GENERAL MOTORS, LLC v. BUCHANAN

After Glenda Marie Buchanan died in a single-vehicle crash in her Chevrolet Trailblazer, her husband sued General Motors, claiming a defective steering wheel angle sensor caused the wreck. As part of the lawsuit, he sought to depose GM's CEO, Mary Barra, pointing to her public statements about vehicle safety. GM asked the trial court to block the deposition, arguing Barra had no personal knowledge of the specific defect and that the information could come from other employees instead. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both refused to apply the 'apex doctrine,' a framework some other courts use to protect high-ranking executives from depositions, and let the deposition proceed. The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed that Georgia should not adopt a version of the doctrine that shifts the burden onto the person seeking discovery. But it found that the trial court never actually weighed whether GM's specific arguments, like Barra's lack of relevant knowledge, showed 'good cause' for protection. Because of that gap, the court sent the case back for the trial court to properly consider those arguments.

A trial court considering a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26(c) may consider factors like an executive's rank, lack of unique personal knowledge, and availability of information elsewhere, but Georgia does not adopt any burden-shifting apex doctrine; the party seeking the order still bears the burden of proving good cause, and the trial court must actually engage with the arguments raised.

The ruling affects how Georgia courts handle attempts to depose corporate CEOs and other executives in lawsuits against businesses. Companies cannot rely on executive rank alone to avoid depositions, but plaintiffs' lawyers can still expect trial judges to seriously weigh burden and relevance arguments before ordering a deposition.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction

1. The court explained that Georgia's discovery rule (OCGA § 9-11-26(b)(1)) is broader than the federal discovery rule, so federal cases applying the 'apex doctrine,' a framework limiting depositions of high-ranking executives, are only persuasive where they align with Georgia's text.
2. Because OCGA § 9-11-26(c) places the burden of proving 'good cause' for a protective order on the party seeking that order, the court refused to adopt any version of the apex doctrine that would shift the burden onto the person seeking the deposition instead.
3. The court held that factors commonly tied to the apex doctrine, such as an executive's high rank, lack of unique personal knowledge, and availability of the same information elsewhere, are still relevant considerations a trial judge may weigh, but they do not create a presumption favoring protection from discovery.
4. Reviewing the trial court's order, the court found it rejected the apex doctrine as a mandatory framework but never actually analyzed whether GM's specific factual arguments about Barra's lack of knowledge and availability of other witnesses amounted to good cause.
5. The court also disapproved the trial court's reliance on older Court of Appeals language requiring proof of 'bad faith or harassment' before limiting discovery, explaining that the statute focuses on the burden discovery would impose on the person being deposed, not the requesting party's motives.
6. Because the trial court did not fully engage with the arguments GM raised, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and directed that the case be sent back for the trial court to properly consider those arguments.

• wrongful death lawsuit
• CEO deposition
• apex doctrine
• protective order
• GM steering defect