In THE INTEREST OF T.B., a Child

A 16-year-old boy, T. B., was charged in Chatham County Juvenile Court with delinquency after an incident in which he hid from police in a hotel storage closet and struggled with officers while allegedly experiencing psychiatric symptoms. He had a documented history of psychotic disorders and had been involuntarily hospitalized shortly after the incident. Before his adjudication hearing, T. B. asked the juvenile court to order a psychological evaluation so he could raise an insanity or delusional-compulsion defense, arguing he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. The juvenile court refused, ruling that Georgia's Juvenile Code does not allow insanity defenses in delinquency cases because those cases do not involve a finding of criminal 'guilt.' The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed. Analyzing the wording and purpose of the Juvenile Code, the court held that a child cannot be found to have committed a 'delinquent act' if an insanity or delusional-compulsion defense would excuse the conduct under Georgia's criminal insanity statutes. The court sent the case back for the juvenile court to reconsider T. B.'s request for an evaluation.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that when a child's delinquency charge is based on an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the child may raise an affirmative defense of insanity or delusional compulsion under Georgia's criminal insanity statutes, because such a defense means the child has not committed 'an act designated a crime' under the Juvenile Code's definition of delinquent act.

The ruling affects juvenile courts and children statewide by confirming that youths facing delinquency charges based on alleged crimes can raise insanity or delusional-compulsion defenses, giving mentally ill children and their attorneys a legal tool previously denied to them in Georgia juvenile proceedings.

Vacated and remanded

1. The court noted the Juvenile Code does not expressly say whether insanity defenses are available in delinquency proceedings, so it had to interpret the statute's text and structure rather than rely on an explicit answer.
2. The court rejected the juvenile court's reasoning that the Code's mention of an alibi defense implied insanity defenses were barred, explaining that inferring one available defense does not mean all others are excluded, especially since that reading would conflict with the Juvenile Code's stated purpose of according due process to accused children.
3. The court focused on the statutory definition of 'delinquent act,' which requires 'an act...designated a crime,' and applied the technical legal meaning of 'act' (something done voluntarily to which legal consequences attach) rather than its everyday meaning, because the everyday meaning would make the phrase nonsensical when combined with the Criminal Code's definition of 'crime,' which requires both an act and a mental state.
4. Applying that technical meaning, the court reasoned that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity results in acquittal rather than legal consequences attaching to the underlying conduct, so a child who was insane or under a delusional compulsion has not committed an 'act' that can be 'designated a crime.'
5. The court also relied on the Juvenile Code's stated purpose of mitigating, not worsening, the adult consequences of criminal behavior, reasoning that barring insanity defenses would let children face serious consequences like secure detention for conduct that would be fully excused if committed by an adult.
6. Because the juvenile court's blanket rule that insanity defenses are never available was legally incorrect, the Supreme Court of Georgia set aside the order denying a psychological evaluation and directed the juvenile court to reconsider the request under the correct legal standard.

• insanity defense
• delusional compulsion
• juvenile delinquency
• mental illness
• Chatham County juvenile court