. 1984).
- De novo review.
- Because a trial court credited a police officer’s testimony and decided defendant’s suppression motion on an issue of law rather than on any issue of conflicting evidence, the court of appeals correctly used the de novo standard of review. Silva v. State, 278 Ga. 506, 604 S.E.2d 171, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 846 (2004).
- On appeal, trial court’s findings adopted unless clearly erroneous.
- On appeal of a denial of a motion to suppress, the evidence is to be construed most favorably to the upholding of the findings and judgment made. The trial court’s findings must be adopted unless determined to be clearly erroneous. Dennis v. State, 166 Ga. App. 715, 305 S.E.2d 443, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3266 (1983). 2. Illustrative Cases Exclusionary rule is not to be applied in federal grand jury proceedings. Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542, 250 S.E.2d 376, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1280 (1978), overruled in part, Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 314 S.E.2d 621, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 691 (1984).
- Fruit of the poisonous tree.
- While non-custodial and custodial statements were properly admitted, as not vitiating the defendant’s constitutional rights once defendant invoked the right to counsel, a subsequent interview initiated by police violated this right; as a result, cocaine seized through information obtained from the interview had to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 202 (2008), overruled in part, Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 883 S.E.2d 317, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 13 (2023). Grand jury witness cannot refuse to answer questions on ground they are product of unlawful searches and seizures. United States v. Worobyzt, 522 F.2d 196, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 12303 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911, 96 S. Ct. 1507, 47 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 858 (1976). One doing business as corporation may not vicariously enjoy privilege of corporation under U.S. Const., amend. 4; documents that the person could have protected from seizure, if they had been the person’s own, may be used against the person, no matter how they were obtained from the corporation. United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825, 96 S. Ct. 40, 46 L. Ed. 2d 42, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2337 (1975). Confession made by appellant when not under arrest not illegally
- obtained.
- Because the appellant was not under arrest at the time of making a confession, the confession could not have been the product of an illegal arrest. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 640 (1981).
- Suppression of post arrest interview not required.
- Fourth amendment did not require the suppression of the defendant’s post-arrest interview because police had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on evidence that the victim wanted to leave the defendant but was scared because the defendant threatened the victim, the defendant lied to the police about being in a relationship with the victim, and saliva containing the defendant’s DNA was found on the victim’s chest. Harper v. State, 310 Ga. 679, 853 S.E.2d 645, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 2 (2021).
- Police interview room.
- It was not error to admit a recorded conversation between the defendant and the defendant’s parent in a police interview room as the defendant did not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment in the conversation. No representations or inquiries were made as to privacy or confidentiality; police officers’ entry into the room did not cause the defendant and the parent to cease talking or lower their voices; and the defendant had been put in a place containing no guarantees that communications taking place therein would remain confidential. Dickerson v. State, 292 Ga. App. 775, 666 S.E.2d 43, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 741 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C2002, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 955 (Ga. Nov. 3, 2008). Videotape of the defendant’s conversation with family members was properly admitted into evidence as there was no evidence that the police did anything to foster a belief that the conversation would be private. While the subject-matter of the defendant’s statements might evidence a subjective expectation of privacy, the location in which the incriminating statements were made, and other circumstances surrounding the conversation determine the reasonableness of that expectation. Therefore, the defendant’s conversation with family in a police interview room was not “fruit of the poisonous tree” as the defendant’s personal request to meet with the family was an intervening cause. Rashid v. State, 292 Ga. 414, 737 S.E.2d 692, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 63 (2013). Admissibility of Evidence; Exclusionary Rule (Cont’d) 2. Illustrative Cases (Cont’d) Seizure from pretrial detainee’s
- cell.
- Because the state properly sought and obtained a search warrant before it seized written materials from a pretrial detainee’s cell, it was error to grant the detainee’s motion to suppress. State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 517 S.E.2d 61, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 515 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083, 120 S. Ct. 807, 145 L. Ed. 2d 680, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 241 (2000). Where causal connection between
- illegal arrest and confession not broken, confession inadmissible.
- If the causal connection between an illegal arrest and a confession is not broken by any intervening events, but a suspect is interrogated from the time of the suspect’s arrival until the suspect confesses a short time later, the trial court errs by admitting the confession into evidence, and a conviction based solely on the confession cannot stand. Robinson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 741, 305 S.E.2d 381, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3272 (1983). Incriminatory statement held not
- illegally obtained.
- Where the appellant did nothing prior to making the incriminatory statement, such as requesting to leave or speak with an attorney, that would require a finding that the appellant had been placed involuntarily in police custody, the trial judge did not err in ruling that the statement made by the appellant was not the product of an illegal arrest. Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 277 S.E.2d 18, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 753 (1981). gally obtained. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3186 (1981). Testimony made after admission of
- Later trespass does not render inadmissible in evidence knowledge leillegally obtained evidence unconstitutionally impelled.
- In the absence of a contrary showing by the state, a defendant’s testimony in a case after the admission into evidence of illegally seized evidence is unconstitutionally impelled by that erroneous admission. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1368 (1976).
- Impeachment on cross-examination.
- Illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach a statement made by a defendant on cross-examination when the statement being impeached is in response to a question that was reasonably suggested by the defendant’s direct testimony. United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 25756 (11th Cir. 1983). Evidence obtained under warrant issued by one affiliated with law en-
- forcement inadmissible.
- If a magistrate had such an affiliation with law enforcement as to disqualify the magistrate from issuing a search warrant, the evidence obtained thereby must be excluded. State v. Guhl, 140 Ga. App. 23, 230 S.E.2d 22, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1336 (1976), rev’d, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 791 (1977). Illegal search of curtilage caused all other evidence seized to be inad-
- missible.
- Trial court properly granted defendants’ motions to suppress evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia found at the residence owned by one defendant as officers had already learned that the person they were looking for stayed at a trailer next door, and thus officers engaged in impermissible search of the curtilage when officers found a bag of drugs 45 feet from defendants’house; as a result, all evidence seized in course of subsequent searches of the property was obtained as a direct result of the impermissible intrusion into the curtilage and had to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. State v. Gravitt, 289 Ga. App. 868, 658 S.E.2d 424, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 211 (2008).
- Yard.
- Defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress a key ring and shell casings recovered from his yard because he failed to show that such a motion would have been successful as no evidence was admitted regarding the exact distance between defendant’s house and the area of his yard where the items were found, and defendant did not offer evidence about what the relevant area of his yard was used for. Reese v. State, 317 Ga. 189, 891 S.E.2d 835, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 173 (2023).
- Warrant containing false statement.
- Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, U.S. Const., amend. 4 requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request; in the event the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2658 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1251 (1980). Evidence obtained on basis of false
- information central to affidavit inadmissible.
- If it is established at a hearing on a motion to suppress that evidence was seized on the basis of false information which strikes at the heart of a supporting affidavit’s showing of probable cause, the court must grant the defendant’s motion. United States v. Black, 344 F. Supp. 537, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12712 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 476 F.2d 267, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 10582 (5th Cir. 1973).
- Unsigned confession held admissible.
- The fact that a statement amounting to a confession by the defendant was unsigned and the fact that the stenographer who transcribed it was not present at the trial and did not testify as to its verity is not ground for excluding it from evidence. Freeman v. State, 230 Ga. 85, 195 S.E.2d 416, 1973 Ga. LEXIS 819 (1973).
