--- title: U.S. Const. Art. IV, Sec. 2. Interstate Comity collection: code id: us-const:art-iv-sec-2 cite_as: U.S. Const. Art. IV, Sec. 2 canonical_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-iv-sec-2 md_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-iv-sec-2.md text_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-iv-sec-2/text source_url: https://www.legis.ga.gov/api/document/docs/default-source/joint-features-document-library/1us-const-(v1)-2025-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=328b75b8_0#page=162 date: 2025 status: active corpus_version: 2025-supplement-89aa39ab3c68 license: CC0-1.0 publisher: Georgia Commons, an independent project of Georgia Civic Data. Not the State of Georgia. Not legal advice. up: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/index.md previous: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-iv-sec-1.md next: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-iv-sec-3.md index: https://georgiacommons.org/code/index.md omitted: notes omitted_chars: 12257 omitted_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-iv-sec-2.md?notes=all&start=11649 version: the only printed version in_force: true heading_path: Relations Between States --- # U.S. Const. Art. IV, Sec. 2. Interstate Comity A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due. ## Cross References Criminal extradition, § 17-13-1 et seq. ## Editor's Notes U.S. Const., art. IV, sec. II, cl. 3 concerned slaves and indentured servants and has been rendered obsolete by U.S. Const., amend. 13. ## Law Reviews For article discussing fishing rights along maritime belt of the United States, in light of Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S. Ct. 1157, 92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948), see 11 Ga. B.J. 191 (1948). For comment on Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S. Ct. 1157, 92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948), holding unconstitutional discriminatory license tax on foreign shrimp boats within three-mile limit, see 11 Ga. B.J. 83 (1948). For comment discussing cruel and unusual punishment and scope of review of proceedings through writ of habeas corpus of convict escaped from chain gang, in light of Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864, 70 S. Ct. 146, 94 L. Ed. 530 (1949), see 12 Ga. B.J. 356 (1950). For article, “Interstate Extradition and State Sovereignty,” see 1 Mercer L. Rev. 147 (1950). For note, “Interstate Extradition,” see 1 J. Pub. L. 463 (1952). For comment on Watson v. Grimes; Harper v. Grimes, 218 Ga. 631, 129 S.E.2d 795 (1963), see 26 Ga. B.J. 92 (1963). For note discussing the constitutional implications of higher nonresident tuition fees charged by state universities, see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 86 (1971). For article, “Problems in Search of Principles: The First Amendment in the Supreme Court from 1791-1930,” see 35 Emory L.J. 59 (1986). For article, “Georgia and the Development of Constitutional Principles: An Essay in Honor of the Bicentennial,” see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1987). For article, “Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private Property: 1760-1860,” see 39 Emory L.J. 65 (1990). For article, “Slavery and Race: New Ideas and Enduring Shibboleths in the Interpretation of the American Constitutional System,” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 637 (1993). For article, “The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,” see 43 Ga. L. Rev. 1117 (2009). For article, “Jurisdictional Discrimination and Full Faith and Credit,” see 63 Emory L. J. 1023 (2014). ## Prohibition of Application of Docresidents in Fela Actions. The privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution prohibits Georgia courts from applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens to citizens of other states who are nonresidents of Georgia in Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases and declining to exercise jurisdiction of such actions brought by them. Brown v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 229 Ga. 481, 192 S.E.2d 382, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 658 (1972). Validity of statute denying medical ## Care to Nonresidents. Absent some relationship to the availability of postprocedure medical care for an aborted patient, the constitutionality of a residence requirement could not be upheld. The privileges and immunities clause protects persons who enter Georgia seeking the medical services that are available there. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 112 (1973). Extradition 1. In General Duty to honor demand of sister ## State for Extradition of Fugitive. The Constitution imposes a duty upon the executive authority of each state of this Union to honor the demand of another state for the extradition of a fugitive from the demanding state. Hart v. Mount, 196 Ga. 452, 26 S.E.2d 453, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 337 (1943). It is not by virtue of mere comity that extradition warrant is issued, but in obedience to constitutional mandate. Hart v. Mount, 196 Ga. 452, 26 S.E.2d 453, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 337 (1943). Extradition based on constitutional ## Mandate, Not Merely Comity. The matter of rendering one from an asylum state to another state by extradition proceedings is not founded merely on comity between the states, but is in response to a requirement under U.S. Const., art. IV, sec. II, cl. 2. House v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 572, 105 S.E.2d 745, 1958 Ga. LEXIS 495 (1958). ## Law Governing Extradition Proceedings. The primary law governing extradition proceedings is found in the Constitution of the United States, and the acts of Congress in pursuance thereof. McFarlin v. Shirley, 209 Ga. 794, 76 S.E.2d 1, 1953 Ga. LEXIS 393 (1953). Elements necessary to authorize ## Extradition. If a request for extradition is premised on the constitutional provision, one arrested and held on the governor’s warrant issued in response to the request is entitled to habeas corpus relief upon establishing that he is not a fugitive from justice. Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, 453 S.E.2d 698, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 93 (1995). In order to authorize an extradition under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the alleged criminal act must have been committed by an individual who was at the time of its commission personally within the state which demands the individual’s surrender, and that such person must have fled from the demanding state to the state where the individual is found, either directly or indirectly. Such a person is defined as a fugitive from justice. Jackson v. Pittard, 211 Extradition (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) Ga. 427, 86 S.E.2d 295, 1955 Ga. LEXIS 346 (1955). fore serving full term is fugitive from ## Convicted Felon Leaving State Bejustice. Where a person is convicted of felony committed by the person in one state, and that person goes into another state, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, before serving the full term for which that person was sentenced, that person thereby becomes a fugitive from justice. Brown v. Lowry, 185 Ga. 539, 195 S.E. 759, 1938 Ga. LEXIS 809 (1938); King v. Mount, 196 Ga. 461, 26 S.E.2d 419, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 330 (1943); Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659, 30 S.E.2d 48, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 293 (1944); Taylor v. Foster, 205 Ga. 36, 52 S.E.2d 314, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 516 (1949); House v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 572, 105 S.E.2d 745, 1958 Ga. LEXIS 495 (1958); Frazier v. Grimes, 221 Ga. 375, 145 S.E.2d 39, 1965 Ga. LEXIS 467 (1965); Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1067 (1979). ## Parole Violator Subject to Extradition. A person who has been convicted of a felony in another state and released on parole by the authorities of that state with permission to go into this state, upon the violation of the terms of parole by the commission of a felony in this state, becomes a fugitive from justice within the meaning of U.S. Const., art. IV, sec. II, cl. 2 and the Act of Congress enacted pursuant thereto, 18 U.S.C. § 662, and subject to extradition by the state where the person was convicted, although that person has committed no crime in that state subsequent to parole. Beavers v. Lowry, 186 Ga. 557, 198 S.E. 692, 1938 Ga. LEXIS 647 (1938). Aparoled convict who violates the terms of parole may be extradited from one state to another on the ground that the person is a convict whose term has not expired, and therefore is charged with crime under the provision of United States Constitution relating to interstate extradition. Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659, 30 S.E.2d 48, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 293 (1944); Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699, 75 S.E.2d 427, 1953 Ga. LEXIS 369 (1953); Soviero v. State, 220 Ga. 119, 137 S.E.2d 471, 1964 Ga. LEXIS 465 (1964); Frazier v. Grimes, 221 Ga. 375, 145 S.E.2d 39, 1965 Ga. LEXIS 467 (1965). Parole violator committing another ## Felony Is Fugitive From Justice. If a person who has been convicted of a felony or other crime in another state, and released on parole by the authorities of that state with permission to go into another state, violates the terms of his parole by the commission of another felony, or a federal offense amounting to a felony, that person becomes a fugitive from justice within the meaning of U.S. Const., art. IV, sec. II, cl. 2. Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699, 75 S.E.2d 427, 1953 Ga. LEXIS 369 (1953). Convicted felon involuntarily brought into state from convicting ## Jurisdiction to Serve Sentence Fugitive From Justice. Petitioner, brought into Georgia after conviction in the state of Massachusetts for the purpose of serving the sentence imposed by the federal court, and consequently not coming into Georgia from Massachusetts voluntarily, was nevertheless a fugitive from justice. Scheinfain v. Aldredge, 191 Ga. 479, 12 S.E.2d 868, 1941 Ga. LEXIS 312 (1941). Violator of conditional pardon still ## Charged with Crime. A person who is out on a conditional pardon which has been revoked, is nevertheless still a person who is charged with crime within the meaning of U.S. Const., art. IV, sec. II, cl. 2. Deering v. Mount, 194 Ga. 833, 22 S.E.2d 828, 1942 Ga. LEXIS 691 (1942). Felon serving only part of sentence ## Subject to Later Extradition. Where an individual who had been convicted and sentenced for the offense of embezzlement in the state of Louisiana was taken into custody by federal authorities and convicted and sentenced for a federal offense, was then returned to the authorities of Louisiana, and after serving a part of the sentence imposed upon the individual by the court of that state, was reprieved to the United States authorities to permit the individual to serve a federal sentence and after said sentence was served, was then arrested on a warrant issued by the Governor of Georgia on a requisition from the Governor of Louisiana, in order that the individual might be extradited and required to serve out an incomplete sentence in that state, in the circumstances the individual was a fugitive from the justice of Louisiana within the purview of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and was subject to extradition to that state. King v. Mount, 196 Ga. 461, 26 S.E.2d 419, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 330 (1943). Extradition not violative of right to ## Fair Trial. One accused of crime has a right to a full and fair trial according to the law of the government whose sovereignty he is alleged to have offended, but he has no more than that. He should not be permitted to use the machinery of one sovereignty to obstruct his trial in the courts of the other, unless the necessary operation of such machinery prevents his having a fair trial, and he may not complain if one sovereignty waives its strict right to exclusive custody of him for vindication of its laws in order that the other may also subject him to conviction of crime against it. House v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 572, 105 S.E.2d 745, 1958 Ga. LEXIS 495 (1958). ## On Facts, Conditional Pardon Violator Subject to Extradition. Petitioner, who was granted a conditional pardon on 10-year sentence imposed in Florida, provided that the petitioner leave the state of Florida immediately, and thereafter remain outside the state and lead a sober, peaceable, and law-abiding life, and was later arrested and tried in the federal courts and sentenced to serve ten years, was a fugitive from justice subject to extradition to Florida, when that state revoked the conditional pardon and placed a detainer with the federal authorities. House v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 572, 105 S.E.2d 745, 1958 Ga. LEXIS 495 (1958). 2. Procedure Precedence of extradition warrant over bill of exceptions in habeas cor- ## Pus. The filing of a bill of exceptions to the decision of the judge in the hearing of a habeas corpus case, if the petitioner is being detained under an extradition warrant, does not operate as a supersedeas, and, pending the decision on appeal, the petitioner must remain in the condition in which the petitioner is placed by the judgment; in such a case there is no provision in the law of this state for bail. Hames v. Sturdivant, 181 Ga. 472, 182 S.E. 601, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 128 (1935). Laws of demanding state control as > The printed notes continue for 12,257 more characters, not shown here. Continue at https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-iv-sec-2.md?notes=all&start=11649