Johnson v. State

Hymetheus Johnson shot and killed Javontae Passard outside Johnson's mother's house in Bibb County after Passard, an uninvited guest, refused to leave and got into a heated argument with Johnson. When Johnson pulled a gun on Passard, Passard pushed the gun away, and Johnson then shot him twice, killing him. A jury convicted Johnson of malice murder and theft of the car he drove away in. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, Johnson argued the trial judge should have told the jury it could instead convict him of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser charge that applies when a killing results from a sudden, uncontrollable passion triggered by serious provocation. He said Passard's refusal to leave, angry words, and shove provoked him. The court disagreed, holding that an uninvited guest lingering, arguing, and pushing away a gun pointed at his face is not the kind of provocation that would justify a voluntary manslaughter instruction. It affirmed Johnson's convictions.

The court held that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not warranted because none of Passard's conduct, an uninvited approach to the house, refusal to leave, argumentative words, or pushing away a gun pointed at his face, amounted to the serious provocation required to excite an irresistible passion to kill in a reasonable person.

The ruling reinforces for Georgia trial courts and defense lawyers how little a confrontation involving trespassing, arguing, or self-defensive shoving counts toward a voluntary manslaughter instruction, keeping the bar high for defendants who claim they killed in the heat of passion rather than with intent to kill.

Affirmed

1. The court applied the rule that a trial judge must give a requested voluntary manslaughter instruction only if there is at least slight evidence that the killing resulted from a sudden, violent, irresistible passion triggered by serious provocation, rather than deliberate revenge.
2. It found that an uninvited guest knocking on a door and not immediately leaving when asked is not conduct that would provoke a reasonable person into an irresistible urge to kill, drawing on precedent that killing a trespasser with a deadly weapon is generally murder, not manslaughter.
3. It concluded that a heated verbal argument between Johnson and Passard, even with angry words, does not by itself count as the serious provocation needed for a voluntary manslaughter charge under established Georgia case law.
4. It reasoned that Passard shoving away the gun Johnson had pointed at his face was simply physical resistance to Johnson's own unlawful act of brandishing a weapon, which courts have held is not the type of provocation that requires a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
5. Because there was no specific evidence of provocation around the time of the shooting sufficient to generate a sudden, irresistible passion to kill in a reasonable person, the court concluded the trial judge was correct to deny the requested instruction.

• murder conviction
• voluntary manslaughter instruction
• jury instructions
• Bibb County shooting