Constitution of the United States

Amend. XI. Restriction of Judicial Power Against the States

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Current through: the volume states no acts currency; this is its 2025 edition.

The Judicial power to the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

The notes below are printed with the section but are not enacted law (O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1(c)). They are shown apart from the text.

Editor's notes

U.S. Const., amend. 11 modifies U.S. Const., art. III, sec. II, cl. 1.

Law reviews

For article, “Georgia Versus the United States Supreme Court,” see 4 J. Pub. L. 285 (1955). For comment criticizing Gainer v. School Bd., 135 F. Supp. 559 (M.D. Ala. 1955), refusing to enforce injunction against school board for discriminatory salary practices on grounds of this amendment, see 7 Mercer L. Rev. 387 (1956). For comment on Knowles v. Housing Auth., 212 Ga. 729, 95 S.E.2d 659 (1957), holding that the act giving the housing authority unqualified power to sue and be sued under § 49-2-6 waived any immunity the authority otherwise might have claimed under the state’s privilege of governmental immunity, see 20 Ga. B.J. 258 (1957). For article, “Sovereign Immunity in Administrative Law—A New Diagnosis,” see 9 J. of Pub. L. 1 (1960). For article, “The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation,” see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 207 (1968). For note, “Sovereign Immunity and the Fair Labor Standards Act,” see 21 J. of Pub. L. 415 (1972). For comment discussing Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973) and Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), as to restrictions under this amendment on federal jurisdiction over suits seeking to force state officials to make retroactive payment of withheld state-federal welfare payments, see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 366 (1973). For comment discussing executive immunity under this amendment, in light of Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev’d sub nom. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 42 U.S.L.W. 4543 (1974), see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 669 (1974). For article discussing developing principles of state sovereignty limitations on Congress’ exercise of its granted powers, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 35 (1976). For note discussing state liability for highway defects and waiver of sovereign immunity under this amendment, see 27 Emory L.J. 337 (1978). For a note analyzing sovereign immunity in this state and proposing implementation of a waiver scheme and creation of a court of claims pursuant to Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. I, see 27 Emory L.J. 717 (1978). For comment on Kimble v. Solomon, 599 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1979) and this amendment, see 14 Ga. L. Rev. 135 (1979). For article discussing interpretation of this amendment, see 14 Ga. L. Rev. 389 (1980). For comment on Owen v. City of Independence, 444 U.S. 822, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 64 L. Ed. 2d 850 (1980), discussing state and municipal immunity from suit, see 14 Ga. L. Rev. 605 (1980). For note, state standing in police-misconduct cases: expanding the boundaries of parens patriae, see 16 Ga. L. Rev. 865 (1982). For note, “Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity,” see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 513 (1983). For article surveying 1982 Eleventh Circuit cases involving constitutional civil law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1221 (1983). For survey of 1985 Eleventh Circuit cases on employment discrimination, see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 1315 (1986). For article, “Georgia and the Development of Constitutional Principles: An Essay in Honor of the Bicentennial,” see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1987). For article, “Federal Preemption, Federal Conscription Under the New Super-fund Act,” see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 643 (1987). For survey of 1986 Eleventh Circuit cases on bankruptcy, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 1097 (1987). For survey of 1986 Eleventh Circuit cases on trial practice and procedure, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 1371 (1987). For article, “Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence After Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes of Action over Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction,” see 37 Emory L.J. 645 (1988). For annual Eleventh Circuit survey of constitutional law — civil, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 1313 (1991). For comment on the role of the Eleventh Amendment in shipwreck litigation, see 42 Emory L.J. 1099 (1993). For article, “Individual Rights and the Powers of Government,” see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 343 (1993). For article, “Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey January 1, 1993 — December 31, 1993: Constitutional Civil Law,” see 45 Mercer L. Rev. 1217 (1994). For comment, “Roving Federalism: Waiver Doctrine After College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,” see 49 Emory L.J. 859 (2000). For