Art. VI. Debts, Supremacy, Oath

Active

Current through: the volume states no acts currency; this is its 2025 edition.

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

The notes below are printed with the section but are not enacted law (O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1(c)). They are shown apart from the text.

Editor's notes

U.S. Const., amend. 14, sec. III, disqualifies from office those persons who fail to honor the oath required by clause 3 of this article.

Cross references

Oaths of elected executive officers, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. V, § III, Para. II. and Title 45, Chapter 3, Art. 1. Taking of oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Georgia, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. IV, Para. II (members of General Assembly); Art. V, Sec. I, Para. VI and 45-12-4 (Governor and Lieutenant Governor); §§ 15-2-3, 15-3-5, 15-5A-8, 15-6-6, 15-9-2.1, 15-9-6, 15-10-3, 15-10-222 (judges); 15-2-40, 15-6-51, 15-6-58, 15-6-59, 15-8-5, 15-9-36, 15-10-3 (clerks). Oaths of public officials and public employees, Title 45, Chapter 3, Art. 1.

Law reviews

For comment criticizing Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1950), holding suspending California Alien Land Law as discriminatory in violation of United States Treaty, see 2 Mercer L. Rev. 276 (1950). For comment on Commonwealth of Pa. v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S. Ct. 477, 100 L. Ed. 640 (1956), holding that the Federal Alien Registration Act (Smith Act), 54 Statute 670, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2835, superseded the enforceability of Pennsylvania Sedition Act, see 19 Ga. B.J. 100 (1956). For comment concerning state taxation of federal property in light of Offutt Hous. Co. v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253, 76 S. Ct. 814, 100 L. Ed. 1151 (1956), see 19 Ga. B.J. 247 (1956). For article, “Interposition, Nullification and the Delicate Division of Power in a Federal System,” see 5 J. of Pub. L. 2 (1956). For article, “The Law of the Land,” focusing on the role of the Supreme Court, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 444 (1957). For comment on Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1957), and Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 76 S. Ct. 886, 100 L. Ed. 1342 (1956), as to military authority overseas over dependents of servicemen, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 540 (1957). For article criticizing statutory interpretation of Federal Power Act extending federal authority through the commerce clause, and proposing a balancing of interests test to protect state jurisdiction over production and gathering of natural gas and electricity when they are local activities, see 10 Mercer L. Rev. 226 (1959). For article, “The Subject-Matter Limitation Upon the Treaty-Making Power,” see 11 J. of Pub. L. 122 (1962). For note discussing habeas corpus as a means of exerting control by the central government in protecting the constitutional rights of criminal defendants and the ramifications for federalism, see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 281 (1964). For article, “Consolidation by Compact: A Remedy for Preemption of State Food and Drug Laws,” see 14 J. of Pub. L. 276 (1965). For note, “The State Action Doctrine and State Antitrust Laws — Thirty-five Years of Struggle,” see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 1039 (1969). For comment on United States v. Barash, 428 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1970), as to the constitutionality under the principle of double jeopardy, of increasing severity of punishment on retrial following successful appeal, see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 194 (1971). For comment on Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081 (D.D.C. 1970), as to religious regulations at military academies, see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 400 (1971). For article, “The Treaty Power and Family Law,” see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 55 (1972). For article, “The Role and Impact of the Supreme Court and Judicial Decision-Making in the Evolution of American Federalism,” see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 457 (1972). For article discussing the “void from inception” doctrine as applied to statutory law in Georgia, see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 101 (1973). For note discussing the doctrine of federal preemption in the allocation of powers between the nation and the states, see 22 J. of Pub. L. 391 (1973). For note, “Oil Spills — State Prevention and the Possibility of Pre-emption,” see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 559 (1973). For article discussing the constitutional parameters of state efforts to stimulate international trade, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 391 (1976). For article suggesting federal preemption implications of state attempts to regulate foreign investment in domestic corporations, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 615 (1976). For comment discussing federal immunity from state taxation, in light of United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 97 S. Ct. 699, 50 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977), see 26 Emory L.J. 709 (1977). For article discussing the interrelationship between state and federal authority in regulating scientific and technological expansion, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 785 (1977). For article discussing theoretical problems raised by constitutional adjudication and judicial supremacy in the United States, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 1069 (1977). For article, “The Georgia Bill of Rights: Dead or Alive?,” see 34 Emory L.J. 341 (1985). For article, “Separation of Political Powers: Boundaries or Balance?,” see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 171 (1986). For article, “State Taxation of Interstate Banking,” see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 283 (1986). For article, “Georgia and the Development of Constitutional Principles: An Essay in Honor of the Bicentennial,” see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1987). For article, “Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis of State Law,” see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 667 (1988). For article, “Georgia’s Current Antita-keover Law: A Look at Management’s New Shield,” see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 176 (1988). For article, “Children, Poverty and State Constitutions,” see 38 Emory L.J. 577 (1989). For note, “Overcoming Tobacco Company Immunity: Cipollone Clears an Uncertain Path,” see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 253 (1992). For note, “Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Claims: Adding Clarity and Respect for State Sovereignty to the Analysis of Federal Preemption Defenses,” see 36 Ga. L. Rev. 797 (2002). For comment, “Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland: Reaffirming Ex Parte Young and the Necessity of Finding Regulatory Hand-Back Schemes to a Gift or Gratuity,” see 52 Emory L.J. 1519 (2003). For annual survey on product liability, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2012). For article, “Conflict of Laws Structure and Vision: Updating a Venerable Discipline,” see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015). For note, “State Drone Laws: A Legitimate Answer to State Concerns or a Violation of Federal Sovereignty,” see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 377 (2015). For article, “Faithful Parents: Choice of Childcare Parentage Laws,” see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 325 (2019).

