Constitution of the United States

Amend. VII. Right to Trial by Jury in Civil Cases

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Current through: the volume states no acts currency; this is its 2025 edition.

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

The notes below are printed with the section but are not enacted law (O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1(c)). They are shown apart from the text.

Editor's notes

This amendment curtails the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court granted in U.S. Const., art. III, sec. II, as to questions of fact.

Cross references

Right to trial by jury, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. 1, Sec. 1, Para. XI and §§ 9-11-38, 9-11-39. Grand juries, § 15-12-60 et seq.

Law reviews

For comment on Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953), reversing a felony conviction decided by a majority verdict upon the accused’s waiver of a unanimous verdict induced by the trial court, see 16 Ga. B.J. 234 (1953). For article, “Jury Trials in Contempt Cases,” see 20 Ga. B.J. 297 (1957). For comment discussing limits on the military’s jurisdiction and the constitutional rights of servicemen in light of O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S. Ct. 1683, 23 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1969), see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 311 (1969). For article on the judicial development of the due process clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14 and the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 533 (1971). For note discussing televised and photographic coverage of court proceedings in light of the individuals’ right to a fair trial, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 1099 (1978). For comment discussing the forcible medication of involuntarily committed mental patients with antipsychotic drugs in light of Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 739 (1981). For comment on Cotten v. Witco Chem. Corp., 651 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3565 (Jan. 18, 1982), and discussion of complex cases and the seventh amendment, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 1353 (1982). For article, “Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters,” see 20 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (1986). For article, “A Comment on Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters,” see 20 Ga. L. Rev. 455 (1986). For comment, “Summary Judgment: The Majority View Undergoes a Complete Reversal in the 1986 Supreme Court,” see 37 Emory L.J. 171 (1988). For article, “The Endangered Right of Jury Trials in Dispossessories,” see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 126 (1988). For article, “The Structure of Rights,” see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 415 (1993). For article, “Rights as Trumps,” see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 463 (1993). For article, “Further Reflections on Rights and Interests: A Reply,” see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 489 (1993). For article, “Utopian Dangers: Chemer-insky’s ‘Right to Minimum Subsistence’,” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 553 (1993). For article, “The Peremptory Challenge: A Lost Cause,” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 579 (1993). For article, “Article II Courts,” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 825 (1993). For note, “In re Grabill Corporation; Appeal of NCNB National Bank of North Carolina: Four to One Against Jury Trials in Bankruptcy Courts,” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1415 (1993). For article on constitutional criminal procedure, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 1305 (2001). For article, “The Right to a Jury Decision on Sentencing Facts after Booker: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach the Sixth,” 39 Ga. L. Rev. 895 (2005). For article, “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform,” see 44 Ga. L. Rev. 433 (2010). For note, “ERISA’s Remedial Irony: Narrow Interpretation Paves the Way for Jury Trials in Suits for Breach of Fidu-ciary Duty Under ERISA,” see 26 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 971 (2010). For article, “Confusion Codified: Why Trademark Remedies Make No Sense,” see 17 J. Intell. Prop. L. 245 (2010). For article, “Eleventh Circuit Survey: January 1, 2013 — December 31, 2013: Article: Labor and Employment,” see 65 Emory L. J. 1067 (2014). For article, “Judging Congressional Elections,” see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 359 (2017). For article, “Medical Malpractice as Worker’s Comp: Overcoming State Constitutional Barriers to Tort Reform,” see 67 Emory L.J. 975 (2018). For article, “The Impropriety of Punitive Damages in Mass Torts,” see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 723 (2018). For note, “Who Determines What Is Egregious? Judge or Jury: Enhanced Damages After Halo v. Pulse,” see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 389 (2018). For annual survey on class actions, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 895 (2019). For note, “Reluctance or Apathy? Examining Georgia’s Continued Adherence to a Strict Mutuality Issue Preclusion Doctrine,” see 37 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 541 (2021).

