Art. I, Sec. 10. Powers Denied to the States

Active

Current through: the volume states no acts currency; this is its 2025 edition.

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws; and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

The notes below are printed with the section but are not enacted law (O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1(c)). They are shown apart from the text.

Cross references

Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or laws which impair the obligations of contracts, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X and § 1-3-5. Authorization for state militia, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. II. Contracts declared unenforceable at law, §§ 13-8-1, 13-8-2. Cooperation with other states generally, § 28-6-1 et seq.

Law reviews

For note, “Annexation by Municipalities in Georgia,” see 2 Mercer L. Rev. 423 (1951). For article, “Constitutionality of Economic Regulations,” see 2 J. of Pub. L. 98 (1953). For article discussing Georgia alimony provisions allowing modification of judgments with respect to federal and state constitutional limitations, see 18 Ga. B.J. 153 (1955). For comment on Watson v. Employer’s Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 75 S. Ct. 166, 99 L. Ed. 74 (1954), holding that a statute allowing a direct action by the policy holder against the insurer contrary to the terms of the contract and requiring the consent of the insurer to such action as a prerequisite of doing business in the state was not violative of the Constitution, see 17 Ga. B.J. 529 (1955). For article, “Patterns of Social Legislation: Reflections on the Welfare State,” see 6 J. of Pub. L. 3 (1957). For comment discussing state intervention in contracts between private parties, under the contract clause, in light of Willys Motors v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, 142 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956), see 6 J. of Pub. L. 250 (1957). For article, “The Subject-Matter Limitation Upon the Treaty-Making Power,” see 11 J. of Pub. L. 122 (1962). For article, “Consolidation by Compact: A Remedy for Preemption of State Food and Drug Laws,” see 14 J. of Pub. L. 276 (1965). For comment on Sanders v. Harper, 220 Ga. 649, 141 S.E.2d 156 (1965), see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 311 (1965). For article discussing the constitutional parameters of state efforts to stimulate international trade, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 391 (1976). For comment on Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1976), see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 1237 (1976). For comment discussing interpretation of ex post facto clause, see 28 Emory L.J. 429 (1979). For note, “Lapse or Continuation of Local Constitutional Amendments Under the Constitution of 1983,” see 21 Ga. St. B.J. 78 (1984). For article, “The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform,” see 34 Emory L.J. 617 (1985). For comment, “Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A Constitutional Analysis,” see 36 Emory L.J. 285 (1987). For article, “Georgia and the Development of Constitutional Principles: An Essay in Honor of the Bicentennial,” see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1987). For article, “Metaphor and Paradox,” see 23 Ga. L. Rev. 1053 (1989). For article, “Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private Property: 1760-1860,” see 39 Emory L.J. 65 (1990). For article, “Federal and State ‘State Action’: The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine,” see 24 Ga. L. Rev. 327 (1990). For annual Eleventh Circuit survey of constitutional law — civil, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 1075 (1992). For article, “Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice,” see 42 Emory L.J. 1 (1993). For note, “Water Wars in the Southeast: Alabama, Florida, and Georgia Square Off Over the Apalachicola Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin,” see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 689 (1993). For survey of 1995 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional civil law, see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 745 (1996). For article, “Eleventh Circuit Survey: January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013: Article: Federal Sentencing Guidelines,” see 65 Emory L. J. 971 (2014). For article, “The Nature of Family, The Family of Nature: The Surprising Liberal Defense of the Traditional Family in the Enlightment,” see 64 Emory L.J. 591 (2014). For article, “Protecting States in the New World of Energy Federalism,” see 67 Emory L.J. 921 (2018). For annual survey on the federal sentencing guidelines, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 1181 (2018). For article, “Coequal Federalism and Federal-State Agencies,” see 55 Ga. L. Rev. 287 (2020).

Other notes (44 entries, as printed)

is congressionally sanctioned interchanging remedy only.: Statute which changes or affects remedy only and does not destroy or impair vested rights is not unconstitutional as impairing obligation of contract, although it may be retroactive and although, in changing or modifying the remedy, the rights of the parties may be incidentally affected. Morris v. Interstate Bond Co., 180 Ga. 689, 180 S.E. 819, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 531 (1935).
Validity of statute eliminating disability payments.: Former Code 1933, § 78-911 (see O.C.G.A. § 47-17-81), which eliminated, under certain conditions, payment for permanent or total disability, did not violate constitutional provisions providing that no ex post facto law, retroactive law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed, because in passing former Code 1933, § 78-917 (see O.C.G.A. § 47-17-101) the legislature specifically provided that all rights and benefits conferred would be subject to future legislative change or revision, and that no beneficiary would be deemed to have any vested right to any annuities or benefits provided therein. Prichard v. Board of Comm’rs of Peace Officers Annuity & Benefit Fund, 211 Ga. 57, 84 S.E.2d 26, 1954 Ga. LEXIS 486 (1954).