- Conversation overheard by arresting officers admissible.
- Evidence of statements made by the defendant in a conversation overheard by the arresting officers who had concealed themselves, as planned between them and the person with whom the defendant talked, does not amount to evidence given by the defendant involuntarily and without the advice of counsel, and is not coerced from the defendant in violation of the defendant’s rights not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself. Blackwell v. State, 113 Ga. App. 536, 148 S.E.2d 912, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 1126 (1966).
- Defendant not under arrest.
- Because the defendant’s encounters with the police remained consensual and voluntary, and the defendant consented to a continued detention for further questioning, a motion to suppress the evidence seized based on an illegal detention by the police was properly denied. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. 185, 640 S.E.2d 1, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 888 (2006). Evidence obtained during unlawful
- detention of vehicle inadmissible.
- Where no circumstances at all appear which might give rise to an articulable suspicion (less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice) that the law has been violated, the act of following and detaining a vehicle and its occupants must be judged as an impermissible intrusion on the rights of the citizen. Where this occurs, the penalty exacted by the law is that evidence turned up as a result of such intrusion may not be introduced against the defendant on the trial of the defendant’s case. Brooks v. State, 144 Ga. App. 97, 240 S.E.2d 593, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2595 (1977). Clothing named in warrant and
- seized during lawful search admissible.
- Because the evidence showed that the police officers had been informed that the defendant had on a certain type of clothing on the day the defendant discussed the murder with an informant, and the police, using a valid warrant, found the clothing in the defendant’s apartment and seized it, it was not error to admit the clothing into evidence. Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 182 S.E.2d 779, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 825 (1971). Films inadmissible where warrant
- improperly issued.
- Admission in evidence of allegedly obscene motion picture Admissibility of Evidence; Exclusionary Rule (Cont’d) 2. Illustrative Cases (Cont’d) films seized under the authority of a warrant issued by a justice of the peace on a police officer’s affidavit giving the films’ titles, and stating that the officer had determined from personal observation of the films and of the theater’s billboard that they were obscene, is erroneous, as the issuance of the warrant without the justice of the peace’s inquiry into the factual basis for the officer’s conclusions falls short of constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression. Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1020 (1972). The seizure as obscene of a motion picture film being exhibited to the general public at a commercial theater, without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, is unreasonable, and the evidence is not admissible. Hall v. State, 139 Ga. App. 488, 229 S.E.2d 12, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1857 (1976). No federal interference in pending state case by requiring release of ille-
- gally obtained evidence.
- Where allegedly obscene films and projectors are seized as evidence of a violation of former Code 1933, § 26-2101 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80), and the case is pending in the state courts, federal courts will not interfere with the pending case by requiring release of the contraband as an unconstitutional seizure. G & E Bus. Servs., Inc. v. McAuliffe, 480 F. Supp. 239, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8418 (N.D. Ga. 1979). Gun given to sheriff by relative in
- latter’s house admissible.
- If a sheriff goes into the house of a relative and takes possession of a gun offered to the sheriff, the evidence is insufficient to show an unreasonable search and seizure and to require suppression of the gun as evidence. Marsh v. State, 223 Ga. 590, 157 S.E.2d 273, 1967 Ga. LEXIS 616 (1967). Rifle found in unkept area in trailer
- park.
- The defendant’s motion to suppress a rifle connected with the robbery with which the defendant was charged was properly denied where the rifle was found in an unkept area between two trailers in a trailer park of which the defendant was not an occupant or resident and where probable cause existed for a search of the area. Dunbar v. State, 163 Ga. App. 243, 292 S.E.2d 897, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3196 (1982). Pistol admissible where procured in search incidental to arrest of an-
- other.
- It is not error, in the trial of the accused for armed robbery, to admit in evidence, over objection, a pistol procured by FBI agents in the search of an apartment in Los Angeles, where the search was made incidental to the lawful arrest of another person, as the search and seizure of the evidence was lawful. Cash v. State, 222 Ga. 55, 148 S.E.2d 420, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 396 (1966). edly obtained from a defendant are not obtained by a search of the person but of the premises when found on the floor where the defendant had been standing after the defendant had moved from the spot and which were not there before the defendant had stood there, and if the search of the premises was lawful, then there is no ground to suppress this evidence. Logan v. State, 135 Ga. App. 879, 219 S.E.2d 615, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1857 (1975). Heroin inadmissible where burden of proof showing legal arrest not met. — Heroin seized from defendant’s automobile following arrest for prowling is inadmissible as evidence where the state failed to carry its burden of proof for showing that the arrest itself was legal by introducing an exemplified copy of the city ordinance, if such existed, under which defendant was arrested. Traylor v. State, 127 Ga. App. 409, 193 S.E.2d 876, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 904 (1972).
- Lottery tickets and money alleg-Tourist camp registration cards admissible.
- Objection to admission in evidence of registration cards kept by tourist camp under former Code 1933, §§ 52-308 and 52-312 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 43-21-56 and 43-21-52), on grounds that the acquisition of such cards was in violation of U.S. Const., amends. 4, 5, and 14, was without merit in view of the provision of former Code 1933, § 52-112 that the permanent record for the registration of guests should be available at all times for inspection by any peace or law enforcement officer. Copeland v. Leathers, 206 Ga. 280, 56 S.E.2d 530, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 455 (1949). Evidence admissible if probable cause existed at time of arrest and
- seizure.
- Certain evidence consisting of bloodstained carpet removed from the premises where the deceased and defendant lived is admissible if probable cause existed at the time the evidence was removed and when the defendant was arrested. Ray v. State, 235 Ga. 467, 219 S.E.2d 761, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 904 (1975).
- Scope of pat down search exceeded.
- — Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence since the investigating police officer exceeded the scope of a Terry pat down search when the officer pulled open defendant’s pocket to discover what was in it; the officer provided no facts which would lead the officer to suspect that the pill bottles the officer felt in defendant’s pocket were some type of atypical weapon so as to justify intruding into defendant’s pocket for the officer’s protection. Howard v. State, 253 Ga. App. 158, 558 S.E.2d 745, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 5 (2002). Officer was justified in conducting a pat-down when the officer testified that the officer observed the defendant place something in defendant’s pocket and then place defendant’s hand in defendant’s pocket; defendant refused to remove defendant’s hand although the officer repeatedly instructed the defendant to do so; and, the officer became concerned for the officer’s safety because of defendant’s actions. However, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress since the officer could not identify the object the officer felt as either a weapon, or by its contour and mass, contraband and thus the intrusion into defendant’s pocket was impermissible. Sudduth v. State, 288 Ga. App. 541, 654 S.E.2d 446, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1243 (2007). Photographs of automobile and paint scrapings taken from exterior of vehicle were not subject to defendant’s motion to suppress. Deshazier v. State, 155 Ga. App. 526, 271 S.E.2d 664, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2655 (1980). Evidence held legally seized and
- admissible.
