Kessler v. State

Dana Michael Kessler was convicted by a Muscogee County jury of felony murder and related charges after he shot and killed Jeffrey Morgan, Jr. during an attempted robbery of a marijuana deal. Kessler had confessed to police during a recorded interview, and at trial he testified he shot Morgan accidentally during a gun sale. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, Kessler argued his confession should have been suppressed because detectives improperly promised him a benefit for confessing, that the trial judge should have granted a mistrial after the prosecutor made improper comments about sentencing during closing argument, and that a jury instruction on the definition of a crime was wrong. He also argued these errors combined entitled him to a new trial. The court rejected each argument and affirmed his convictions and sentence.

The court held that Kessler's confession was not induced by any improper hope of benefit because he denied thinking his statement would reduce his sentence and confessed only after a lengthy delay, and that the trial judge properly corrected the prosecutor's improper sentencing remarks through jury instructions rather than a mistrial, and that the jury instruction on the definition of a crime was legally accurate.

The ruling reinforces that a confession is only excluded when police promises actually caused the confession, not merely because improper statements were made. It also shows that judges can correct prosecutors' improper sentencing remarks with instructions rather than always declaring a mistrial.

Affirmed

1. The court applied the rule that a confession is only inadmissible under Georgia's confession statute (O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824) if police promises of leniency actually caused the defendant to confess, not merely if improper promises were made.
2. Because Kessler testified he did not believe his statement would lead to a reduced sentence, and he did not confess until about 20 minutes after the last allegedly improper statement by detectives, the court found no causal link between any promises and his confession.
3. On the mistrial claim, the court noted Kessler only properly preserved his first objection to the prosecutor's closing argument remarks about sentencing, since he did not move for a mistrial after his second objection and did not join his co-defendant's later objection.
4. Applying the rule that a mistrial is required only when necessary to preserve a fair trial, the court found the trial judge's repeated instructions telling the jury that sentencing was solely the court's responsibility, along with the presumption that jurors follow instructions, cured any potential confusion from the prosecutor's remarks.
5. On the jury instruction claim, the court found the trial judge's definition of a 'crime,' which referenced criminal negligence, matched the wording of Georgia's own criminal negligence statute (O.C.G.A. § 16-2-1) and was reinforced by other accurate instructions on intent and the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter, so it was not erroneous.
6. Because none of Kessler's individual claims were found to be errors, the court declined to find cumulative error, since Georgia law only aggregates the effects of actual errors, not claims that were rejected.

• felony murder conviction
• confession suppression
• hope of benefit
• prosecutorial closing argument
• jury instructions