--- title: U.S. Const. Art. VI. Debts, Supremacy, Oath collection: code id: us-const:art-vi cite_as: U.S. Const. Art. VI canonical_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-vi md_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-vi.md text_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-vi/text source_url: https://www.legis.ga.gov/api/document/docs/default-source/joint-features-document-library/1us-const-(v1)-2025-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=328b75b8_0#page=171 date: 2025 status: active corpus_version: 2025-supplement-89aa39ab3c68 license: CC0-1.0 publisher: Georgia Commons, an independent project of Georgia Civic Data. Not the State of Georgia. Not legal advice. up: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/index.md previous: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-v.md next: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-vii.md index: https://georgiacommons.org/code/index.md omitted: notes omitted_chars: 19552 omitted_url: https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-vi.md?notes=all&start=10183 version: the only printed version in_force: true heading_path: Debts, Supremacy, Oath --- # U.S. Const. Art. VI. Debts, Supremacy, Oath A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that. All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States. ## Cross References Oaths of elected executive officers, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. V, § III, Para. II. and Title 45, Chapter 3, Art. 1. Taking of oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Georgia, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. IV, Para. II (members of General Assembly); Art. V, Sec. I, Para. VI and 45-12-4 (Governor and Lieutenant Governor); §§ 15-2-3, 15-3-5, 15-5A-8, 15-6-6, 15-9-2.1, 15-9-6, 15-10-3, 15-10-222 (judges); 15-2-40, 15-6-51, 15-6-58, 15-6-59, 15-8-5, 15-9-36, 15-10-3 (clerks). Oaths of public officials and public employees, Title 45, Chapter 3, Art. 1. ## Editor's Notes U.S. Const., amend. 14, sec. III, disqualifies from office those persons who fail to honor the oath required by clause 3 of this article. ## Law Reviews For comment criticizing Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1950), holding suspending California Alien Land Law as discriminatory in violation of United States Treaty, see 2 Mercer L. Rev. 276 (1950). For comment on Commonwealth of Pa. v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S. Ct. 477, 100 L. Ed. 640 (1956), holding that the Federal Alien Registration Act (Smith Act), 54 Statute 670, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2835, superseded the enforceability of Pennsylvania Sedition Act, see 19 Ga. B.J. 100 (1956). For comment concerning state taxation of federal property in light of Offutt Hous. Co. v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253, 76 S. Ct. 814, 100 L. Ed. 1151 (1956), see 19 Ga. B.J. 247 (1956). For article, “Interposition, Nullification and the Delicate Division of Power in a Federal System,” see 5 J. of Pub. L. 2 (1956). For article, “The Law of the Land,” focusing on the role of the Supreme Court, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 444 (1957). For comment on Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1957), and Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 76 S. Ct. 886, 100 L. Ed. 1342 (1956), as to military authority overseas over dependents of servicemen, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 540 (1957). For article criticizing statutory interpretation of Federal Power Act extending federal authority through the commerce clause, and proposing a balancing of interests test to protect state jurisdiction over production and gathering of natural gas and electricity when they are local activities, see 10 Mercer L. Rev. 226 (1959). For article, “The Subject-Matter Limitation Upon the Treaty-Making Power,” see 11 J. of Pub. L. 122 (1962). For note discussing habeas corpus as a means of exerting control by the central government in protecting the constitutional rights of criminal defendants and the ramifications for federalism, see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 281 (1964). For article, “Consolidation by Compact: A Remedy for Preemption of State Food and Drug Laws,” see 14 J. of Pub. L. 276 (1965). For note, “The State Action Doctrine and State Antitrust Laws — Thirty-five Years of Struggle,” see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 1039 (1969). For comment on United States v. Barash, 428 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1970), as to the constitutionality under the principle of double jeopardy, of increasing severity of punishment on retrial following successful appeal, see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 194 (1971). For comment on Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081 (D.D.C. 1970), as to religious regulations at military academies, see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 400 (1971). For article, “The Treaty Power and Family Law,” see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 55 (1972). For article, “The Role and Impact of the Supreme Court and Judicial Decision-Making in the Evolution of American Federalism,” see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 457 (1972). For article discussing the “void from inception” doctrine as applied to statutory law in Georgia, see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 101 (1973). For note discussing the doctrine of federal preemption in the allocation of powers between the nation and the states, see 22 J. of Pub. L. 391 (1973). For note, “Oil Spills — State Prevention and the Possibility of Pre-emption,” see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 559 (1973). For article discussing the constitutional parameters of state efforts to stimulate international trade, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 391 (1976). For article suggesting federal preemption implications of state attempts to regulate foreign investment in domestic corporations, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 615 (1976). For comment discussing federal immunity from state taxation, in light of United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 97 S. Ct. 699, 50 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977), see 26 Emory L.J. 709 (1977). For article discussing the interrelationship between state and federal authority in regulating scientific and technological expansion, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 