Other notes (38 entries, as printed)

Scope and purpose generally.: U.S. Const., amend. 7 preserves the right which existed under the common law when the amendment was adopted. The phrase “common law” found in U.S. Const., amend. 7 is used in contradistinction to equity, admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence. Thus it has no application to cases where recovery of money damages is an incident to equitable relief even though damages might have been recovered in an action at law. It does not apply where the proceeding is not in the nature of a suit at common law. Wirtz v. Alapaha Yellow Pine Prods., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 465, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6953 (M.D. Ga. 1963). U.S. Const., amend. 7 preserves to litigants the right to jury trial in suits at common law not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered. In a just sense, U.S. Const., amend. 7 then may well be construed to embrace all suits, which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights. Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15676 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 570 F.2d 1226, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 11864 (5th Cir. 1978). By “common law,” the framers of U.S. Const., amend. 7 meant not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered. FDIC v. New London Enters., Ltd., 619 F.2d 1099, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16300 (5th Cir. 1980). tory of the existing law, for it required only that jury trial in suits at common law was to be “preserved.” It thus did not purport to require a jury trial where none was required before. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 97 S. Ct. 1261, 51 L. Ed. 2d 464, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 65 (1977), superseded by statute as stated in, In re United Mo. Bank, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 6290 (8th Cir. 1990). The phrase “suits at common law” has been construed to refer to cases tried prior to the adoption of U.S. Const., amend. 7 in courts of law in which jury trial was customary, as distinguished from courts of equity or admiralty, in which jury trial was not. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 97 S. Ct. 1261, 51 L. Ed. 2d 464, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 65 (1977), superseded by statute as stated in, In re United Mo. Bank, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 6290 (8th Cir. 1990). Right extends beyond common-law
U.S. Const., amend. 7 was declaraactions recognized at time of adoption.: Although the thrust of U.S. Const., amend. 7 was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791, it has long been settled that the right extends beyond the common-law forms of action recognized at that time. FDIC v. New London Enters., Ltd., 619 F.2d 1099, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16300 (5th Cir. 1980). This right extends beyond common-law causes of action that existed at the time of the amendment’s adoption. Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18704 (11th Cir. 1982). U.S. Const., amend. 7 requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather than in an action in equity or admiralty. Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18704 (11th Cir. 1982). Right to jury trial only when issues
of material fact in dispute.: The right to a jury trial is not infringed where the jury would have no role because there are no issues of material fact in dispute. CM3, Inc. v. Associated Realty Investors/Prado, 201 Ga. App. 428, 411 S.E.2d 320, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1439 (1991). teed only for the resolution of legal claims. Schofield v. Stetson, 459 F. Supp. 998, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14301 (M.D. Ga. 1978). If a case involves only equitable issues, trial by jury is not guaranteed by U.S. Const., amend. 7. Duncan v. First Nat’l Bank, 597 F.2d 51, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14018 (5th Cir. 1979). Where the whole case is equitable in nature there is no constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 645 F.2d 6, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13276 (5th Cir. 1981). Jury trial dependent on whether
Jury trial is allowed and guaranissue is legal or equitable.: Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial depends on whether the issue before the court is legal or equitable. Stamps v. Sexton Bros. Tire Co. (In re Major Tire Co.), 64 B.R. 305, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5477 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). Where legal claims are joined with equitable claims, the right to a jury trial on the legal claims, including all issues common to both claims, remains intact. The right cannot be abridged by characterizing the legal relief sought as being incidental to the equitable claim. Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15676 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 570 F.2d 1226, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 11864 (5th Cir. 1978).