Validity of zoning ordinance.: Because plaintiff, while proceeding to zone property was pending, filed application to authorize building of filling station, and ordinance was later adopted zoning plaintiff’s property for residential purposes, such ordinance was not in violation of the federal and state Constitutions as an ex post facto or retroactive law. Gay v. Mayor of Lyons, 212 Ga. 438, 93 S.E.2d 352, 1956 Ga. LEXIS 402 (1956). Statute is retroactive if it creates a new obligation on transactions or
considerations already past, or destroys or impairs vested rights.: A statute does not operate retrospectively because it relates to antecedent facts, but if it is intended to affect transactions which occurred or rights which accrued before it became operative and ascribes to them essentially different effects, in view of the law at the time of their occurrence, it is retroactive in character. Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803, 1959 Ga. LEXIS 550 (1959); Adams v. Adams, 219 Ga. 633, 135 S.E.2d 428, 1964 Ga. LEXIS 347 (1964). Validity of statute destroying
vested right to property.: Former Code 1933, § 67-1308 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80), providing that title to real property conveyed to secure debt should revert to grantor when debt became 20 years past due, unless debt was extended or renewed and such renewal recorded, or an affidavit setting out the facts of renewal was recorded with the conveyance, which section imposed conditions upon grantee not in existence at time of execution of the contract, divested the grantee of a vested right to the property, and impaired the obligation of the contract as applied to such deed, which was executed prior to passage and effective date of the Act, is unconstitutional, because in violation of U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, cl. 1 and of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. II, (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X), which prohibited this state from passing any retroactive law or any law impairing the obligations of contracts. Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803, 1959 Ga. LEXIS 550 (1959). pation tax payment pending license
Validity of statute requiring occuapplication.: It is competent for the legislature to enact that a person entering upon business or occupation upon which a tax provided in ordinance has been imposed, by the terms thereof, should pay the amount of the tax named for the year, or for any period of time within the year, during which the person should choose to apply for a license. Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 938 (1968). 2. Criminal Phrase “ex post facto” applies to criminal, not civil, cases. Hayes v. Howell, 251 Ga. 580, 308 S.E.2d 170, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 924 (1983).
Passing on validity of constitutional amendment not affecting petitioner’s rights.: In habeas corpus proceeding based on alleged invalidity of constitutional amendment placing power of granting pardons and paroles in Board of Pardons and Paroles rather than Governor, court would not pass on constitutionality of amendment, since even if it were unconstitutional the prior provision would be in effect, and petitioner would not be entitled to discharge. Court will not pass on constitutionality of law when it is challenged by party whose rights are not affected by it. Whittle v. Jones, 198 Ga. 538, 32 S.E.2d 94, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 426 (1944). ing amendment void as ex post facto
Avoidance of construction renderlaw.: Because a constitutional amendment placing power to grant pardons in Board of Pardons and Paroles instead of Governor was silent as to whether it applied to persons previously convicted, amendment would not be given retroactive operation as to those persons if such construction would render amendment void as an ex post facto law. Whittle v. Jones, 198 Ga. 538, 32 S.E.2d 94, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 426 (1944). As a general rule, any law is ex post facto which is enacted after offense was committed, and which, in relation to offense or its consequences, alters the situation of the accused to the accused’s disadvantage. A statute, however, cannot be an ex post facto law if it is apparent that legislature in enacting the statute did not make criminal an act which was innocent when done; did not aggravate an offense or change the punishment and make it greater than when it was committed; did not alter the rules of evidence and require less or different evidence than the Ex Post Facto Laws (Cont’d) 2. Criminal (Cont’d) law required at time of commission of offense; and did not deprive the accused of any substantial right or immunity that the accused possessed at the time of commission of the offense. Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 896 (1972).
Delayed effective date of statute.: The application of 21 U.S.C. § 862 to deny defendant federal benefits did not violate the Constitution’s ex post facto clause; although the statute applied only to persons convicted of conspiracy after September 1, 1989, it was enacted on November 18, 1988, during the course of the conspiracy, and thus defendant had adequate notice of the penalty. United States v. Bush, 28 F.3d 1084, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21326 (11th Cir. 1994). Validity of statute removing prior
right.: Although it is the rule that no one has a vested right in a mere mode of procedure, so that a statute merely regulating procedure and leaving untouched all substantial protections with which existing law surrounds the person accused of crime is not within the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, yet a statute is void and ineffective as related to previous offenses if it takes from the accused a substantial right given to the accused by law in force at the time to which guilt relates, and such statute cannot be sustained simply because, in a general sense, it may be said to regulate procedure. Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 896 (1972).