Other notes (27 entries, as printed)

Inconsistent state law.: The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution dictates that federal law preempts inconsistent state law. Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc., 260 Ga. 850, 412 S.E.2d 526, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 4 (1991). Direct conflict between state law and federal constitutional provisions raises question under supremacy clause of broader scope than where the alleged conflict is only between a state statute and a federal statute that might be resolved by the construction given either the state or the federal law. United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 371 U.S. 285, 83 S. Ct. 397, 9 L. Ed. 2d 317, 1963 U.S. LEXIS 2404 (1963). State policy opposed to federal policy must give way. A state is without power to provide the conditions on which the federal government will effectuate its policies. United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 371 U.S. 285, 83 S. Ct. 397, 9 L. Ed. 2d 317, 1963 U.S. LEXIS 2404 (1963). Regulations promulgated by federal agencies under a statutory authorization have the force of federal law and can preempt conflicting state law. Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F. Supp. 1135, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17112 (S.D. Ga. 1990). Motorist’s tort claim, alleging that a tractor-trailer was defective because it did not have adequate reflective materials along its side, was preempted by federal regulations promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F. Supp. 1135, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17112 (S.D. Ga. 1990). empted by Liability Risk Retention
Georgia’s direct action statutes pre-Act.: Liability Risk Retention Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3901, et seq., preempted Georgia’s motor carrier and insurance carrier direct action statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-112(c) and 40-2-140(d)(4), in regard to a risk retention group that was not chartered in Georgia, thus precluding injured passengers from bringing a direct action against the risk retention group. The court rejected the passengers’ contention that the statutes were financial responsibility laws and not preempted under 15 U.S.C. § 3905. Reis v. OOIDA Risk Retention Group, Inc., 303 Ga. 659, 814 S.E.2d 338, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 294 (2018). tutional issue is a constitutional rule binding upon the states. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S. Ct. 639, 17 L. Ed. 2d 593, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2451 (1967). Application of supremacy clause ancing of, state and local action against federal policy. DeKalb County v. Henry C. Beck Co., 382 F.2d 992, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5106 (5th Cir. 1967).
Supreme Court ruling on a constirequires determination of, and bal-United States Supreme Court decisions construing federal statute binding on state supreme court.: The Bankruptcy Act being a federal statute, decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing and applying it are binding upon the state Supreme Court as precedents. Branch v. Human, 215 Ga. 209, 109 S.E.2d 732, 1959 Ga. LEXIS 437 (1959). Limitation on state power of direct
taxation.: In the field of direct taxation, the power of the sovereign state is supreme, except when the exercise of that supreme right brings it into collision with the operation of a government instrumentality necessary to the existence of the federal government and to the exercise of its powers upon a subject as to which exclusive jurisdiction was delegated to Congress in the Constitution of 1789. City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 175 Ga. 201, 165 S.E. 270, 1932 Ga. LEXIS 224 (1932). State courts cannot award federal
tax exemption.: Georgia state courts do not have the authority to award the federal income tax dependency exemption to a noncustodial parent. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 261 Ga. 11, 401 S.E.2d 714, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 132 (1991).
Federal power to wage war superior to state power to tax.: Even though the power of a state to tax generally is supreme, that power may not be used to hamper, hinder, annoy, harass, and impede the federal government in the exercise of its unlimited power to carry on war. City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 175 Ga. 201, 165 S.E. 270, 1932 Ga. LEXIS 224 (1932). Nothing in Constitution requires State of Georgia to make conviction qualification to serve as juror. Brady v. State, 199 Ga. 566, 34 S.E.2d 849, 1945 Ga. LEXIS 413 (1945). Strict local rules of pleading cannot rized by federal laws. Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 70 S. Ct. 105, 94 L. Ed. 100, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 1665 (1949). Federal bankruptcy law preempts state law, owing to the supremacy clause. As one of Congress’ enumerated powers, the power to enact bankruptcy laws is limited only by the substantive guarantees contained in the federal Constitution. Goerg v. Parungao, 844 F.2d 1562, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 6507 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 850, 102 L. Ed. 2d 981, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 376 (1989). The Constitution of the United States empowered Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,” and laws enacted by Congress pursuant to this grant of authority are supreme to those of the states. Bankruptcy provisions allowing the opportunity to cure and reinstate accelerated debts and bankruptcy provisions governing the payment of secured creditors’ attorney’s fees are no exception to the supremacy clause. In re Centre Court Apts., Ltd., 85 B.R. 651, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 547 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). The federal Bankruptcy Code, rules, and official forms, rather than Georgia law, apply and control in prescribing the procedure whereby exemptions are to be claimed in a bankruptcy case and, as a result, debtors in bankruptcy are not required to comply with O.C.G.A. § 44-13-101. Caruthers v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 87 B.R. 723, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 825 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). Federal law preempted plaintiff’s state law claims against defendants for actions they took in violation of plaintiff’s bankruptcy stay. Smith v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 225 Ga. App. 383, 481 S.E.2d 558, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 140 (1997), cert. dismissed, No. S97C1344, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 858 (Ga. Oct. 3, 1997).
of federal offense grounds for disbe used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery autho-State statute affecting area not addressed by federal law.: The enactment of a state statute affecting an area of the law that is not addressed by the federal statute concerning child pornography law (18 U.S.C. § 2251) does not violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Aman v. State, 261 Ga. 669, 409 S.E.2d 645, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 831 (1991). Treaty as to service of process on
foreign corporation.: In action involving sufficiency of service of process on foreign corporation, judicial notice had to be taken of a treaty concerning service abroad, and it predominates over any statutory provision of the State of Georgia. Camp v. Sellers & Co., 158 Ga. App. 646, 281 S.E.2d 621, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2352, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 3003 (1981). Deliberate violations of state law
for federal purposes.: Investigators and prosecutors must be as aware as are the courts of the delicate interface between state and federal law enforcement. Deliberate violations of state law for federal purposes must be the rare exception, and be clearly seen to be reasonable, necessary, and proper. Otherwise, federal officers will have to be abandoned by federal courts as the supremacy clause will not save them. Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18657 (11th Cir. 1982). That a deliberate violation of state law may render federal law enforcement more convenient is insufficient to shield the agent from state prosecution. More is required lest the issue, at least initially, be left to state court resolution. Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18657 (11th Cir. 1982).
Child support guidelines.: O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 is not unconstitutional under the supremacy clause. Ward v. McFall, 277 Ga. 649, 593 S.E.2d 340, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 179, cert. Supreme Law of Land (Cont’d) denied, 543 U.S. 818, 125 S. Ct. 57, 160 L. Ed. 2d 26, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 5647 (2004).
State defenses to civil rights claims.: — Supremacy clause of federal Constitution prevents state court from construing federal rule to permit state immunity defense to claim made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Davis v. City of Roswell, 250 Ga. 8, 295 S.E.2d 317, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1214 (1982). Using state law to interpret federal
act.: Applicability of the general provisions of state contract law to the determination of the “making of an arbitration agreement” did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act and, thus, the supremacy clause. Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 27702 (11th Cir. 1985). Under the supremacy clause, § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act preempts O.C.G.A. § 34-4-6 and thus employee employed under contract requiring arbitration of any claims or disputes cannot bring action under O.C.G.A. § 34-4-6 for unpaid wages. Haluska v. RAF Fin. Corp., 875 F. Supp. 825, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19526 (N.D. Ga. 1994). menting employment reclassification proposal that was flawed and likely to have an adverse racial impact. Williams v. Ledbetter, 685 F. Supp. 247, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4078 (M.D. Ga. 1988). Georgia “anti-takeover” statute enjoyed a presumption of validity under the supremacy and interstate commerce clauses, because it could not be established with the required degree of legal certainty that the statute denied hostile tender offers for Georgia corporations a meaningful opportunity to succeed. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1096, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10807 (N.D. Ga. 1989). Treaty duly entered into is the supreme law of the land. Butler’s Shoe Corp. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 514 F.2d 1283, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 14089 (5th Cir. 1975). Treaty lawfully entered into stands on same footing of supremacy as do the Constitution and laws of the
