Amend. XVI. Power of Congress to Lay and Collect Income Taxes

U.S. Const., amend. 16 modifies U.S. Const., art. I, sec. IX, cl. 4.

Income taxes, § 48-7-1 et seq.

For note, “Taxation of Illegally Received Income,” see 1 J. of Pub. L. 473 (1952). For article, “The Supreme Court’s Approach to Annual and Transactional Accounting for Income Taxes: A Common Law Malfunction in a Statutory System?,” see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 329 (1986). For article, “Rethinking Constitutional Review in America and the Commonwealth: Judicial Protection of Human Rights in the Common Law World,” see 35 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 99 (2006). For comment, “If It Quacks Like a Duck: In Light of Today’s Financial Environment, Should Credit Unions Continue to Enjoy Tax Exemptions?,” see 28 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1367 (2012).

Congress does not have an unlimited right to tax the citizenry.

A federal statute passed under the taxing power may be so arbitrary and capricious as to violate the due process of law clause of the U.S. Const., amend. 5. Fears v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1223, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14379 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, Esparza-Nevarez v. U. S., 518 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975). Congress bears the responsibility for establishing the rules of taxation, and as long as Congress has acted within its constitutional powers, the judiciary cannot use its broad powers to frustrate specific statutory language. Fears v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1223, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14379 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, Esparza-Nevarez v. U. S., 518 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975). Within constitutional limitations, there is no equity in tax law. Fears v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1223, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14379 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, Esparza-Nevarez v. U. S., 518 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975). Unconstitutionality of a tax measure derives neither from unequal imposition nor from unequal incidence, but rather from that special instance where the act is so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for example, the confiscation of property. Fears v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1223, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14379 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, Esparza-Nevarez v. U. S., 518 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975). General principle underlying the income tax statutes, ever since the adoption of U.S. Const., amend. 16, has been the computation of gains and losses on the basis of an annual accounting for the transactions of the year. Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319, 52 S. Ct. 568, 76 L. Ed. 1128, 1932 U.S. LEXIS 607 (1932). “Income” not to be restrictively

construed.

The power to lay and collect taxes on incomes “from whatever source derived,” are words of enlargement indicating an intention that the meaning of “income” should not be restricted. Magness v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 740, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 5005 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 931, 78 S. Ct. 412, 2 L. Ed. 2d 414, 1958 U.S. LEXIS 1604 (1958). State courts cannot award federal

tax exemption.

Georgia state courts do not have the authority to award the federal income tax dependency exemption to a noncustodial parent. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 261 Ga. 11, 401 S.E.2d 714, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 132 (1991).

C.J.S.

ALR.

Income tax on profit upon sale by executor or administrator at advance over cost to decedent, 33 A.L.R. 813. Taxes paid or due to federal government as deductible in computing state personal property or income tax, 39 A.L.R. 352. Constitutionality of statute permitting payment of taxes in installments, 157 A.L.R. 338.