comment, “Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland: Reaffirming Ex parte Young and the Necessity of Finding Regulatory Hand-Back Schemes to a Gift or Gratuity,” see 52 Emory L.J. 1519 (2003). For note, “Lapides: Striking a Balance Between State Sovereignty and Fairness to Individual Litigants?,” see 54 Mercer L. Rev. 1741 (2003). For note, “Finding Immunity: Manders v. Lee and the Erosion of 1983 Liability,” see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 1505 (2004). For article, “General Intangible or Commercial Tort: Moral Rights and State-Based Intellectual Property as Collateral under U.C.C. Revised Article 9,” see 22 Bank. Dev. J. 95 (2005). For article, “Rethinking Constitutional Review in America and the Commonwealth: Judicial Protection of Human Rights in the Common Law World,” see 35 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 99 (2006). For 2006 eleventh circuit survey of admiralty law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 1113 (2007). For article, “Congressional End-Run: The Ignored Constraint on Judicial Review,” see 45 Ga. L. Rev. 211 (2010). For comment, “Keeping the Arms in Touch: Taking Political Accountability Seriously in the Eleventh Amendment Arm of the State Doctrine,” see 64 Emory L.J. 819 (2015). For article, “Eleventh Circuit Survey: January 1, 2014 — December 31, 2014: Employment Discrimination,” see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 927 (2015). For annual survey on employment discrimination, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 875 (2016). For article, “A Penal Colony for Bad Lawyers,” see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 743 (2018). For article, “Transcript: Abortion and Gay Rights,” see 35 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 871 (2019). For article, “Coequal Federalism and Federal-State Agencies,” see 55 Ga. L. Rev. 287 (2020).

Other notes (46 entries, as printed)

Purpose.: The very object and purpose of U.S. Const., amend. 11 is to prevent the indignity of subjecting a state to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties. Ramsey v. Hamilton, 181 Ga. 365, 182 S.E. 392, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 94 (1935). U.S. Const., amend. 11 grants a state immunity from suits by an individual. Turner v. Ledbetter, 906 F.2d 606, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12049 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928, 111 S. Ct. 2041, 114 L. Ed. 2d 125, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2769 (1991).
How amendment to be construed.: — In order to secure the manifest purpose of the constitutional exemption guaranteed by U.S. Const., amend. 11, it should be interpreted not literally and too narrowly, but with the breadth and largeness necessary to enable it to accomplish its purpose; and must be held to cover not only suits brought against a state by name, but those against its officers, agents, and representatives, where the state, though not named, is the real party against which the relief is asked and the judgment will operate. Ramsey v. Hamilton, 181 Ga. 365, 182 S.E. 392, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 94 (1935). Georgia Attorney General lacks statutory authority to waive the state’s eleventh amendment immunity from suit; only the legislature can authorize a waiver of sovereign immunity. Ramey v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1382, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12883 (M.D. Ga. 2001).
Standing of county in federal court.: — A political subdivision of this state, such as the DeKalb County School District and its Board of Education, does not have standing to maintain a suit against the state in federal court for a breach of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 680, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6429 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1015, 118 S. Ct. 601, 139 L. Ed. 2d 489, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7366 (1997).
Partial dismissal permitted.: Federal courts may dismiss claims which run afoul of U.S. Const., amend. 11 without dismissing other claims involved in the case. Brown v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Exmrs., 960 F. Supp. 301, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4064 (M.D. Ga. 1997). Federal court had jurisdiction over
state agency.: The Georgia Department of Transportation was subject to jurisdiction of the federal court in an action by citizens seeking a preliminary injunction against a federally-funded road widening project that involved removal of a historically significant oak tree. Hatmaker v. Georgia DOT ex rel. Shackelford, 973 F. Supp. 1047, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21785 (M.D. Ga. 1995), dismissed, 973 F. Supp. 1058, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18510 (M.D. Ga. 1997). Determination of dischargeability
of student loan.: An adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a student loan which, if successful, would restrain the defendant state from collecting the student loan debt at issue constitutes a suit for eleventh amendment purposes. Wilson v. South Carolina State Educ. Assistant Auth., 258 B.R. 303, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 57 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001).