Jury trial if legal issues.: Where both legal and equitable issues are presented in a case, even when the legal issues are incidental to the equitable issues, the legal issues must be presented to a jury. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12605 (N.D. Ga. 1968), rev’d, 421 F.2d 888, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11301 (5th Cir. 1970). When legal and equitable actions are tried together, the right to a jury in the legal action encompasses the issues common to both. Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 30644 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S. Ct. 97, 78 L. Ed. 2d 102, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 1180 (1983). It makes no difference if the equigal cause so that the basic issue of the case taken as a whole is equitable; as long as any legal cause is involved the jury rights it creates control. United States v. McMahan, 569 F.2d 889, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12112 (5th Cir. 1978); Duncan v. First Nat’l Bank, 597 F.2d 51, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14018 (5th Cir. 1979). Loss of right to jury trial through prior determination of equitable
table cause clearly outweighs the leclaims.: Where both legal and equitable issues are presented in a single case, only under the most imperative circumstances can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims. This applies whether the trial judge chooses to characterize the legal issues presented as incidental to equitable issues or not. United States v. McMahan, 569 F.2d 889, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12112 (5th Cir. 1978).
Right applies to federal courts.: The right of trial by jury, under U.S. Const., amend. 7, applies to federal courts. Porter v. Watkins, 217 Ga. 73, 121 S.E.2d 120, 1961 Ga. LEXIS 380 (1961). Right does not apply to suits in state courts. Butler v. Claxton, 221 Ga. 620, 146 S.E.2d 763, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 649 (1966); Smith v. Milliken & Co., 189 Ga. App. 897, 377 S.E.2d 916, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 54 (1989). Trial court’s entry of summary judgment against a life estate claimant in an action against a former daughter-in-law did not violate seventh amendment rights, as that federal constitutional amendment did not apply to suits in state court; moreover, the claimant’s rights were not infringed because summary judgment was granted due to the finding that there were no issues of material fact in dispute. Crane v. Poteat, 275 Ga. App. 669, 621 S.E.2d 501, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1000 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0260, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 180 (Ga. Feb. 27, 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 830, 127 S. Ct. 52, 166 L. Ed. 2d 51, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5965 (2006). Trial court’s dismissal of a driver’s negligence lawsuit filed against an insured’s insurer did not deprive the driver of any seventh amendment right to a jury trial or right of access to the courts under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII, given that the seventh amendment did not apply to suits in state courts and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII dealt with a litigant’s choice of either self-representation or representation by counsel, not access to the courts. Crane v. Lazaro, 281 Ga. App. 127, 635 S.E.2d 319, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 946 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0006, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 907 (Ga. Oct. 30, 2006), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1200, 127 S. Ct. 1278, 167 L. Ed. 2d 69, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1335 (2007). Effect of Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have not abrogated the common-law right to jury consideration of legal issues, such as title to land in trespass and ejectment actions, after timely demand. United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10941 (5th Cir. 1971).
Request for attorney fees.: The mere inclusion of a request for attorney’s fees, where the plaintiff ’s other claims are exclusively equitable in nature, does not entitle the defendant to a jury trial pursuant to the seventh amendment. Wheeless v. Gelzer, 765 F. Supp. 741, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7450 (N.D. Ga. 1991). Right to revoke the waiver of the right to a jury trial is subject only to proof of special circumstances showing that its exercise would substantially delay or impede the cause of justice. Brumbalow v. State, 128 Ga. App. 581, 197 S.E.2d 380, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1551 (1973).
Parties may waive unanimity requirements in civil cases.: If the parties to a civil case may validly agree to have their rights determined without any jury or with a jury of 11 or less members, it follows that they may with equal validity consent to accept a verdict arrived at by a specified number of jurors, even that of a bare majority. A party may waive constitutional rights designed for that party’s benefit and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize civil litigants to stipulate for majority verdicts. Phillips v. Meadow Garden Hosp., 139 Ga. App. 541, 228 S.E.2d 714, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1879 (1976). Parties may not be deprived of una-
