DALY v. BERRYHILL

Shane Berryhill had emergency heart surgery, including a stent placement, performed by Dr. Dale Daly. Five days later, against instructions not to engage in strenuous activity or lift more than ten pounds, Berryhill went hunting, carried a rifle weighing more than nine pounds, and climbed an eighteen-foot deer stand, where he fainted and fell, breaking several vertebrae. He and his wife sued Dr. Daly and his practice, Savannah Cardiology, claiming Daly prescribed too much blood pressure medication and caused the fainting spell. At trial, the judge told the jury it could find that Berryhill assumed the risk of his own injury, and the jury sided with the doctor. The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, saying there was no evidence Berryhill specifically knew fainting was a risk. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed, holding that Berryhill's knowledge of his major surgery and the instructions to avoid strenuous activity was enough evidence for the jury to consider whether he knowingly took an obvious cardiovascular risk, even without knowing fainting specifically was possible.

A jury instruction on assumption of the risk was proper because a competent adult who knowingly disregards explicit post-surgical instructions against strenuous activity cannot claim ignorance of the obvious cardiovascular danger, even without being told fainting specifically was a possible outcome.

The ruling clarifies that Georgia patients who ignore clear post-surgical instructions can have a jury weigh whether they assumed the risk of harm, even without being told the exact way the harm might occur. This affects how medical malpractice cases are tried and defended across the state.

Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed

1. The court explained that only 'slight evidence' supporting a legal theory is needed to justify giving a jury instruction, meaning even a small amount of evidence from which a jury could draw an inference is enough to let the jury decide the issue.
2. To prove assumption of the risk, a defense that says a plaintiff cannot recover if he knowingly and voluntarily took on an obvious danger, the defendant must show the plaintiff actually knew of the danger, understood the risk, and voluntarily exposed himself to it.
3. The court noted that this knowledge requirement uses an objective common-sense standard: for certain obvious dangers, like drowning in water or alligator attacks near a lagoon, courts treat a competent adult as knowing the risk even without being warned of every specific way harm could occur.
4. Applying that reasoning, the court found evidence that Berryhill knew he had just undergone major heart surgery and had been told not to engage in strenuous activity, lift heavy objects, or bend for about a week, which was enough for a jury to conclude he was aware of an obvious cardiovascular danger even though no one specifically warned him about fainting.
5. Because the jury, not the appellate court, is responsible for weighing conflicting evidence, the existence of any slight evidence supporting the instruction meant the trial court was right to give it, regardless of whether contrary evidence might have persuaded a different result.

• assumption of risk
• medical malpractice
• jury instructions
• heart surgery
• deer hunting accident