Jordan v. State

Travis Jordan was on trial for murder in Treutlen County when, midway through his trial, he agreed to plead guilty to felony murder in exchange for the other charges being dropped and his sentence left to the judge. Before he was sentenced, Jordan changed his mind and asked to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial judge refused, reasoning that because Jordan was charged with a capital crime like murder, he had no right to withdraw the plea, and that he had waived any such right anyway. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed on both points. It explained that the exception for capital cases only applies when the State actually seeks the death penalty and extra proceedings are needed afterward to decide on that punishment, which did not happen here. It also found nothing in the record showing Jordan was ever told he had a right to withdraw his plea or that he was giving it up. Because Georgia law gives defendants an automatic right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing unless they knowingly waive it, and no valid waiver occurred here, the court reversed and sent the case back.

A defendant charged with a capital crime like murder retains the absolute right under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-93(b) to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing unless the State actually seeks the death penalty, and that right can only be waived if the record shows the defendant was informed of the specific right and knowingly gave it up.

The ruling clarifies that Georgia defendants keep an automatic right to undo a guilty plea before sentencing even in murder cases, unless prosecutors seek the death penalty. Trial courts and prosecutors must now clearly explain and document that right on the record, or risk having plea deals unravel later.

Judgment reversed

1. The court explained that Georgia's plea-withdrawal statute (O.C.G.A. § 17-7-93(b)) gives defendants an absolute right to take back a guilty plea any time before the judge formally announces the sentence, a right that ends once sentencing occurs.
2. The court identified a narrow exception from an earlier case, Fair v. State, which removes that right only when the State is actually seeking the death penalty, because death penalty cases require an extra proceeding after the plea to prove an aggravating circumstance before sentencing.
3. Applying that exception here, the court found it did not apply because the prosecutor never sought the death penalty against Jordan, so no extra post-plea proceeding was required and his plea alone triggered a normal sentencing.
4. The court then considered whether Jordan gave up (waived) his right to withdraw, explaining that a waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and the State bears the burden of proving that on appeal by pointing to something in the record showing the defendant was actually told about the specific right.
5. Reviewing the plea hearing transcript, the court found the trial judge only told Jordan he could not ask for another jury trial after sentencing, which is different from telling him he was giving up his separate right to withdraw the plea before sentencing, so no valid waiver was shown.
6. Because the record contained no evidence that Jordan was informed of or knowingly waived his right to withdraw, the court concluded the trial judge wrongly denied his motion and reversed the case.

• guilty plea withdrawal
• felony murder
• capital case exception
• plea waiver
• Treutlen County