Immunity applies to awards payable from state treasury.: The doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits a monetary award when the amount of that award would be paid from the state treasury. Eley v. Morris, 390 F. Supp. 913, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13845 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 24131 (11th Cir. 1983). U.S. Const., amend. 11 is, in effect, the prohibition of an award of damages which must be paid out of the state treasury. Davis v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 445 F. Supp. 1048, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15029 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Retroactive monetary relief
against a state.: U.S. Const., amend. 11 restricts the power of the federal courts to order retroactive monetary relief against a state. Davis v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 445 F. Supp. 1048, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15029 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Because an award of costs does not compensate the plaintiff for the injury that first brought the plaintiff into court, such an award does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 11’s proscription against awards of “retroactive” relief against the state. Georgia Ass’n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 794, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 12870 (11th Cir. 1988). For the purposes of U.S. Const., amend. 11, there is no reason for distinguishing between actual costs and interest on those costs that result from a lengthy appellate process. Georgia Ass’n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 794, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 12870 (11th Cir. 1988). cies of the state may be instituted, without making the state a party and without its consent, where they are seeking to enforce an unconstitutional statute or a valid law in an unconstitutional manner. Davis v. Cook, 55 F. Supp. 1004, 1944 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2343 (D. Ga. 1944).
Suits against administrative agen-Suit against agency and officials.: Eleventh amendment barred lawsuit by Medicaid recipients seeking a portion of a tobacco settlement against state agency; however, the more difficult issue of whether the eleventh amendment barred the lawsuit insofar as the state officials were concerned was not addressed since the issue lacked merit anyway. McClendon v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18566 (11th Cir. 2001).
Suits against state officers.: A suit against individuals for the purpose of preventing them as officers of state from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff, is not a suit against the state within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 11. Davis v. Cook, 55 F. Supp. 1004, 1944 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2343 (D. Ga. 1944). A suit to restrain unconstitutional action threatened by an individual who is a state officer is not a suit against the state. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 72 S. Ct. 321, 96 L. Ed. 335, 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2483 (1952). Suit to redress unconstitutional action by state officials will lie in federal courts. Peacock v. Riggsbee, 309 F. Supp. 542, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12920 (N.D. Ga. 1970). Individual officers of a state may be sued when they act unconstitutionally under color of state law. Neal v. Georgia, 469 F.2d 446, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 6827 (5th Cir. 1972). Suits against state officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional rights are not forbidden by U.S. Const., amend. 11. Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12449 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev’d, 503 F.2d 1319, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6149 (5th Cir. 1974). State officials may be sued in federal court on the basis that the state statutes under which they are acting are unconstitutional. Eley v. Morris, 390 F. Supp. 913, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13845 (N.D. Ga. 1975). A district attorney and assistant district attorney were acting as state officials, rather than county officials, and were entitled to immunity under U.S. Const., amend. 11. McClendon v. May, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1023 (S.D. Ga. 1999), aff’d, 212 F.3d 599, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12368 (11th Cir. 2000). Suit against state officers acting in
individual capacities.: Negligence suit was against state employees in both their official and individual capacities where the complaint referred to the DOT and its agents, listing the officials individually by name, nothing in the pleadings or pretrial order said the officials were sued in their “official capacity” only, and neither party took any step during the litigation that was inconsistent with the employees being sued in their individual capacities. Hobbs v. Roberts, 999 F.2d 1526, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22404 (11th Cir. 1993).
Actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.: The fourteenth amendment does not supersede the eleventh amendment in actions alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section five of the fourteenth amendment authorizes Congress to override eleventh amendment immunity to the extent necessary to enforce legislation designed to implement the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment, but it is well settled that § 1983 does not constitute an exercise of that authority. Thomas v. Devries, 834 F. Supp. 398, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14927 (M.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d, United States v. Rucker, 36 F.3d 95, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24508 (11th Cir. 1994). Public corporations and political
subdivisions.: Neither public corporations nor political subdivisions are clothed with that immunity from suit which belongs to the state alone by virtue of its sovereignty. Davis v. Cook, 55 F. Supp. 1004, 1944 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2343 (D. Ga. 1944). Suit by a public utility against a public service commission where it is charged that the commission in fixing a rate, issuing an order, or assessing a penalty, has acted illegally or abused its authority, or violated the constitutional rights of the public utility to its injury and damage, is not such an action against the state as is prohibited by U.S. Const., amend. 11. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 205 Ga. 863, 55 S.E.2d 618, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 637 (1949).