State is prohibited from imple-United States.: A treaty must be regarded as a part of the law of the state as much as are the state’s own statutes and it may override the power of the state even with respect to the great body of private relations which usually fall within the control of the state. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8151 (N.D. Ga. 1964), aff’d, 386 F.2d 323, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4584 (5th Cir. 1967). Warsaw Convention, as a treaty, constitutes part of the law of this
land, overriding state law and policies.: One is not bound to seek redress in the courts of this country. One may submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign state and, presumably, have one’s rights determined in accordance with the law of that place; but if one institutes action here, the law which the court will apply is that set forth by the convention, even though it be inconsistent with the law of the forum. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8151 (N.D. Ga. 1964), aff’d, 386 F.2d 323, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4584 (5th Cir. 1967). Legislation conflicting with a court
order drawing its authority from U.S.
Const., amend. 14 is unconstitutional.: Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ., 334 F. Supp. 909, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10690 (S.D. Ga. 1971).
Laws or regulations promoting racial discrimination unconstitutional.: — Any law or regulation of a state, county, or municipality requiring or furthering racial discrimination in the public schools violates the federal Constitution. Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ., 334 F. Supp. 909, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10690 (S.D. Ga. 1971). Federal court decisions other than Supreme Court’s not binding on
Georgia appellate courts.: While the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are binding upon the Georgia appellate courts, those of other federal courts are not binding upon the Georgia appellate courts. Security Mgt. Co. v. King, 132 Ga. App. 618, 208 S.E.2d 576, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1768 (1974). Constitutionally obtained evidence in violation of state law admissible in
federal courts.: Wiretap or other evidence obtained without violating the federal Constitution or federal law is admissible in a federal criminal trial even though obtained in violation of state law. United States v. Hayes, 445 F. Supp. 455, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13454 (M.D. Ga. 1977). islatures control over jurisdiction or procedure in courts of the United States. United States v. Hayes, 445 F. Supp. 455, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13454 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
Supremacy clause denies state leg-Applicability of preemption doctrine.: The preemption doctrine may apply: (1) if there is direct conflict between state and federal regulation; (2) if state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress; or (3) if Congress has “occupied the field” in a given area so as to oust all state regulation, whether friendly or hostile. Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Ass’n of Petro. Retailers, 484 F. Supp. 1008, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7715 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff’d, 644 F.2d 1030, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13419 (5th Cir. 1981). The preemption doctrine is a product of the supremacy clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, Cl. 2, which invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law. The preemption argument invokes the Supreme Court of Georgia’s constitutional question jurisdiction under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II (1). RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444, 807 S.E.2d 381, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 930 (2017).
With statutory conflicts, preemption largely a matter of construction.: — If preemption is deemed to occur by virtue of conflict with a federal statute, the extent of preemption is largely a question of statutory construction. Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Ass’n of Petro. Retailers, 484 F. Supp. 1008, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7715 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff’d, 644 F.2d 1030, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13419 (5th Cir. 1981). Preemption may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc., 260 Ga. 850, 412 S.E.2d 526, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 4 (1991). States may not statutorily burden ments federal courts are prohibited from imposing. Ehlers v. City of Decatur, 614 F.2d 54, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 19503 (5th Cir. 1980). Allegations concerning federal
