Nelson v. Wilkey

Morocco Jacobi Wilkey changed his plea to guilty midway through his methamphetamine trial. Thirteen days later, at his sentencing hearing, his lawyer revealed she had just learned that a co-defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant for selling methamphetamine, information that could have helped Wilkey's defense. She told the judge Wilkey had 30 days after sentencing to withdraw his plea, but Georgia law actually gave him an absolute right to withdraw it for any reason only up until sentencing was pronounced, a right his lawyer never explained to him. After his later motion to withdraw was rejected as filed too late, Wilkey sought habeas corpus relief, a legal challenge to the validity of his imprisonment. A Clayton County habeas court set aside his conviction, finding his lawyer's failure to advise him of his pre-sentencing right was ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed, affirming that the habeas court's factual findings were supported by the record and that Wilkey was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.

The court held that a defense lawyer provides constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to tell a client about his absolute statutory right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, particularly after learning new information that would materially change her advice, and that this deficiency prejudiced Wilkey because he would have withdrawn his plea and continued trial had he known.

The ruling reminds Georgia defense lawyers that clients must be told about their absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, especially when new evidence surfaces. Defendants who weren't so advised may have grounds to challenge their convictions through habeas corpus.

Affirmed

1. The court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington for ineffective assistance claims, requiring proof that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant's case.
2. The court found no reasonable attorney would let sentencing proceed without first advising a client of his absolute right under Georgia's plea-withdrawal statute (O.C.G.A. § 17-7-93(b)) to withdraw a guilty plea for any reason before sentencing, especially after learning new evidence that could change her advice.
3. Because sentencing was pronounced without that advice, Wilkey lost his unconditional right to withdraw his plea and was left with only the much harder post-sentencing 'manifest injustice' standard, showing the deficiency had real legal consequences.
4. The court deferred to the habeas court's credibility finding that Wilkey did not know of his right to withdraw before sentencing and acted immediately once he believed he could withdraw, concluding this supported a finding of prejudice.
5. The court rejected the Warden's argument that Wilkey needed a constitutional right to withdraw his plea itself, clarifying that the constitutional violation was the denial of effective counsel, not the absence of a constitutional plea-withdrawal right.

• ineffective assistance of counsel
• guilty plea withdrawal
• habeas corpus relief
• methamphetamine conviction
• Sixth Amendment