- There was probable cause for arrest where radio report described blacks in a Buick, and the persons stopped were blacks in a Buick similar in color and style to that described, and matching leather jackets in plain view on the car’s back seat corresponded with and corroborated the report that the robbers had been wearing such jackets; therefore evidence was legally seized. Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 260 S.E.2d 60, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1230 (1979). Evidence held legally seized and admissible as: (1) evidence seized from the defendant’s residence as a result of an interrogation was sufficiently attenuated from any illegality to be admissible; (2) the duration of the search had no bearing on the subsequent consent given by the defendant’s roommate; (3) the consent was not a product of any illegal conduct; and (4) there was no evidence of any flagrant misconduct and coercion on the part of the investigating law enforcement officers involved. Spence v. State, 281 Ga. 697, 642 S.E.2d 856, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 241 (2007). Because a search warrant affidavit provided the issuing magistrate with sufficient probable cause connecting the defendant to the residence of a female friend for the magistrate logically to conclude that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found therein, despite the omission of additional evidence by the affiant, an order granting suppression of the evidence seized therein was reversed. State v. Hunter, 282 Ga. 278, 646 S.E.2d 465, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 360 (2007). Failure of arbitrator to decide any
- and all disputes.
- Although only a little time elapsed between an officer’s act of pushing aside the blinds in a home and the acquisition of the inculpatory evidence, this factor is not dispositive. The record reflects that the officer pushed aside the blinds for safety reasons only after the defendant voluntarily questioned what was going on and that the officer did not view any evidence in the home that was ultimately gathered pursuant to the search warrant. Defendant’s act of voluntarily opening the door of the home, attacking the officer, and then resisting arrest were intervening acts that Admissibility of Evidence; Exclusionary Rule (Cont’d) 2. Illustrative Cases (Cont’d) completely purged the taint from the officer’s initial unlawful act. If the defendant had not attacked the officer and then resisted arrest, the evidence found in the home would be inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. Lawson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 865, 684 S.E.2d 1, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 845 (2009), cert. dismissed, No. S10C0118, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 206 (Ga. Mar. 1, 2010), cert. denied, No. S10C0117, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 195 (Ga. Mar. 1, 2010). Statement granting consent to
- search suppressed.
- The trial court properly suppressed evidence as to the defendant’s statement granting consent for the search of defendant’s vehicle after applying the “reasonable person” test; the trial court determined that after the defendant was placed in the back of the trooper’s car, the defendant was “in custody” for Miranda purposes even though defendant was not “under arrest” and then concluded that a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances would not feel that they were at liberty to terminate any interrogation and leave based on the officer’s retention of possession of the defendant’s driver’s license and an above average amount of cash while placing defendant in the back of the patrol car to await the arrival of a drug dog. Cotton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 18, 513 S.E.2d 763, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 337 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C0985, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 598 (Ga. June 11, 1999). Failure to object to no ruling made
- on motion to suppress.
- In the absence of a ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress and of an objection when the evidence was offered at trial, a defendant waived his right to contest the admissibility of the evidence on appeal. Castillo v. State, 281 Ga. 579, 642 S.E.2d 8, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 127 (2007).
- Abandoned property.
- Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress as the police search of a bag containing the items purportedly stolen from the burglary and theft victims was not illegal; the bag was located in a closet of a bedroom in a friend’s residence, and because the evidence showed the defendant had abandoned it, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag and the defendant could not claim that the fourth amendment prohibited a search of the bag by police. Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 581 S.E.2d 279, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 306 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C1000, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 576 (Ga. June 2, 2003). Warrant for vehicle following
- search of home proper.
- Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied as a magistrate’s issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s home was supported by probable cause for purposes of the fourth amendment, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, and O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 where: (1) witnesses reported seeing defendant at the victim’s home near the time that the victim disappeared; (2) the farm manager who located the victim’s body told police that defendant commonly used the farm for hunting; (3) defendant had a tumultuous relationship with the victim; and (4) defendant’s mailbox was painted in a similar camouflage as the cattle trough in which the victim was found; as the warrant for the house was proper, the warrant for defendant’s truck was not fruit of the poisonous tree. Fortson v. State, 277 Ga. 164, 587 S.E.2d 39, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 840 (2003), overruled on other grounds, Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 820 S.E.2d 640, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (2018), overruled in part, Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 868 S.E.2d 764, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 17 (2022). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to suppress photographs that were developed from film that was in a disposable camera found in the defendant’s duffle bag at the time of the defendant’s arrest because: (1) the defendant lacked standing to challenge the admission of the evidence since the camera belonged to the defendant’s sibling, most of the photographs had been taken by the sibling, and the camera had only been borrowed by the defendant; (2) the film was admissible under the same rationale as an inventory search because the police had to develop the film to determine to whom the camera belonged before they could return it to its owner; and (3) the film was the fruit of a search incident to the defendant’s lawful arrest because it was found in the defendant’s duffle bag in a search incident to the defendant’s arrest. Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 454, 579 S.E.2d 214, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 319 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106, 124 S. Ct. 1059, 157 L. Ed. 2d 892, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 79 (2004).
- Consent to search.
- Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of contraband, namely, defendant’s possession of marijuana, as police officer’s discovery of the marijuana was not pursuant to an impermissible pat-down search that two other officers conducted on a group of students, including defendant, but was pursuant to defendant’s invitation for the officer to search defendant after the officer asked defendant why defendant’s license had been suspended; however, a remand was necessary to determine whether defendant’s consent to search was voluntarily given. State v. Baker, 261 Ga. App. 258, 582 S.E.2d 133, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 562 (2003).
- Inevitable discovery rule.
- Evidence gathered by a crime scene investigator from a motel room where the victim was found dead was admissible under the inevitable discovery rule; the information contained in the affidavit in support of the application for a search warrant that was issued after the investigator’s illegal entry was gathered prior to the illegal entry. Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 647 S.E.2d 15, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 480 (2007). Inevitable discovery rule did not
- apply.
- The inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply despite the state’s position that the discovery of the methamphetamine was inevitable because the officer would not have allowed the defendant to drive the vehicle without a tag away from the scene and when the vehicle was searched the pipe and syringe would have been found, providing probable cause for the search of defendant’s person and the inevitable discovery of the methamphetamine in defendant’s pocket. However, no testimony was presented regarding the procedure that the officer would have followed in this situation and, even accepting the state’s argument that the officer was required to impound the car since the car did not have a tag, there is nothing to show that an inventory search would have been conducted immediately at the site of the stop and, likewise, there is nothing to show that the defendant would have been present, whether the inventory search was conducted at the scene or subsequent to the vehicle being removed from the area, and thus nothing to show that the defendant would have been immediately searched. Sudduth v. State, 288 Ga. App. 541, 654 S.E.2d 446, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1243 (2007).
- Multiple blood samples.
- Although a first search warrant for defendant’s blood was defective, a second blood sample that was later drawn from defendant was not “fruit of the poisonous tree” because there was no evidence that the second search warrant for the blood was defective or that the second blood sample was obtained by exploitation of the original defective warrant; the second sample was separate and distinguishable from the first sample so as to be purged of the primary taint and, therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the second sample. McKinney v. State, 261 Ga. App. 218, 582 S.E.2d 463, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 515 (2003). Probable cause for blood test of sus-
- pected intoxicated driver.