nimity requirement by statute.: In federal courts, civil litigants cannot be deprived by statute of their right under U.S. Const., amend. 7 to a unanimous verdict. Phillips v. Meadow Garden Hosp., 139 Ga. App. 541, 228 S.E.2d 714, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1879 (1976). U.S. Const., amend. 7 requires that the jury be allowed to make reasonable inferences from facts proven in evidence having a reasonable tendency to sustain them. Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 363, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12178 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 480 F.2d 158, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9695 (5th Cir. 1973). pert opinion to have the force of fact when based on facts which sustain it. Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 363, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12178 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 480 F.2d 158, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9695 (5th Cir. 1973). U.S. Const., amend. 7 does not require that inferences be made from
U.S. Const., amend. 7 permits exwithheld facts.: U.S. Const., amend. 7 does not require that experts or the jury be permitted to make inferences from the withholding of crucial facts, favorable in their effects to the party who has the evidence of them in the party’s peculiar knowledge and possession, but elects to keep it so. Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 363, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12178 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 480 F.2d 158, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9695 (5th Cir. 1973). Summary judgment is authorized where there are no issues of material fact in dispute. In such circumstances the jury, as trier of fact, has no role, and appellant’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 7 are not infringed. Barrett v. Independent Order of Foresters, 625 F.2d 73, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14446 (5th Cir. 1980). When a buyer claiming the buyer was fraudulently sold real estate argued, on appeal, that the trial court’s summary dismissal of the buyer’s complaint under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-12(b)(6) and 9-11-56 deprived the buyer of the right to a jury trial, this claim had no merit because, when the opposing parties filed an affidavit with their motion for summary judgment claiming that the misrepresentation alleged in the buyer’s complaint did not occur, and the buyer did not respond to that motion, the evidence in the record was undisputed that the misrepresentation, which was the crux of the buyer’s claims, did not happen, so there was no fact-finding role for a jury to perform and therefore no infringement on the buyer’s seventh amendment rights. Crane v. Samples, 267 Ga. App. 895, 600 S.E.2d 624, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 680 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1719, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 781 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1719, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 789 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2004). Remittitur as condition precedent
to denial of new trial.: Where a definite and readily ascertainable portion of a verdict should not have been awarded to the plaintiff, a court, as a matter of law, can condition the denial of a new trial on a remittitur of that portion of the judgment by the plaintiff. Such a remittitur does not infringe upon U.S. Const., amend. 7’s guaranty of trial by a jury. Woodbury v. Whitmire, 246 Ga. 349, 271 S.E.2d 491, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1103 (1980). Conditioning the grant of defendant’s motion for a new trial on the plaintiff’s refusal to remit portion of the jury award that the court determined was excessive did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional right to a jury trial. Lisle v. Willis, 265 Ga. 861, 463 S.E.2d 108, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 863 (1995). Matters assigned to administrative
agencies.: When Congress creates new statutory “public rights,” it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating U.S. Const., amend. 7’s injunction that jury trial is to be preserved in suits at common law. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 97 S. Ct. 1261, 51 L. Ed. 2d 464, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 65 (1977), superseded by statute as stated in, In re United Mo. Bank, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 6290 (8th Cir. 1990). Jury trials are incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication and would substantially interfere with an agency’s role in the statutory scheme. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 518 F.2d 990, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 12830 (5th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 430 U.S. 442, 97 S. Ct. 1261, 51 L. Ed. 2d 464, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 65 (1977).
Failure to meet rule-required prerequisites to trial.: No constitutional right to a trial exists when, after notice and a reasonable opportunity, a party fails to make the rule-required demonstration that some dispute of material fact exists which a trial could resolve. Oglesby v. Terminal Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 1111, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 5855 (5th Cir. 1976). tion unheard of at common law, U.S. Const., amend. 7 requires a trial by jury if that action involves rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law. FDIC v. New London Enters., Ltd., 619 F.2d 1099, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16300 (5th Cir. 1980). Statutory actions which create a right to recover damages have been held to be actions enforcing legal rights. FDIC v. New London Enters., Ltd., 619 F.2d 1099, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16300 (5th Cir. 1980). Statutorily conferred legal rights
