In the Matter of W. McCall Calhoun, Jr

W. McCall Calhoun, Jr., a Georgia lawyer since 1990, was found guilty after a federal bench trial of a felony (obstructing Congress's certification of the Electoral College vote) and several misdemeanors for his role in the January 6, 2021 breach of the U.S. Capitol. The State Bar of Georgia sought to suspend his law license while his federal appeal was pending, and a Special Master recommended exactly that, finding he violated professional conduct rules that bar convicted felons and certain misdemeanants from practicing. Calhoun objected, arguing that a judge's finding of guilt after a bench trial is not a 'conviction' under the bar rules because those rules mention only pleas and jury 'verdicts,' and he also raised due process and free-speech-style defenses. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed, holding that 'verdict' in ordinary usage includes a judge's finding of guilt in a bench trial, so Calhoun was validly convicted, and it ordered him suspended until his federal appeal concludes.

The court held that a judge's finding of guilt in a bench trial qualifies as a 'verdict' under the bar's definition of 'conviction,' so Calhoun's felony conviction violated Rule 8.4(a)(2), justifying his suspension from practicing law pending the outcome of his federal appeal.

The ruling confirms that Georgia lawyers convicted after a bench trial, not just a jury trial, can be suspended immediately, without waiting out an appeal. This affects any Georgia attorney facing felony charges, reinforcing that professional discipline tracks the reality of a guilty finding rather than the trial's format.

Suspension from practice of law pending appeal

1. The court explained that the bar rules define 'conviction' to include guilty pleas and 'verdicts,' and it had to decide whether a judge's finding of guilt after a bench trial (rather than a jury) counts as a 'verdict.'
2. The court rejected Calhoun's reliance on Court of Appeals cases stating 'there is no verdict in a bench trial,' explaining those cases only addressed whether a judge could direct a verdict for himself, not the broader meaning of the word 'verdict.'
3. Applying ordinary dictionary definitions and its own past practice of calling bench trial outcomes 'verdicts,' the court concluded that a judge's finding of guilt counts as a verdict, so Calhoun was validly 'convicted' under the disciplinary rules.
4. The court found Calhoun's argument that his conduct would only be a misdemeanor under a specific Georgia statute (O.C.G.A. § 16-11-34.1, covering disruption of the Georgia legislature) irrelevant, because that statute covers different conduct than what Calhoun actually did, and Georgia's rules respect how other jurisdictions classify crimes.
5. The court held that Comment [5] to Rule 8.4, which allows good-faith legal challenges to disputed obligations, does not excuse Calhoun's conduct because his own testimony showed he knew he might be committing at least a trespass and chose to proceed anyway.
6. Relying on prior precedent (In the Matter of Stoner) holding that suspending a lawyer before appeals are final is rationally related to preserving public confidence in the justice system, the court concluded that suspending Calhoun pending his appeal does not violate his due process rights.

• attorney suspension
• January 6 Capitol breach
• State Bar of Georgia
• bench trial verdict
• due process rights