Validity of statute altering procedural conduct of criminal trials.: Because the changes effected by enactment of a law constitute merely an alteration in conditions deemed necessary for the orderly and just conduct of criminal trials, they do not deprive defendant of any substantial personal right within meaning of constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto laws. Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 896 (1972). To invoke protection of ex post facto clause, appellant must show harm by showing trial court’s decision would have been different had it been rendered before the decision in question. Alexander v. State, 139 Ga. App. 338, 228 S.E.2d 364, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1794 (1976). Ex post facto law is one that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action; or that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12575 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S. Ct. 1448, 55 L. Ed. 2d 494, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 942 (1978). Restriction on judicial, as well as
legislative, powers.: The ex post facto clause is a limitation upon the powers of the legislature; but the principle on which the clause is based — the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties — is fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty. As such, that right is protected against judicial action by the due process clause. An unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law which U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, cl. 1 forbids. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12575 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S. Ct. 1448, 55 L. Ed. 2d 494, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 942 (1978). Validity of laws not affecting legal
protections of accused.: The prescribing of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts and creation of new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, are not considered within the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. McSears v. State, 247 Ga. 48, 273 S.E.2d 847, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 602 (1981). duction in size of jury is prohibited as an ex post facto law. McSears v. State, 247 Ga. 48, 273 S.E.2d 847, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 602 (1981). duce number of peremptory jury
After commission of offense, a re-Effect of amending statute to rechallenges.: The application to a criminal defendant of the statutory amendment reducing the number of the defendant’s peremptory strikes did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Stargel v. State, 210 Ga. App. 619, 436 S.E.2d 786, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1280 (1993).
Effect of amending statute to reduce number of impaneled jurors.: Application of the 1992 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-160 requiring the court to have 30, rather than 42, impaneled jurors from which the defense and prosecution may strike jurors did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Shuler v. State, 213 Ga. App. 790, 446 S.E.2d 225, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 732 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1693, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1125 (Ga. Oct. 17, 1994). An increase in child support did not violate the ex post facto clause as applied to a defendant originally convicted of abandonment of the defendant’s children and whose sentence was suspended upon condition that he pay a certain amount of child support per month, since the child support obligation was a pre-existing duty under state law and was neither a part of the sentence nor a punishment. Hudson v. Deyton, 770 F.2d 1558, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 23199 (11th Cir. 1985). Rules of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles are “laws” within the meaning of the ex post facto clause. Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1639 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260, 111 S. Ct. 2915, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1079, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3873 (1991). Elimination of an annual parole reconsideration hearing violated the ex post facto clause because the amendment of rules that had required an annual hearing to provide instead for a hearing at least every eight years substantially disadvantaged a prisoner’s parole eligibility. Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1639 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260, 111 S. Ct. 2915, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1079, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3873 (1991). Retroactive change in the method for calculating the tentative parole month of certain crime severity level offenders under the parole decision guidelines did not violate the ex post facto clause because the change did not produce a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes. Jones v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 59 F.3d 1145, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 20179 (11th Cir. 1995). The retroactive application of amendments to the Georgia regulations changing the frequency of parole reviews, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 475-3-.05.(2) (1986), does not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 146 L. Ed. 2d 236, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2346 (2000). Analysis of claims that amendments to Georgia regulations eliminating annual parole reconsideration hearings violates the ex post facto clause when applied to inmates who had been entitled to more frequent parole reconsideration at the time they committed their crimes must be made on a case-by-case basis. Harris v. Hammonds, 217 F.3d 1346, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16102 (11th Cir. 2000). Enhanced sentencing statute for
DUI.: Defendant who committed a DUI offense on November 11, 1990, was improperly subjected to the enhanced sentencing provisions contained in O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(c)(3)(A), which did not become effective until January 1, 1991. Holtapp v. City of Fayetteville, 208 Ga. App. 606, 431 S.E.2d 403, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 526 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1266, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 882 (Ga. Sept. 20, 1993). Election of application of ex post
facto law.: Application of the life-without-parole statute to defendant did not violate ex post facto prohibitions where the defendant expressly elected the application, and the statute did not establish a greater penalty or alter the situation to the defendant’s disadvantage. Brantley v. State, 268 Ga. 151, 486 S.E.2d 169, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 360, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 985, 118 S. Ct. 449, 139 L. Ed. 2d 384, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 6958 (1997). Requirement to renew registration as sex offender not ex post facto. — Defendant’s conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(3) as a result of failing to renew the defendant’s Ex Post Facto Laws (Cont’d) 2. Criminal (Cont’d) registration as a sex offender was upheld on appeal as the requirement to register as a sexual offender under § 42-1-12(e)(3) resulted in a new crime under § 42-1-12(n) and was not an ex post facto law. Frazier v. State, 284 Ga. 638, 668 S.E.2d 646, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 801 (2008). Impairment of Contracts Legislature can impose upon county into which another county is merged the burden of performing the contracts and paying the debts of the merged county; an Act so providing for the performance of the contracts and payment of the debts of the merged county does not in any way impair the obligation of the contracts of the merged county in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States. Hines v. Etheridge, 173 Ga. 870, 162 S.E. 113, 1931 Ga. LEXIS 429 (1931). Freedom of contract is a qualified and not an absolute right; there is no absolute freedom to contract as one chooses; liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint — not immunity from reasonable regulations. City of Newnan v. Atlanta Laundries, Inc., 174 Ga. 99, 162 S.E. 497, 1932 Ga. LEXIS 4 (1932). Contracts between individuals or corporations are impaired within the meaning of U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, cl. 1 whenever the right to enforce them by legal process is taken away or materially lessened. A different rule prevails in respect to contracts of sovereigns. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L. Ed. 1434, 1934 U.S. LEXIS 969 (1934), overruled in part, Pro-Eco v. Board of Comm’rs, 57 F.3d 505, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 14338 (7th Cir. 1995). Validity of statute affecting or
