Smith v. State

Danyel Smith was convicted in 2003 of killing his two-month-old son, Chandler, based largely on medical testimony that the baby's injuries were caused by violent shaking, a diagnosis known as shaken baby syndrome. Nineteen years later, Smith filed an extraordinary motion for a new trial, backed by a new medical expert who said that current science, developed after his trial, shows Chandler's injuries actually came from birth complications, prior seizures, dehydration from a long car ride, and vaccinations, not abuse. A Gwinnett County judge denied the motion without ever holding a hearing, reasoning that expert opinion could never count as newly discovered evidence and that Smith had not shown the evidence was truly new or that he acted diligently. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed, holding that expert opinions can support such a motion when they relate to new facts, and that Smith's filings raised enough factual questions that he deserved a chance to prove his claims at an evidentiary hearing.

An extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence can rest on expert opinion testimony, so long as that opinion relates to new and material facts; because Smith's filings plausibly alleged such new facts and adequate diligence, the trial court had to hold a hearing before rejecting the motion.

The decision affects anyone convicted based on medical testimony that later scientific developments call into question, especially in shaken baby syndrome cases. It clarifies that Georgia trial courts cannot summarily reject new expert opinions without a hearing when a defendant makes specific factual claims about changed science.

Vacated and remanded with direction for an evidentiary hearing

1. The court explained that under Georgia's extraordinary motion statute (O.C.G.A. § 5-5-23), a defendant seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must show, among other things, that the evidence was unknown at trial despite due diligence, is material enough to likely change the verdict, and is not merely cumulative or used only to attack a witness's credibility.
2. The court held that this statute does not exclude expert opinion testimony from counting as newly discovered evidence, because the law only requires that the evidence relate to new and material facts, not that the evidence itself be a raw fact; prior cases rejecting expert opinions did so because those opinions were merely impeaching or cumulative, not because expert opinions are automatically barred.
3. Applying that rule, the court found that Dr. Ghatan's affidavit, which described medical understanding of infant brain injuries that developed only after Smith's 2003 trial, plausibly relied on new facts about birth trauma, vaccination risks, and diagnostic techniques that did not exist or were not accepted at the time of trial.
4. Because Smith's filings, if proven true at a hearing, could satisfy the requirements that the evidence was unknown at trial, discovered through due diligence, and material enough to affect the verdict, the trial court could not resolve those factual disputes on the papers alone and instead had to hold an evidentiary hearing.
5. The court concluded that granting a hearing does not guarantee Smith a new trial; he still must prove each requirement at that hearing, but the trial court's decision to deny relief entirely without any hearing was legally incorrect.

• shaken baby syndrome
• extraordinary motion for new trial
• newly discovered evidence
• murder conviction
• expert testimony