- There was probable cause under the fourth amendment for an officer to request a blood test under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 from a defendant suspected of driving under the influence when the defendant showed four out of six signs of impairment on a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, admitted to drinking, smelled of alcohol, had a positive alco-sensor result, and had bloodshot eyes. The fact that an officer did not believe that there was probable cause to request the blood test did not require a different finding, as the scope of a person’s fourth amendment rights was determined objectively. State v. Preston, 293 Ga. App. 94, 666 S.E.2d 417, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 842 (2008). “Protective sweep” following the defendant’s arrest was permissible and reasonable because officers on the scene did not know whether other assailants or victims remained inside the resi-Admissibility of Evidence; Exclusionary Rule (Cont’d) 2. Illustrative Cases (Cont’d) dence. Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 807 S.E.2d 350, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 922 (2017). Stop of juvenile was not an illegal
- detention.
- Juvenile court properly denied a juvenile’s motion to suppress the physical and testimonial evidence as well as properly adjudicated the juvenile delinquent as a result of the evidence obtained by the police not being the product of an illegal detention. The officers who stopped the juvenile and three other cohorts had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the juvenile should have been in school at the time and day of the stop, the juvenile matched the description of a youth involved in home burglaries with three others, and the four were stopped while canvassing the same neighborhood where a rash of burglaries had been occurring. In the Interest of J.T., 297 Ga. App. 636, 678 S.E.2d 111, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 503 (2009). Remedies for Violation of Rights Constitutional tort claim depends
- on conduct’s reasonableness.
- Where the factual allegations clearly established a factual dispute which impacted on the reasonableness of federal agents’ conduct in serving a subpoena and where, given the factual circumstances, a jury was entitled to find whether the agents’ search and seizure of business records and material violated established constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known, the district court correctly denied summary judgment to the agents on the question of qualified immunity on the plaintiffs’ constitutional tort claim for unlawful search and seizure. Goddard v. Urrea, 847 F.2d 765, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8600 (11th Cir. 1988). Defendant must show harm from
- challenged warrant.
- Where defendant failed to show any harm resulting from the issuance of a challenged warrant, there was nothing for the court to review on appeal. Soto v. State, 252 Ga. 164, 312 S.E.2d 306, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 614 (1984). Plaintiff was not required to show significant injury as an essential ingredient to a fourth amendment excessive force claim. Gardner v. Rogers, 224 Ga. App. 165, 480 S.E.2d 217, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1345 (1996). Compensation for invasion of
- FourthAmendment rights.
- Courts of law are capable of making the types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of injury necessary to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4. The same may not be true, however, with respect to other types of constitutionally protected interests, and therefore the appropriateness of money damages may well vary with the nature of the personal interest asserted. Polakoff v. Henderson, 370 F. Supp. 690, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 106, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12414 (N.D. Ga. 1973), aff’d, 488 F.2d 977, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 10357 (5th Cir. 1974).
- Suppression of illegally seized evidence justified.
- An officer, who knew the defendant, forcibly opened the defendant’s vehicle door, thereby physically restraining defendant’s movement so that defendant’s subsequent consent to a search of defendant’s vehicle, after arriving at a location under surveillance for drug manufacturing, was invalid as the consent was the product of a wrongful detention; thus, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle. Smith v. State, 288 Ga. App. 87, 653 S.E.2d 510, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1148 (2007).
- Subjective intent in making arrest.
- — Because a police officer’s subjective intent in making an arrest is irrelevant to a finding of probable cause, a plaintiff need not establish intentional conduct or even gross negligence to establish a violation of the fourth amendment. McKenna v. County of Clayton, 657 F. Supp. 221, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14668 (N.D. Ga. 1987). Qualified immunity of officer in
- making arrest denied.
- When an arrestee allegedly called an officer “a fucking asshole” and was arrested, the officer was properly denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to the arrestee’s claims under the fourth amendment because the officer did not have arguable probable cause to arrest the arrestee for disorderly conduct under Georgia law since the arrestee was not shouting and did not appear to be a danger to anyone as the arrestee walked away. Merenda v. Tabor, 506 Fed. Appx. 862, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2351 (11th Cir. 2013). Good faith and reasonable belief in validity of arrest are the appropriate standards in testing the arresting officer’s liability for a warrantless arrest. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Federal constitutional standards proper measure of conduct of state
- officer.
- Where an unlawful state arrest is the basis of an action for violation of rights under U.S. Const., amends. 4 and 14, federal constitutional standards are the appropriate measure of the conduct of the arresting officer. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Liability under federal civil rights
- statute.
- Even if a police officer violates a state arrest statute, the officer is not liable under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless the officer also violated federal constitutional law governing warrantless arrests. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975). A supervisory or nonsupervisory official’s failure or refusal to intervene when a constitutional violation such as the use of a chokehold once an arrestee is shackled is taking place in the official’s presence establishes direct liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive use of force against the arrestee in violation of the arrestee’s rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13851 (N.D. Ga. 1983). A municipality cannot be held liable under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for an illegal arrest absent a showing that the arrest without probable cause was the result of a custom, pattern, or practice of the municipality. Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19906 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Where a governing body has worked constitutional deprivation of a citizen pursuant to an impermissible or corrupt policy which is intentional and deliberate, a cause of action is accrued against the governing body and its employees under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in spite of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. City of Cave Spring v. Mason, 252 Ga. 3, 310 S.E.2d 892, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 564 (1984). An unprovoked beating and killing of a suspect by police officers was sufficiently serious to be actionable, as a federal civil rights claim, under U.S. Const., amend. 4, notwithstanding the existence of a state tort remedy. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 23839 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 106 S. Ct. 1970, 90 L. Ed. 2d 654, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 3043 (1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124, 106 S. Ct. 1993, 90 L. Ed. 2d 673, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 3168 (1986), overruled in part, Severe v. City of Miami, No. 17-22153-CIV, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105523 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2019), overruled in part, Bledsoe v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 16-2296-DDC-JPO, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87618 (D. Kan. May 7, 2021). In a federal civil rights action by a state prisoner alleging violations of fourth amendment rights, federal abstention was proper until the state appellate court decided the issue upon its review of the conviction. Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 29421 (11th Cir. 1985). In a case involving use of excessive force by police officers brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the balancing test for determining whether a substantive due process violation has been committed, while similar in many respects to that for assessing a fourth amendment claim, requires a plaintiff to show that the force used by a defendant officer was applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. The fourth amendment balancing test, on the other hand, does not include a “malicious and sadistic” element; rather, the reasonableness of the seizure or intrusion is the central inquiry, as is the case with respect to fourth amendment analyses outside of the police abuse context. Thompson v. Spikes, 663 F. Supp. 627, Remedies for Violation of Rights (Cont’d) 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541 (S.D. Ga. 1987). Recognizing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 clearly requires a showing of something more than common law tort elements, the court analyzed a deputy sheriff ’s tort claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false arrest and false imprisonment, in the context of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, and found that claims thereunder were validly inferable for alleged conspiracy by fellow officers to force the deputy to give false testimony against a county sheriff. Mastroianni v. Deering, 835 F. Supp. 1577, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19036 (S.D. Ga. 1993). In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because where the facts indicated that the plaintiff’s arrest had not ended at the time of the defendant police officers’ use of excessive force, U.S. Const., amend. 4 applied to the plaintiff’s excessive force claims even if the plaintiff was in post-arrest, pre-charge custody at the time of the use of such force. Albritten v. Dougherty County, Ga., 973 F. Supp. 1455, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18774 (M.D. Ga. 1997). In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendant police officers’ use of physical force against plaintiff violated U.S. Const., amend. 4, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities. Albritten v. Dougherty County, Ga., 973 F. Supp. 1455, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18774 (M.D. Ga. 1997). Because a plaintiff in a civil rights case prosecuted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force used in arrest may receive compensatory damages for such things as physical pain and suffering and mental and emotional anguish, and because such a plaintiff whose constitutional rights are violated is entitled to receive nominal damages even if the plaintiff fails to produce any evidence of compensatory damages, the district court erred in granting judgment to defendant officers as a matter of law. Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14355 (11th Cir. 2000). In an arrestee’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit that alleged that the arrestee’s fourth amendment right against the use of excessive force was violated when a sheriff’s deputy crashed a cruiser into the car during a high-speed pursuit, rendering the arrestee a quadriplegic, the arrestee’s deliberate indifference claim against the sheriff in an individual capacity was dismissed on summary judgment because the sheriff had provided the deputies with all of the training that was required by the State of Georgia; even if there were a causal connection between the sheriff’s failure to train the deputies in the techniques of making high-pursuit stops, the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity. Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01-CV-148-WBH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27348 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003), rev’d in part, aff’d, 406 F.3d 1307, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 6721 (11th Cir. 2005).