Where a legislature creates an acand remedies.: A jury trial is required by U.S. Const., amend. 7 when a statute confers rights and remedies of a legal nature as opposed to an equitable nature. Schofield v. Stetson, 459 F. Supp. 998, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14301 (M.D. Ga. 1978).
Injunctive relief.: No constitutional right to a jury trial exists in equity actions for injunctive relief. United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., 324 F. Supp. 287, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
State drug forfeiture proceedings.: — U.S. Const., amend. 7 guarantees a jury trial in federal drug forfeiture actions and is inapplicable to similar actions conducted at the state level pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49. Swails v. State, 263 Ga. 276, 431 S.E.2d 101, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 489, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011, 114 S. Ct. 602, 126 L. Ed. 2d 567, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7657 (1993).
Violation of municipal ordinance.: — The constitutional guarantee of a right to a trial by a jury does not extend to one charged in a municipal court with violation of a municipal ordinance. Key v. Stewart, 228 Ga. 516, 186 S.E.2d 739, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 822 (1972). Constitutional guarantee of trial by jury does not extend to eminent domain proceedings. Sweat v. Georgia Power Co., 235 Ga. 281, 219 S.E.2d 384, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 855 (1975). Condemnation suit brought under Code 1933, § 36-301 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. § 22-1-1 et seq.) is not a suit at common law within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 7 and, therefore, a common-law jury trial in such a case is not guaranteed by it. United States v. Kennesaw Mt. Battlefield Ass’n, 99 F.2d 830, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 3006 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 646, 59 S. Ct. 587, 83 L. Ed. 1045, 1939 U.S. LEXIS 779 (1939).
Stockholder’s derivative suits.: The right under U.S. Const., amend. 7 to trial by jury extends to a stockholder’s derivative suit with respect to those issues as to which the corporation, had it been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a jury trial. United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., 324 F. Supp. 287, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Stockholder’s refusal to accept tender offer.: Federal district court’s determination that a dissenting shareholder’s refusal to accept a stock tender offer was “arbitrary, vexatious, or otherwise not in good faith” did not violate the shareholder’s seventh amendment right to have a jury decide whether the shareholder had acted arbitrarily. Columbus Mills, Inc. v. Freeland, 918 F.2d 1575, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 21558 (11th Cir. 1990).
Obscenity cases.: Ajudge may act as a finder of fact in civil proceedings involving obscenity. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 454 F. Supp. 289, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16732 (N.D. Ga. 1978). Former Code 1933, § 92-7301 (see O.C.G.A. § 48-3-1) is not violative of Ga. Const. 1877, Art. VI, Sec. XVIII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI), or of U.S. Const., amend. 7. Hicks v. Stewart Oil Co., 182 Ga. 654, 186 S.E. 802, 1936 Ga. LEXIS 531 (1936). Claim for back wages in an action is one for breach of an employment contract, and as such is clearly within the jury trial guarantee of U.S. Const., amend. 7. Johnson v. Georgia Hwy. Express, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 327, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8724 (N.D. Ga. 1968), rev’d, 417 F.2d 1122, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10240 (5th Cir. 1969). Denial of jury trial on back pay
issue under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).: In a case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)), comes into where the gravamen of the complaint is injunctive and declaratory relief against racial discrimination in employment, and back pay is one of the modes of relief that a court can grant, denial of defendant’s demand for a jury trial on the issue of back pay does not contravene the Constitution. Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8718 (S.D. Ga. 1968).
Avoidance of lien on exempt property is equitable in nature.: As an equitable action, the proceeding is not a suit at common law in which legal, as opposed to equitable, rights are to be determined. Neither the seventh amendment of the United States Constitution nor the Bankruptcy Code provide support for a creditor’s demand for a jury trial in such a case. Caruthers v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 87 B.R. 723, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 825 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
Interrogatory answers to be interpreted so as to eliminate inconsistency.: U.S. Const., amend. 7 requires a court to interpret a jury’s answers to special interrogatories, if at all possible, so that there is no inconsistency. In doing so, the court must consider all the circumstances, especially the issues submitted to the jury, the instructions to the jury, and any expressions of the jury extrinsic to their answers to the interrogatories. Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 9542 (11th Cir. 1987). Standard for review of federal court’s denial or grant of new trial. — The general rule is that a federal district court’s denial or grant of a new trial is within its discretion and is ordinarily nonreviewable save for an abuse of that discretion or misapprehension of the law. To protect a litigant’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. 7 and to prevent improper intrusion on the jury’s function, a somewhat broader review applies to an order granting a new trial as opposed to an order denying such a motion, and the greatest degree of scrutiny is exercised when a new trial is granted on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 11302 (5th Cir. 1981).
