Schmitt v. State

Bryan Keith Schmitt was driving home when his car struck and killed Hamid Jahangard after the two had argued near a driveway. A Fulton County jury convicted Schmitt of malice murder and related charges, rejecting his claim that the collision was an accident and that he never intended to hurt Jahangard. Schmitt asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that if the collision was truly an accident, without criminal intent, it was not a crime. The judge refused and even told the jury to disregard the word 'accident' after Schmitt's lawyer mentioned it in closing argument. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that Schmitt presented enough evidence, including testimony about braking and swerving away from Jahangard, to require that instruction, and that the State did not show the mistake was harmless. The court reversed the conviction on most counts but said the evidence was strong enough that the State can retry Schmitt.

The trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of accident because Schmitt presented at least slight evidence that he lacked criminal intent, and the State failed to show it was highly probable this error did not affect the verdict; however, the evidence was legally sufficient, so retrial is permitted.

The ruling reinforces that Georgia trial judges must give an accident instruction whenever even slight evidence supports it, protecting defendants' right to have juries weigh that defense. It also means Schmitt faces a new trial, and prosecutors statewide must be careful about excluding accident theories from jury consideration.

Judgment reversed

1. The court explained that under Georgia law, a jury instruction on a defense need only be supported by 'slight evidence,' a low threshold, and that the accident defense applies whenever evidence negates the defendant's required criminal intent for the crime charged.
2. Reviewing the trial record, the court found undisputed facts, including that Schmitt turned his car, braked, and swerved away from Jahangard before only the edge of his car struck him, could let a reasonable juror conclude the collision was accidental rather than the product of criminal negligence.
3. Because that evidence did not necessarily show criminal negligence (reckless disregard for safety), the trial court was wrong to refuse Schmitt's requested instruction on the accident defense as to the malice murder charge.
4. Applying the harmless-error test, which asks whether it is highly probable that an error did not affect the verdict, the court found the evidence of Schmitt's intent was conflicting and not overwhelming, so the State could not show the missing instruction was harmless, especially since the judge also told jurors to disregard the word 'accident.'
5. Extending this reasoning to the related felony murder and aggravated assault counts, the court found that for the assault charge requiring intent to cause harm (Count 4, and its felony murder counterpart Count 2), the same slight evidence of lack of intent required an accident instruction.
6. For the assault charge based on placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of injury (Count 5, and its felony murder counterpart Count 3), the court distinguished a prior case, Patterson v. State, because Schmitt disputed whether he intended to turn his car in the way he actually did, so an accident instruction was also required there.

• malice murder conviction
• accident defense
• jury instructions
• harmless error
• aggravated assault