- Internal Revenue Service Commissioner absolutely immune from liability.
- The United States is absolutely immune from damages in a suit seeking damages under the Constitution, as is the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service insofar as the Commissioner is acting within the scope of the Commissioner’s official capacity. Sellers v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 1149, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16949 (N.D. Ga. 1983). ously liable for the fourth and fifth amendment violations of the Internal Revenue Service agents. Sellers v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 1149, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16949 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Police officers’ use of deadly force against suspect who was armed with knife and had just stabbed several people was reasonable and hence within the bounds of the fourth amendment. O’Neal v. DeKalb County, 850 F.2d 653, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 9980 (11th Cir. 1988).
- Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service cannot be held vicari-Habeas corpus.
- If the petitioner is aggrieved by unconstitutional search and seizure, the petitioner is entitled to habeas relief on that basis alone. Wilson v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 859, 218 S.E.2d 573, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1307 (1975). In federal habeas corpus court the test of legality of state arrest is “federal probable cause.” Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12174 (S.D. Ga. 1975). If the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at trial. Anglin v. Green, 639 F. Supp. 490, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23503 (S.D. Ga. 1986), aff’d, 853 F.2d 930, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8883 (11th Cir. 1988). Right to acquittal on ground of un-
- lawful arrest.
- A defendant in a criminal case cannot claim a verdict declaring the defendant to be not guilty on the ground that the defendant was illegally arrested. Morton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 329, 208 S.E.2d 134, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1683 (1974). When illegal arrest not grounds for
- reversal.
- Assuming that the warrantless arrest was illegal, it is not in and of itself a ground for reversal where defendant has been indicted and convicted. Thompson v. State, 157 Ga. App. 600, 278 S.E.2d 62, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1927, aff’d, 248 Ga. 343, 285 S.E.2d 685, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 1012 (1981).
- Conviction based on evidence illegally admitted must be reversed.
- The fruits of an illegal arrest are not admissible in evidence against a defendant, and a conviction which is based upon evidence thus illegally admitted must be reversed and set aside. Traylor v. State, 127 Ga. App. 409, 193 S.E.2d 876, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 904 (1972).
- Mere claim of illegal arrest insufficient for new trial or release.
- If there is no claim that the conviction rested upon evidence seized as a result of an illegal arrest, or upon a confession secured pursuant to the illegal arrest, etc., but simply that the defendant was illegally arrested, then this, alone, does not entitle the defendant to release or a new trial. Johnson v. State, 128 Ga. App. 69, 195 S.E.2d 676, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1393 (1973).
- When objections raised.
- The lack of probable cause to arrest should be raised before trial if possible, and certainly at trial. A court, nevertheless, is bound to consider error apparent on the face of the record which rises to the level of “plain” or “fundamental” error. United States v. McGee, 464 F.2d 542, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989, 93 S. Ct. 346, 34 L. Ed. 2d 255, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 869 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078, 93 S. Ct. 697, 34 L. Ed. 2d 667, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 226 (1972); 409 U.S. 1078, 93 S. Ct. 697, 34 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1972). Fourth amendment objections may be raised in proceedings other than criminal trials. FTC v. Page, 378 F. Supp. 1052, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7885 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
- Authority of state drug enforcement officer to search and seize.
- The Chief Drug Inspector of the State Board of Pharmacy and the Inspector’s assistants have the authority to make arrests for violations of former Code 1933, Chs. 79A-7 and 79A-8 (see O.C.G.A. Arts. 2 and 3, Ch. 13, T. 16), and to search and seize evidence necessary for presentation before courts of this state or before the State Board of Pharmacy; the Chief Drug Inspector and the Inspector’s assistants do not have the authority to seize prescription from a pharmacy without properly acquiring a valid search warrant. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 70-112.
- Authority to seize prescriptions.
- Any law enforcement official who has obtained search warrant may lawfully search and seize prescriptions retained for inspection by a pharmacy as required by Georgia law. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 70-112.
- Constitutionality of fingerprint requirement.
- Requiring applicants for driver’s license or identification card to submit fingerprints does not violate constitutional rights. 1997 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U97-7. hicles entering hospital grounds
- Regulation allowing search of vevalid.
- A regulation established by the Department of Human Resources which makes vehicles entering the grounds of Central State Hospital subject to search is a valid exercise of the department’s power, and does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. 1974 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 74-15.
- Unauthorized dormitory searches.
- — A college may not rely absolutely on a contractual provision in a dormitory contract to conduct a search of a student’s dormitory room in the absence of a valid warrant or consent. 1994 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 94-13.
- Use of metal detectors in schools.
- The use of a metal detector to screen everyone or to randomly screen students as they enter school is not an unreasonable search and thus is not unconstitutional. However, the metal detector could be used in some manner, such as selective screening, which could violate the prohibition against unreasonable searches. 1994 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U94-9.
- Am. Jur. 2d.
- 3B Am. Jur. 2d, Aliens and Citizens, § 1770. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arrest, §§ 2, 81, 93. 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 412. 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, § 66. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 510. 35 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Tax Enforcement, § 283. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, § 79. 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Searches and Seizures, § 1.
- C.J.S.
- 3 C.J.S., Aliens, §§ 25, 52. 3A C.J.S., Aliens, § 1221. 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 725. 16B C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 1171. 16D C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 2122. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 19. 28 C.J.S., Drugs and Narcotics, § 69. 47C C.J.S., Internal Revenue, § 756 et seq. 48A C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, § 706 et seq. 57 C.J.S., Military, § 418. 79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures, §§ 1, 161, 201 et seq. 80 C.J.S., Shipping, § 14. 91 C.J.S., United States, § 46.
- ALR.
