JACKSON v. RAFFENSPERGER

Mary Jackson and her nonprofit ROSE help mothers with breastfeeding using a private credential called Certified Lactation Counselor, but Georgia's Lactation Consultant Practice Act only lets people with a different, harder-to-get credential called IBCLC obtain a state license to work for pay. Jackson and ROSE sued the Secretary of State, arguing this violates their rights to due process and equal protection under the Georgia Constitution. A Fulton County trial court dismissed the case, ruling Georgia's constitution does not protect a right to work in one's chosen profession and that the two types of lactation consultants were not similarly situated. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed on both points. It found decades of its own precedent recognizing a constitutional right to pursue a lawful occupation free from unreasonable government interference, and it found that the complaint's allegations that both types of consultants do the same work and are equally competent were enough to plausibly claim they are similarly situated. The court sent the case back to the trial court to reconsider the dismissal motion.

The Georgia Constitution's Due Process Clause protects a right to pursue a lawful occupation free from unreasonable government interference, and the complaint's allegations that differently credentialed lactation consultants perform the same work and are equally competent were sufficient to allege they are similarly situated for equal protection purposes.

The ruling affects hundreds of Georgia lactation consultants who lack the IBCLC credential, particularly those serving rural and minority communities, by keeping alive their challenge to a law that could bar them from working for pay, while also reaffirming a broader constitutional protection for occupational freedom that could matter in future licensing disputes.

Reversed and remanded with direction

1. The court reviewed the dismissal under the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6)), which requires courts to accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true at this early stage.
2. Looking to its own precedent, including cases striking down licensing requirements for photographers, plumbers, and electricians, the court found a long-standing rule that the Georgia Constitution's Due Process Clause protects a person's right to work in a lawful occupation of their choosing unless the government has a reasonable basis for interfering.
3. The court rejected the trial court's reliance on a Court of Appeals case, Brown v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, which claimed there is no constitutional right to practice a healthcare profession, finding that the cases Brown relied on did not actually support that broad statement, and it disapproved of Brown on that point.
4. Turning to the equal protection claim, which requires showing the state treated similarly situated people differently, the court noted its past cases treating people who perform the same work as similarly situated even when their specific job conditions differ.
5. Because the complaint alleged that lactation consultants with different private credentials perform the same lactation care work and are equally competent, the court held these allegations were enough to plausibly claim the two groups are similarly situated, so the case could not be dismissed on that basis.

• lactation consultant licensing
• occupational freedom
• due process
• equal protection
• Georgia Secretary of State