Jenkins v. State

Larry Jenkins was 17 when he was arrested in connection with the kidnapping and shooting deaths of Terry Ralston and her son Michael in Wayne County. After his arrest, officers questioned him briefly on the way to jail, and then, while he was being patted down during booking, he clearly said he would not answer questions without a lawyer. His confession the next day was suppressed before his first trial, but after he won a new trial on other grounds, the trial court reconsidered and allowed the confession into evidence, reasoning his earlier request for a lawyer was too early to count. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed. It held that because Jenkins had already been given his Miranda warnings, had already been questioned once, and was in the middle of the booking process when he asked for a lawyer, a reasonable person in his position would have believed more questioning was coming soon. That made his request valid, so his later confession should have been kept out of evidence, and the error was not harmless. Four Justices dissented, arguing his request came during a lull between interrogations, not during one, so it should not have counted.

A suspect who has already been given Miranda warnings and already interrogated once may still validly invoke the right to counsel during a later phase, like booking, if a reasonable person in his position would believe further interrogation is imminent; here, Jenkins's unequivocal request for a lawyer met that standard, making his later confession inadmissible.

The ruling affects how Georgia police handle suspects who ask for a lawyer during breaks in questioning, such as during booking, requiring officers to treat those requests as binding even before a formal interview starts. Jenkins must now be retried, and prosecutors statewide must reassess how they handle statements taken after similar early requests for counsel.

Judgment reversed

1. The court explained that under Miranda, once a suspect in custody who has been given his rights clearly says he wants a lawyer, police must stop questioning him until a lawyer is present or he reopens the conversation himself.
2. Some federal appeals courts have said a suspect cannot invoke this right too early, before an interrogation or when one is not yet imminent; the court assumed without deciding that this rule applies, rather than adopting it outright.
3. Applying that assumed rule, the court looked at whether a reasonable person in Jenkins's position would have believed more questioning was about to happen: he had been warned of his rights, had already been briefly questioned in the patrol car about who else was in the van, and was still with the same officer who had questioned him when he asked for a lawyer during booking.
4. Because those facts showed further questioning was at least imminent from a reasonable person's viewpoint, Jenkins's request for a lawyer was valid and police were required to honor it by stopping all questioning about the case.
5. Since the confession that followed was Jenkins's own admission of guilt, one of the most powerful kinds of evidence at trial, and the rest of the evidence against him, while strong, was not overwhelming, the court could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that using the confession made no difference to the jury's verdict.

• Miranda rights
• murder conviction
• right to counsel
• booking process
• confession suppression