Implied waiver of jury trial.: The right to a jury trial is impliedly waived by participating in a bench trial and by failing to protest or object to a bench trial. Goss v. Bayer, 184 Ga. App. 730, 362 S.E.2d 768, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2367 (1987).
Issuance of writ of possession.: A debtor’s constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial was not infringed when the trial court issued a writ of possession without the benefit of a jury, where there were no issues of material fact in dispute. Bledsoe v. Central Ga. Prod. Credit Ass’n, 180 Ga. App. 598, 349 S.E.2d 821, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2206 (1986).
Violation of county zoning ordinance.: An indictment charging violation of a county zoning ordinance is a charge of a violation of state law for failure to comply with the local zoning ordinances and, where such violation is a misdemeanor under state law, the defendant is entitled to trial by jury. Clark v. State, 157 Ga. App. 486, 277 S.E.2d 738, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1876 (1981).
Back pay under Civil Rights Act.: An action for reinstatement and back pay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is by nature equitable and entails no rights under U.S. Const., amend. 7. Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 30644 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S. Ct. 97, 78 L. Ed. 2d 102, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 1180 (1983).
Bankruptcy proceedings.: Defendant had no seventh amendment right to a jury trial in a bankruptcy proceeding, where all claims presented by plaintifftrustee were of an equitable nature. Stamps v. Sexton Bros. Tire Co. (In re Major Tire Co.), 64 B.R. 305, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5477 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). Presiding over a jury trial in a core proceeding by a bankruptcy court would not violate the seventh amendment. Ellenberg v. Bouldin, 125 B.R. 851, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 60 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990). The seventh amendment would be violated where a district court reviews de novo the verdict of a jury trial conducted by a bankruptcy court in a noncore proceeding. Ellenberg v. Bouldin, 125 B.R. 851, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 60 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990). Debtor waived its seventh amendment right to a jury trial by bringing a noncore adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court. Haile Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 132 B.R. 979, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1528 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1991). The seventh amendment applied to a case where the remedy sought and most of the claims sounded in law, as opposed to equity. Hays v. Equitex, Inc., 260 B.R. 915, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 336 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2001). Trustee did not waive seventh amendment right to a jury trial where three of the four claims at issue were legal claims, they were only incidentally related to the bankruptcy case, they did not have anything to do with the claims process and/or the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship, and they were asserted against non-creditor third parties only to generate funds for distribution to creditors. Hays v. Equitex, Inc., 260 B.R. 915, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 336 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2001).
Fraudulent conveyance by bankruptcy debtors.: U.S. Const., amend. 7 did not grant bankruptcy debtors the right to a trial by jury in a suit by the trustee-in-bankruptcy against the debtors seeking to avoid an allegedly fraudulent conveyance of property. Pettigrew v. Graham, 747 F.2d 1383, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 16229 (11th Cir. 1984).
Claims under Postal Reorganization Act.: There is no right for Postal Reorganization Act claims against the postal service to be tried by a jury. Griffin v. United States Postal Serv., 635 F. Supp. 190, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25991 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
Actions against federal government.: The seventh amendment right to trial by jury does not apply in actions against the federal government because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Griffin v. United States Postal Serv., 635 F. Supp. 190, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25991 (N.D. Ga. 1986). Constitutional limit on punitive
damage award.: Upon determination of the constitutional limit on a particular award, the district court may strike the unconstitutional excess from a jury’s punitive damage award and enter judgment for that amount. Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g., Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5935 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931, 120 S. Ct. 329, 145 L. Ed. 2d 256, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 6617 (1999).
