In the Matter of Oksana Klymovych

A solo attorney named Oksana Klymovych was accused by a client of mishandling funds and violating professional conduct rules. She cooperated with the State Bar for months, answering questions and providing documents, but did not file a formal written answer to the Bar's complaint on time. A special master (a hearing officer appointed by the court) found her in default, treated the charges as admitted, and recommended a one-year suspension without ever considering her actual defenses. The Supreme Court of Georgia had to decide whether the special master was right to refuse to let her reopen that default. The court held he was not: because Klymovych had cooperated throughout the process, explained her confusion about disciplinary procedures, and showed no willful defiance, the case should be decided on its merits rather than by default. The court reversed that part of the ruling and sent the case back for further proceedings.

A special master abuses his discretion by refusing to open a default in an attorney disciplinary case when the record shows the attorney cooperated with the State Bar, provided information and documents, and offered a non-willful explanation for missing the deadline, because disciplinary matters should be decided on their merits whenever possible.

The ruling reinforces that Georgia lawyers facing discipline who genuinely cooperate, even if they miss a filing deadline, should generally get their case decided on the substance rather than losing automatically by default. This affects how special masters handle future Bar discipline cases.

Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded

1. The court explained that in attorney disciplinary cases there is a strong preference for deciding matters on their merits rather than by default, especially when the attorney has tried to cooperate and participate in the process.
2. The court applied the standard for opening a default under Georgia's civil default-opening statute (OCGA § 9-11-55(b)), which asks whether the missed deadline resulted from willful or gross negligence and whether the other side would be harmed by reopening the case.
3. Applying that standard to the facts, the court found Klymovych had actively cooperated with the State Bar for months, answered questions, and supplied documents, and that her missed deadline stemmed from an honest misunderstanding rather than willful defiance.
4. The court also found the State Bar had not shown it would be harmed by reopening the default, and that the Bar had not adequately argued Klymovych lacked a meritorious defense, undermining the basis for keeping the default in place.
5. Because these factors favored deciding the case on its merits, the court concluded the special master abused his discretion in denying the motion to open default and sent the matter back for a decision on the substance of the charges.

• attorney discipline
• default judgment
• State Bar complaint
• law license suspension
• Ukrainian attorney