Steel v. State

Attorney Brian Steel represented a defendant in a Fulton County gang and racketeering trial before Chief Judge Ural Glanville. After Judge Glanville held a private, off-the-record meeting with a witness and prosecutors, Steel learned about it and told the judge, prompting the judge to demand Steel reveal his source. Steel refused, citing attorney-client privilege and his ethical duty of confidentiality under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Judge Glanville held Steel in contempt, had him briefly removed from the courtroom, then let him return to keep representing his client while threatening jail time later that day if Steel still would not talk. Steel appealed, arguing among other things that due process required the judge to step aside from deciding the contempt charge against him. The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed on that narrower point: because the judge put off announcing Steel's final punishment and the judge himself was wrapped up in the underlying dispute, a different judge should have handled the contempt hearing. The court reversed the contempt order without reaching Steel's other arguments.

When a trial court delays announcing a contempt punishment and the contemnor's conduct was directed at the judge or the judge became personally involved in the underlying controversy, due process requires that a different judge, not the one involved in the dispute, preside over the contempt hearing.

The ruling limits how far Georgia trial judges can go in personally deciding contempt charges against lawyers when punishment is postponed and the judge is entangled in the dispute. It protects attorneys from having a judge who was part of the conflict act as both accuser and decision-maker, reinforcing fairness safeguards for lawyers and litigants across Georgia courts.

Judgment reversed

1. The court explained that due process protections apply to criminal contempt proceedings because a conviction can mean jail time or a fine, so courts cannot punish contemnors without some fair procedure.
2. It distinguished summary contempt, where a judge can immediately punish disruptive courtroom conduct without a separate hearing, from situations where punishment is delayed or the conduct happened outside the judge's presence; the latter situations require more process, including notice and a hearing.
3. The court noted that when punishment is delayed and the contemnor's conduct was directed at the judge personally, or the judge became entangled in the underlying dispute, a different judge (not the one involved) must conduct the contempt hearing, following its earlier decision in Dowdy v. Palmour.
4. Applying that rule here, the court found that although Judge Glanville initially punished Steel summarily by briefly removing him from court, the final punishment (20 days in jail) was announced only later that day, meaning the announcement was delayed and additional process was owed.
5. Because Steel's refusal to name his source was conduct directed at Judge Glanville himself, and the exchanges showed Judge Glanville had become personally involved in the ex parte meeting controversy, the court concluded a different judge should have decided the contempt charge, so the failure to reassign the matter required reversal.

• attorney contempt
• due process
• judicial recusal
• ex parte hearing
• attorney-client privilege