access to federal courts with requirerights insufficient to confer jurisdiction.: Because the federal rights of which plaintiff was allegedly deprived were those arising under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 301 et seq., and the supremacy clause of the Constitution, such allegations were insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Seagraves v. Harris, 629 F.2d 385, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 12811 (5th Cir. 1980). Federal FDA tampon warning label requirements expressly preempted state tampon warning label requirements for toxic shock syndrome, including those that emanated from state tort law. Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc., 260 Ga. 850, 412 S.E.2d 526, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 4 (1991). Supremacy clause does not apply to the regulatory scheme promulgated under the Medicare and Medicaid Acts. See Brogdon v. National Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9014 (N.D. Ga. 2000). Train speed limits are part of federal statutory scheme that explicitly preempts state regulations covering the same subject matter. Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12731 (11th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 2982 (1993). In a wrongful death action that alleged negligence under Georgia law, federal regulations pre-empted the negligence action only insofar as it asserted that the train was traveling at an excessive speed. CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 2982 (1993), superseded by statute as stated in Armijo v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 87 F.3d 1188, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16061 (10th Cir. 1996), superseded by statute as stated in CSX Transp. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, 9 F. Supp. 2d Supreme Law of Land (Cont’d) 1374, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10021 (N.D. Ga. 1998), superseded by statute as stated in Gould v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. EV 96-248-C H/Y, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24106 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 1998) (decided under prior law). But see CSX Transp. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10021 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff’d, 182 F.3d 788, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17042 (11th Cir. 1999). Federal Survivor Benefit Plan (10 U.S.C. § 1447 et seq.) preempted the authority of state law regarding the payment of annuity benefits. King v. King, 225 Ga. App. 298, 483 S.E.2d 379, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 371 (1997). Federal Aviation Safety Noise Abatement Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. § 2106, preempts state law with regard to suits seeking redress for airport noise. City ofAtlanta v. Watson, 267 Ga. 185, 475 S.E.2d 896, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 709 (1996).
Common-law railroad grade crossing liability not affected.: In the absence of a decision by a federally designated policymaker, state common-law liabilities relating to the adequacy of railroad grade crossings are not affected by the federal highway aid provisions of the United States Code. Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12731 (11th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 2982 (1993). Wrongful death claim that the owner and operator of a train was negligent under Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at a crossing was not pre-empted by federal law. CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 2982 (1993), superseded by statute as stated in Armijo v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 87 F.3d 1188, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16061 (10th Cir. 1996), superseded by statute as stated in CSX Transp. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10021 (N.D. Ga. 1998), superseded by statute as stated in Gould v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. EV 96-248-C H/Y, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24106 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 1998) (decided under prior law). But see CSX Transp. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10021 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff’d, 182 F.3d 788, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17042 (11th Cir. 1999). Electric cooperative not exempt