changing remedy only.: Statute that changes or affects a remedy only and does not destroy or impair vested rights is not unconstitutional as impairing obligation of contract, although it may be retroactive and although, in changing or modifying the remedy, the rights of the parties may be incidentally affected. Morris v. Interstate Bond Co., 180 Ga. 689, 180 S.E. 819, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 531 (1935). Contract between the state and an tutional prohibition. Morris v. Interstate Bond Co., 180 Ga. 689, 180 S.E. 819, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 531 (1935). Lien once acquired under existing law is regarded as a vested property right which may not be impaired by subsequent legislation. Morris v. Interstate Bond Co., 180 Ga. 689, 180 S.E. 819, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 531 (1935). Validity of statute affecting prior
individual is protected by this constitax lien.: Former Code 1933, § 92-5712 (see O.C.G.A. § 48-5-25), providing that any party having an interest in property returned or assessed with other property for taxation shall be allowed to pay the taxes assessed against any one or more pieces of property in which he is so interested and obtain a release as to such property, is unconstitutional as applied to the lien of a tax execution previously transferred according to law and with the transfer duly recorded, because it would impair the obligation of a contract in violation of the state and federal Constitutions. Morris v. Interstate Bond Co., 180 Ga. 689, 180 S.E. 819, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 531 (1935). Validity of statute affecting remedy
expressly made part of contract.: Remedies existing by law at time of execution of contract may be modified by the legislature without impairing the obligation, provided an efficient remedy is left for its enforcement; the rule is different, however, as to a remedy that the parties have expressly made a part of the contract, because in such case the remedy is integrated as a part of the obligation, and a subsequent statute which affects the remedy impairs the obligation and is unconstitutional. Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S.E. 15, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 70 (1935). Validity of statute affecting remedy
existing as implicit part of contract.: — Remedy subsisting in a state when and where a contract is made and is to be performed is a part of its obligation, and any subsequent law of the state which so affects that remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract is forbidden by the Constitution, and is, therefore, void. Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S.E. 15, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 70 (1935). tutional sense, is the means provided by law by which it can be enforced, by which the parties can be obliged to perform it, and whatever legislation lessens the efficacy of these means impairs the obligation. Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S.E. 15, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 70 (1935). Validity of statutes affecting rights
Obligation of a contract, in consticonferred by prior security deed.: Because a security deed executed in 1930 provided that in case of default in payment of debt the grantee might sell the property at the courthouse in a named county different from that in which the property was located, after first advertising the sale for a stated period in a newspaper published in the county in which the sale should be conducted, former Code 1933, § 67-1506 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162), could not be constitutionally applied to such preexisting contract so as to require, in terms of the statute, that the sale should be advertised and conducted at the time and place and in the usual manner of sheriff’s sales in the county in which the property, or a part thereof, was located. The same is true of former Code 1933, §§ 67-1503 through 67-1505 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161), relating to confirmation of sale, which abridges the right to a deficiency judgment after a sale under the security deed. As to the rights conferred by the prior security deed, Code 1933, §§ 67-1503 through 67-1506, is invalid. Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S.E. 15, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 70 (1935). Ordinance prohibiting the owning, maintaining, and operating of pinball machines and the like was not violative of the provisions of the federal and state Constitutions prohibiting the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Woodward v. City of Lithonia, 191 Ga. 234, 11 S.E.2d 476, 1940 Ga. LEXIS 607 (1940). proval and validation of school
Contractual nature of relation between electors and state upon apbonds.: The approval of school bonds by the electors and their validation according to statute created a status analogous to a contractual relation between such electors and the state, which relation could not be destroyed or impaired by a subsequent statute or constitutional provision. Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 37 S.E.2d 322, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 396 (1946). ligation of contract is an appeal to the not be foreclosed by a state court’s determination whether there was a contract or what were its obligations. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 67 S. Ct. 1584, 91 L. Ed. 1977, 1947 U.S. LEXIS 2027 (1947). Contractual nature of franchise granted by city to public service cor-
Claim that state statute impairs ob-United States Constitution and canporation.: It is generally recognized that a franchise granted by a city council to a public service corporation to use its streets and public places, if the city has the charter power to grant such a franchise, is a binding contract and cannot be impaired in view of the prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts contained in the United States Constitution. City of Summerville v. Georgia Power Co., 205 Ga. 843, 55 S.E.2d 540, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 608 (1949). Contract clause protects a vested stroyed by an Act of the legislature. Guest v. Stone, 206 Ga. 239, 56 S.E.2d 247, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 419 (1949). Former Code 1933, § 3-108 (see ciary under contract between other parties to recover, could be given no retroactive effect, as to do so would violate the provisions of the United States and state Constitutions as to impairing the obligations of contracts, by creating a right for one to recover under an existing contract where he previously had no such right and subjecting a party to an existing contract to liability to a third person who previously had no right under the contract. Guest v. Stone, 206 Ga. 239, 56 S.E.2d 247, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 419 (1949).