Immunity for Department of Transportation.: State Department of Transportation employees are immune from a suit for negligence in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Thorne v. Littlefield Constr. Co., 782 F. Supp. 108, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 583 (M.D. Ga. 1992). The Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) is an arm of the state and thus may have immunity under the eleventh amendment because any recovery would have been paid out of state funds; Georgia DOT’s source of revenue is from the motor fuel tax specified in the Georgia Constitution. The fact that Georgia DOT can allocate its funds in its own discretion and without intervention by the state legislature does not change the fact that these funds are state funds. Robinson v. Georgia DOT, 966 F.2d 637, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16179 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022, 113 S. Ct. 660, 121 L. Ed. 2d 586, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 7729 (1992). The Georgia Department of Transportation, which may receive immunity under the eleventh amendment, did not waive its federal immunity where plaintiffs sought relief for inverse condemnation of property that was an ancestral cemetery because it had consented to suit in state court; the Georgia Constitution expressly reserves the state’s immunity in federal court, and a waiver in state court does not constitute a waiver in federal court. Robinson v. Georgia DOT, 966 F.2d 637, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16179 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022, 113 S. Ct. 660, 121 L. Ed. 2d 586, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 7729 (1992). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2(a)(8), the legislature has delegated to the Department of Transportation the authority to exercise the right and power of eminent domain for public road and transportation purposes. It follows that DOT is an “arm of the State” for eminent domain purposes, and that the trial court correctly held that an action brought against DOT under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could not be maintained for losses occasioned by pre-condemnation publicity. Thompson v. DOT, 209 Ga. App. 353, 433 S.E.2d 623, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 876 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1635, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 964 (Ga. Oct. 12, 1993). Department of Human Resources and agents or employees of county department of family and children services were immune from suit against them in their official capacities. Powell v. Department of Human Resources, 918 F. Supp. 1575, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3003 (S.D. Ga. 1996), aff’d, 114 F.3d 1074, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12379 (11th Cir. 1997). Because sovereign immunity in Georgia may be waived only by statute, and because the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., specifically disavows any intent to waive the state’s eleventh amendment immunity, the eleventh amendment barred the plaintiff’s claim against the Department of Human Resources for injuries sustained by plaintiff’s son while in foster care. McCall v. Dep’t of Human Res., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20059 (M.D. Ga. 2001).
Ports Authority as arm of state.: Because the Ports Authority was an “arm of the state” entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court, the sovereign immunity from suit in state court that was reserved to the Ports Authority under the Georgia Constitution was not susceptible of abrogation by federal maritime law and barred a lawsuit in state court to recover damages for the tort of its employee, except to the extent the state consented to the suit. Ga. Ports Auth. v. Lawyer, 304 Ga. 667, 821 S.E.2d 22, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 702 (2018).
Georgia Department of Revenue.: The Georgia Department of Revenue is a state entity, entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Miles v. Georgia Dep’t of Revenue, 797 F. Supp. 987, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12343 (S.D. Ga. 1992). Bankruptcy debtors’ adversary proceeding against the Georgia Department of Revenue was barred by U.S. Const., amend. 11. Taylor v. Department of Revenue (In re Taylor), 249 B.R. 571, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 636 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000).
