---
title: U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. Powers Denied to the States
collection: code
id: us-const:art-i-sec-10
cite_as: U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10
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---

# U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. Powers Denied to the States

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws; and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

## Cross References

Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or laws which impair the obligations of contracts, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X and § 1-3-5.

Authorization for state militia, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. II.

Contracts declared unenforceable at law, §§ 13-8-1, 13-8-2.

Cooperation with other states generally, § 28-6-1 et seq.

## Law Reviews

For note, “Annexation by Municipalities in Georgia,” see 2 Mercer L. Rev. 423 (1951).

For article, “Constitutionality of Economic Regulations,” see 2 J. of Pub. L. 98 (1953).

For article discussing Georgia alimony provisions allowing modification of judgments with respect to federal and state constitutional limitations, see 18 Ga. B.J. 153 (1955).

For comment on Watson v. Employer’s Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 75 S. Ct. 166, 99 L. Ed. 74 (1954), holding that a statute allowing a direct action by the policy holder against the insurer contrary to the terms of the contract and requiring the consent of the insurer to such action as a prerequisite of doing business in the state was not violative of the Constitution, see 17 Ga. B.J. 529 (1955).

For article, “Patterns of Social Legislation: Reflections on the Welfare State,” see 6 J. of Pub. L. 3 (1957).

For comment discussing state intervention in contracts between private parties, under the contract clause, in light of Willys Motors v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, 142 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956), see 6 J. of Pub. L. 250 (1957).

For article, “The Subject-Matter Limitation Upon the Treaty-Making Power,” see 11 J. of Pub. L. 122 (1962).

For article, “Consolidation by Compact: A Remedy for Preemption of State Food and Drug Laws,” see 14 J. of Pub. L. 276 (1965).

For comment on Sanders v. Harper, 220 Ga. 649, 141 S.E.2d 156 (1965), see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 311 (1965).

For article discussing the constitutional parameters of state efforts to stimulate international trade, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 391 (1976).

For comment on Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1976), see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 1237 (1976).

For comment discussing interpretation of ex post facto clause, see 28 Emory L.J. 429 (1979).

For note, “Lapse or Continuation of Local Constitutional Amendments Under the Constitution of 1983,” see 21 Ga. St. B.J. 78 (1984).

For article, “The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform,” see 34 Emory L.J. 617 (1985).

For comment, “Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A Constitutional Analysis,” see 36 Emory L.J. 285 (1987).

For article, “Georgia and the Development of Constitutional Principles: An Essay in Honor of the Bicentennial,” see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1987).

For article, “Metaphor and Paradox,” see 23 Ga. L. Rev. 1053 (1989).

For article, “Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private Property: 1760-1860,” see 39 Emory L.J. 65 (1990).

For article, “Federal and State ‘State Action’: The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine,” see 24 Ga. L. Rev. 327 (1990).

For annual Eleventh Circuit survey of constitutional law — civil, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 1075 (1992).

For article, “Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice,” see 42 Emory L.J. 1 (1993).

For note, “Water Wars in the Southeast: Alabama, Florida, and Georgia Square Off Over the Apalachicola Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin,” see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 689 (1993).

For survey of 1995 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional civil law, see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 745 (1996).

For article, “Eleventh Circuit Survey: January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013: Article: Federal Sentencing Guidelines,” see 65 Emory L. J. 971 (2014).

For article, “The Nature of Family, The Family of Nature: The Surprising Liberal Defense of the Traditional Family in the Enlightment,” see 64 Emory L.J. 591 (2014).

For article, “Protecting States in the New World of Energy Federalism,” see 67 Emory L.J. 921 (2018).

For annual survey on the federal sentencing guidelines, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 1181 (2018).

For article, “Coequal Federalism and Federal-State Agencies,” see 55 Ga. L. Rev. 287 (2020).

## Is Congressionally Sanctioned Interchanging Remedy Only.

Statute which changes or affects remedy only and does not destroy or impair vested rights is not unconstitutional as impairing obligation of contract, although it may be retroactive and although, in changing or modifying the remedy, the rights of the parties may be incidentally affected. Morris v. Interstate Bond Co., 180 Ga. 689, 180 S.E. 819, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 531 (1935).

## Validity of Statute Eliminating Disability Payments.

Former Code 1933, § 78-911 (see O.C.G.A. § 47-17-81), which eliminated, under certain conditions, payment for permanent or total disability, did not violate constitutional provisions providing that no ex post facto law, retroactive law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed, because in passing former Code 1933, § 78-917 (see O.C.G.A. § 47-17-101) the legislature specifically provided that all rights and benefits conferred would be subject to future legislative change or revision, and that no beneficiary would be deemed to have any vested right to any annuities or benefits provided therein. Prichard v. Board of Comm’rs of Peace Officers Annuity & Benefit Fund, 211 Ga. 57, 84 S.E.2d 26, 1954 Ga. LEXIS 486 (1954).