ground of defense from being de-O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20), permitting benefi-Validity of statute eliminating ability payments.: Former Code 1933, § 78-911 (see O.C.G.A. § 47-17-81), which Impairment of Contracts (Cont’d) eliminated, under certain conditions, payment for permanent or total disability, did not violate constitutional provisions providing that no ex post facto law, retroactive law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed, because in passing former Code 1933, § 78-917 (see O.C.G.A. § 47-17-101) the legislature specifically provided that all rights and benefits conferred would be subject to future legislative change or revision, and that no beneficiary would be deemed to have any vested right to any annuities or benefits provided therein. Prichard v. Board of Comm’rs of Peace Officers Annuity & Benefit Fund, 211 Ga. 57, 84 S.E.2d 26, 1954 Ga. LEXIS 486 (1954). Pension is not a gratuity, but a contract based upon a consideration and gives pensioner a vested right which under U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, cl. 1 cannot be impaired. Such contract cannot be modified, repealed, or defeated by subsequent Acts of the General Assembly after its creation. Burks v. Board of Trustees of Firemen’s Pension Fund, 214 Ga. 251, 104 S.E.2d 225, 1958 Ga. LEXIS 385 (1958). Validity of statute destroying
vested right to property.: Former Code 1933, § 67-1308 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80), providing that title to real property conveyed to secure debt should revert to grantor when debt became 20 years past due, unless debt was extended or renewed and such renewal recorded, or an affidavit setting out the facts of renewal was recorded with the conveyance, which section imposed conditions upon grantee not in existence at time of execution of the contract, divested the grantee of a vested right to the property, and impaired the obligation of the contract as applied to such deed, which was executed prior to passage and effective date of the Act, is unconstitutional, because in violation of U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, cl. 1 and of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. II, (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X), which prohibited this state from passing any retroactive law or any law impairing the obligations of contracts. Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803, 1959 Ga. LEXIS 550 (1959). Validity of statute empowering courts to revise alimony and support
judgments.: Former Code 1933, § 30-220 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-18 and 19-6-19), conferring jurisdiction and power on courts of this state to revise judgments fixing permanent alimony or support for minor children, does not offend those constitutional provisions of this state and of the United States which provide that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted, and this is true even though the amount of alimony or support so awarded by the judgment, as well as the time during which it is to be paid, is agreed to in writing by the parties. Nelson v. Roberts, 216 Ga. 741, 119 S.E.2d 545, 1961 Ga. LEXIS 326 (1961). sions to retired judges of probate
Validity of chapter governing pencourts.: The obligation of the board to pay monthly benefits to retired ordinaries (now judges of probate courts) under former Code 1933, Ch. 24-17A (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 47) existed only so long as there existed funds to pay these benefits. When these funds were exhausted, the obligation of the board administering the chapter ended, and thus the chapter is not unconstitutional as violative of the contractual obligation clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. Sanders v. Harper, 220 Ga. 649, 141 S.E.2d 156, 1965 Ga. LEXIS 593 (1965). U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X is restricted to the protection of vested rights; it does not render inviolate mere contingent or speculative interests. Webb v. Whitley, 114 Ga. App. 153, 150 S.E.2d 261, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 676 (1966). Decision to award a limited liability company fee simple title in real property did not violate the contract impairment clauses in U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X as a corporation’s rights to the property pursuant to a 1984 tax deed had not vested prior to the effective date of a 1989 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48, which operated retrospectively. BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185, LLC, 285 Ga. 5, 673 S.E.2d 205, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 42 (2009). U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X’s prohibition of any state law impairing the obligation of contracts is not a limitation on the power of eminent domain. — The obligation of a contract is not impaired when it is appropriated to a public use and compensation made therefor. Such an exertion of power is a taking, and not an impairment of a contractual obligation. City of Atlanta v. Airways Parking Co., 225 Ga. 173, 167 S.E.2d 145, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 418 (1969). Condemnation of portion of rights of condemnee under its contract with city does not violate the provision of U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, cl. 1 prohibiting the passage of a law impairing the obligation of contracts. City of Atlanta v. Airways Parking Co., 225 Ga. 173, 167 S.E.2d 145, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 418 (1969). U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, cl. 1 does not forbid the equitable modification of a contract. Selby v. Gilmer, 240 Ga. 241, 240 S.E.2d 80, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1461 (1977). Impairment of contracts by state
for public welfare.: Constitutional restraints upon impairment of obligation of contracts do not prevent state from exercising such powers as are necessary in the exercise of its sovereign right to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. Moore v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 242 Ga. 182, 249 S.E.2d 549, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1133 (1978). Act of General Assembly revoking pal offices, is not a law in impairment of contract since the right of an incumbent to an office is not vested, but may be revoked if the law under which the incumbent holds office is capable of being repealed. City of Mt. View v. Clayton County, 242 Ga. 163, 249 S.E.2d 541, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1129 (1978). Contract clause does not prohibit state from repealing or amending statutes generally or from enacting