- Constitutional guaranties against unreasonable searches and seizures as applied to a search for or seizure of intoxicating liquor, 13 A.L.R. 1316; 27 A.L.R. 709; 39 A.L.R. 811; 74 A.L.R. 1418. Federal Constitution as a limitation upon the powers of the states in respect of search and seizure, 19 A.L.R. 644. Right to arrest without a warrant for unlawful possession or transportation of intoxicating liquor, 44 A.L.R. 132. Admissibility of evidence obtained by government or other public officer by intercepting letter or telegraph or telephone message, 53 A.L.R. 1485; 66 A.L.R. 397; 134 A.L.R. 614. Search of automobile without a warrant by officers relying on description of persons suspected of a crime, 60 A.L.R. 299. Right of search and seizure incident to lawful arrest without a search warrant, 74 A.L.R. 1387; 82 A.L.R. 782. Use as evidence against officers, employees, or stockholders of corporation of illegally seized documents or other articles belonging to corporation, 78 A.L.R. 343. Right of employee having control of articles for employer to avail himself of rule which excludes evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, 86 A.L.R. 346. Constitutionality of statutory provisions for examination of records, books, or documents for taxation purposes, 103 A.L.R. 522. Right of privacy, 138 A.L.R. 22; 57 A.L.R.3d 16. Order upon application for suppression in criminal case of evidence wrongly seized by government as appealable, 156 A.L.R. 1207. Requiring submission to physical examination or test as violation of constitutional rights, 164 A.L.R. 967; 25 A.L.R.2d 1407. Modern status of rule governing admissibility of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, 50 A.L.R.2d 531; 43 A.L.R.3d 385. Opening, search, and seizure of mail, 61 A.L.R.2d 1282. Nature of interest in, or connection with, premises searched as affecting standing to attack legality of search, 78 A.L.R.2d 246. Federal Constitution as affecting admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, 84 A.L.R.2d 959. Transiently occupied room in hotel, motel, or roominghouse as within provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures, 86 A.L.R.2d 984. Lawfulness of nonconsensual search and seizure without warrant, prior to arrest, 89 A.L.R.2d 715. Admissibility, in civil case, of evidence obtained by lawful search and seizure, 5 A.L.R.3d 670. Validity of procedures designed to protect the public against obscenity, 5 A.L.R.3d 1214; 93 A.L.R.3d 297. Lawfulness of seizure of property used in violation of law as prerequisite to forfeiture action or proceeding, 8 A.L.R.3d 473. Validity of consent to search given by one in custody of officers, 9 A.L.R.3d 858. Lawfulness of search of motor vehicle following arrest for traffic violation, 10 A.L.R.3d 314. Propriety of considering hearsay or other incompetent evidence in establishing probable cause for issuance of search warrant, 10 A.L.R.3d 359. Search warrant: sufficiency of description of apartment or room to be searched in multiple-occupancy structure, 11 A.L.R.3d 1330. Investigations and surveillance, shadowing and trailing, as violation of right of privacy, 13 A.L.R.3d 1025. Modern status of rule as to validity of nonconsensual search and seizure made without warrant after lawful arrest as affected by lapse of time between, or difference in places of, arrest and search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727. Plea of guilty as waiver of claim of unlawful search and seizure, 20 A.L.R.3d 724. Requiring suspect or defendant in criminal case to demonstrate voice for purposes of identification, 24 A.L.R.3d 1261. Admissibility, in criminal case, of evidence obtained by search by private individual, 36 A.L.R.3d 553. Privilege against self-incrimination as ground for refusal to produce noncorporate documents in possession of person asserting privilege, but owned by another, 37 A.L.R.3d 1373. “Fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine excluding evidence derived from information gained in illegal search, 43 A.L.R.3d 385. Right of exonerated arrestee to have fingerprints, photographs, or other criminal identification or arrest records expunged or restricted, 46 A.L.R.3d 900; 58 A.L.R.4th 902. Censorship of convicted prisoners’ “legal” mail, 47 A.L.R.3d 1150. Censorship of convicted prisoners’ “nonlegal” mail, 47 A.L.R.3d 1192. Lawfulness of “inventory search” of motor vehicle impounded by police, 48 A.L.R.3d 537. Observation through binoculars as constituting unreasonable search, 48 A.L.R.3d 1178. Censorship and evidentiary use of unconvicted prisoners’ mail, 52 A.L.R.3d 548. Uninvited entry into another’s living quarters as invasion of privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 434. Waiver or loss of right of privacy, 57 A.L.R.3d 16. Admissibility, in criminal prosecution, of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance of prisoner, 57 A.L.R.3d 172. Admissibility of videotape film in evidence in criminal trial, 60 A.L.R.3d 333; 41 A.L.R.4th 812; 41 A.L.R.4th 877. Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure, 77 A.L.R.3d 636. Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches, 79 A.L.R.3d 1083. State or municipal liability for invasion of privacy, 87 A.L.R.3d 145. Necessity that demanding state show probable cause to arrest fugitive in extradition proceedings, 90 A.L.R.3d 1085. Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of adult defendant’s property or residence authorized by defendant’s minor child — state cases, 99 A.L.R.3d 598. Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant’s property or residence authorized by domestic employee or servant, 99 A.L.R.3d 1232. Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant’s property or residence authorized by defendant’s spouse (resident or nonresident) — state cases, 1 A.L.R.4th 673; 65 A.L.R.5th 407. Admissibility of evidence discovered in warrantless search of rental property authorized by lessor of such property — state cases, 2A.L.R.4th 1173; 61A.L.R.5th 1. Use of electronic sensing device to detect shoplifting as unconstitutional search and seizure, 10 A.L.R.4th 376. Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues, 12 A.L.R.4th 318. Propriety of requiring suspect or accused to alter, or to refrain from altering, physical or bodily appearance, 24 A.L.R.4th 592. Disputation of truth of matters stated in affidavit in support of search warrant — modern cases, 24 A.L.R.4th 1266. Sufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs, 25 A.L.R.4th 419. Admissibility in criminal case of evidence that accused refused to take test of intoxication, 26 A.L.R.4th 1112. Employment of photographic equipment to record presence and nature of items as constituting unreasonable search, 27 A.L.R.4th 532. Search and seizure: suppression of evidence found in automobile during routine check of vehicle identification number (VIN), 27 A.L.R.4th 549. Admissibility, in criminal case, of evidence discovered by warrantless search in connection with fire investigation — post-Tyler cases, 31 A.L.R.4th 194. Propriety in state prosecution of severance of partially valid search warrant and limitation of suppression to items seized under invalid portions of warrant, 32 A.L.R.4th 378. Validity, in state criminal trial, of arrest without warrant by identified peace officer outside of jurisdiction, when not in fresh pursuit, 34 A.L.R.4th 328. Validity of, and admissibility of, evidence discovered in search authorized by judge over telephone, 38 A.L.R.4th 1145. Search and seizure: what constitutes abandonment of personal property within rule that search and seizure of abandoned property is not unreasonable — modern cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381. Admissibility, in criminal case, of physical evidence obtained without consent by surgical removal from person’s body, 41 A.L.R.4th 60. Admissibility of visual recording of event or matter giving rise to litigation or prosecution, 41 A.L.R.4th 812. Admissibility of visual recording of event or matter other than that giving rise to litigation or prosecution, 41 A.L.R.4th 877. Validity of arrest made in reliance upon outdated warrant list or similar police records, 45 A.L.R.4th 550. Officer’s ruse to gain entry as affecting admissibility of plain-view evidence — modern cases, 47 A.L.R.4th 425. Search and seizure: necessity that police obtain warrant before taking possession of, examining, or testing evidence discovered in search by private person, 47 A.L.R.4th 501. Propriety of state or local government health officer’s warrantless search — post-Camara cases, 53 A.L.R.4th 1168. Seizure of books, documents, or other papers under search warrant not describing such items, 54 A.L.R.4th 391. False light invasion of privacy — accusation or innuendo as to criminal acts, 58 A.L.R.4th 902. Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in public restroom, 74 A.L.R.4th 508. Search and seizure of telephone company records pertaining to subscriber as violation of subscriber’s constitutional rights, 76 A.L.R.4th 536. Liability for discharge of at-will employee for refusal to submit to drug testing, 79 A.L.R.4th 105. “Caller ID” system, allowing telephone call recipient to ascertain number of telephone from which call originated, as violation of right to privacy, wiretapping statute, or similar protections, 9 A.L.R.5th 553. Lawfulness of search of person or personal effects under medical emergency exception to warrant requirement, 11 A.L.R.5th 52. Search and seizure: lawfulness of demand for driver’s license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance, pursuant to police stop to assist motorist, 19 A.L.R.5th 884. Admissibility, in motor vehicle license suspension proceedings, of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, 23 A.L.R.5th 108. Search conducted by school official or teacher as violation of fourth amendment or equivalent state constitutional provision, 31 A.L.R.5th 229. Search and seizure of bank records pertaining to customer as violation of customer’s rights under state law, 33 A.L.R.5th 453. Propriety of stop and search by law enforcement officers based solely on drug courier profile, 37 A.L.R.5th 1. Propriety of execution of search warrant at nighttime, 41 A.L.R.5th 171. Searches and seizures: Reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of garbage or trash receptacle, 62 A.L.R.5th 1. Belief that burglary is in progress or has recently been committed as exigent circumstance justifying warrantless search of premises, 64 A.L.R.5th 637. Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in tent or campsite, 66 A.L.R.5th 373. Validity of anticipatory search warrants — state cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361. Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant’s property or residence authorized by one, other than relative, who is cotenant or common resident with defendant — state cases, 68 A.L.R.5th 343. Civilian participation in execution of search warrant as affecting legality of search, 68 A.L.R.5th 549. Effect of retroactive consent on legality of otherwise unlawful search and seizure, 76 A.L.R.5th 563. Permissibility and sufficiency of warrantless use of thermal imager or Forward Looking Infra-Red Radar (F.L.I.R.), 78 A.L.R.5th 309. Validity of police roadblocks or checkpoints for purpose of discovery of illegal narcotics violations, 82 A.L.R.5th 103. Validity of search or seizure of computer, computer disk, or computer peripheral equipment, 84 A.L.R.5th 1. What constitutes compliance with knock-and-announce rule in search of private premises — state cases, 85 A.L.R.5th 1. Federal and state constitutions as protecting prison visitor against unreasonable searches and seizures, 85 A.L.R.5th 261. Constitutionality of secret video surveillance, 91 A.L.R.5th 585. Expectation of privacy in internet communications, 92 A.L.R.5th 15. Destruction of property as violation of fourth amendment, 98 A.L.R.5th 305. Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches, 99 A.L.R.5th 557. Error, in either search warrant or application for warrant, as to address of place to be searched as rendering warrant invalid, 103 A.L.R.5th 463. Search warrant as authorizing search of structures on property other than main house or other building, or location other than designated portion of building, 104 A.L.R.5th 165. Odor detectable by unaided person as furnishing probable cause for search warrant, 106 A.L.R.5th 397. When are facts offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of cocaine so untimely as to be stale — State cases, 109 A.L.R.5th 99. When are facts offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sexual offense so untimely as to be stale — State cases, 111 A.L.R.5th 239. When are facts relating to marijuana, provided by one other than police or other law enforcement officer, so untimely as to be stale when offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of a controlled substance — State cases, 112 A.L.R.5th 429. When are facts relating to drug other than cocaine or marijuana so untimely as to be stale when offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of controlled substance — State cases, 113 A.L.R.5th 517. Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle based on odor of marijuana — State cases, 114 A.L.R.5th 173. When are facts relating to marijuana, provided by police or other law enforcement officer, so untimely as to be stale when offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of controlled substance — State cases, 114 A.L.R.5th 235. Validity of warrantless search based in whole or in part on odor of narcotics other than marijuana, or chemical related to manufacture of such narcotics, 115 A.L.R.5th 477. Validity of routine roadblocks by state or local police for purpose of discovery of driver’s license, registration, and safety violations, 116 A.L.R.5th 479. Use of trained dog to detect narcotics or drugs as unreasonable search in violation of state constitutions, 117 A.L.R.5th 407. Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues — Motions and objections during trial and matters other than pretrial motions, 117 A.L.R.5th 513. Validity of warrantless search of other than motor vehicle or occupant of vehicle based on odor of marijuana — State cases, 122 A.L.R.5th 439. Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle driver based on odor of marijuana-State cases, 123 A.L.R.5th 179. Validity of search conducted pursuant to parole warrant, 123 A.L.R.5th 221. Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle passenger based on odor of marijuana, 1 A.L.R.6th 371. Application of Leon good faith exception to exclusionary rule where police fail to comply with knock and announce requirement during execution of search warrant, 2 A.L.R.6th 169. Application in state narcotics cases of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers’ rule under fourth amendment — Cocaine cases, 4 A.L.R.6th 599. Application in state narcotics cases of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers’ rule under fourth amendment — Drugs other than marijuana and cocaine and unidentified drugs, 12 A.L.R.6th 553. Construction and application of rule permitting knock and talk visits under fourth amendment and state constitutions, 15 A.L.R.6th 515. When is warrantless entry of house or other building justified under “hot pursuit” doctrine, 17 A.L.R.6th 327. When does use of taser constitute violation of constitutional rights, 45 A.L.R.6th 1. Construction and application of Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485, 47 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 657 (2009), that police may search vehicle incident to recent occupant’s arrest only if arrestee is within reaching distance of passenger compartment at time of search or it is reasonable to believe vehicle contains evidence of offense — pretextual traffic offenses and other criminal investigations, 56 A.L.R.6th 1. What constitutes “custodial interrogation” by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of his or her federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation — in nonpolice vehicle for traffic stop, 56 A.L.R.6th 323. What constitutes “custodial interrogation” by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation — at nonpolice vehicle for other than traffic stop, 57 A.L.R.6th 83. What constitutes “custodial interrogation” by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation — where unspecified as to precise location of roadside questioning by law enforcement officers, 58 A.L.R.6th 215. What constitutes “custodial interrogation” within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation — at suspect’s place of employment or business, 58 A.L.R.6th 439. Necessity of rendering medical assistance as circumstance permitting warrantless entry or search of building or premises, 58 A.L.R.6th 499. Propriety of execution of no-knock search warrant, 59 A.L.R.6th 311. What constitutes “custodial interrogation” within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation — at school, 59 A.L.R.6th 393. Validity of search of wireless communication devices, 62 A.L.R.6th 161. Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in backyards, 62 A.L.R.6th 413. When does use of pepper spray, mace, or other similar chemical irritants constitute violation of constitutional rights, 65 A.L.R.6th 93. Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in outbuildings, 67 A.L.R.6th 531. Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues — pretrial motions — suppression motions where no warrant involved, 71 A.L.R.6th 1. Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues — pretrial motions — suppression motions where warrant was involved, 72 A.L.R.6th 1. Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for the truth — underlying homicide and assault offenses, 72 A.L.R.6th 437. Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues — pretrial motions — motions other than for suppression, 73 A.L.R.6th 1. Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for truth — underlying drug offenses, 73 A.L.R.6th 49. Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for the truth — underlying sexual offenses, 74 A.L.R.6th 69. Construction and application by state courts of protective sweep doctrine recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990) — warrantless search of house for dangerous persons, 78 A.L.R.6th 297. Permissibility under Fourth Amendment of Terry stop to investigate completed misdemeanor, 78 A.L.R.6th 599. Construction and application by state courts of protective sweep doctrine recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990) — warrantless search of apartment or other non-house dwelling for dangerous persons, 79 A.L.R.6th 1. Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for truth — underlying vehicular offenses, 79 A.L.R.6th 325. Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant theft and burglary offenses, 80 A.L.R.6th 239. Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for the truth — underlying miscellaneous offenses, 81 A.L.R.6th 257. Permissibility under Fourth Amendment of investigatory traffic stop based solely on anonymous tip reporting drunk driving, 84 A.L.R.6th 293. Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure, 92 A.L.R.6th 1. Sufficiency of search warrant for DNA sample, 93 A.L.R.6th 275. Validity of use of cellular telephone or tower to track prospective, real time, or historical position of possessor of phone under state law, 94 A.L.R.6th 579. Search and seizure: what constitutes abandonment of real property within rule that search and seizure of abandoned property is not unreasonable, 99 A.L.R.6th 397. Application of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers’ rule under Fourth Amendment in prosecution for prostitution, pornography, or other sexually based offense — state cases, 101 A.L.R.6th 299. Application of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers’ rule under Fourth Amendment in murder, homicide or manslaughter prosecution — state cases, 101 A.L.R.6th 331. Application of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers’ rule under Fourth Amendment in prosecution for robbery, burglary, larceny, or other theft offense — state cases, 103 A.L.R.6th 347. Whether police scan of magnetic strip on credit or debit card violates reasonable expectation of privacy under fourth amendment, 5 A.L.R.7th 1. Construction and application of supreme court’s holding in Florida v. Jar-dines, that canine sniff on front porch of home constitutes “search” for purposes of fourth amendment in subsequent similar factual circumstances, 15 A.L.R.7th 3. Validity of search and seizure warrant, and execution thereof, to disclose records and electronic communications relating to specific e-mail address, 15 A.L.R.7th 5. What constitutes reasonable time to wait under knock-and announce rule in context of search or arrest within private premises - State cases, 71 A.L.R.7th 2. Open Container Laws, 81 A.L.R.7th 3. Application of fourth amendment to evidence seized in foreign jurisdiction, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 4. Sufficiency of information provided by confidential informant, whose identity is known to police, to provide probable cause for federal search warrant where there was no indication that informant provided reliable information to police in past-Cases decided after Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), 9 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1. Assessment of constitutionality of officer’s entry into home to execute arrest warrant under Payton v. New York framework — Federal appellate cases, 36 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4. Determinations whether federal agency actions relating to mining operations constituted major federal actions for purposes of § 102(2)(C) of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(C)), 37 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 9. Determinations whether federal agency actions relating to oil and gas extraction constituted major federal actions for purposes of § 102(2)(C) of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(C)), 37 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 11. Hobby Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101 et seq., and regulations thereunder, 39 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1. Permissibility under fourth amendment of detention of motorist by police, following lawful stop for traffic offense, to investigate with canine matters not related to offense — Federal cases post Rodriguez v. U.S., 39 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6; 53 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 8. Requirement that transfer be “for the benefit of” particular creditor within meaning of preferences section of bankruptcy code, which permits trustee to avoid certain transfers of an interest of debtor in property to or for benefit of creditor, 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(1), 39 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 8. When good faith or reasonableness is necessary for defense of qualified immunity in action for damages against law enforcement official under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for violation of right to privacy under fourth amendment, 51 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 1. Construction and application by federal courts of protective sweep doctrine recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990) — warrantless search of house for dangerous persons, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 159. Construction and application of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule — Supreme Court cases, 68 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 303. Construction and application by federal courts of protective sweep doctrine recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990) — warrantless search of apartment or other nonhouse dwelling for dangerous persons, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 241. Evidence of officer’s actions leading up to use of excessive force in federal excessive force cases, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4. Validity, under federal constitution, of regulations, rules or statutes allowing drug testing of students, 87 A.L.R. Fed. 148. Validity, construction, and effect of domestic currency transaction reporting requirement based upon 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a), 89 A.L.R. Fed. 770. Warrantless search by government employer of employee’s workplace locker, desk, or the like as violation of fourth amendment privacy rights — federal cases, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 226. Validity of use of cellular telephone or tower to track prospective, real time, or historical position of possessor of phone under fourth amendment, 92 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1. Physical examination of child’s body for evidence of abuse as violative of fourth amendment or as raising fourth amendment issue, 93 A.L.R. Fed. 530. What constitutes functional equivalent of border for purpose of border exception to requirements of fourth amendment, 94 A.L.R. Fed. 372. Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of compensatory damages in civil actions for deprivation of rights under 42 USCS § 1983 — modern cases, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 501. Immunity of federal tax agent from suit based upon agent’s effort to enforce or collect tax, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 700. Validity of warrantless search under extended border doctrine, 102 A.L.R. Fed. 269. Admissibility of evidence not related to air travel security, disclosed by airport security procedures, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 658. Warrantless detention of mail for investigative purposes as violative of fourth amendment, 115 A.L.R. Fed. 439. Permissibility under fourth amendment of detention of motorist by police, following lawful stop for traffic offense, to investigate matters not related to offense, 118 A.L.R. Fed. 567. Use of trained dog to detect narcotics or drugs as unreasonable search in violation of the fourth amendment, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 399. Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of adult defendant’s property or residence authorized by defendant’s minor relative, 152 A.L.R. Fed. 475. Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant’s property or residence authorized by defendant’s spouse, 154 A.L.R. Fed. 579. Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant’s property or residence authorized by defendant’s adult relative other than spouse, 160 A.L.R. Fed. 165. Validity of warrantless administrative inspection of business that is allegedly closely or pervasively regulated; cases decided since Colonnade Catering Corp. v. U.S., 397 U.S. 72, 90 S. Ct. 774, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1970), 182 A.L.R. Fed. 467. When are facts offered in support of search warrant for evidence of federal nondrug offense so untimely as to be stale, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 415. Forcible administration of antipsychotic medication to pretrial detainees — Federal cases, 188 A.L.R. Fed. 285. Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle based on odor of marijuana — Federal cases, 188 A.L.R. Fed. 487. Validity of warrantless search of other than motor vehicle or occupant of motor vehicle based on odor of marijuana — Federal cases, 191 A.L.R. Fed. 303. Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle occupant based on odor of marijuana — Federal cases, 192 A.L.R. Fed. 391. Sufficiency of information provided by confidential informant, whose identity is known to police, to provide probable cause for federal search warrant where there was indication that informant provided reliable information to police in past — Cases decided after Ilinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), 196 A.L.R. Fed. 1.
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Current through: the volume states no acts currency; this is its 2025 edition.
Text read from 1us-const-(v1)-2025-pdf.pdf, Volume V1, 2025 edition, pages 297 to 535; merge action: bound only; file SHA-256 3ba17b39ff61.
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