from state and local taxation.: An electric cooperative’s right and privilege to distribute electric power purchased by it from the Tennessee Valley Authority pursuant to contract does not render it an instrumentality of the federal government exempt from state and local taxation. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Calhoun, 264 Ga. 769, 450 S.E.2d 410, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 902 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109, 115 S. Ct. 1960, 131 L. Ed. 2d 852, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3260 (1995). The federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq., preempts O.C.G.A. § 21-5-35, pertaining to the acceptance of campaign contributions during legislative sessions, insofar as applies to candidates for federal office. Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9280 (11th Cir. 1996). Oath of Office Oath provisions of the United States and Georgia Constitutions do not violate U.S. Const., amend. 1; but this requirement does not authorize a majority of state legislators to test the sincerity with which another duly elected legislator can swear to uphold the Constitution. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 87 S. Ct. 339, 17 L. Ed. 2d 235, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 75 (1966).
Supremacy clause of federal Constitution prohibits United States mili-Am. Jur. 2d.: 3B Am. Jur. 2d, Aliens and Citizens, §§ 1766, 1868, 2006, 2012. 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Alternative Dispute Resolution, § 93. 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment, § 457. 9 Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy, § 11. 9A Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy, §§ 1374, 1375. 9B Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy, § 1702. 9D Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy, §§ 3528, 3589. 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 5, 55, 57, 59. 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 219, 226, 379. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 88. 24A Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 815. 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Elections, § 102. 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions and Enforcement of Judgments, § 294. 32 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Courts, §§ 7, 25, 358. 32AAm. Jur. 2d, Federal Courts, § 878. 35 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Tax Enforcement, § 274. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homestead, § 8. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges, § 57. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, § 190. 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Military and Civil Defense, § 92. 53A Am. Jur. 2d, Money, § 89. 59A Am. Jur. 2d, Passports, § 26. 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, §§ 69, 122. 67B Am. Jur. 2d, Sales and Use Taxes, §§ 25, 26, 94, 154. 67B Am. Jur. 2d, Salvage, § 3. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping, §§ 47, 84. 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, §§ 71, 134, 411. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, States, Territories, and Dependencies, § 62. 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Treaties, § 12. 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation, § 178. 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, § 37.
C.J.S.: 2 C.J.S., Admiralty, § 14. 3 C.J.S., Aliens, § 155. 3A C.J.S., Aliens, § 1184. 8A C.J.S., Bankruptcy, § 3. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 9. 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §§ 716, 909. 18 C.J.S., Convicts, § 10. 27A C.J.S., Divorce, § 11. 28 C.J.S., Drugs and Narcotics, § 212. 33 C.J.S., Exchanges, § 42. 36 C.J.S., Federal Courts, § 134. 72A C.J.S., Products Liability, §§ 44, 52. 81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, § 210. 81A C.J.S., States, § 33 et seq. 85 C.J.S., Taxation, § 2071. 87 C.J.S., Treaties, § 1. 91 C.J.S., United States, § 28.
ALR.: Relation of treaty to state and Federal law, 4 A.L.R. 1377; 134 A.L.R. 882. Conflict between federal and state statutes of limitations, 82 A.L.R. 808. Power of state or municipality to impose license fee or tax upon safe-deposit vaults maintained by national bank, 115 A.L.R. 684. Jurisdiction of state court to enforce or control performance by federal officer or employee of duties imposed upon him by a federal statute, 138 A.L.R. 1200. Effect of unreasonableness, or variance from constitutional, charter, or statutory provision, of penalty prescribed by ordinance, 138 A.L.R. 1208. Validity of ordinance relating to usury or interest rates as affected by variations from statutory provisions, 138 A.L.R. 1492. Duty of state courts to follow decisions of federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, on federal questions, 147 A.L.R. 857. Enforceability of federal penal statutes in state courts, 162 A.L.R. 373; 172 A.L.R. 231. Federal court’s adoption of state period of limitation, in action to enforce federally created right, as including related or subsidiary state laws or rules as to limitations, 90 A.L.R.2d 265. Constitutionality of statutory provision requiring reimbursement of public by child for financial assistance to aged parents, 75 A.L.R.3d 1159. Validity, construction, and application of state statutory provisions limiting amount of recovery in medical malpractice claims, 26 A.L.R.5th 245. Application of state and local construction and building regulations to contractors engaged in construction projects for the federal government, 131 A.L.R. Fed. 583.

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