city charter, thus abolishing municilegislation with retroactive effects.: Appling County v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 621 F.2d 1301, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15461 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015, 101 S. Ct. 574, 66 L. Ed. 2d 474, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 4146 (1980). With respect to grants of political or governmental authority to cities, tive power of states is not restrained by the contract clause. Appling County v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 621 F.2d 1301, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15461 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015, 101 S. Ct. 574, 66 L. Ed. 2d 474, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 4146 (1980). tract clause analysis is whether the legislative action impaired or changed a specific contractual obligation. City of Atlanta v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 636 F.2d 1084, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20205 (5th Cir. 1981). plicable to individual conduct by persons acting under color of state law. Stone Mt. Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt, 570 F. Supp. 238, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15846 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff’d, 746 F.2d 761, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 16791 (11th Cir. 1984). tory immunity to bar employee from
towns, counties, and the like, legisla-Preliminary question under con-Constitutional provision is not ap-Municipality cannot claim staturecovering pay.: To bar a municipal employee from recovering pay for services the employee performed by allowing the municipality to claim statutory immunity would violate the prohibition against the impairment of a contract which is found in both the state and federal constitutions. Smith v. City of Atlanta, 167 Ga. App. 458, 306 S.E.2d 720, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2522 (1983).
Reduction in future nonvested retirement benefits.: Since there is no vested right to benefits one was never entitled to receive, the reduction in future benefits to retiree did not violate the retiree’s constitutional right to protection against impairment of contract. Tate v. Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 257 Ga. 365, 359 S.E.2d 649, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 849 (1987).
Retrospective application of judicial construction of insurance contracts.: The interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-5 by Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Ga. App. 230, 274 S.E.2d 623 (1980) was based on the Impairment of Contracts (Cont’d) insurer’s failure to comply with specific requirements of the law and was not an unconstitutional impairment of the insurance contract. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates, 542 F. Supp. 807, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13187 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
Franchise tax on gas sales.: Franchise granted in 1940 by town ordinance to gas company allowing for the sale and distribution of gas services to town inhabitants was not granted in perpetuity; thus, 1980 town ordinance providing for a three percent franchise tax on gas sales impaired no contractual rights granted to the assignor of the gas company’s franchise, and trial court did not err in refusing to declare the 1980 ordinance unconstitutional as an impairment of contract. Gas Light Co. v. Town of Bibb City, 253 Ga. 498, 322 S.E.2d 250, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 1011 (1984). Subjecting retirement benefits of come taxation did not violate the constitutional prohibition against state laws impairing the obligation of contracts, where the teachers had no vested right to an irrevocable exemption, such irrevocable exemption being barred under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I. Parrish v. Employees’ Retirement Sys., 260 Ga. 613, 398 S.E.2d 353, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 461 (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 918, 111 S. Ct. 2016, 114 L. Ed. 2d 103, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2565 (1991). Duties on Imports Non-discriminatory ad valorem tax
retired school teachers to state inconstitutional.: A non-discriminatory ad valorem tax does not violate this section’s “import-export” clause, where the imported goods are “no longer in transit”. Los Angeles Tile Co. v. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 209 Ga. App. 245, 433 S.E.2d 82, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 837 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1524, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 906 (Ga. Oct. 5, 1993). Nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes do not interfere with the free flow of imported goods among the states. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L. Ed. 2d 495, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 120 (1976). Imports subject to uniform taxes imposed for services supplied by
state.: The import-export clause clearly prohibits state taxation based on foreign origin of imported goods, but it cannot be read to accord imported goods preferential treatment that permits escape from uniform taxes imposed without regard to foreign origin for services which the state supplies. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L. Ed. 2d 495, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 120 (1976). Taxable status of packaged and
bulk imports.: There is a vast distinction between goods shipped in packaging, such as crates or cartons, and goods shipped in bulk. Packaged imports retain their status as imports, and are not subject to taxation. Bulk imports that have been mingled with other bulk imports, sorted, and arranged for sale do not retain their status as imports, and they are subject to taxation. Wages v. Michelin Tire Corp., 233 Ga. 712, 214 S.E.2d 349, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1426 (1975), aff’d, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L. Ed. 2d 495, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 120 (1976).
