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Supreme Court of Georgia · criminal appeal

Champ v. State

Filed February 15, 2021 · Docket S20A1552 · 854 S.E.2d 706

The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a Ben Hill County man's murder conviction but sent the case back to the trial court to hold a hearing on his claim that he was unconstitutionally excluded from bench conferences during jury selection.

In plain language

Dekito Champ was convicted of murder for shooting his former girlfriend, Jana Watson, at his family's home in Fitzgerald, Georgia after she came to pick up a dog they had shared. At trial, prospective jurors were repeatedly called to the judge's bench to discuss excusing them, but Champ, though sitting in the courtroom, could not hear those conversations. He never objected during trial or in his motion for new trial. Only once he had new lawyers on appeal did he argue that being kept out of earshot at these bench conferences violated his right under the Georgia Constitution to be present at his own trial. The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed the evidence supported his conviction and affirmed that part of the case. But because this claim was raised for the first time on appeal, the trial court never got a chance to gather evidence or decide whether Champ effectively went along with (acquiesced to) his absence. The court sent the case back for a hearing on that specific question.

What the court decided

The court held that Champ's constitutional right to be present was implicated by several bench conferences he could not hear, but because he raised this claim for the first time on appeal, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether he acquiesced to those absences before any relief can be granted.

Why it matters

The ruling sets a procedural rule for future Georgia criminal appeals: when a defendant raises a right-to-be-present claim for the first time on appeal, trial courts must hold a hearing to develop facts about acquiescence rather than have appellate courts guess, affecting how such claims are litigated statewide.

Outcome

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with direction

How the court got there

  1. The court first applied the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, asking only whether a rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and concluded the eyewitness accounts, forensic evidence, and suicide note were enough to support the murder conviction.
  2. The court then explained that the Georgia Constitution gives criminal defendants the right to be present at all critical stages of trial, including bench conferences at which a prospective juror is discussed and removed, even though the defendant may see but not hear those conferences.
  3. Because several of the bench conferences here involved direct questioning of prospective jurors and decisions to remove them, the court found Champ had a constitutional right to participate, a point the State itself conceded on appeal.
  4. The court explained that this right can be given up (relinquished) only if the defendant personally waives it, his lawyer waives it with his express permission or in his presence, or the defendant later acquiesces, meaning he stays silent after learning enough about what happened to fairly be treated as consenting.
  5. Because Champ raised this claim for the first time on appeal, the trial court never held a hearing or made findings on whether he knew enough about the bench conferences to have acquiesced, so the existing trial record alone could not resolve the question.
  6. The court concluded that fairness to both sides, and concern about defense lawyers gaming the system by staying silent until appeal, required sending the case back so the trial court can gather evidence and decide the acquiescence question first.

From the opinion

the Georgia Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'the right to be present, and see and hear, all the proceedings which are had against him on [his] trial before the [c]ourt.'

Nahmias · States the core constitutional right at the heart of Champ's appeal.

We analyze whether a defendant has waived his right to be present precisely because we cannot assume that he acquiesced, so it would be counterproductive to assume that counsel facilitated a defendant's acquiescence.

McMillian · McMillian's disagreement with the majority's assumption about defense counsel's typical conduct.

Topics

  • murder conviction
  • right to be present
  • jury selection
  • bench conferences
  • acquiescence

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