TAYLOR, EXR. v. THE DEVEREUX FOUNDATION, INC. (And Vice Versa)

Tia McGee, a 15-year-old girl living at a Devereux Foundation behavioral health facility in Georgia, was sexually assaulted by an employee assigned to supervise her cottage. A jury awarded $10 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive damages after finding Devereux at fault. Georgia law caps most punitive damages awards at $250,000, so the trial court reduced the punitive award accordingly. Jo-Ann Taylor, representing McGee's estate, argued the cap violated Georgia's constitutional right to a jury trial, separation of powers, and equal protection. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all three arguments. It found that although claims like McGee's premises liability claim existed in 1798, Taylor did not show that Georgia juries back then could award punitive damages against someone who merely acted with an 'entire want of care' rather than intentional wrongdoing. The court also rejected Devereux's cross-appeal challenges, upholding the jury's punitive damages verdict, the attorney fee award, and the trial court's decision to start interest accruing from the date of the jury's verdict.

The court held that Georgia's constitutional right to a jury trial does not protect punitive damages awarded for a defendant's 'entire want of care' because historical evidence shows only intentional misconduct claims supported punishment damages in 1798-era law, so the $250,000 statutory cap on punitive damages is constitutional and applies here.

The ruling confirms that Georgia's punitive damages cap applies broadly, limiting recoveries even in severe cases involving vulnerable victims like children in residential care. Plaintiffs' lawyers, insurers, and institutions like treatment facilities across Georgia can rely on this cap continuing to shield large punitive awards from full enforcement.

Affirmed in both the appeal and cross-appeal

1. The court applied a framework from an earlier case, Nestlehutt, which asks first whether the type of claim (here, premises liability, meaning a landowner's duty to keep property safe for visitors) existed in Georgia by 1798, the historical benchmark date for the state constitution's jury trial right.
2. The court found premises liability claims did exist by 1798, so it then asked whether the specific kind of damages sought (punitive damages for an 'entire want of care,' a legal term meaning conduct so careless it shows indifference to consequences, without requiring intentional wrongdoing) fell within the historical jury trial right.
3. Examining six pre-1776 English cases Taylor relied on, the court concluded that while English juries could award 'punishment damages' to deter and penalize wrongdoers, every one of those cases involved intentional misconduct, such as trespass, assault, or false imprisonment, not mere carelessness.
4. Because Taylor could not point to any historical case authorizing punishment damages for conduct amounting only to an entire want of care, the court concluded she failed to prove that the modern punitive damages she sought were protected by the constitutional jury trial right, so the legislature could cap them by statute.
5. On separation of powers, the court reasoned that a flat statutory cap on damages differs from the judiciary's power to grant new trials or reduce excessive verdicts (called remittitur) because the cap applies automatically without judges weighing evidence, so it does not intrude on judicial authority.
6. On equal protection, applying the lenient 'rational basis' test (asking only whether some conceivable justification supports the law), the court found the legislature could have reasonably chosen a flat dollar cap instead of a percentage-based limit to balance punishment goals against economic predictability, so the cap survives equal protection scrutiny.

• punitive damages cap
• sexual assault lawsuit
• right to jury trial
• separation of powers
• attorney fees