which cannot be destroyed or impaired by a subsequent statute.: 1977 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U77-10. ment statute not violation of treaty
Reciprocal child support enforceprovisions.: So long as a reciprocal child support enforcement statute does not require more than a routine review of foreign laws, does not directly affect United States foreign policy and does not have a potential for the disruption of foreign policy or embarrassment to the United States government, it does not violate the treaty provisions of the United States Constitution. 1981 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 81-12. Prohibiting involuntary separation
benefits to state employees.: An amendment to the Georgia Constitution prohibiting the grant of involuntary separation retirement benefits to state employees who are by law currently entitled to coverage under the involuntary separation benefits section of the Employees’ Retirement System Act would, in all probability, be unconstitutional under the federal impairment clause contained in U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X. 1983 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U83-72. sion terminating retirement benefits
Retrospective application of provifor conviction of crime.: The General Assembly has the authority to enact a statute which proposes the forfeiture of earned retirement benefits of future public employees due to the conviction of a crime; however, an amendment to the Georgia Constitution proposing such a forfeiture by employees who are currently by law vested with rights under the public retirement system would, in all probability, be unconstitutional under the federal impairment clause contained in U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X. 1985 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U85-3.
Am. Jur. 2d.: 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Ambassadors, Diplomats and Consular Officials, § 1. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 143. 9 Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy, § 11. 9A Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy, § 1376, 1493. 9D Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy, § 3125. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Colleges and Universities, § 5. 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 219, 382, 392. 16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 640, 685, 712, 747. 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, § 9, 75. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 493. 21AAm. Jur. 2d, Customs Duties and Import Regulations, § 1, 154. 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Descent and Distribution, § 109. 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, § 8. 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Exemptions, § 12. 32 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Courts, § 473. 32A Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Courts, § 872, 921. 36 Am. Jur. 2d, Foreign Corporations, § 149, 160. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 181. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Insolvency, § 3. 44A Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 1640. 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, § 32. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 804. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Licenses and Permits, § 19. 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Marriage, § 7. 53A Am. Jur. 2d, Mines and Minerals, § 160, 371. 53A Am. Jur. 2d, Money, § 12, 27. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole, § 80. 59A Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership, § 120. 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Peddlers, Solicitors and Transient Dealers, § 58. 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Lands, § 51. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations, § 305. 67B Am. Jur. 2d, Sales and Use Taxes, § 9, 10. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping, § 77. 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 73, 75, 77, 148, 204, 316, 349. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, States, Territories, and Dependencies, § 9, 10, 78. 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Treaties, § 4. 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Wharves, § 27, 29. 81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witnesses, § 227. 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 9.
C.J.S.: 15 C.J.S., Commerce, § 129 et seq. 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §§ 506 et seq. 18 C.J.S., Corporations, § 64. 25 C.J.S., Customs Duties, § 26. 29 C.J.S., Elections, § 47. 35 C.J.S., Extradition and Detainers, § 93. 36 C.J.S., Federal Courts, § 94. 47A C.J.S., Internal Revenue, § 97. 58 C.J.S., Monetary and Currency Regulation, §§ 1, 4. 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 1836. 80 C.J.S., Shipping, § 27. 81A C.J.S., States, §§ 13, 71 et seq., 272, 448. 84 C.J.S., Taxation, § 13. 87 C.J.S., Treaties, § 2. 91 C.J.S., United States, § 253. 91 C.J.S., Vagrancy and Related Offenses, § 27. 94 C.J.S., Wharves, §§ 18, 24.
