Jenkins v. State

Roshoun Jacarri Jenkins asked a trial court to dismiss the charges against him because the State had not brought him to trial quickly enough under Georgia's speedy trial demand statute. When the trial court denied that request, Jenkins tried to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia without first getting permission through the state's interlocutory appeal process, which applies to non-final rulings. The court explained that a past decision, Hubbard v. State, had allowed direct appeals in a similar situation by borrowing a legal doctrine from federal courts that lets certain important, separate rulings be appealed right away. But the Justices said that doctrine rests on shaky legal footing when applied to Georgia's own appeal statute, and they declined to extend it to Jenkins's situation. Because Jenkins did not follow the required interlocutory appeal steps, the court found it had no power to consider his appeal and dismissed it.

Because dismissal of a speedy trial demand is not one of the case types Georgia law allows to be appealed directly, and because the court declined to extend the collateral-order doctrine used in Hubbard v. State to this situation, Jenkins was required to follow interlocutory appeal procedures, which he did not do.

Criminal defendants and defense lawyers across Georgia now know they cannot bypass interlocutory appeal procedures when challenging denial of a speedy trial demand outside the narrow Hubbard situation, meaning they must seek a trial court's or appellate court's permission before appealing such rulings.

Appeal dismissed

1. Georgia law limits direct appeals to certain listed categories of rulings under OCGA § 5-6-34(a); rulings outside those categories must go through the interlocutory appeal process in OCGA § 5-6-34(b), which requires a trial court's certificate and appellate court's permission before an appeal can proceed.
2. The court noted that in Hubbard v. State, it had allowed a direct appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial demand by applying the collateral-order doctrine, which lets courts hear immediate appeals of a small class of rulings that finally decide rights separate from the rest of the case and are too important to wait.
3. The court explained that this collateral-order doctrine was borrowed from federal law, where it interprets a federal statute allowing appeals from 'final decisions,' language that differs from Georgia's own statute, which allows appeals only from 'final judgments.'
4. Because that difference in statutory language means Georgia's reliance on the collateral-order doctrine rests on uncertain legal grounding, the court decided not to expand its use of that doctrine beyond the specific situation in Hubbard.
5. Since Jenkins's appeal fell outside Hubbard's narrow circumstances and he had not followed the interlocutory appeal procedures, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review his case.

• speedy trial demand
• direct appeal jurisdiction
• interlocutory appeal
• collateral-order doctrine