Suits against state bar.: Since the Georgia Supreme Court is an arm of the State of Georgia and the State Bar is an arm of the Georgia Supreme Court, where a complaint alleged that actions in disbarring an attorney taken by the individual defendants were in their official capacities as members of the judiciary and of the State Bar, the claims for compensatory damages against all defendants were claims against the state and barred by the eleventh amendment. Cohran v. State Bar, 790 F. Supp. 1568, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6689 (N.D. Ga. 1992). Enforcement of federal regulatory
statutes.: The defense of sovereign immunity must be denied when the United States seeks to enforce a federal regulatory statute. Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur County, 482 F.2d 361, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9046 (5th Cir. 1973). nity defense when it enters a field which is regulated by federal statute, whereby Congress has specifically created a remedy in private parties for the violation of the statute and has expressly provided that the private remedy is applicable to the states. Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur County, 482 F.2d 361, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9046 (5th Cir. 1973).
State waives its sovereign immu-State employees not immune in federal suit.: Because a state’s liability insurance trust fund voluntarily established to protect its employees against personal liability for damages does not make the state the real party in interest for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity, individuals employed by a state agency are not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit in federal court when they are sued in their individual capacity but are nevertheless eligible for insurance protection from the state’s voluntarily established liability insurance trust fund, through which the state will pay the verdict. Jackson v. Georgia DOT, 16 F.3d 1573, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5648 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929, 115 S. Ct. 320, 130 L. Ed. 2d 281, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 7121 (1994). Award of retroactive benefits under
public aid program.: U.S. Const., amend. 11 bars a federal district court from awarding retroactive benefits under a federal-state public aid program that are ultimately payable from state’s general revenues. Adams v. Harden, 493 F.2d 21, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 8955 (5th Cir. 1974). Injunction prohibiting the state from recouping funds which persons received in violation of current Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program requirements but which they were entitled to receive under previous law was not barred by the eleventh amendment, because the recipients were not seeking damages but rather were seeking to prevent the state from essentially accomplishing a legal termination of AFDC benefits without providing adequate notice under federal law. Turner v. Ledbetter, 906 F.2d 606, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12049 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928, 111 S. Ct. 2041, 114 L. Ed. 2d 125, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2769 (1991).
Creation of insurance fund to indemnify state.: Without an explicit provision that the creation of the insurance fund to indemnify the state waived both state sovereign and eleventh amendment immunity, federal district court could not conclude that the state, by creating such a fund, had waived its constitutional immunity from being sued in federal court. Hobbs v. Georgia DOT, 785 F. Supp. 980, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2084 (N.D. Ga. 1992). Payment of awards by school
boards.: Even though a majority of funds controlled by a school board emanates from the state, the board has sufficient sources of income to satisfy a judgment, or the ability to raise it, as well as the authority to pay an award of back salary without transgressing state law. Davis v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 445 F. Supp. 1048, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15029 (N.D. Ga. 1975). U.S. Const., amend. 11 proscribes suits by citizens against their own state. Ezzell v. Board of Regents, 838 F.2d 1569, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3055 (11th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has consistently held that an unconsenting state is immune from suits brought in federal courts by the state’s own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. Miles v. Georgia Dep’t of Revenue, 143 F.R.D. 302, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14523 (S.D. Ga. 1992).