ALR.: Relation of treaty to state and federal law, 4 A.L.R. 1377; 134 A.L.R. 882. Franchise provisions for free or reduced rates by public service corporations as contract protected from change under contract clause of federal Constitution, 10 A.L.R. 499. What money is legal tender, 31 A.L.R. 246. Effect of war on treaty rights, 47 A.L.R. 457. Constitutional or statutory changes affecting grand jury or substituting information for indictment as an ex post facto law, 53 A.L.R. 716. Effect of statutory change of penalty or punishment after conviction, 55 A.L.R. 443. Constitutionality of retroactive statute curing defect in private instrument purporting to convey title or create interest in property or as to filing or recording thereof, 57 A.L.R. 1197. Construction of statutes of limitation as regards their retrospective application to causes of action already barred, 67 A.L.R. 297. Constitutionality, construction, and applicability of statute making refusal to pay for commodities a criminal offense, 76 A.L.R. 1338. Retroactive effect of statutes regarding provisions with reference to avoidance of fire insurance policies, 78 A.L.R. 617. Imposition of wharfage or dockage fees, by state or municipality, as tonnage duty, 80 A.L.R. 388. Constitutional provision against impairing obligation of contract as applicable to statutes affecting rights or remedies of holders or owners of improvement bonds or liens, 85 A.L.R. 244; 97 A.L.R. 911. Blue Sky Laws, 87 A.L.R. 42. Statutes in relation to interest as obnoxious to constitutional provision against impairing obligation of contracts, 87 A.L.R. 462. Power to require filing of schedule of prices as a condition of license for a business or profession, 87 A.L.R. 519. Raising maximum limit of permissible municipal indebtedness as impairing obligation of existing municipal contracts, 90 A.L.R. 859. Debtor’s exemption statutes as impairing obligations of existing contracts, 93 A.L.R. 177. Contracts for payment in gold or silver or in gold or silver coin (“gold coin” clauses), 95 A.L.R. 1383; 101 A.L.R. 1318; 114 A.L.R. 820. Constitutionality of statute changing rights of withdrawing members of building and loan association, 98 A.L.R. 82; 133 A.L.R. 1493. Validity of statute or ordinance regulating barbers, 98 A.L.R. 1088. Constitutional provision against impairing obligation of contracts as applied to rights or remedies of owners of property subject to assessment for local improvements, 100 A.L.R. 164. Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute permitting release of part of property subject to tax liens or special assessments, 100 A.L.R. 418. Statute affecting mortgagee’s rights and remedies in respect of deficiency as unconstitutional impairment of obligation of contract, 108 A.L.R. 891; 115 A.L.R. 435; 130 A.L.R. 1482; 133 A.L.R. 1473. Tax exemption as unconstitutionally impairing public obligations antedating the exemption, 109 A.L.R. 817. Constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws as applicable to statutes relating to joinder of offenses or defendants, 110 A.L.R. 1308. Constitutionality of crop insurance statutes, 113 A.L.R. 739. Constitutional provisions against impairment of obligations of contract as applied to sinking funds for retirement of municipal or other public bonds, 115 A.L.R. 220. Validity and effect, as to previously recorded instrument, of statute which places or changes time limit on effectiveness of record of mortgages or other instruments, 133 A.L.R. 1325. Constitutionality, construction, and application of compacts and statutes involving cooperation between states, 134 A.L.R. 1411. Constitutionality of statute which in effect limits judgment creditor after crediting thereon fair market value of property purchased by him at execution sale, 144 A.L.R. 858. Validity and construction of war legislation in nature of moratory statute, 144 A.L.R. 1508. Constitutionality and construction of repeal or modification by legislative action of teachers’ tenure statute, as regards retrospective operation, 147 A.L.R. 293. Retroactive application, to previous sales, of statutes reducing period of redemption from tax sales, as unconstitutional impairment of contract obligations, 147 A.L.R. 1123. Price ceiling, adopted as a war measure, as affecting preexisting contracts, 147 A.L.R. 1286; 149 A.L.R. 1451; 151 A.L.R. 1450. Retrospective statute subjecting interests of trust beneficiaries to claims of creditors, 151 A.L.R. 1417. Rights of parties to contract the performance of which is interfered with or prevented by war conditions or acts of government in prosecution of war, 151 A.L.R. 1447; 152 A.L.R. 1447; 153 A.L.R. 1417; 154 A.L.R. 1445; 155 A.L.R. 1447; 156 A.L.R. 1446; 157 A.L.R. 1446; 158 A.L.R. 1446. Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute or contract regarding deduction from, or adjustment of, wages in respect of defective workmanship, 153 A.L.R. 866. Constitutionality, construction, and application of statutes affecting the rights or remedies of purchasers under antecedent executory contracts for purchase of real property, 153 A.L.R. 1209. Retroactive application of statutes regarding enforcement of awards under workmen’s compensation acts, 155 A.L.R. 558. Statute providing for apportionment between lessor and lessee of a tax imposed upon the producer of oil, gas, or other natural production as violation of the constitutional provision against impairment of the obligation of contracts, 160 A.L.R. 980. Retrospective operation of criminal negligence statute, 14 A.L.R.2d 726. Validity of statute establishing or authorizing minimum price schedules for barbers, 54 A.L.R.3d 916. Validity, construction, and effect of state franchising statute, 67 A.L.R.3d 1299. Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures, 81 A.L.R.3d 486. Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 A.L.R.3d 564. Mandatory retirement of public officer or employee based on age, 81 A.L.R.3d 811. Zoning: building in course of construction as establishing valid nonconforming use or vested right to complete construction for intended use, 89 A.L.R.3d 1051. Prohibition, under state civil rights laws, of racial discrimination in rental of privately owned residential property, 96 A.L.R.3d 497. Construction and application of U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 10, cl. 1, and state constitutional provisions proscribing state bills of attainder, 63 A.L.R. 6th 1.

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