CL SNF, LLC v. FOUNTAIN

Minnie Fountain was the court-appointed guardian for her adult nephew, Leroy Wiggins. When Wiggins was admitted to a skilled nursing facility run by CL SNF, LLC and related companies (called Clinch here), Fountain signed both an admission agreement and a separate arbitration agreement covering future disputes about his care. After Wiggins was allegedly sexually assaulted by another resident, Fountain sued Clinch, which asked the court to send the case to arbitration instead of trial. The trial court and the Court of Appeals of Georgia both refused to enforce the arbitration agreement, with the Court of Appeals ruling that neither Fountain's letters of guardianship nor Georgia's guardianship statutes gave her the power to sign away Wiggins's right to sue in court before any dispute existed. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed. It held that Georgia's guardianship statutes give a guardian broad power to do what is reasonably necessary for a ward's care, and that signing a pre-dispute arbitration agreement as part of arranging nursing home care can fall within that power. The court reversed and sent the case back for further proceedings.

The court held that Georgia's guardianship statutes (O.C.G.A. § 29-4-22 and § 29-4-23) grant a guardian the power to enter into a binding pre-dispute arbitration agreement on a ward's behalf when exercising that power is reasonably necessary to adequately provide for the ward's support, care, health, and welfare.

The ruling affects families who serve as guardians for incapacitated relatives and the nursing homes and care facilities that ask guardians to sign admission paperwork. It clarifies that arbitration clauses guardians sign when arranging care can be enforceable, potentially steering future injury and abuse claims against care facilities away from jury trials and into arbitration.

Reversed and remanded

1. The court examined the letters of guardianship, which made Fountain responsible for Wiggins's care but said her authority was subject to 'applicable statutes,' so the court turned to Georgia's Guardianship Code to see what those statutes allow.
2. Under O.C.G.A. § 29-4-22, a guardian must make decisions about the ward's support, care, education, health, and welfare and must act as a fiduciary, meaning she must act in the ward's best interest with reasonable care and loyalty, and under O.C.G.A. § 29-4-23(a)(4) a guardian may exercise 'other powers reasonably necessary' to provide for those needs.
3. The court found that the Guardianship Code does not directly address pre-dispute arbitration agreements, but it does let a guardian use alternative dispute resolution when bringing claims, though this alone does not automatically imply the power to sign an arbitration agreement before any dispute arises.
4. The court reasoned that if guardians could later disavow contract terms found not strictly necessary, care providers and guardians would face impossible uncertainty every time they negotiated admission agreements, so the power to weigh and accept such terms, including arbitration clauses, must be part of arranging care.
5. Because a guardian, like a competent adult, could reasonably decide that agreeing to arbitration serves a ward's interests, the court concluded that entering a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in connection with securing nursing home care is a power 'reasonably necessary' under the statute.
6. The court rejected Fountain's argument that the specific alternative-dispute-resolution provision blocks reliance on the general 'reasonably necessary' power, finding no conflict between the two provisions because the specific provision simply says nothing about pre-dispute agreements.

• nursing home arbitration
• guardian authority
• adult ward care
• arbitration agreements
• sexual assault lawsuit