Kinslow v. State

Jereno Kinslow worked in the IT department for the City of Norcross. After clashing with his new supervisor, Greg Cothran, Kinslow secretly altered the city's computer network so that copies of Cothran's incoming emails were also sent to Kinslow's personal email account. This continued even after Kinslow was fired, until the city discovered it. A jury convicted him of computer trespass, and the Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court of Georgia had to decide whether copying and forwarding someone else's emails, without blocking or slowing them down, amounts to 'obstructing, interrupting, or interfering with the use of data' under Georgia's computer trespass law. The court concluded that because Cothran still received his emails without delay, Kinslow's conduct did not meet the narrow legal meaning of those words, so the evidence could not support the conviction. Three Justices disagreed and would have upheld the conviction.

OCGA § 16-9-93 (b) (2)'s prohibition on 'interfering' with data requires proof that the defendant's conduct hindered or disrupted the normal flow or use of the data, not merely that he accessed or copied it without permission; because Cothran's emails still reached him without delay, the evidence was insufficient to convict Kinslow.

The ruling narrows what counts as criminal 'interference' under Georgia's computer trespass statute, meaning copying or duplicating data without disrupting its normal delivery may not be enough for a conviction. Prosecutors, employers, and IT workers across Georgia now have clearer boundaries for what unauthorized network activity is actually a crime.

Judgment reversed

1. The court applied the Jackson v. Virginia standard, which asks whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Because the State's argument relied only on the word 'interfering' (having waived reliance on the 'computer program' language and effectively on 'interrupting'), the court had to define that single word as used in the statute.
3. Using dictionaries from around the time the statute was written and the legal canon of noscitur a sociis (that a word takes meaning from the words grouped with it), the court read 'interfering' to require the same kind of disruption as its neighboring words 'obstructing' and 'interrupting', meaning hindering the use of data rather than simply meddling with it.
4. Applying the related canon of ejusdem generis (that a general closing term in a list should be read as similar in kind to the specific terms before it) and the rule against treating statutory language as meaningless surplusage, the court concluded a broader reading would make 'obstructing' and 'interrupting' pointless.
5. Measured against that narrower definition, the evidence showed only that Kinslow created an extra copy of Cothran's emails without ever blocking, slowing, or otherwise hindering Cothran's own receipt of them, so no rational jury could find he 'interfered' with the use of the data as the statute requires.

• computer trespass conviction
• email forwarding
• Norcross city employee
• OCGA 16-9-93
• evidence sufficiency