Suits seeking damages against administrative agencies.: Claim for damages and prospective injunctive relief against the State Board of Pharmacy for refusal to reinstate license was barred as a suit against the State. Hicks v. Georgia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 553 F. Supp. 314, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16537 (N.D. Ga. 1982). Suits seeking damages against
state officers.: Claim for damages from State Board of Pharmacy members for actions in their official capacities is a suit against the state and is barred. Hicks v. Georgia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 553 F. Supp. 314, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16537 (N.D. Ga. 1982). A medical doctor’s civil rights action against members of the state board of medical examiners alleging that the board’s summary suspension of his licenses to practice medicine and to prescribe controlled substances was, in effect, a suit against the state and, insofar as damages were sought from the members in their official capacities, the action was barred by the eleventh amendment. Howard v. Miller, 870 F. Supp. 340, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17123 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
Damages against parole board officers unavailable.: Defendant’s monetary claims asserted against members of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles were barred by U.S. Const., amend. 11, as defendants were immune in their official capacity as agents of the real and substantial party in interest, the state. Lemley v. Bowers, 813 F. Supp. 814, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20712 (N.D. Ga. 1992). ministrators immune from damages
State educational institute and adaction.: The Valdosta Technical Institute, as an educational agency of the State of Georgia providing technical and vocational instruction, and members of its administration, acting as state officials, were immune from a damages action brought in the course of a discrimination claim for non-renewal of a teaching contract. Durrani v. Valdosta Tech. Inst., 810 F. Supp. 301, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20059 (M.D. Ga. 1992), aff’d, 3 F.3d 443, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22576 (11th Cir. 1993). Board of pharmacy and members
immune from damage actions.: Because of the control the state exercises over the State Board of Pharmacy, and because the board appears to be an entity of the state as defined by Georgia law, the board, and the board members in their official capacities, are immune from damage actions by virtue of eleventh amendment immunity. Shepard v. Byrd, 581 F. Supp. 1374, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19563 (N.D. Ga. 1984). But members subject to suit for un-
lawful acts.: By conditioning the reinstatement of a pharmacist’s license to practice pharmacy on the release from civil liability of any person connected with the pharmacist’s investigation and arrest, the State Board of Pharmacy engaged in a practice that was against public policy and thus unlawful. The board members therefore were not absolutely immune from suit in their individual capacities, however, the members of the board were immune from damages based on their qualified immunity. Shepard v. Byrd, 581 F. Supp. 1374, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19563 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Drug and narcotics agency officers
immune from suit for damages.: Neither a federal civil rights action for damages nor a pendent claim of malicious prosecution may proceed against agents of the Georgia Drug and Narcotics Agency in their official capacities by virtue of the eleventh amendment. Shepard v. Byrd, 581 F. Supp. 1374, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19563 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Community college professors’ suit against members of the board of regents of the university system was not barred by the eleventh amendment, where the board’s authority to ignore the professors’ tenure, when exercised, was alleged to be repugnant to the constitution, where the members had exercised and were continuing to exercise that authority to the professors’ detriment, and the relief sought would end such conduct. Ezzell v. Board of Regents, 838 F.2d 1569, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3055 (11th Cir. 1988).
College and regents immune.: Where the state had not consented or waived immunity, and since Georgia College and the Regents of the University System are state entities to which Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 114 (11th Cir. 1989) applies, a § 1983 action against these defendants could not be entertained in federal court. Thomas v. Devries, 834 F. Supp. 398, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14927 (M.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d, United States v. Rucker, 36 F.3d 95, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24508 (11th Cir. 1994). The bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the board of regents of the university system in an action by a trustee based on a breach of contract by the board; thus, a judgment previously entered against the board was void. Ellenberg v. Board of Regents (In re Midland Mechanical Contractors), 200 B.R. 453, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1145 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).
College professor, dean, individually immune.: Official capacities aside, college dean and college professor were immune in their individual capacities in a civil rights action brought by a discharged professor, as they were cloaked in eleventh amendment immunity. Thomas v. Devries, 834 F. Supp. 398, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14927 (M.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d, United States v. Rucker, 36 F.3d 95, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24508 (11th Cir. 1994). Eleventh amendment bars a federal civil rights claim against a state park authority, which, although a public corporation, is closely controlled by the state; a suit against the authority is effectively a suit against the state. Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 24131 (11th Cir. 1983). Power of the board of regents of the university system to sue and be sued waives eleventh amendment immunity in both state and federal courts. McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9555 (S.D. Ga. 1982). Waiver of suit in state courts is not construed automatically to include federal litigation as well. Hodges v. Tomberlin, 510 F. Supp. 1280, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9687 (S.D. Ga. 1980). Consent to suit in state court does not necessarily waive eleventh amendment immunity. Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 24131 (11th Cir. 1983). State may be subject to monetary as well as injunctive relief where it has waived immunity under U.S. Const., amend. 11. Hodges v. Tomberlin, 510 F. Supp. 1280, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9687 (S.D. Ga. 1980). State officials not immune from suit
for injunctive relief.: U.S. Const., amend. 11 does not insulate state officials acting in their official capacities from suit for prospective injunctive relief to remedy violations of federal constitutional law. Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 114, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 528 (11th Cir. 1989). An action by a railroad corporation seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against individual members of the Public Service Commission in their official capacities was not barred by the eleventh amendment. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 944 F. Supp. 1573, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16413 (N.D. Ga. 1996). Injunctive relief suit based on past
actions.: Although the eleventh amendment does not act as a bar to suits against state officials to the extent injunctive relief is sought for ongoing violations of federal law, where plaintiff complained of violations over a period of time in the past, plaintiff was barred from seeking injunctive relief against state officers for past violations. Coney v. Department of Human Resources, 787 F. Supp. 1434, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3682 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
Prisoner’s action for injunctive relief barred.: U.S. Const., amend. 11 barred a prison inmate’s action against the Georgia Department of Corrections and board of corrections seeking injunctive relief from the prison mail policy, where the state itself could not be liable on the merits, and the inmate had failed to amend his complaint to add the state officials acting in their official capacities. Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 114, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 528 (11th Cir. 1989).
