Art. I, Sec. 1. Legislative Powers Vested in Congress

For article discussing validity of “executive privilege” as defense to congressional demand for information, see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 809 (1974). For article discussing the separation of powers implications of implied rights of actions, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 973 (1983). For article, “Congress: The Purse, the Purpose, and the Power,” 21 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1986). For article, “The Impact of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on Federal Policy,” 21 Ga. L. Rev. 17 (1986). For article, “Congress As Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine,” 21 Ga. L. Rev. 57 (1986). For article, “Separation of Political Powers: Boundaries or Balance?,” see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 171 (1986). For article, “The Framers’ Understanding of Constitutional Deliberation in Congress,” 21 Ga. L. Rev. 217 (1986). For note, “Bowsher v. Synar: Bright-Line Rule or Dice-Toss Approach to Separation of Powers?,” see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 969 (1987). For article, “The Separation of Powers in a Federal System,” see 37 Emory L.J. 538 (1988). For introduction to symposium on separation of powers, see 37 Emory L.J. 535 (1988). For article, “Preserving Judicial Integrity: Some Comments on the Role of the Judiciary Under the ‘Blending’ of Powers,” see 37 Emory L.J. 587 (1988). For article, “The Preservation of Individual Liberty Through the Separation of Powers and Federalism: Reflections on the Shaping of Constitutional Immortal-ity,” see 37 Emory L.J. 613 (1988). For article, “An Overview of the New Federal Sentencing Guidelines,” see 25 Ga. St. B.J. 16 (1988). For article, “The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standard at the FCC,” see 38 Emory L.J. 714 (1989). For article, “Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation,” see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 121 (2016). For article, “Do State Lines Make Public Health Emergencies Worse? Federal Versus State Control of Quarantine,” see 67 Emory L.J. 491 (2018). For article, “Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org and the Fight Over Copyright Protection for Annotations and Commentary,” see 54 Ga. L. Rev. 111 (2019). For article, “Foreword: Lawyers and Linguists Collaborate in Using Corpus Linguistics to Produce New Insights Into Original Meaning,” see 36 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. vi (2020). For article, “Effective But Limited: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of the Original Public Meaning of Executive Power,” see 36 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 607 (2020).

Congress may fix standard and delegate details.

Legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated, but it is equally well settled that Congress may declare its will, and, after fixing a primary standard, devolve upon administrative officers the “power to fill up the details” by prescribing administrative rules. It is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power to make laws from administrative authority to make regulations, but when Congress has legislatedand indicated its will, it can give to those who are to act under such general provisions power to fill up the details by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, violation of which can be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress. Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 7 F. Supp. 139, 1934 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1580 (D. Ga.), aff’d, 74 F.2d 200, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 3908 (5th Cir. 1934). ity not delegation of legislative

Delegation of rule-making authorpower.

That Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution; but the authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an administrative to a legislative character because the violation thereof is punished as a public offense. So long as a policy is laid down and a standard established by a statute, no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply; but the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate if our constitutional system is to be maintained. United States v. Griffin, 12 F. Supp. 135, 1935 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1311 (D. Ga. 1935).

Am. Jur. 2d.

61C Am. Jur. 2d, Pollution Control, § 1629. 77 Am. Jur. 2d, United States, § 10.

C.J.S.

91 C.J.S., United States, §§ 14, 28.

ALR.

Constitutionality and construction of Emergency Price Control Act as relating to rent, 148 A.L.R. 1403; 149 A.L.R. 1467; 150 A.L.R. 1462; 151 A.L.R. 1465; 152 A.L.R. 1462; 153 A.L.R. 1434; 154 A.L.R. 1460; 155 A.L.R. 1461; 156 A.L.R. 1459; 157 A.L.R. 1457; 158 A.L.R. 1464. Constitutionality, construction, and application of Emergency Price Control Act, 148 A.L.R. 1429; 149 A.L.R. 1472; 150 A.L.R. 1470; 151 A.L.R. 1469; 152 A.L.R. 1472; 153 A.L.R. 1444; 154 A.L.R. 1468; 155 A.L.R. 1467; 156 A.L.R. 1467; 157 A.L.R. 1463; 158 A.L.R. 1474. Power and duty of court where Legislature renders constitutional mandate ineffectual by failing to enact statute necessary to make it effective or by repealing or amending statute previously passed for that purpose, 153 A.L.R. 522. Implied cause of action for damages for violation of provisions of state constitutions, 75 A.L.R.5th 619. School’s violation of student’s substantive due process rights by suspending or expelling student, 90 A.L.R.6th 235. Validity, construction, and effect of domestic currency transaction reporting requirement based upon 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a), 89 A.L.R. Fed. 770.