State v. Powell

A 15-year-old girl, Paris Powell, was interviewed by a Henry County detective three times after a shooting that killed Larry Bryant. Her mother was present each time. During the third interview, after the mother asked whether they needed a lawyer, the detective told the mother it was her decision, effectively suggesting only the mother, not the teenager, could invoke the right to counsel. The teenager then made incriminating statements. A Henry Superior Court judge ruled her first two interviews were voluntary but suppressed everything she said and wrote after that exchange in the third interview. The State appealed, arguing the judge wrongly applied a legal test meant for in-custody juvenile statements. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed, holding that the test can also apply to non-custodial due process voluntariness questions, and found the trial judge's factual findings were supported by the record. The court affirmed the suppression, though one Justice dissented, arguing the trial court used the wrong legal framework entirely.

The court held that the trial judge did not clearly err in finding, under the totality of the circumstances, that a 15-year-old's statements after being incorrectly told her mother alone could invoke her right to counsel were not knowing and voluntary, so suppression of those later statements was proper.

The decision affects how Georgia police interview juvenile witnesses and suspects, especially when a parent is present. It signals that detectives who imply only a parent can invoke a child's right to a lawyer risk having resulting statements thrown out, even when the child is not formally in custody.

Affirmed

1. The court explained that a set of nine factors from Riley v. State, originally developed to test whether a juvenile knowingly waived Miranda rights during custodial questioning, has also been used by Georgia courts to judge whether a juvenile's statement was voluntary under general due process principles, even outside of custody.
2. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia does not second-guess a trial judge's factual findings and credibility calls unless they are clearly wrong, but it independently checks whether the law was applied correctly to those facts.
3. Applying that deferential review, the court found the trial judge could reasonably conclude, based on the detective's own testimony, that he directed all discussion of the right to a lawyer to the mother rather than the teenager, incorrectly suggesting only the mother could invoke that right.
4. Walking through each of the nine Riley factors (age, education, knowledge of rights, access to a parent, timing, interrogation methods, length, prior refusals, and later repudiation), the court concluded the record supported the trial judge's findings even though some factors leaned toward admissibility.
5. Because the teenager was never told her statements could be used against her, was misled about who could ask for a lawyer, and was not told talking was optional, the court concluded the overall circumstances supported finding her later statements were not voluntary.

• juvenile interrogation
• motion to suppress
• Miranda rights
• felony murder case
• right to counsel