Fadesire v. State

Faruk Adedapo Fadesire was convicted of murder and other crimes for shooting Mikfeesha Dotson in a Stone Mountain motel room in 2020. A witness who was in the room heard gunshots and saw Fadesire, the only other person present, look scared before fleeing; police later matched a gun found with him to shell casings from the scene. On appeal, Fadesire argued his trial lawyer should have objected to two things the prosecutor said in closing argument: one comment he claimed hinted at his choice not to testify, and another where the prosecutor said 'I know who did it,' which he said improperly shared the prosecutor's personal opinion of his guilt. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that a reasonable defense lawyer could have chosen, as a matter of strategy, not to object to either remark, so the lawyer's performance was not constitutionally deficient. The court affirmed the convictions.

A defense lawyer's decision not to object to a prosecutor's ambiguous remark about proving motive, or to a comment suggesting personal belief in guilt, was not objectively unreasonable because a reasonable lawyer could have concluded an objection would be meritless or would only draw more attention to the remark.

The ruling reinforces that defense lawyers in Georgia have wide latitude to make strategic choices about when to object during closing arguments, and that failing to object will rarely support an ineffective-assistance claim if a reasonable tactical explanation exists, guiding future appeals across the state.

Affirmed

1. The court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington for ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires showing both that the lawyer's performance was objectively unreasonable (deficient) and that the deficiency likely changed the trial's outcome (prejudice).
2. For the first remark, about being unable to 'step into the brain' of another person, the court found it was most naturally understood as explaining why the State did not need to prove motive, not as a comment on Fadesire's decision not to testify, so an objection could reasonably have been seen as meritless.
3. The court also reasoned that even if the remark touched on the right to remain silent, defense counsel could reasonably decide not to object because doing so might have drawn even more attention to Fadesire's silence.
4. For the second remark, where the prosecutor said 'I know who did it,' the court assumed it may have improperly suggested a personal belief in guilt, but held that counsel could still reasonably choose not to object to avoid highlighting the strength of the State's case to the jury.
5. The court noted that an objection was unlikely to result in a mistrial and more likely would have led only to a curative instruction, so counsel could reasonably conclude the potential benefit of objecting was not worth the risk of emphasizing the prosecution's case.
6. Because Fadesire could not show his lawyer's silence was objectively unreasonable, his ineffective assistance claim failed under the deficiency prong, and the convictions stood.

• ineffective assistance of counsel
• murder conviction
• closing argument
• right to remain silent
• prosecutorial comments