Suit against probation office prohibited.: Since the probation office was part of the Department of Corrections under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-43.1, the district court properly dismissed the probationer’s claims against the probation office as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A suit against the probation office was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Lovelace v. Dekalb Cent. Prob., 144 Fed. Appx. 793, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 16090 (11th Cir. 2005).
No money damages in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.: The United States Supreme Court recognizes a significant limitation on actions under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1867, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against a state agency by specifically holding that, consistent with U.S. Const., amend. 11, relief generally must be limited to prospective injunctive relief, not money damages. Hodges v. Tomberlin, 510 F. Supp. 1280, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9687 (S.D. Ga. 1980). Waiver of immunity in bankruptcy
proceeding.: Even though the state has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court for violations of the automatic stay, it could waive this immunity by filing a proof of claim against the debtor’s estate, thus submitting itself to the bankruptcy court’s equitable jurisdiction. Headrick v. Georgia ex rel. Dep’t of Revenue, 200 B.R. 963, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1234 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996). Immunity abrogated by provision
of Bankruptcy Code.: Sovereign immunity of the state was abrogated by 11 U.S.C. § 106, subjecting it to damage awards for violations of the automatic stay, and this abrogation was enacted by a valid exercise of power under the fourteenth amendment. Headrick v. Georgia ex rel. Dep’t of Revenue, 200 B.R. 963, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1234 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996). The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution granted Congress authority to abrogate the state’s eleventh amendment immunity from suit by individuals for the state’s violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s discharge injunction. Burke v. Georgia ex rel. Dep’t of Revenue, 203 B.R. 493, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1614 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), aff’d, No. 92-11482-JSD, No. CV197-42, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23919 (S.D. Ga. July 23, 1997). The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution granted to Congress the authority to abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity against individual suits in federal court for damages arising from the state’s violation of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Headrick v. Georgia, 203 B.R. 805, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1620 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), aff’d, No. 92-11482-JSD, No. CV197-42, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23919 (S.D. Ga. July 23, 1997). State has waived immunity under U.S. Const., amend. 11 in establishing the Georgia Ports Authority. Hodges v. Tomberlin, 510 F. Supp. 1280, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9687 (S.D. Ga. 1980). ally related sphere by operating a research vessel in the navigable waters of the United States, this act did not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity from suits in federal court under the Jones Act and the general maritime law. Sullivan v. Georgia Dep’t of Natural Resources, 724 F.2d 1478, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 25532 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872, 105 S. Ct. 222, 83 L. Ed. 2d 152, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 3806 (1984). Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 48-2-35 do not constitute a waiver of immunity under the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution and were not enough to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts in Georgia to hear plaintiff’s claims against the state for damages or prospective relief regarding automobile “title transfer fee” statute. Johnsen v. Collins, 875 F. Supp. 1571, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20214 (S.D. Ga. 1994). In determining whether entity is arm of the state sharing the state’s immunity under U.S. Const., amend. 11, courts look to the entity’s function and characteristics as determined by state law. East Cent. Health Dist. v. Brown, 752 F.2d 615, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28064 (11th Cir. 1985).