Excessive jury award.: A federal court has no general authority to reduce the amount of a jury’s verdict; however, when a court finds that a jury’s award of damages is excessive, it may grant the defendant a new trial. Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g., Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5935 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931, 120 S. Ct. 329, 145 L. Ed. 2d 256, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 6617 (1999). Because a jury’s award of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of fact, appellate review of a trial court’s determination that an award is consistent with due process does not implicate U.S. Const., amend. 7 concerns. Kent v. A.O. White, Jr., Consulting Eng’rs, P.C., 253 Ga. App. 492, 559 S.E.2d 731, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 111, overruled in part, Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Six Flags Over Ga., L.L.C., 254 Ga. App. 598, 563 S.E.2d 178, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 430 (2002).
Am. Jur. 2d.: 9 Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy, § 862. 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 412. 32 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Courts, § 448. 35 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Tax Enforcement, § 790. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, § 315. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, § 4. 75AAm. Jur. 2d, Trial, § 724.
C.J.S.: 8A C.J.S., Bankruptcy, § 465. 15A C.J.S., Common Law, § 1. 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 725. 16D C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 2122. 35B C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, § 893 et seq. 36 C.J.S., Federal Courts, § 614 et seq. 50A C.J.S., Juries, §§ 5, 23, 36, 221.
ALR.: Right to jury in will contest, 67 A.L.R. 564. Constitutionality, construction, and effect of statute providing for jury trial in disbarment proceedings, 78 A.L.R. 1323. Statutes in relation to subject-matter or form of instructions by court as impairing constitutional right to jury trial, 80 A.L.R. 906. Right of defendant to waive right of trial by jury where he is not represented by counsel, 102 A.L.R. 802. Waiver of right to jury trial as operative after expiration of term during which it was made, or as regards subsequent trial, 106 A.L.R. 203. Right to jury trial in suit to remove cloud, quiet title, or determine adverse claims, 117 A.L.R. 9. Right to jury trial as to fact essential to action or defense but not involving merits thereof, 170 A.L.R. 383. Constitutional right to jury trial in proceeding for adjudication of incompetency or insanity or for restoration, 33 A.L.R.2d 1145. Mandamus or prohibition as remedy to enforce right to jury trial, 41 A.L.R.2d 780. Constitutionality of arbitration statutes, 55 A.L.R.2d 432. Withdrawal or disregard of waiver of jury trial in civil action, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. Rule or statute requiring opposing party’s consent to withdrawal of demand for jury trial, 90 A.L.R.2d 1162. Sufficiency of waiver of full jury, 93 A.L.R.2d 410. Right in equity suit to jury trial of counterclaim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321. Right of indigent to proceed in marital action without payment of costs, 52 A.L.R.3d 844. Right to counsel in contempt proceedings, 52 A.L.R.3d 1002. Right to a jury trial on motion to vacate judgment, 75 A.L.R.3d 894. Religious belief, affiliation, or prejudice of prospective jurors as proper subject of inquiry or grounds for challenge on voir dire, 95 A.L.R.3d 172. Validity and efficacy of accused’s waiver of unanimous verdict, 97 A.L.R.3d 1253. Authority of state court to order jury trial in civil case where jury has been waived or not demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. Right to jury trial in stockholder’s derivative action, 32 A.L.R.4th 1111. Jury trial waiver as binding on later state civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. Validity of law or rule requiring state court party who requests jury trial in civil case to pay costs associated with jury, 68 A.L.R.4th 343. Right to jury trial in action under state civil rights law, 12 A.L.R.5th 508. Validity, construction, and application of state statutory provisions limiting amount of recovery in medical malpractice claims, 26 A.L.R.5th 245. Contractual jury trial waivers in state civil cases, 42 A.L.R.5th 53. Right to jury trial in child neglect, child abuse, or termination of parental rights proceedings, 102 A.L.R.5th 227. Failure of state prosecutor to disclose pretrial statement made by crime victim as violating due process, 102 A.L.R.5th 327. Contractual jury trial waivers in federal civil cases, 92 A.L.R. Fed. 688. Right to jury trial in action by Secretary of Labor to recover back wages under 29 USCS § 217 and liquidated damages under 29 USCS § 216(c) for violation of wage and hour provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 861. Right to jury trial on issue of damages in copyright infringement actions under 17 USCA § 504, 163 A.L.R. Fed. 467. Construction and application of re-examination clause of Seventh Amendment, 10 A.L.R.7th 1. Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury — Supreme Court decisions, 57 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 2.

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