Massey v. State

A man in Crisp County was charged with possessing a firearm while serving a first-offender sentence for a prior violent felony, which Georgia law forbids under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 (b). He challenged the charge, arguing the ban violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms, but the trial court rejected his argument, relying on earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases and a Georgia Supreme Court precedent. While his appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Rahimi, a new Second Amendment ruling. The Supreme Court of Georgia did not rule on the merits itself. Instead, it vacated (undid) the trial court's order and sent the case back so the trial court could reconsider its decision in light of Rahimi. Four Justices dissented, arguing Rahimi actually supports the original ruling and that sending the case back would only cause needless delay.

The court held only that the trial court's order should be vacated and the case sent back for the trial court to reconsider its ruling on the Second Amendment challenge in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening decision in United States v. Rahimi, without deciding the underlying constitutional question itself.

The order leaves in limbo a Georgia law disarming people serving first-offender sentences for violent felonies, delaying a final answer on its constitutionality. Defendants facing similar gun charges, prosecutors, and trial judges statewide must wait for further guidance before the legal question is resolved.

Vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rahimi

1. The majority order did not explain its reasoning beyond directing that the trial court's order be vacated and the case be reconsidered in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's new Second Amendment decision in United States v. Rahimi.
2. The dissent, by contrast, argued that Rahimi does not undercut the trial court's original decision because Rahimi reaffirmed that legislatures may disarm people who pose a threat of violence, including those who committed violent felonies.
3. The dissent relied on earlier precedent, including Spencer v. State and Heller's statement that longstanding bans on firearm possession by felons remain valid, to argue the existing law already resolved the appeal.
4. The dissent also invoked a U.S. Supreme Court warning, from Lawrence v. Chater, that courts should not remand cases without deciding them when the delay and cost of remand outweigh any potential benefit, concluding that standard was not met here.

• Second Amendment
• firearm possession
• first-offender sentence
• gun rights
• Rahimi decision