## Validity of Zoning Ordinance.

Because plaintiff, while proceeding to zone property was pending, filed application to authorize building of filling station, and ordinance was later adopted zoning plaintiff’s property for residential purposes, such ordinance was not in violation of the federal and state Constitutions as an ex post facto or retroactive law. Gay v. Mayor of Lyons, 212 Ga. 438, 93 S.E.2d 352, 1956 Ga. LEXIS 402 (1956).

Statute is retroactive if it creates a new obligation on transactions or

## Considerations Already Past, or Destroys or Impairs Vested Rights.

A statute does not operate retrospectively because it relates to antecedent facts, but if it is intended to affect transactions which occurred or rights which accrued before it became operative and ascribes to them essentially different effects, in view of the law at the time of their occurrence, it is retroactive in character. Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803, 1959 Ga. LEXIS 550 (1959); Adams v. Adams, 219 Ga. 633, 135 S.E.2d 428, 1964 Ga. LEXIS 347 (1964).

Validity of statute destroying

## Vested Right to Property.

Former Code 1933, § 67-1308 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80), providing that title to real property conveyed to secure debt should revert to grantor when debt became 20 years past due, unless debt was extended or renewed and such renewal recorded, or an affidavit setting out the facts of renewal was recorded with the conveyance, which section imposed conditions upon grantee not in existence at time of execution of the contract, divested the grantee of a vested right to the property, and impaired the obligation of the contract as applied to such deed, which was executed prior to passage and effective date of the Act, is unconstitutional, because in violation of U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, cl. 1 and of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. II, (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X), which prohibited this state from passing any retroactive law or any law impairing the obligations of contracts. Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803, 1959 Ga. LEXIS 550 (1959). pation tax payment pending license

## Validity of Statute Requiring Occuapplication.

It is competent for the legislature to enact that a person entering upon business or occupation upon which a tax provided in ordinance has been imposed, by the terms thereof, should pay the amount of the tax named for the year, or for any period of time within the year, during which the person should choose to apply for a license. Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 938 (1968).

2. Criminal

Phrase “ex post facto” applies to criminal, not civil, cases. Hayes v. Howell, 251 Ga. 580, 308 S.E.2d 170, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 924 (1983).

## Passing on Validity of Constitutional Amendment Not Affecting Petitioner’s Rights.

In habeas corpus proceeding based on alleged invalidity of constitutional amendment placing power of granting pardons and paroles in Board of Pardons and Paroles rather than Governor, court would not pass on constitutionality of amendment, since even if it were unconstitutional the prior provision would be in effect, and petitioner would not be entitled to discharge. Court will not pass on constitutionality of law when it is challenged by party whose rights are not affected by it. Whittle v. Jones, 198 Ga. 538, 32 S.E.2d 94, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 426 (1944). ing amendment void as ex post facto

## Avoidance of Construction Renderlaw.

Because a constitutional amendment placing power to grant pardons in Board of Pardons and Paroles instead of Governor was silent as to whether it applied to persons previously convicted, amendment would not be given retroactive operation as to those persons if such construction would render amendment void as an ex post facto law. Whittle v. Jones, 198 Ga. 538, 32 S.E.2d 94, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 426 (1944).

As a general rule, any law is ex post facto which is enacted after offense was committed, and which, in relation to offense or its consequences, alters the situation of the accused to the accused’s disadvantage. A statute, however, cannot be an ex post facto law if it is apparent that legislature in enacting the statute did not make criminal an act which was innocent when done; did not aggravate an offense or change the punishment and make it greater than when it was committed; did not alter the rules of evidence and require less or different evidence than the Ex Post Facto Laws (Cont’d) 2. Criminal (Cont’d) law required at time of commission of offense; and did not deprive the accused of any substantial right or immunity that the accused possessed at the time of commission of the offense. Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 896 (1972).

## Delayed Effective Date of Statute.

The application of 21 U.S.C. § 862 to deny defendant federal benefits did not violate the Constitution’s ex post facto clause; although the statute applied only to persons convicted of conspiracy after September 1, 1989, it was enacted on November 18, 1988, during the course of the conspiracy, and thus defendant had adequate notice of the penalty. United States v. Bush, 28 F.3d 1084, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21326 (11th Cir. 1994).

Validity of statute removing prior

## Right.

Although it is the rule that no one has a vested right in a mere mode of procedure, so that a statute merely regulating procedure and leaving untouched all substantial protections with which existing law surrounds the person accused of crime is not within the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, yet a statute is void and ineffective as related to previous offenses if it takes from the accused a substantial right given to the accused by law in force at the time to which guilt relates, and such statute cannot be sustained simply because, in a general sense, it may be said to regulate procedure. Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 896 (1972).


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