Although Georgia entered a feder-Civil rights action seeking to compel provision of indigent defense services.: U.S. Const., amend. 11 did not bar a civil rights action brought on behalf of indigent defendants seeking to compel the governor and other state officials to provide indigent defense services that met minimum constitutional standards. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 15659 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 957, 110 S. Ct. 2562, 109 L. Ed. 2d 744, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2766 (1990). facts from a sunken ship located on state property at the bottom of a river were not entitled to a salvage award from the state. Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged, 606 F. Supp. 801, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24297 (S.D. Ga. 1984), aff’d, 775 F.2d 302, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 24245 (11th Cir. 1985).
Private divers who salvaged arti-Suits against counties.: Suit against the sheriff in the sheriff’s official capacity amounts to a suit against the county employing the sheriff, and a suit against a county is generally not precluded under the eleventh amendment. Thompson v. Spikes, 663 F. Supp. 627, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541 (S.D. Ga. 1987). U.S. Const., amend. 11 does not protect a county from being subjected to a Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., suit in federal court without its consent. Prickett v. DeKalb County, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18139 (N.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 254 F.3d 74, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15279 (11th Cir. 2001).
Suits against county departments.: — County departments, including the county department of family and children services, were state rather than county entities for the purposes of eleventh amendment immunity. Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 707 F. Supp. 1318, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1795 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 909 F.2d 463, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 14321 (11th Cir. 1990). The eleventh amendment barred claims against employees of a county department of family and children services for injuries sustained by the plaintiff’s son while in foster care because the county department was a state agency for purposes of the eleventh amendment. McCall v. Dep’t of Human Res., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20059 (M.D. Ga. 2001). Hospital authority was local, not state, instrumentality, and was not entitled to immunity under the eleventh amendment in a federal civil rights suit brought by a paramedic against the authority. Baxter v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 764 F. Supp. 1510, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7207 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
Immunity of Savannah Port Authority members.: Members of the Savannah Port Authority, who sued in their individual or personal capacities, are entitled to the same qualified immunities from tort liability as are accorded by principles of federal and state law to other public officers in the executive branch of state government. 1986 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U86-7. Participation by Georgia in the Coastal Zone Management Act would not constitute consent to waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity or consent for other states to assert regulatory jurisdiction within Georgia. 1997 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 97-2.
Am. Jur. 2d.: 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Admiralty, § 28. 3C Am. Jur. 2d, Aliens and Citizens, § 2039. 9A Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy, § 1581. 15AAm. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court, § 60. 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Drains and Drainage Systems, § 26. 32 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Courts, § 423 et seq. 32A Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Courts, § 909. 45C Am. Jur. 2d, Job Discrimination, § 2027. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, § 175. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 31. 61C Am. Jur. 2d, Pollution Control, § 898. 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 291. 67B Am. Jur. 2d, Salvage, § 64. 67B Am. Jur. 2d, Schools, § 372. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, States, Territories, and Dependencies, § 103.
C.J.S.: 2 C.J.S., Admiralty, § 63. 14A C.J.S., Civil Rights, § 216. 36 C.J.S., Federal Courts, §§ 1, 126 et seq., 465.
ALR.: What actions arise under Constitution, laws, and treaties of United States; general principles, 12 A.L.R.2d 5. State’s immunity from tort liability as dependent on governmental or proprietary nature of function, 40 A.L.R.2d 927. Sovereign immunity doctrine as precluding suit against sister state for tort committed within forum state, 81 A.L.R.3d 1239. Immunity of state from civil suits under Eleventh Amendment — Supreme Court cases, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 175. COVID-19-related litigation: moratorium on evictions, 75 A.L.R.7th 6. Uniform anatomical gift act, 75 A.L.R.7th 8. Change of gender or sex on government id, records, or forms, 77 A.L.R.7th 2.

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