785 (1977). For article discussing theoretical problems raised by constitutional adjudication and judicial supremacy in the United States, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 1069 (1977). For article, “The Georgia Bill of Rights: Dead or Alive?,” see 34 Emory L.J. 341 (1985). For article, “Separation of Political Powers: Boundaries or Balance?,” see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 171 (1986). For article, “State Taxation of Interstate Banking,” see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 283 (1986). For article, “Georgia and the Development of Constitutional Principles: An Essay in Honor of the Bicentennial,” see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1987). For article, “Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis of State Law,” see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 667 (1988). For article, “Georgia’s Current Antita-keover Law: A Look at Management’s New Shield,” see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 176 (1988). For article, “Children, Poverty and State Constitutions,” see 38 Emory L.J. 577 (1989). For note, “Overcoming Tobacco Company Immunity: Cipollone Clears an Uncertain Path,” see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 253 (1992). For note, “Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Claims: Adding Clarity and Respect for State Sovereignty to the Analysis of Federal Preemption Defenses,” see 36 Ga. L. Rev. 797 (2002). For comment, “Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland: Reaffirming Ex Parte Young and the Necessity of Finding Regulatory Hand-Back Schemes to a Gift or Gratuity,” see 52 Emory L.J. 1519 (2003). For annual survey on product liability, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2012). For article, “Conflict of Laws Structure and Vision: Updating a Venerable Discipline,” see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015). For note, “State Drone Laws: A Legitimate Answer to State Concerns or a Violation of Federal Sovereignty,” see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 377 (2015). For article, “Faithful Parents: Choice of Childcare Parentage Laws,” see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 325 (2019). ## Inconsistent State Law. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution dictates that federal law preempts inconsistent state law. Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc., 260 Ga. 850, 412 S.E.2d 526, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 4 (1991). Direct conflict between state law and federal constitutional provisions raises question under supremacy clause of broader scope than where the alleged conflict is only between a state statute and a federal statute that might be resolved by the construction given either the state or the federal law. United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 371 U.S. 285, 83 S. Ct. 397, 9 L. Ed. 2d 317, 1963 U.S. LEXIS 2404 (1963). State policy opposed to federal policy must give way. A state is without power to provide the conditions on which the federal government will effectuate its policies. United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 371 U.S. 285, 83 S. Ct. 397, 9 L. Ed. 2d 317, 1963 U.S. LEXIS 2404 (1963). Regulations promulgated by federal agencies under a statutory authorization have the force of federal law and can preempt conflicting state law. Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F. Supp. 1135, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17112 (S.D. Ga. 1990). Motorist’s tort claim, alleging that a tractor-trailer was defective because it did not have adequate reflective materials along its side, was preempted by federal regulations promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F. Supp. 1135, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17112 (S.D. Ga. 1990). empted by Liability Risk Retention ## Georgia’s Direct Action Statutes pre-Act. Liability Risk Retention Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3901, et seq., preempted Georgia’s motor carrier and insurance carrier direct action statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-112(c) and 40-2-140(d)(4), in regard to a risk retention group that was not chartered in Georgia, thus precluding injured passengers from bringing a direct action against the risk retention group. The court rejected the passengers’ contention that the statutes were financial responsibility laws and not preempted under 15 U.S.C. § 3905. Reis v. OOIDA Risk Retention Group, Inc., 303 Ga. 659, 814 S.E.2d 338, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 294 (2018). tutional issue is a constitutional rule binding upon the states. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S. Ct. 639, 17 L. Ed. 2d 593, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2451 (1967). Application of supremacy clause ancing of, state and local action against federal policy. DeKalb County v. Henry C. Beck Co., 382 F.2d 992, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5106 (5th Cir. 1967). ## Supreme Court Ruling on a Constirequires Determination Of, and bal-United States Supreme Court Decisions Construing Federal Statute Binding on State Supreme Court. The Bankruptcy Act being a federal statute, decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing and applying it are binding upon the state Supreme Court as precedents. Branch v. Human, 215 Ga. 209, 109 S.E.2d 732, 1959 Ga. LEXIS 437 (1959). Limitation on state power of direct ## Taxation. In the field of direct taxation, the power of the sovereign state is supreme, except when the exercise of that supreme right brings it into collision with the operation of a government instrumentality necessary to the existence of the federal government and to the exercise of its powers upon a subject as to which exclusive jurisdiction was delegated to Congress in the Constitution of 1789. City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 175 Ga. 201, 165 S.E. 270, 1932 Ga. LEXIS 224 (1932). State courts cannot award federal ## Tax Exemption. Georgia state courts do not have the authority to award the federal income tax dependency exemption to a noncustodial parent. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 261 Ga. 11, 401 S.E.2d 714, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 132 (1991). > The printed notes continue for 19,552 more characters, not shown here. Continue at https://georgiacommons.org/constitution/us/art-vi.md?notes=all&start=10183