Sharpe v. State

David Lee Sharpe was involved in a fight and gunfight outside an Emanuel County nightclub that left Devonte Coney dead from a gunshot. A jury convicted Sharpe of felony murder, theft by receiving stolen property, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, though it acquitted him of malice murder. Sharpe appealed, arguing his trial lawyer was constitutionally ineffective for not objecting to a GBI agent's testimony about surveillance video and for not asking the judge to poll the jury after a juror said she felt pressured into her verdict. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected both ineffective-assistance arguments, finding the lawyer's choices were reasonable trial strategy and that Georgia law bars using juror testimony about internal deliberations to challenge a verdict. But the court found the evidence did not show Sharpe knew or should have known the gun was stolen, so it reversed only that theft conviction while affirming the rest.

The court held that trial counsel's decisions not to object to the GBI agent's video testimony and not to request a jury poll were reasonable trial strategy, not deficient performance, but that the evidence was legally insufficient to show Sharpe knew or should have known the firearm was stolen.

The ruling reinforces that Georgia jurors generally cannot testify about pressure or arguments during deliberations to undo a verdict, and it clarifies that prosecutors must show a defendant knew a gun was stolen, not just that he possessed it, to sustain a theft-by-receiving conviction.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part

1. The court applied the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard from Jackson v. Virginia, which asks whether a rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and found the evidence supported the felony murder and firearm possession convictions but not the theft charge, since nothing showed Sharpe knew or should have known the gun was stolen.
2. Under the two-part Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, Sharpe had to show his lawyer's performance was unreasonable and that it likely changed the trial's outcome; the court found trial counsel's choice not to object to the GBI agent's video testimony was a deliberate strategy to support a self-defense theory, and such tactical choices are not deficient unless no competent lawyer would have made them.
3. The court noted Georgia's near-total bar on using juror testimony about what happened during deliberations (O.C.G.A. § 24-6-606(b)) meant it could not consider a juror's later claims that she felt pressured or cursed at while deciding the verdict.
4. Because there was no evidence trial counsel had reason to suspect the verdict was coerced at the time it was returned, and Georgia courts have consistently rejected ineffective-assistance claims based solely on a failure to poll the jury, the court found no deficient performance on that ground either.

• felony murder conviction
• ineffective assistance of counsel
• theft by receiving stolen property
• jury polling
• GBI agent testimony